A Manual of Christian Doctrine

Rev. John S. Banks

F. W. Swaine
Battersea S.W.
1893

A MANUAL OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

MORRISON AND GIBB, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.

230.02
B226m

A MANUAL

OF

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

BY THE

REV. JOHN S. BANKS,

THEOLOGICAL TUTOR, HEADINGLEY COLLEGE, LEEDS.

FOURTH REVISED EDITION.

75-850


LONDON:

CHARLES H. KELLY, 2, CASTLE STREET, CITY ROAD, E.C.,

AND 66, PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.

1893.

THE MASTER'S COLLEGE
POWELL LIBRARY
SANTA CLARITA, CA 91321



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024

https://archive.org/details/manualofchristia0000revj

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL FACTS.

PART FIRST.

DOCTRINES PRESUPPOSED IN REDEMPTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.

PAGE

Appendix—Materialism, Pantheism, ... 30

CHAPTER II.

DIVINE REVELATION.

Sec. 1. Scripture a Divine Revelation, ... 36
A. Presumptive Evidence, ... 37
B. Evidences Proper, ... 39
a. Miracles, ... 39
b. Prophecy, ... 44
C. Auxiliary Evidences, ... 45

PAGE

SEC. 2. Inspiration, ... 49
A. Doctrine, ... 49
a. Old Testament, ... 51
b. New Testament, ... 52
B. Dogma, ... 53
SEC. 3. Canon, ... 55
A. Formation of Canon, ... 56
a. Old Testament, ... 57
b. New Testament, ... 58
B. Rule of Faith, ... 61

CHAPTER III.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES, ETC.

SEC. 1. Attributes, ... 70
,, 2. The Trinity, ... 76
A. Doctrine, ... 77
B. Dogma, ... 80

CHAPTER IV.

CREATION AND PROVIDENCE.

SEC. 1. Creation, ... 88
,, 2. Divine Image in Man, ... 90
,, 3. Providence, ... 92

CHAPTER V.

SIN.

SEC. 1. Actual Sin, ... 97
,, 2*a*. Doctrine of Original Sin, ... 98
,, 2*b*. Dogma, ... 101

PART SECOND.

DOCTRINES OF REDEMPTION.

CHAPTER I.

PERSON OF CHRIST.

SEC. 1. Doctrine of Scripture, ... 109
,, 2. Direct Inferences, ... 118
,, 3. Dogma, ... 122
,, 4. The Two Incarnate States, ... 132

CHAPTER II.

ATONEMENT.

PAGE

Sec. 1. Doctrine of Scripture, ... 137
,, 2. Dogma, ... 142
,, 3. Divergent Theories, ... 150
,, 4. Universal Extent, ... 161

CHAPTER III.

EXPERIENCE OF SALVATION.

Sec. 1. Conditions, ... 166
,, 2. Blessings, ... 169
A. Justification, ... 169
a. Nature of, ... 169
b. By Faith alone, ... 176
B. Regeneration, ... 180
C. Sanctification, ... 182
a. Nature of Sanctification, ... 183
b. Progressive, ... 185
c. Entire Sanctification, ... 187
,, 3. Assurance, ... 195
,, 4. Conditional Perseverance, ... 197

CHAPTER IV.

THE CHURCH.

Sec. 1. Notes of Church, ... 205
,, 2. Apostolical Succession, ... 209
,, 3. Church Offices, ... 215
,, 4. The Lord's Day, ... 221
,, 5. The Sacraments, ... 223
I. Scripture Doctrine, ... 223
a. Baptism, ... 225
Baptismal Regeneration, ... 227
Infant Baptism, ... 230
Mode, ... 231
b. The Lord's Supper, ... 233
II. Dogma, ... 236
1. Nature of Sacrament, ... 236
2. Baptism, ... 239
3. Lord's Supper, ... 241

CHAPTER V.

LAST THINGS.

		PAGE
SEC. 1.	Intermediate State,	253
	Purgatory,	255
,, 2.	Second Coming,	256
	Pre-Millenarianism,	257
,, 3.	The Resurrection,	260
,, 4.	The Judgment,	261
,, 5.	Eternal Life and Death,	261
	a. The Righteous,	261
	b. The Wicked,	263
	Note on "Eternal,"	278

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

1. *Christian Theology* may be briefly defined as the *science of the Christian religion.* The word itself is a definition, meaning "discourse about God," a phrase enlarged in early days into "discourse about God and divine things."[1] There is a sense in which every doctrine refers to God.[2] Dr. Pope's definition is, "The science of God and divine things, based upon the revelation made to mankind in Jesus Christ, and variously systematized within the Christian Church."[3] Dr. Hodge's is substantially the same, "The exhibition of the facts of Scripture in their proper order and relation, with the principles or general truths involved in the facts themselves."[4] Here all turns upon the term "science." By scientific knowledge is meant systematic, reasoned knowledge, *i.e.* not merely the general knowledge which suffices for practical life, but such knowledge of the causes, relations, and laws of things as reason demands. In every other sphere man is not content with noting and registering facts as they are presented to observation, but seeks to reduce them to order and

[1] λόγος περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν θείων.

[2] The term Theology is sometimes used, as by Hodge, to denote the doctrines relating specifically to the divine existence, nature, and attributes.

[3] *Comp. Theol.* i. 3.

[4] *Syst. Theol.* i. 19.

understand their inner connection. The result of this process is science. A process, that is universally regarded as legitimate and indeed inevitable everywhere else, cannot be wrong in the religious life. Its legitimacy can only be contested on the ground that theology does not deal with facts; in other words, that it is a mere collection of fancies and illusions, having no basis of reality. Is it so? The objects with which theology deals are the contents of the Christian consciousness, the belief in God, sin, redemption, immortality. This Christian consciousness or experience is too widespread to be explained away as mere fancy or illusion. Every fact with which theology deals is present explicitly or implicitly in the experience of every Christian. And but for the imperfection of Christians, and the difficulty of interpreting them, we might take their experience as the quarry from which to draw the materials of theology. But no such objections apply to Scripture, to which every Christian without exception appeals, and of which he is the product and reflection (1 Pet. i. 23). The perfect Christian experience, with all that it implies, the complete course of revelation of which each individual believer is the outcome, is found there. Scripture, then, is to theology what outward nature is to physical science; what the mind and its operations are to mental science. It supplies the materials, the facts or phenomena which theology uses.

The usefulness of theology is as little open to dispute as its legitimacy. It is necessary, not to ordinary Christians, but to Christian teachers and advocates. It is neither necessary nor possible that every one should be a lawyer, doctor, engineer. But every one who aspires to one of these professions must have more than the empirical knowledge which suffices for ordinary life. Times like ours are the last in which Christian teachers can afford to dispense with accurate and complete knowledge.

There is, then, as little or as much theology in Scripture as there is science in nature. The materials are there, nothing more. Yet while it is true that all theology, like all science,

is human and artificial, the order and laws which it formulates are all latent in the facts. It is only the form or expression that is human. We see a striking example of this in the technical terms which abound in theology. Such terms are a necessity in the framing of definitions. They save time, secure precision, and often exclude error. Objections to terms like Trinity, nature, person, homoousion, are at bottom objections to the doctrines which they bring to a point.[1]

A conventional but useful distinction, which we must ever bear in mind, is the one between doctrine and dogma. By the former we understand the systematized teaching of Scripture on any given subject; by the latter, the form which the doctrine has assumed as the result of development. In this way Biblical Theology and Dogmatic Theology arise. Every dogma is more or less a theory in the right sense, *i.e.* a statement embodying the implications and giving the *rationale* of the doctrine. Thus, there is both a doctrine and a dogma of every article of the Christian faith — the Trinity, Christ's Person, Atonement, Justification. It is in the field of dogma that the chief differences of the Christian world are found. Theological systems, creeds, and confessions express these differences. In the field of doctrine there is substantial unity.

The differences and antagonisms of theological systems are often used to disprove the scientific character of theology. "Contrast," it is said, "this Babel of opinions with the grand unity of scientific teaching." One reply is, that differences of Christian belief are grossly exaggerated, often by friends, always by foes. In times of controversy especially like the Reformation, the points at issue inevitably throw the points held in common into the shade. We should be the last to minimise the differences between Romanism and Protestantism, or even between Calvinism and Arminianism, yet few realize the extent of the fundamental unity lying behind these differences. Again,

[1] It is not only non-Christians who object to the technicalities of theology. Well-meaning but thoughtless Christians do the same. They might as well propose to abolish astronomy, geology, physical geography.

* Jne who maintains at ... of ... same nature with ...

a fairer comparison would be, not between theology and physical science, but between the former and mental science, where the subjects are in closer affinity. But where is the unity of mental and moral philosophy? The schools of Christian thought are certainly not more numerous than the schools of mental philosophy. Every great thinker is variously interpreted by different disciples. Nay, even in physical science, when we leave facts for theories (*i.e.* doctrine for dogma), we find as little unity as in the theological world. Note the different theories in geology and related sciences. Such differences are inevitable from the constitution of the human mind, from the wealth and many-sidedness of truth, and from the necessity of sometimes giving prominence to a particular truth or aspect of truth. And inevitable differences are innocent.

The scientific character of theology being admitted, the most important rule of procedure in it is, that the induction of facts which forms the basis of teaching should be complete. Every error in doctrine has arisen from the neglect of this rule. Every heresy, from the earliest to the latest, is the exaggeration or distortion of some one side of the truth to the neglect of other sides.

2. *Nature of Christian Evidence.*—The test of the sufficiency of evidence is, Is it the best of the kind appropriate to the subject? Physical truth must be established by experiment; historical, by testimony; spiritual, by the interrogation of consciousness, reason, and moral sense. To attempt to transpose any of these means of proof is folly. And yet some writers against Christianity appear to wish to do so. At least they demand better and stronger evidence than the best and strongest possible in the case. The disposition, observable in our days, to demand mathematical certainty for matters of religious belief is due to the prominence given to physical science. Exclusive dealing with subjects of physical science insensibly begets a craving for the same degree of certainty in other fields. Men overlook the important fields of conduct in which any such certainty is out of the question.

All truth may be classed as *intuitive*, *demonstrative*, *and probable*. The test of the first is that it is self-evident, it neither needs nor is capable of proof. Let any one try to give a reasoned demonstration of an axiom of Euclid. Truths coming under this head, though the foundation of all other truth, are comparatively few in number and abstract in nature. Demonstration, like intuition, gives absolute certainty, but does so by means of a course of reasoning. The conclusion of a geometrical theorem or problem is as certain as an axiom, but it is reached by way of proof. Demonstrated knowledge covers a wider area than the former kind; yet its extent is limited. It relates chiefly to the physical world. There is no doubt a wonderful charm in the certainties of mathematical processes. Their peril is that they beget impatience with every other kind of certainty. When we speak of the certainty attainable in every other field as amounting to probability, we use the term in a restricted sense. In popular usage the word probability suggests an element of doubt. But this is not a necessary element. I have no doubt that there is such a city as Rome, or that Julius Cæsar lived and fought, and yet my conviction only amounts to probability. Unlike the two other kinds of certainty, probability, as Butler points out, has endless diversity of degree, ranging from the lowest presumption to the highest moral certainty, according to the evidence. If the testimony by which facts of past history or present occurrence are made known to me fulfils every test applicable to testimony, my certainty of conviction as to the truth of the facts is as good for this sphere as that of intuition or demonstration is for other spheres. Testimony is the ground of faith and action in nine-tenths of the affairs of life. In matters of health, education, business, law, politics, morals, any other kind of certainty is impossible, and men never dream of asking for any other. The essential bases of Christianity consist of historical facts, verifiable by historical evidence, and by historical evidence only. The Christian case is that the evidence for Christianity is incomparably stronger than that for facts of

experience and history which no sane man ever dreams of doubting.

The feature of the Christian evidences which gives them this high degree of certainty is their cumulative character. Scarcely any article of the Christian creed, perhaps none, rests on a single line of argument; it is the goal of several converging lines. In legal cases, circumstantial is often more convincing than direct evidence. In the same way, Christian faith appeals to different witnesses—history, man's moral nature, living experience. The undesigned coincidence of such various and independent witnesses is conclusive to a fair mind. This feature also meets the case of different natures and generations. One is more impressed by the historical, another by the moral. In the last century the battle of faith and unbelief was fought on the ground of history and reason; the battle now turns more on the verdict of conscience.

Probably the reason why some demand higher than moral certainty for religious faith is the importance of the subject. It seems unbecoming for such great truths and such tremendous issues to rest on anything less than absolute certainty. Still we cannot go against facts and the nature of things. And the seeming disadvantage is not without compensation. Were religious certainty absolute, faith would be as compulsory in the religious as in the physical sphere. There would be as little room for the play of choice and the manifestation of character in one as in the other. In a word, faith would cease to be a moral act altogether. Whatever intellectual discipline may be found in the study of mathematical and physical truth, moral discipline is absent, moral emotion and enthusiasm are dormant, the wishes and inclinations of the inquirer form no factor in the case. On the other hand, where the conclusion depends on an overplus of probability, our attitude to the conclusion will insensibly influence our treatment of the evidence. Religious inquiry has always acted as a test of character. As men use or abuse their freedom, it becomes a stepping-stone or a stumbling-block to salvation (Luke ii. 34).

The probable character of Christian evidence explains the fact of its rejection by many. It would be difficult to explain the rejection of self-evident or demonstrated truth. Moral wilfulness or perversity can scarcely be alleged in all cases. We grant that, even taking into account the point now under consideration, the vast amount of unbelief is staggering at first sight. Why should there be so much more scepticism in religion than in history, where the evidence is of the same kind, but far less in degree? The explanation is to be found in the difference of the interests at stake. Whether I believe in the facts of Roman and Greek history or not will make no difference in my life. But acceptance of Christianity involves the acceptance of a new law of life, a revolution of thought and practice of the most far-reaching kind. It is evident that where this consequence is disliked, some reason will be sought for avoiding it. If the practical issues were the same in the other case, historical infidels would be plentiful enough.

The mysteriousness of Christian doctrine is less objected to now than formerly. The material universe, history, human nature and life, natural religion, are seen to be no longer the simple things they were once thought to be in contrast with religion. Science does little more than arrange and connect facts; questions of nature and mode are as inscrutable as ever. The growth of trees, the mutual influence of mind and matter, to say nothing of the nature of either, are as mysterious as miracles. Yet ignorance in one class of questions does not invalidate knowledge in another. Knowledge is real and trustworthy as far as it goes. Our knowledge and ignorance relate to precisely the same class of questions in religious faith as in other spheres. In a word, we apprehend what we cannot comprehend (γνῶσις, ἐπίγνωσις).[1]

3. *Unity of Theology.*—This results from the unity of the

[1] See Dr. Mozley, *Lectures and Theological Papers*, essay on "Mysterious Truths," p. 108. "What we *deny* of God, we know in some measure—but what we *affirm* we know not; only we declare what we *believe* and adore," Owen, *Works*, i. 66.

facts to which theology refers. Thus the unity is natural, not artificial,—the unity of a living organism, not of a machine Christianity is a system, not a congeries, of doctrines, one or another of which may be removed without affecting the rest. The view taken of any leading doctrine determines the view taken of the rest. The views taken of the seriousness of sin and redemption react on each other. If sin be treated lightly, no need will exist for a costly remedy. Or, if we take low views of Christ's person and nature, we shall be driven to a reduced estimate of the evil of sin. Thus, Pelagianism and Socinianism always go together. Whichever of the two we begin with, we end with the other. Arianism involves the denial of the Trinity. Predestinarianism has far less serious consequences. Still it tells powerfully on the place given to personal repentance and faith. So again, in Romanist and Protestant systems of theology, there are certain central principles and doctrines which give character to the rest. Accept the Romanist theory of the Church, or the Protestant doctrine of the Sufficiency of Scripture, and the remainder of the system follows.

We here see the impossibility of separating theoretical from practical doctrines. All practice rests upon some theory, expressed or implied. They are two sides of the same thing. A one-sided object would be a curiosity. We cannot preach repentance and forgiveness without having some theory of their nature and their relations to other things. We can neither worship Christ, nor refuse to worship him, without holding some doctrine of his nature to justify our conduct. The Trinity is the most speculative doctrine of Christianity, and has raised more metaphysical issues than perhaps any other subject of inquiry. Yet its practical influence on Christian thought and life is enormous. Its presence or absence makes the difference between two Christianities.

The great body of truth held in common by all Christian Churches is often overlooked. In the confession of one God, of the Trinity, of a Divine Revelation in Scripture, of the Fall, of the Incarnation, the Atonement, Pardon and Regeneration, future

Eternal Awards, the Romanist and Protestant worlds are united. Without underrating the divergences which exist, we must not forget that those divergences often bear on the light in which certain blessings are to be viewed rather than on the fact whether such blessings exist. In both communions we must distinguish between the common Christian element and the distinctively Roman or Protestant element. The distinctive doctrines held by all sections of Protestantism are such as, the Sole Sufficiency of Scripture, Justification by Faith, etc. The common doctrines are neither Romanist nor Protestant, but Christian. Protestantism is often called a system of negations, but its negations are only of Romanist additions. The distinctively Romanist doctrines are the real negations, *i.e.* negations of the original Christian doctrines, to which the Reformation was a return. The divisions of Protestant Churches turn far more on questions of polity than of doctrine, and the doctrinal differences nowhere relate to essentials. The greatest controversy is that between Calvinist and Arminian, which bears only on a secondary point. The distinctive note of Lutheranism is its semi-Romanist doctrine of the Sacraments; of the Reformed bodies, their Predestinarian doctrine; of Anglicanism, its episcopal polity; of Independency, its congregational system; of Baptists, their views on two points relating to the sacrament of Baptism; of Methodism, its Arminianism and Experimental Theology. Presbyterian churches are named after the form of church-polity peculiar to them; in doctrine they belong to the Reformed side which follows Calvin. Independents and Baptists were originally one both in Predestinarian creed and congregational polity, differing only on the point of Baptism. The Baptists remain faithful to the creed of Calvin, which is for the most part given up by Congregationalism.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL FACTS.

1. The Scripture parallel of different theologies is found in the difference between the teaching of the apostles Peter, Paul, and John. The influence of personal temperament on the form of teaching is as clearly seen in them as in modern systems. Peter has an eye for practical religion chiefly. Paul is the logical reasoner and systematizer. John is the Seer; he announces dogmatically what he has seen by intuition. Not only do they deal with different parts of the body of revealed truth, but even in expounding the same part they contemplate it on different sides and describe it by different terms. Here is incontestable proof that variety in form is quite consistent with substantive unity. In short, the inspired apostles are examples of that practice of giving prominence to one truth or aspect of truth which lies at the root of many modern differences.

In post-apostolic days we find marked divergence between the types of teaching followed at Antioch, Alexandria, and in North Africa respectively. The first led the way in the literal, grammatical exegesis of Scripture. Its sober, rational spirit savours more of the West than the East. Its chief representatives are Theodore of Mopsuestia, †428; Theodoret, †457; and Chrysostom.[1] Alexandria was the home of eclectic, philosophical Christianity, the aim of which was to reconcile knowledge and faith. Its allegorizing interpretation ran to great extremes. Its great names are Clement, †220; Origen, †254; Athanasius, †373. The North African Churches exhibit the practical spirit

[1] See Smith's *Dict. Christian Biogr.* for these and following names.

of the West. Cyprian, †258 ; Tertullian, †220; Augustine, †430, are its representatives. Here again we have differences without opposition.[1]

2. The substance of the faith of the Church in this its undivided period is preserved to us in the three Oecumenical Creeds.[2] The Apostles' Creed (so called not as written by apostles, but as summarizing their teaching) is mainly a compendium of the chief Christian facts, apart from theological interpretation. Its three divisions are an expansion of the baptismal formula. It was undoubtedly meant in a Trinitarian sense, although this sense is not put into words. The Nicene Creed[3] (named from the General Council of Nicæa, 325 A.D.), defining the faith of the Church respecting the divinity of Christ in opposition to Sabellianism and Arianism, but chiefly to the latter. The creed was completed at the Council of Constantinople, 381, by the addition of the qualifying clauses in reference to the Holy Spirit. One clause (*filioque*) was first added by the local synod of Toledo, 589 A.D., and the Council of Frankfort, 794. The Athanasian Creed (also called *Quicunque*, from its first word) doubtless embodies the substance of the teaching of Athanasius, but is certainly not his work. In its present form it is not earlier than the 8th or 9th century. The two doctrines defined in it are the Trinity and the Incarnation. These creeds are far from being a complete summary of the Christian faith. The two latter were only meant to define the doctrines which were the subject of controversy at the time. General Councils did not profess to announce new doctrines, but only to define what the Church had always understood to be the mind of Scripture on particular points. Whether they

[1] On the Schools of Alexandria and Antioch, see Blunt, *Dict. Theology.*

[2] Symbol also = creed; symbol literally = sign, compendium. The term is much used in Germany, where symbolics = history of creeds.

[3] First four General Councils: Nicæa, 325 ; Constantinople, 381 ; Ephesus, 431 ; Chalcedon, 451. These are received by all orthodox Christendom. The Roman Catholic Church receives 18 General Councils before the Vatican one. See Blunt, *Dict. Theology,* "Councils," "Creeds," "Nicene Creed," "Quicunque Vult."

defined correctly is for each Church and Christian to decide. Romanism holds such Councils to have intrinsic authority,—Protestantism, not. "The Three Creeds ought thoroughly to be received and believed, for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture" (Eng. Art. viii.). "General Councils may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God" (Art. xxi.).[1]

The Eastern and Western Churches have taken different parts in the definition of doctrine. To the East, with its fondness for metaphysical subtleties, we owe the dogma of the Trinity and the doctrines bearing on the nature of the Godhead. The more practical genius of the West has busied itself with the doctrines of Sin and Redemption.

3. The first great division in the Church was that between the East and West, resulting in the establishment of the Greek and Latin Churches. The sole doctrinal point involved was the single or double procession of the Holy Spirit. The East, taking its stand on the earlier councils and creeds, refused to admit the *filioque* clause into the Nicene Creed, and affirmed the single procession; the West took the other side. The lawfulness of image-worship and the date of Easter were other subjects of strife, the first especially. For images the Greek Church substitutes pictures. These were the ostensible causes of separation. The more potent cause, however, was the rivalry of the two pontiffs of Constantinople and Rome. The strife was almost as much political as ecclesiastical, and the decline of the Eastern empire greatly helped the victory of the Roman bishop. It is difficult to fix the exact date of the division. In the 9th century the two pontiffs had got to the point of excommunicating each other. The Greek Church, by its boasted title of "orthodox," casts the stigma of heresy on its Roman sister. The Roman Church has certainly shown most life and energy.

The Greek Church has added little to the early creeds. Its doctrine may be further learnt from the *Confessio Gennadii*, 1453; *Conf. Orthodoxa*, 1643.

[1] Lumby, *History of Three Creeds*. Swainson, *ditto*.

The standards of Roman doctrine are the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, 1545–1563, Sess. 4–7, 13, 14, 21–25; *Professio Fidei Tridentina* (Creed of Pius IV.), 1564; *Catechismus Romanus*, 1566, under Pius V.[1]

The Roman Creeds just mentioned were of course subsequent to the Reformation of the 16th century. The separation from Rome was soon followed by internal divisions within Protestantism which found expression in new creeds. The first broad division is that between Lutheranism and the Reformed Churches which adhered to Calvin.

The chief Lutheran standards are the *Augsburg Confession* (Augustana), 1530, Melancthon's work, presented by the Protestant deputies at the Diet of Augsburg to Charles V. as their confession; the *Apology* for ditto; also Melancthon's *Formula of Concord*, 1577; *Smalkald Articles*, 1537; and Luther's two Catechisms, 1529.

The principal Reformed confessions are *Helvetic Confession* i., 1537; *Consensus Tigurinus*, 1549; the Geneva (1551), Belgic (1562), Gallic (1559), and Scotch confessions; *Helvetic Confession* ii., 1564; *Formula Consensus Helvetici*, 1675; Heidelberg Catechism, 1562.

The Scotch confession was replaced by the Westminster Confession, 1643 – 48, supplemented by the two Scotch catechisms.

The 39 Anglican Articles are drawn from Reformed sources, as is evident from Art. xvii. especially.

The earliest formulæ of Arminianism are the *Remonstrantia*, 1610, and the *Conf. Remonstrantium*, 1622.

The Methodist standards are Wesley's first 53 sermons and Notes on New Testament.

Barclay's *Apology* informally represents the views of the Society of Friends.

[1] Cramp, *Text-Book of Popery*, 2nd ed. 1839, gives accurate translations of all the chief doctrinal definitions of the Trent Council, and so is an excellent account of the whole system of Roman doctrine. Canon Jenkins, *Creed of Pius IV.*

The Racovian Catechism (1605) exhibits the position of early Socinianism.[1]

4. Two other movements outside the sphere of creeds, demanding notice, are *Mysticism* and *Rationalism.* These represent, not different schools, but tendencies of thought present more or less in every age. They are exaggerations of truth. Thus, mysticism insists on the spiritual nature of Christianity as a divine life within man, to the neglect of forms of creed and worship, and sometimes even of conduct. Its key-note is union, fellowship with God. It knows by intuition, and obeys feeling. It thus represents a precious truth, for there is a genuine mysticism inseparable from living Christianity (Gal. ii. 20; John xiv. 23, xvii. 23). Its error lies in the neglect of other equally necessary truths, the result being that it is in constant danger of falling into pantheism. Union with God is pushed to the extreme of identity. It is impossible to distinguish much of the teaching of mysticism from pantheism. Yet the better mystics have rendered invaluable service to Christianity, especially by keeping up, in days of formalism, a witness for spiritual religion. Naturally it is in such days that mysticism abounds most as a reaction from dead form. So again we find the greatest mystics in the Roman Catholic Church, whose hard externalism calls forth the protest of man's spiritual nature. The more spiritual genius of Protestantism satisfies man's deeper instincts, and so obviates the extremes of mysticism. Prominent mystics are Erigena, 9th century; Eckart, †1329; à Kempis; Tauler, †1361; Behmen, †1624; Fénélon, Madame Guion, William Law.[2]

Rationalism is at the other extreme. It lays as great emphasis on reason and proof as mysticism does on feeling. Reason is the judge and man the measure of truth. Miracle,

[1] Winer, *Confessions of Christendom*, p. 8.

[2] R. A. Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, 2 vols. Overton, *Life and Opinions of William Law.* Law's *Spirit of Prayer* is a good exposition of Behmen's ideas. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* i. 61. Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, "Mystics;" *Dict. Theology*, "Mysticism."

supernatural revelation, authority in matters of faith, are rejected as infringing on the rights or transcending the limits of reason. Christianity is reduced to natural religion. This tendency exists in endless difference of degree from modest "criticism" to stark Deism. Modern Rationalism took its rise in England about two centuries ago. Lord Herbert, †1648; Toland, 1696; Hobbes; Shaftesbury, †1773; Collins, †1729; Bolingbroke, Tindal, were among its leaders. From England it was carried to France and Germany, where it grew unchecked and wrought fearful havoc. At home it was largely counteracted by apologists like Lardner, Paley, Butler, and still more by the evangelical revival.[1]

5. The history of theology proper may be said to begin with John of Damascus, 8th century, whose *Exposition of the Faith* is the first attempt at a systematic treatment of Christian doctrine. The works of the Fathers merely supply the materials for such a treatment. From the days of the Damascene, of Anselm and Bernard to Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, theology sat as queen. The name of the mediæval or scholastic divines is legion.[2] They borrowed all their material from the Fathers, shaping it by the rules of Aristotle's philosophy. But their want of originality and their passion for system and subtle distinctions must not blind us to their learning, acuteness, and devotion. The *Summa Theologiæ* of Aquinas is still a text-book of Roman theology. Aquinas died in his 49th year (1274 A.D.). Yet the works which he found time to write on philosophy, theology, exegesis, fill from 20 to 30 folios. The tradition of Roman Catholic learning is continued by Bellarmin, Petavius, and Perrone. The first theologian of the

[1] Hurst, *History of Rationalism.* Dorner, *Protestant Theology*, ii. 66. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* i. 34. Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, "Rationalists;" *Dict. Theology*, "Rationalism." Although Blunt's extreme High-Churchism often renders him unfair, he always gives the essential facts of the case in a very able form. Leland, *View of Principal Deistical Writers in England.* A. S. Farrar, *Critical Hist. of Free Thought*, describes both English and Continental Rationalism.

[2] Blunt, *Dict. Theology*, "Scholastic Theology."

Reformation was Melancthon, whose *Loci Communes*, published in 1521, ran through 80 editions in the author's lifetime, and gave its name to countless successors. It is characteristic of the practical spirit of the Reformation, that Melancthon's *Loci* grew out of lectures on the Epistle to the Romans, treating the topics there suggested in the order in which they occur. Then came the age of the "Protestant scholastics,"—on the Lutheran side, Chemnitz, †1586; Gerhard, 1637; Quenstedt, 1688; Calov, 1686; Hollaz, 1713,—on the Reformed, Calvin, †1564; F. Turretine, †1687. Calvin's *Institutes* is the prime authority for Reformed doctrine. Its arrangement follows the order of the Trinity. Among modern continental theologians it may suffice to mention Martensen (*Christian Dogmatics* and *Ethics*), Dorner (*System of Christian Doctrine*), Oosterzee. The old English theology is well worthy of study. It is divided into two schools, Anglican and Puritan, not unequal in point of learning, although different in tendency. Among the former, Hooker, Barrow, Jackson, Bull, Waterland, Pearson occupy the first place; among the latter, the two Goodwins, one Calvinist and the other Arminian, Owen, Howe, Baxter.

Hodge's *System of Theology*[1] is a learned and comprehensive exposition of Calvinistic (or Augustinian) Doctrine. Dr. Pope's *Compendium*[2] is as able and complete a statement of Arminian and Methodist teaching. For Methodist theology, however, Watson's *Institutes*[3] and Fletcher's works should be still consulted, as well as Wesley's principal treatises.

6. *Branches of Theology.*—*a.* Biblical Theology presents the doctrines of Scripture in systematic order, noting their implications and connection. It presses Hermeneutics, Textual Criticism, Introduction, Archæology, study of the Sacred Tongues, into its service. Biblical doctrine is, of course, the basis and starting-point of all other.[4] *b.* Historical Theology traces the changes of form which doctrine has undergone, and the stages

[1] 3 vols., T. Nelson.
[2] 3 vols., T. Woolmer.
[3] 4 vols., T. Woolmer.
[4] Schmid, Weiss, *Theology of the N. T.*, 2 vols. (T. & T. Clark).

by which it has passed into dogma. Church history, and especially the History of Dogma and Creeds, here come into use?[1] *c.* Systematic or Dogmatic Theology is the result of a blending of the two former branches. *d.* Practical Theology deals with Homiletics, Pastoral Work, etc.[2]

7. *Order of Treatment.*—The subject of Christian theology proper, as of Scripture, is Redemption. Every doctrine is a doctrine of Redemption. But this again presupposes the truth of certain other doctrines, viz. the Divine Existence, Divine Revelation in Scripture, Divine Nature and Attributes, Divine Works of Creation and Providence. All these truths are clearly anterior and necessary to Redemption, which is a special provision for a special need. We must believe that God is, and that Scripture is his Word, before we can receive its teaching on the subject of Redemption. The Divine Nature and Attributes, Creation and Providence, would have been what they are had no need for Redemption arisen.

A natural order of discussion therefore is: 1. Doctrines Presupposed—Divine Existence, Divine Revelation in Scripture, Divine Nature and Attributes, Creation and Providence, Sin. 2. Doctrines of Redemption—Incarnation, Atonement, Nature and Conditions of Benefits of Redemption, Church and Sacraments, Future State.

[1] Neander, *Hist. of Christian Dogmas*, 2 vols. (Bohn); Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, 3 vols. (T. & T. Clark); Shedd, *Hist. of Doctrine*, 2 vols. (T. & T. Clark).

[2] See Hagenbach's *Theol. Encyclopædia*, translated by Crooks and Hurst, New York; Cave, *Introduction to Theology* (T. & T. Clark); Oosterzee, *Practical Theology*.

PART FIRST.

DOCTRINES PRESUPPOSED OR PRELIMINARY.

CHAPTER I.

THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.

Respecting the way in which man comes to know God's existence two views are held. One is, that it is by intuition; the other, that it is the result of reasoning. The former view is favoured by most of the older Christian writers, by German and some English divines.[1] The strongest argument in its favour is drawn from the universal belief in Deity. Such a fact, it is said, can only be explained on the supposition that the belief is innate and intuitive. But looked at more closely, the universal belief is far from uniform or free from error. It has not excluded polytheism and other still worse mistakes. What is the value of an intuition which gives no better idea of its contents? If it is said that such perversions are the result of sin, it is still questionable whether even sin could distort a real intuition to such an extent. Is there any other example of the kind? Nor, again, is the influence of sin a sufficient explanation of the existence of atheism, which must then be ascribed in every case to perverse teaching or a perverse will. A strong objection to the intuitive view is, that where the truth is denied, it makes proof impossible, intuitive truth being

[1] The Germans speak of self-consciousness, world-consciousness, God-consciousness. To speak strictly, consciousness only applies to self.

above proof.[1] Still less can we conceive the possibility of any truth being both intuitive and demonstrative. For this reason, we do not understand how adherents of the intuitive school can appeal to the usual proofs. Moreover, the general theory of innate ideas is no longer regarded as covering the same extent of ground as formerly. It rather includes abstract truths than matters of fact, such as the existence even of the Divine Being. On the other hand, the opinion that this great truth is the result of reasoning, or even that it comes by revelation and is confirmed by reasoning, explains all the facts of the case, and is free from the objections lying against the former view. The truth follows so directly and conclusively from the application of the principle of causality to the world around us, that we should expect to find it universally present in some form, while, at the same time, the very nature of a process of reasoning leaves open the possibility of mistake, evasion, and perversion. Both atheism and polytheism are better explicable on this supposition. If it be said that faith in God is never actually the result of reasoning, it may be replied, that as matter of fact such faith usually comes by instruction, and is verified by reasoning; not to insist that there are implicit, unconscious acts of reasoning, in which some of the steps are left out. This view also leaves the way of argument open. When some one asserts, "I have no such intuition of God," we are not reduced to impotence. When it is said that a doctrine of such magnitude ought not to rest on less than absolute certainty, we can only repeat that if the evidence is infinitely stronger than that which is elsewhere regarded as ample, unbelief is left without excuse, and faith has no need to fear. The fact that intuitive truths are involved in the proof, and that we so seldom need to examine the grounds of our faith, is perhaps the reason why the conclusion has come to be regarded as itself belonging to this class.[2]

[1] See p. 5, *ante*. Pearson on *Creed*, vol. i. 25 (Oxford 1847).

[2] Dr. Pope says, *Comp.* i. 235, God's existence being "innate and connate does not mean that this full knowledge is found in every mind as

The *à posteriori* argument branches into four parts, the cosmological, teleological, moral, and ontological.

1. Cosmological, or Aetiological. This is an argument from the mere existence of the world. The design argument belongs to the next head. The present argument, like the next two, is an application to facts of the law of causality, that every beginning must have a cause.[1] Is this principle intuitive, or a generalization from facts? The first view is the more probable one, for wherever the terms of the proposition are understood it is seen to be self-evident. It is universally and necessarily true. But even if the principle were regarded as a generalization from experience, its certainty would scarcely be lessened, for no principle is more abundantly confirmed by experience. There is no exception to its truth. An uncaused beginning is inconceivable, or self-contradictory. The empirical or sensational school of thought—Brown, Hume, Mill, Bain—define causality as mere invariable antecedence and sequence, rejecting the notion of efficient power or necessary connection. But causality includes more than invariable connection or sequence, which is often present where causality is never thought of. The saying *post hoc propter hoc* illustrates this. True, all that is visible is the connection—the causal power is interposed by reason to explain the connection. But is this an illusion or unwarranted conjecture, as empiricists and positivists say? Then our nature deceives us; for it is at its bidding that we seek a cause for facts, and are restless till we have found it. Positivism, in absolutely restricting our thought to phenomena, is fighting against the oldest and most deeply rooted instinct of human nature. It is also universally felt that only an intelligent cause is a true

an object of consciousness, but that the constitution of human nature is such that it develops a consciousness of God when God presents himself, even as it grows up into a consciousness of self and of the outer world." The latter part of the sentence would apply to the view that our knowledge of God is provable by reasoning.

[1] Usually stated as "Every effect must have a cause," which is tautological. Rightly explained, however, the current phrase may be conveniently used.

cause. Mere mechanical causes never satisfy us. The empirical philosophy would do away with the present argument for God and religion, because on its principles we must not ask for any cause whatever of the invariable connection into which it resolves causality. At the same time, it does away also with mind in man, mind being only conceivable as a cause of thought. Perhaps it matters less that it does away with matter as the cause or subject of phenomena,—all that it leaves being phenomena and their relations.

Applying, then, the principle of causality to the world, the argument runs : Every beginning has a cause, the world had a beginning (or, is an effect), therefore the world had a cause. Here all turns on the second premise. Had the world a beginning? Or, is it an effect? Is this view or the opposite one the more probable? It is not essential to our argument to consider whether the matter itself of the world had a beginning or not. Looking at present only at the form of the world and its component parts, it is quite certain that these forms had a beginning, or rather many beginnings. It is matter of certainty that they are the result of previous forms, and these of others, and so on. The world and everything in it have taken their present shape as the result of previous states. Every atom yet discovered is "a manufactured article." A real atom is purely hypothetical. We are face to face then with a dilemma. Either this process has been going on from all eternity, or there has been a beginning in a cause adequate to the production of all that follows. One of these two conclusions is inevitable. The first, we may safely say, is no *conclusion* at all. It simply sends us on in an infinite regress from point to point. It may float as a vague possibility before the mind, but it has never formed the doctrine of a school, which is sufficient evidence of the verdict of the world upon it. The other inevitable conclusion is the theistic one. The theistic inference, then, does not follow directly from the use of the causal principle. It is the remaining alternative in a dilemma, the other member of which has been ruled out of court.

We have said that we do not need to prove that the matter of the world had a beginning. Still it is the more probable view, because the alternative is the eternity of matter. A cause that is adequate to the creation of the form of the world is adequate to the creation of its matter, which is thus superfluous as an independent existence, and excluded by the law of parsimony of causes. It would also be fatal to the independence of the other cause. As to the theory of matter being the cause of all things, this would make it the cause of mind. Mind may be the cause of matter, but not conversely.

It is said that this argument does not prove the necessity of an intelligent cause, much less a moral one. The first cause may be merely mechanical. But, speaking in a large sense, mind is part of the universe. Its cause must be intelligent. The most superficial glance also shows that the world is a unity, which can only be explained as the result of intelligence. The chief argument, however, on this point falls under other heads.

It is also alléged that the argument does not prove the supposed cause to be infinite. The universe, if an effect, is only a finite one, and requires only a finite cause. This point also belongs to another branch of the argument—the fourth. Meantime it may be remarked, that one of the most notable fruits of science is its revelation of the immeasurable vastness and complexity of the universe. A cause adequate to the creation of such a system is at least practically infinite.

If it be said that the law of causality requires a cause for God himself, the reply is that neither intuition nor experience teaches us that everything must have a cause, but only every beginning, every event. "Everything must have a cause" is a pure assumption, which would lead us back in an infinite regress.

Agnosticism asks, "Why come to any decision at all? Why not leave everything in suspense?" Because such suspense is repugnant to human nature. And if our nature in compelling

us to decide is not to be trusted, nothing is to be trusted. Why is the agnostic in religion not an agnostic in questions of health, business, character, where he has far less certain probabilities to go upon? Consistency is with the believer, not with the agnostic.[1]

2. Teleological. This is the design argument proper, or the argument from final causes. Its principle is a form of the causal principle. A particular kind of beginning (or effect) requires a particular kind of cause. It may be put thus: Order or purpose requires intelligence as its cause.[2] Whether this principle is intuitive or a generalized experience, its truth is undeniable. Wherever we see purpose accomplished, especially by the combination and adaptation of means, we know that the purpose is not in the means, but in some mind that existed outside of and before them.[3] Strictly speaking, there is no design or purpose in things, but only the marks of design, the design being in mind only. Illustration of marks of design in the universe is needless. The universe is one vast system of means and ends. We see this alike in the world of the little revealed by the microscope, and in the world of the great commanded by the telescope.

The fact is admitted by those who reject the argument based upon it. These say, "Undoubtedly the world is full of marks of design, or of what would be such in the works of man. But

[1] Flint, *Theism*, Lect. iv.; Randles, *First Principles*, p. 25, etc.; Buchanan, *Faith in God and Atheism*, vol. i.; Pearson on *Creed*, Art. i.; Barrow on *Creed*, Serm. vi. and vii.

[2] "Design implies a designer," is also tautological. Still the phrase is convenient.

[3] "For myself this obstinate conception occurs again and again, that the whole, as it develops and will be developed, in space and time, determined all the parts of that whole—which it could only do on the supposition that it pre-existed in thought—the thought, therefore, of some Being capable of *so* thinking and *so* acting,—not thinking or acting as a human being. I find this conviction even stronger in me than that which demands some one permanent being (conscious or unconscious) as mere *cause* of all this Becoming we witness; though the two lines of thought and feeling may easily be harmonized." W. Smith, *Gravenhurst*, 2nd ed. p. 415.

here the marks are deceptive." Why? "Because," it is said, "we cannot argue from art to nature. One is no guide to the other. That may be true in one sphere which is false in the other. We have seen watches made, but have not seen a world made." But even on the supposition that the law of causality originates in experience, is there any warrant for the assertion that the generalized results of experience are applicable only to artificial products? Though two and two watches make four watches, do two and two trees make five trees? Is it conceivable that this should be the case anywhere? The causal principle might just as well be restricted to each class of products as to the aggregate. We might just as well say that although a watch or bridge, as evidencing design, must be the fruit of intelligence, something that we have never seen in course of making need not be so. In the case of such a proposition as, "Order is the result of intelligence, and is impossible without it," how is the possibility of an exception conceivable? What valid reason can be given for its restriction? Dr. Flint's view is that the theistic position is not an argument from art to nature, but an application of the same self-evident principle to both,[1] and this is really the true view. The construction of watches, etc., is merely an illustration, not the basis of argument. We have argued, however, on the lower view of the causal principle. Every one, then, who rejects the theistic inference holds that although order, adaptation, purpose in human works can only be explained by an intelligent cause, the same things in nature, on an immensely greater scale and of a far more wonderful kind, require no such cause. A poor specimen of contrivance is impossible without intelligence; a miracle of what has every appearance of being contrivance is possible without intelligence! The atheistic theory has no explanation of the world, for a mere catalogue of phenomenal sequences is no explanation. There would be an excuse for atheism or agnosticism if no key to the

[1] *Theism*, p. 156. On whole argument see Lect. v. and vi.; Harris, *Self-Revelation of God*, p. 316; Janet, *Final Causes*, p. 321; W. Arthur, *Difference between Physical and Moral Law.*

mystery of nature were at hand, and if it were not a settled rule in other fields to argue from the known to the unknown; but when the key lies at our feet, and the rule is in common use, to refuse to see the key or apply the rule is the very height of caprice.

The modern doctrine of the universal presence of law is altogether in our favour. Human geometry is a trifle to the geometry of the universe. The movements of systems and the form of a crystal are determined with mathematical precision. Were the world a chaos instead of a cosmos, we might dispense with intelligence at its source. This branch of the argument has always been felt to be the most conclusive and useful. The field of illustration grows with the growth of knowledge.[1]

3. Moral. This argument is another application of the causal principle. The moral world, consisting of the laws of right to which man is subject, their operations and effects, is as real, as orderly and full of purpose, as the physical, and can only be explained by a cause of the same nature as itself. The chief fact of this world is conscience. Our argument is unaffected

[1] Augustine, *Conf.* x. 6: Non dubiâ sed certâ conscientiâ, Domine, amo te. Percussisti cor meum verbo tuo, et amavi te. . . . Et quid est hoc? Interrogavi terram, et dixit: non sum. Interrogavi mare et abyssos, et responderunt: non sumus Deus tuus, quære super nos. Interrogavi cœlum, solem, lunam, stellas: neque nos sumus Deus, quem quæris, inquiunt. Et dixi omnibus iis, Dicite mihi de illo aliquid. Et exclamaverunt voce magna: Ipse fecit nos. Interrogavi mundi molem de Deo meo, et respondit mihi: Non ego sum, sed ipse me fecit. Augustine then interrogates his powers of body and mind with the same result. He finds God at last in memory. But how came God there? By his own secret but sure self-manifestation. Ubi ergo te inveni, ut discerem te? Neque enim jam eras in memoriâ meâ priusquam te discerem. Ubi ergo inveni te, ut discerem te, nisi in te supra me? . . . Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova; sero te amavi! Et ecce intus eras, et ego foris, et ibi te quærebam; et in ista formosa, quæ fecisti, deformis irruebam. Mecum eras, et tecum non eram. Ea me tenebant longe a te, quæ, si in te non essent, non essent. Vocasti et clamasti, et rupisti surditatem meam. Coruscasti, splenduisti, et fugasti cæcitatem meam. Fragrasti, et duxi spiritum, et anhelo tibi. Gustavi, et esurio, et sitio. Tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam.

THE MASTER'S COLLEGE
POWELL LIBRARY
SANTA CLARITA, CA 91321

by any theory we form of the nature and origin of conscience.[1] However we define or derive it, it stands before us as a fact of unique character. It announces the supreme distinction of right and wrong, commands one, forbids the other, praises if we obey, condemns if we disobey. Its praise is sweeter, its condemnation heavier than any outward praise or blame. Still conscience does not make, it simply announces and administers, moral law. That law is independent of man, unvarying from age to age. How can it be pretended that the moral law is of man's making, when it governs and often condemns him? Would he spontaneously set up a judge, accuser, and tormentor in his own breast? He no more determines what shall be the law of his moral life than he determines the conditions of his physical life. Moreover, the existence of purpose, adaptation of means to ends, is as certain in this as in the material world. The beauty of a virtuous life, the rewards and punishments of moral government, the motives urging to good and dissuading from evil, are as clear proofs of intelligence as anything in visible nature. The laws are as inexorable, the issues as certain, in one case as in the other. The existence, then, and order of the moral world not merely demand an author, but reveal his character, declare him to be the friend of righteousness and the foe of wrong.

This argument has always weighed much with thoughtful minds. Sophocles speaks of "The unwritten laws of God that know not change; they are not of to-day or yesterday, but live for ever." Cicero says of the moral law, "It is not one thing at Rome, another at Athens, one thing now and another in former or future ages, but in all ages and nations it is, has been, and will be one and everlasting." Kant was content to rest the whole argument for God on the moral law. Two things, he said, never ceased to call forth his wonder, the order of the starry heavens and the order of the moral world. Butler says, Had conscience might as it has right, it would rule the world.

[1] "Conscience is a man's judgment of himself according to the judgment of God of him," Ames on *Conscience*, 1643.

"All's love, yet all's law," is Browning's dictum. St. Paul speaks of "the law written in their hearts."[1]

4. Ontological.[2] If the previous arguments are good, they have proved the existence of a great First Cause, powerful, wise, and just. We have, however, the ideas of infinity, eternity, of necessary as opposed to contingent existence, of perfect goodness. No matter whence or how we obtain these ideas, we have them. They must either be affirmed or denied of the Creator, whose existence has been ascertained. Infinity and finitude, absolute and dependent existence, being contraries, one or other of them must be predicable of every being, the divine included. The only question then is, which is the most rational course, to believe that the First Cause is infinite or finite, of absolute or dependent existence. The answer cannot be doubtful. To assert that he depends for his existence on another would only send us a step farther back. If we must believe in a Maker of the universe, if we must believe that he is either infinite or finite, it is obvious which alternative has most reason on its side. The other alternative would give us a doctrine made up of the most incongruous elements. The instinct which leads us to ascribe every possible perfection to the Maker of all things can scarcely be a mistaken one.

Another form which the argument takes is this. We have ideas of infinite goodness, truth, and holiness. Are these merely ideas? Or, is there a Being to whom they belong? If they are mere ideas, how can we account for their existence? Thus there is some measure of truth in Anselm's position, that the very idea of an absolutely perfect Being involves his exist-

[1] Wace, *Christianity and Morality*, pp. 189, 205, 221; Flint, *Theism*, Lect. vii., viii.; Lacordaire, *God*, Conferences (Chapman & Hall); M'Cosh, *Method of Divine Government*, is most powerful under this head, worthy of being regarded as a continuation and expansion of Butler's *Analogy*.

[2] Often called *d priori*, as by Dr. Flint. The argument is one from ideas. Ontology = science of realities. To the old Greeks the only realities were ideas, phenomena were transient things, appearances. In our days the case is reversed.

ence;[1] at least to this extent, that the existence of the idea is best explained on the supposition that it arises from the fact. Otherwise, the noblest ideas known to man are the veriest illusions. It will be said that it is easy to form ideas to which no realities correspond; but ideas which are among the oldest treasures of the race are not to be placed on a level with creations of individual fancy.[2]

It is evident that the four branches of the argument are mutually complementary. The first gives us the idea simply of vast power; the second adds personal intelligence, will, and wisdom; the third exhibits the Maker of the world as a moral governor; while the fourth invests him with the incommunicable perfections of Deity. Each line of reasoning is sound as far as it goes. It proves one thing, brings out one aspect of the idea of God. The whole gives us all the knowledge of God that is possible within the domain of natural religion. Not that unaided reason has ever discovered all this truth for itself. Whether reason in a normal state could do so, we can never certainly know. And again, the knowledge of God thus obtained is far below the knowledge we need and actually possess. Still, it

[1] Anselm, *Proslog.* 2: Convincitur etiam insipiens, esse in intellectu aliquid, quo majus cogitari non potest. Et certo id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re. At the same time it must be remembered that there is a fallacy in Anselm's argument as he puts it. We cannot argue from thought to fact, namely, that because we have an idea of a perfect existence there must be a reality corresponding to it. We can only say, "If God exists, his must be an absolutely perfect existence." And this is the course followed in the text. See Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 252, and Descartes' comments, p. 253.

[2] A good account of the nature of the *à priori* argument, and of the different forms it has taken in the hands of Plato, Augustine, Anselm, Descartes, Malebranche, and others, will be found in Flint's *Theism*, Lect. ix. See also Pope, *Comp. Theol.* i. 236; Smith's *Select Discourses*, Disc. i. and v. The *à priori* argument, so called, of Samuel Clarke, *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, and Gillespie, *Necessary Existence of God*, proceeds on a different line.

forms the groundwork of the knowledge imparted in supernatural revelation. What the latter does is to assume and amplify this great fundamental truth of all religion.

What is the degree of certainty yielded by this argument? It is not of the absolute kind belonging to intuition and demonstration. But it is as much stronger than the certainty attaching to the beliefs of daily life as the evidences of power, will, and moral character apparent in nature and human history are stronger than the evidences of the same qualities in man's works. What comparison is there between these two series of phenomena? One is as much higher than the other, as the heavens are higher than the earth. We believe in intelligent minds around us, because of the evidence they give of their existence. We cannot see, hear, or touch them; they are seen only by the inner eye of reason, *i.e.* we infer their existence from their effects. A Christian's faith in the existence of a Supreme Mind rests on evidence precisely of the same kind, but far greater in amount. As the character of a book, or statue, or mechanical invention is the index of its author's ability, so the wonderful adaptations of the universe declare its Maker's glory. We cannot then imagine anything more rational than a Christian's faith in God. If our faith in history and science rests on rational grounds, with far stronger confidence we may say, "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth."

[Flint's *Theism* and *Anti-Theistic Theories;* Paley's *Natural Theology;* Howe's *Living Temple;* M. Randles, *First Principles of Faith;* Blunt, *Dict. of Theology*, "Theism;" Buchanan, *Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared*, 2 vols.; Jenkins, Fernley Lect. on *Modern Atheism, its Position and Promise;* Dr. Harris's two vols.: *Philos. Basis of Theism* and *Self-Revelation of God;* Watkinson, Fern. Lect., *Influence of Scepticism on Character;* Redford, *Christian's Plea against Modern Unbelief*, p. 54; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctrine*, i. 212; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* i. 204; M'Cosh, *Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral.*]

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I.

The two anti-theistic theories which most nearly concern us are Pantheism and Materialism. The first term is itself a definition,[1] not so the second. A Materialist is not one who believes in the existence of matter, but one who believes there is nothing but matter. The two theories are radically opposed to Theism and to each other. Theism affirms the distinct existence both of the Creator and the creature. Pantheism denies the latter, Materialism the former. One leaves no creature to worship, the other no God to be worshipped. According to the one theory, everything is spirit, there is no matter; according to the other, everything is matter, there is no spirit. Yet these radically opposite theories have this feature in common, that they are monistic, admitting but one ultimate substance. The desire for unity is ineradicable in human nature; but it must not ignore any of the primary facts and distinctions of things. Pantheism and materialism do this in confounding the properties of spirit and matter,—thought and extension. Theism, on the contrary, satisfies the thirst for unity, so far as facts allow. While keeping spirit and matter apart, it traces them at last to their source in the divine will. The independence of matter is derived, not absolute.

Pantheism is peculiarly the error of the East, to whose speculative spirit it is congenial. It is there that it is worked

[1] "The All" is God, or God is "the All." There is some ground for the distinction which Luthardt draws between the tendencies of Eastern and Western Pantheism. "The former merges the world in God, and is consequently Acosmism. Hence it knows nothing of becoming, but only of being, of which particular phenomena are merely modifications (Eleatics, Spinoza). The latter merges God in the world, and is consequently Atheism. Hence it really knows only becoming, not being; it sees the Absolute only on the way to being, and therefore views it as a process (Heraclitus, the Stoics, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel);" *Comp. d. Dogmatik*, p. 80.

out most systematically, and exerts the greatest practical influence. In the West it is the creed of the philosophic few. Pantheistic elements are found in the speculations of New-Platonism in Alexandria, of the early Gnostics, and of some of the mediæval Mystics. But the first thoroughgoing pantheist of the West is Spinoza, a Dutch Jew (1632–77).[1] Considering the charge of *à priori* reasoning so often brought against theologians, it is worth notice that Spinoza's system is perhaps the most perfect system of *à priori* speculation extant. He starts with certain premises, from which pantheistic doctrine is then deduced; but he has first put the doctrine into the premises. The rigid mathematical form of his speculations has a specious look, and is an attraction to many; but it is the veriest delusion. According to Hegelianism, Christianity is pantheistic in essence.

The most common form of pantheism is that which represents spirit and matter as temporary forms assumed by the absolute. They are real as forms, but not *in se;* they are phenomena, properties or accidents, the substance being the divine or the absolute. Two other possible, though uncommon, forms of pantheism, are the idealistic and materialistic; for the first, thought is the sole phenomenal form of the absolute; for the second, matter. But the common feature in all pantheism is, that it makes the essence of Deity consist in absoluteness, and so denies his personality. God is not the infinite, but the absolute, *i.e.* the sum of all existence, or the Unrelated. Any other view is said to be unworthy of God. Everything—strong and weak, good and bad, true and false—is included in the divine existence; God is all alike. But why should it be unworthy of God to exist in a state of relation to other existences, which in the last resort spring from his will? The Absolute must be able to originate such dependent existences, wills endowed with the power of moral freedom, else he would not be the Absolute. The theory that he has done so best explains the facts of life.

[1] Martineau, *Study of Spinoza;* F. Pollock, *Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy.*

Eventually pantheism is driven to deny the distinction between strong and weak, good and bad; weakness is only a lower degree of strength, evil of good. Besides, the term Absolute, like infinite, needs to be itself defined before it can become a definition. Absolute in what? And directly it is defined in any respect, the opposite is negatived. Such negation is not necessarily a defect; it may be an excellence, and its absence a defect. But according to Spinoza and all pantheists, no negation (and therefore no definition) must be affirmed of God.

Personality is denied of God, on the ground that it implies limitation. It is argued that the idea of personality arises in us from the distinction between ourselves and others. But who, it is asked, or what is the other, from which God is eternally distinguished? To this argument there are two replies. The idea of personality arises, not only from our observing a distinction between ourselves and others, but also from the distinction that we make between ourselves and our thoughts, the one element permanent, the other changing. Again, even if it were true that our idea of personality arises in the way stated, it would not follow that this is the only conceivable way in which it can arise. Human personality may be a copy of the divine, without being an adequate copy. Is personality an excellence or not? Is man better than an animal, because he is a self-conscious, self-determining agent? If so, how can such excellence be refused to God? Indeed, if God be the Absolute, on the principle of pantheism, he must be both personal and impersonal.[1]

Materialism is peculiarly the error of the West. Some of the earliest Greek philosophers leaned in this direction. Epicurus formulated the atomic theory, according to which the universe is the result of chance combinations of innumerable atoms. Still, all the intelligence and purpose evident in the universe must have been present germinally in the original atoms, the

[1] Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 334; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, Lect. iii.; Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, "Pantheists;" Buchanan, as before, vol. ii.; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* i. 246, 299.

existence and marvellous properties of which are assumed, not accounted for. Lucretius put the atomic theory into verse. In modern days, Hobbes (1588–1679) led the way in materialistic tendency; Hartley and Priestley took the same course; Locke's philosophy has been interpreted in a materialistic sense. The enormous development of materialism in France, Germany, Italy, and England recently is well known. Mill, Bain, Spencer, Comte are of this school. While there is no necessary connection between materialism and physical science, the prominence given to physical researches, unbalanced by philosophical study, helps the spread of materialism.

A philosophical objection against pantheism and materialism in common is, that they deny the existence of an essential distinction between mind and matter. There is but one substance, either spirit or matter. According to one view, matter is merely a gross form of spirit; according to the other, spirit is a finer form of matter. The difference between such properties as thought, feeling, volition on one side, and size, hardness, weight on the other, is denied to be one of kind. It is enough to reply that hitherto all thought and language have assumed a radical difference between the two. On this point pantheism and materialism have against them a consensus of ancient and universal belief.

A common moral objection is, that the two theories are equally fatalistic. According to one, human life and thought and action are points in the evolution of the one absolute existence; according to the other, they are physical results of physical laws. In either case, freedom and responsibility are out of the question. Now one of the most certain facts of consciousness is that of moral freedom. The consciousness of existence is not more certain. All social and legislative action proceeds upon it. Any theory that runs counter to such a fact is self-condemned.

How can materialism explain the existence of abstract, immaterial ideas? Artistic, moral, and religious ideas are the antithesis of material. How also can it explain memory?

Where and what is the centre of unity, in which past and present meet?[1]

Positivism, as taught by Auguste Comte (1798–1859), is materialism under another name. Adopting the empirical definition of causality, it imperatively forbids all inquiry into causes. Knowledge is rigorously limited to phenomena. Matter, mind, God are dismissed as unknowable. It is not merely religion that is made impossible by this doctrine, but mental philosophy or metaphysics. If there is no mind, of course there is no science of mind. In Comte's *Index Expurgatorius* philosophy stands beside theology. Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, Des Cartes, Berkeley, Kant, Hamilton were mere beaters of the air. According to Comte, theology is the earliest infantine stage of human culture, metaphysics and science being the next two stages. The truth is, that the three classes of ideas are co-ordinate, not successive. They are all found in every age of the world in different degrees of cultivation. We may observe that Comte's boasted altruistic principle of morals is borrowed from Christianity, borrowed without acknowledgment. The strange thing is, that after sweeping away every shred of religious doctrine and faith, Comte sets up a new religion, without God, soul, or immortality. Its god is the aggregate of humanity, its creed the dogmas of science, its worship the worship of humanity, its immortality posthumous influence, its ministers and priests Positivist teachers. No such parody of religion was ever seen on earth before.[2]

Agnosticism professes to be ignorant, and therefore neutral, on the questions of religious faith. It equally repudiates theism and atheism. But the ignorance, it seems, is not absolute. Herbert Spencer holds it indubitable that there is a power behind phenomena, their cause and source, only we can know

[1] Flint, as before, p. 39; Christlieb, Lect. iii.; Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, "Materialists."

[2] Flint, as before, p. 176; McCosh, *Christianity and Positivism;* Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, "Positivists;" W. Arthur, *Positivism and F. Harrison.*

nothing further about it. Two things then are known, first, that there is such a power; secondly, that its nature is unknowable. But the mere certainty of the existence of such a power is no inconsiderable thing. Strange that knowledge should go so far and then stop. Might not the clue, if followed up, lead to other discoveries? Does the Power revealed in the facts of the universe only exist to tantalize and baffle us? The agnostic position, to say the least, is extremely improbable. As matter of fact, the means of knowledge and grounds of faith in religion are precisely similar to those which agnostics accept without question in other fields of inquiry. Why they should be sufficient in one case and insufficient in the other, is inexplicable.

CHAPTER II.

THE DIVINE REVELATION IN SCRIPTURE.

Revelation [1] means unveiling, here of God's mind and will to man. That Scripture is such a revelation has ever been the faith of the Church universal. The fundamental nature of this belief is evident from the consideration that Scripture is both the source and the standard of Christian doctrine, which it can only be on the supposition that it is God's voice to man. This subject includes the proof of three things, that Scripture is a *Divine Revelation*, is *Inspired*, and is the *Canon* of doctrine.

Sec. 1.—Scripture a Divine Revelation.

By this is meant a special, supernatural revelation in distinction from the general, natural one given in creation, conscience, and history. The latter is the more ancient and universal. So far from being abrogated, it is assumed, reaffirmed, and illustrated in Scripture, Ps. xix.; Rom. i. 20, ii. 15; Acts xiv. 17, xvii. 22–31. But this general revelation is the more liable to be mistaken, as it needs to be not merely interpreted, but spelled out from the facts of nature. All depends on the competency and honesty of the reader and interpreter. That man is not to be trusted in this capacity is conclusively shown by the condition of the heathen world, where man was left without the help of special revelation. Besides, the fact of sin and the needs arising out of it are subsequent in time to God's

[1] All words of this termination may denote either the act or its result. When Scripture is termed a revelation, the latter is the meaning.

primitive revelation, and therefore are not provided for in it. Even a republication of the truths of natural religion with special divine attestations would not meet the new wants of man. Thus it is the fact of sin which has made a further revelation necessary. Accordingly, we find that the way of deliverance from sin is not merely the principal, but the only subject of Scripture, which from first to last treats of Redemption. As to the distinction between natural and revealed religion, while certain truths may be classed under one and certain under the other head, it does not follow that even those belonging to natural religion could be clearly and perfectly learnt from natural revelation. As matter of fact, both kinds of truth come to us at the same time, and it is impossible for us so to discriminate between the two as to assign them to different sources. When nature itself is regarded as a revelation, the distinction between natural and revealed falls out of sight; but the distinction, though conventional, is useful.

The evidences that Scripture is a divine revelation may be classed as Evidences Presumptive, Proper, and Auxiliary.

A. *Presumptive.*—This prepares the way for the rest, showing that there is a case for the Christian contention. Perhaps one of the most effective forms of stating this argument is to compare the Christian Scriptures with heathen ones. Referring for details to works on comparative religion,[1] we may instance Hinduism, Buddhism, Parsism, to which Mohammedanism may be added. Here we have the advantage of possessing sacred writings, regarded as divine revelations, from which the doctrines of these systems can be authoritatively learnt.[2] Limiting our attention to the fundamental doctrine of the divine existence already considered, what do these systems teach? The doctrine of the Hindu Vedas is nature-worship, which afterwards grew into pantheism among the educated

[1] See the useful little manuals on non-Christian systems published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

[2] In the case of the Greek and Roman religion, we have no such advantage.

classes, and polytheism among the multitude. Buddhism was originally a system of atheistic morality, which soon passed into the worship of Buddha himself. In Parsism we have a doctrine of essential, eternal dualism, embodied in Ormuzd and Ahriman, the principles of good and evil. In neither of these great systems have we the elementary doctrines of the divine Unity, Spirituality, and Holiness. Mohammedanism borrowed its higher doctrine from Judaism, to which it is a retrogression. Its originality consists in its refusal to accept the fuller revelation of the Godhead given in Christianity. Contrast with heathen teaching the clear, pure monotheism of the Pentateuch. To what is the superiority of the Mosaic teaching due? To divine revelation, we say. To the monotheistic genius of the Jewish or Semitic race, say some. The monotheistic genius of the Semitic race is a modern fiction. Babylonians, Arabians, Phœnicians, who were as much Semitic as the Jews, were not monotheists but gross idolaters. The opinion that the Jews were naturally inclined to monotheistic doctrine is belied by the whole tenor of their history, for they were constantly falling into idolatry. Their faith was evidently in advance of their natural attainments and inclinations. To ascribe it to peculiarity of national genius is merely a confession of ignorance. Here we see Moses, long ages before the days of Buddha and Zoroaster, contemporaneously, as some think, with the seers and singers of the Vedas, teaching a doctrine of monotheism, which has never been improved upon since. All the probabilities are against his having obtained this knowledge by reasoning or intuition, and in favour of its having come to him by direct divine instruction. No doubt, far closer approximations to the truth on this subject are to be found in the sages of the Western world than in the Oriental systems just referred to. Still they only amount to approximations on the part of a few select minds. There is nothing like the clean-cut certainty and definiteness to be found in Scripture from the first.[1]

[1] Pressensé, *Ancient World and Christianity;* Hardwick, *Christ and other Masters;* Kellogg, *Light of Asia and Light of the World.*

One God only

B. *Evidences Proper.*—These are the Miracles and Prophecy of Scripture.

a. Miracles are described in the New Testament as powers, wonders, and signs (Acts ii. 22; Heb. ii. 4), terms which point to three aspects, not three kinds, of miracles. They have often been defined as "violations and suspensions" of the laws of nature. But these phrases are objectionable, because they assume that we know how miracles are wrought. On this point, however, we neither know nor need to know anything. Miracles only concern us as facts, in which aspect they come under the same laws of knowledge and proof as other facts. The simplest definition is the best. Dr. Pope's definition (i. p. 62), "an intervention of the supreme power in the established course of nature," is sufficient. It refutes the common objection that miracles are inconsistent with laws of nature. On the contrary, they presuppose such laws. Where there is no law, no fixed order, there are no exceptions. On the other hand, the assertion that the fixed order of nature includes all possibilities, argues the greatest presumption. No believer in creation, which is the supreme miracle, can deny the possibility of miracles. The position that miracles are possible only presupposes that the Creator is free—that he does in a higher sphere what man does within the limits of law. It is quite conceivable that just as we use natural laws to bring about effects which would never follow from the laws themselves, so divine power uses the same or similar laws to effect results impossible to us. Or, there is nothing impossible in the conception that miracles are unique creative acts. It must be remembered that they are by no means as plentiful, even in Scripture, as is sometimes supposed. The principal displays of miraculous power coincide with the beginnings of the two great dispensations of revelation—the Mosaic and the Christian.

Some modern apologists think it a mistake to put miracles in the forefront of the Christian evidences, and that the stress should rather be placed on the self-evidencing truth of Christianity and its moral influence in the world. They almost

intimate that in scientific days the miracles are a difficulty instead of a help. But however forcible the argument from the work of Christianity in the world, no such argument was possible in the beginning. In those days, at least, a teacher professing to come from God must be able to appeal to some sign of his divine mission. Ages must pass before Christianity could produce such effects as would incontestably prove it to be divine. There is some force therefore in Dorner's suggestion, that miracles were intended principally for contemporaries, intended to serve till the other evidence had time to grow. As for the self-evidencing truth of Christian doctrine, that is only for one who stands inside the circle of Christian experience. It is quite possible that too external a view has been taken of miracles by writers on evidences. They may have spoken as if the evidential were the only purpose. But, on the other hand, purposes of mercy and instruction do not exclude the evidential. In the face of passages like Matt. xi. 5, John v. 36, x. 25, 38, it is quite impossible to maintain that Christ did not appeal to his miracles in their evidential character. To expect him to do it in a more formal way would be to expect him to speak in a more didactic manner than he did on any subject. Loud as the objections may be against revelation with miracles, the objections against revelation without miracles would have been still louder and more reasonable. Besides, the miraculous narratives are an integral part of Scripture. To remove them would be to break up Scripture. Christianity is thus committed to them. Which then is the most natural order? To receive Christ as the Lord of nature and then as a spiritual teacher, or the converse? The first is the ancient, the second the novel order.

Writers like Lecky represent miraculous narratives as the fictions of a credulous age. They accordingly try to prove the first Christian age and the ancient world generally to be of this character, by collecting accounts of wonders then current. There is a fallacy, however, in this style of writing. Stories of prodigies crowded into a few pages look very formidable; but

they are gathered from a wide space of country and time. Could not a similar collection of wonders be made in our days? We do not, of course, deny that there are differences between one age and another. The characteristic of the present age is certainly not credulity; perhaps the spirit of scepticism is just as irrational as the credulity charged upon other days. But were the first Christian ages barren of intellect and genius? Were they not the Augustan days of the Roman empire and literature? Was the critical spirit absent? Were men's senses less acute or their mental powers more sluggish? Did human nature then or ever display any eagerness to be duped?

The objection to the argument from miracles has never been stated more succinctly than by David Hume. It is, that since it is contrary to experience for miracles to be true, but not contrary to experience for testimony to be false, no kind or amount of testimony can render miracles credible. The fallacy of the argument, put in this way, lies in the generality of its premises. When it is said that miracles are contrary to experience, we ask, whose or what experience? The experience of the professed witnesses of miracles? This is the point to be decided. When it is said that it is not contrary to experience for testimony to be false, we ask, what testimony? There are some kinds of testimony which it is contrary to all experience to regard as false. Given facts coming within the cognizance of the senses, given witnesses in a position to know the truth of the facts, competent to judge of them, unlikely to be deceived and under no temptation to deceive, and it is contrary to all experience for their testimony to be false. Such evidence would be accepted in any judicial court on any question. And the evidence for the Christian miracles more than meets these tests. The principle of Hume's objection, which expresses much of the current scepticism of our times, may be otherwise stated thus: The antecedent presumption against miracles, as departures from the fixed course of nature, is so strong that no amount of proof can overcome it. The antecedent presumption against miracles may be admitted. The force of the argument

rests on their unique character. They belong to and evince a supernatural order. To attempt to reduce them to the natural order is to give up their distinctive character. Still one antecedent presumption is met by another, namely, by that against the falsehood of testimony of the kind alleged for the Christian miracles. And the very basis of the sceptical presumption, the fixity of nature, itself rests on testimony and experience. The testimony which begets such an immovable conviction in one case is no stronger than that which exists in the other. In its first form, Hume's argument was directed against the very possibility of miracles, but it was afterwards modified. And this is the ground taken by scepticism still. In our days scientists and rationalists are slow to say what is and is not possible, and prefer to contest the sufficiency of the evidence. On the latter ground Christianity has nothing to fear. No history is confirmed by evidence so abundant and so unexceptionable as the Christian history. The alternative to believing it is disbelief of all history. Sceptics sometimes say that, considering the importance of Christianity and the magnitude of its claims, the evidence for it ought to be such that its falsehood would be a greater miracle than its truth. The condition is a severe one, but a believer may accept it. Our position is precisely that disbelief does violence to all the laws which govern men's belief in other matters.[1]

The fundamental miracle of Christianity is the Resurrection of Christ. This carries all the rest. The other miracles and the entire Christian system stand or fall with it. We call it fundamental, because Christianity is so thoroughly committed to its historical reality. In the Acts and the Epistles it is put

[1] See Dorner on Miracles, *Syst. Christian Doctrine*, ii. 146–183; Mozley's Bampton Lecture on *Miracles;* Bruce, *Miraculous Element in the Gospels;* S. Cox, *Miracles: an Argument and a Challenge;* Row, Bampton Lecture on *Christian Evidences*, Lect. i., ii.; Godet, *Defence of Christian Faith*, Lect. iii.; Steinmeyer, *Miracles of our Lord* (Clark); Ibid., *Passion and Resurrection-History;* Pearson on *Creed;* Barrow, ditto, Serm. xxix., xxx.; South (ed. 1859), Serm. xxxiv. on *Resurrection of Christ*, and Serm. lii.

in the foreground of apostolic preaching. Spiritual teaching is based upon it, the most far-reaching inferences are drawn from it. There is thus no possibility of explaining it away as a mistake or interpolation. Now the one universally admitted fact is the faith of the apostles and of the early Church in the Resurrection. Formerly this was not admitted. The apostles were regarded as wilful impostors. Paley's treatise, however, disposed of the imposture-theory for ever. Rationalists like Renan and Kuenen are at one with believers in admitting the good faith of the apostles. That the early Christians at least believed that Christ actually rose from the dead is proved by evidence so overwhelming—by the New Testament records, Paul's conversion, the continuous observance of the Lord's Day and Easter, the very existence of the Church—that so much must perforce be admitted. How, then, is this faith of the early Church to be explained? Here is the fact. What is its cause? The mythical theory is out of court. Myths require time for their growth. As long as the original facts remain fresh in the knowledge of men, it is impossible to surround them with a halo of legend. And nothing is more certain than that the apostles preached the Resurrection at the time and on the spot. The only refuge left is the visionary theory advocated by Renan. That is, the apostles, seeing a vision, an apparition of Christ, which was the creation of their own brooding hope and fancy, mistook it for a living man. But this is a psychological impossibility. Such a confounding of vision and reality is only possible in two cases. First, in the case of weak, sentimental, half-crazy persons, which the apostles were not. Such cases are altogether abnormal. Or, secondly, where an idea has become a fixed matter of belief and expectation. This the Resurrection was not. All the evidence goes to show that the disciples were in a state of dismay and despair, the very opposite of the state of ecstatic rapture, which could alone have given birth to the dream of the Resurrection. Moreover, the idea was not a familiar one to the Jews. The Old Testament shows that to them death

was associated with thoughts of gloom and irrevocable fixity. Besides, is it usual for such hallucinations as the theory alleges to happen to many persons at the same time and to happen again and again? According to this theory, the whole Christian Church, the greatest birth of time, with all its beneficent results, originated in an illusion, a gross blunder. What earthly empire or institution ever had such an origin? Give us a second instance of the kind. F. C. Baur, indeed, argues that, in order to explain Christianity and the Christian Church, we do not need the fact of the Resurrection, but only the faith of the apostles in it. But the question, How did this faith arise? returns with irresistible force.[1]

b. Prophecy, as an evidence of Revelation, is regarded simply in the narrow sense of prediction. In the broader sense a prophet is a specially commissioned messenger from God (Ex. iv. 16, vii. 1). There were many prophets of whom no predictions are recorded. Prediction is an evidence of divine knowledge, as the miracles just considered are an evidence of divine power. The evidence of miracles is complete at the time, that of prophecy is reserved for the future. One is a fixed amount, the other is growing. One exhibits the divine rule chiefly in nature, the other in history and human life. The question may be asked, if the evidential force of prediction belongs to the future, what was its use at the time of utterance? It will generally be found that prediction appeared in times of national degeneracy and distress, and was intended for purposes of encouragement and warning.

A change has taken place in the mode of treating Scripture prophecy. Formerly the practice was to deal with isolated predictions (Keith), now it is to lay stress on the system of prophecy as a whole (Davison, P. Fairbairn). The Messianic prophecies may be taken as an example. Whatever may be thought of the importance to be ascribed to particular predictions, it is impos-

[1] Fairbairn, *Studies in the Life of Christ*, ch. xviii. ; Row, Bampton Lect. *Christian Evidences*, Lect. vii. ; Godet, *Defence of Christian Faith*, Lect. i., ii. ; Paley, *Evidences of Christianity*.

sible to deny that there is a gradually unfolding series of prophecies on this subject, beginning with the protevangelium, and culminating in the oracles of the greater and lesser prophets, which can only be explained as the result of divine inspiration.[1]

The fulfilment of prediction plainly shows that the history of which it forms part was under supernatural direction. Natural development is present in other histories. Looking back, we see that English institutions are the outgrowth of former conditions, and can trace the successive stages of their growth. The peculiarity of Jewish history is that its development was foretold. This is not natural, but supernatural, development.

The alternatives to the truth of prophecy are, either a merely natural explanation of the passages in question, arrived at by bald, strained exegesis applied on the larger scale, or the theory of interpolation. The latter theory is excluded, not merely by the fact of the extraordinary care with which the Jews guarded their sacred books, but also by the insuperable difficulty of framing successful forgeries of ancient documents. The prophecies are as much part of the texture of the Old Testament as the miracles are of the New. Subsequent forgery is as little to be thought of in one case as in the other.[2]

C. *Auxiliary Evidences.*—These are such as—

a. The Unity of Scripture. Scripture, while made up of the works of some thirty different writers, separated by intervals of centuries, is yet as perfectly one both in form and contents as if it were the product of a single mind. The unity, too, is not that of a machine, obtained by adding part to part, but that of a living organism, which preserves its identity amid continual change. Unity is combined with progress. This is strikingly seen in respect of the teaching of Scripture on all the great

[1] Orelli, *Old Test. Prophecy* (T. & T. Clark).

[2] Davison, *Discourses on Prophecy;* P. Fairbairn on *Prophecy: its Distinctive Nature;* Dean Jackson, Bk. vii. chs. v.–xix.; Payne Smith, *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ.*

doctrines of religion. Thus the earliest and the latest revelations of the divine nature and character differ only in clearness and fulness. All the discrepancies that have ever been alleged, taken at the worst, relate merely to what is external and superficial. Each of the two Testaments forms a whole by itself; the two together form a larger whole. It is interesting to note how the later volume treats the earlier one as one book. In Heb. i. 5–13, five different passages are combined; in Rom. ii. 8–10, three; iii. 10–18, six, etc. How is this profound unity to be explained? Only on the supposition that Scripture issues from one mind, as the doctrine of inspiration affirms.[1]

b. The Character of Christ. The uniqueness and perfection of Christ's moral character are universally admitted. Its uniqueness is seen in the harmonious blending of apparently inconsistent virtues, which exist in other cases for the most part separately and in excess. The character also is not drawn out by the evangelists in set form, but represents the total impression made on the reader's mind. It is exhibited in Christ's words and acts. The life, moreover, is described by four different writers, who, dealing with the same subject, set it in different points of view. Either, then, this character is real, *i.e.* the writers simply describe what they saw and heard, or it is the invention of the evangelists. The latter supposition is too wild for belief. In that case, obscure Jews have accomplished what the greatest dramatists and novelists have never done; they have given to a fictitious creation such an air of reality as to impose on the whole world. Besides, even writers of fiction are dependent on their age for materials. Where in the Jewish world of Christ's days were the materials of such a picture to be found? If the character is real, *i.e.* if it is simply copied from life, we are committed to Christ's teaching, and the Christian position is established.[2]

[1] Rogers, *Superhuman Origin of Bible*; Paley, *Hor. Paulinæ;* Blunt, *Undesigned Coincidences.*

[2] Young, *Christ of History;* Row, *The Jesus of the Evangelists; Ibid.* Bampton Lecture, Lect. iv. It has often been remarked that the sense of

c. The Holiness uniformly ascribed to God in Scripture points to a superhuman origin. According to Scripture, righteousness is God's essential, unchanging attribute. This feature alone puts an impassable gulf between the Christian and the heathen conception of God. In Scripture righteousness is not an abstract ideal, but an active attribute. It is the rule of the divine dealings. As to the reflections made on some of these dealings in the Old Testament, it must be remembered that these acts are judicial punishments of sin. After every possible deduction, it cannot be denied that the moral standard of Scripture is very high. And remembering man's tendency to frame deities in his own image, it is difficult to believe that the Scripture conception of the divine character is the result of human thought.

d. Contrast between Christ's Teaching and that of human philosophers. Canon Row, in his Bampton Lecture (p. 130), has worked out a strong argument on this ground. The points of contrast are such as these:—Philosophers begin with the speculative; they essay faultless definitions of virtue which are never reached. So with Plato. Christ sketches a concrete morality, which has certainly never been excelled, if it has ever been equalled. Philosophers aim at constructing a perfect State through which to regenerate society. See Plato's *Republic*. Christ begins with the individual. The schemes of reform proposed by philosophers were exclusive and aristocratic; they required culture, and gave up the lower and lapsed classes as hopeless. Christ's aims comprehend all; if any preference is shown, it is for the neglected and lost. Philosophers emphasized the stronger virtues, such as courage, justice, magnanimity. Christ puts the milder virtues first. He shifted, so to speak, the centre of gravity in ethics, an act which has had incalculable consequences (see Mr. Row's striking remarks, p. 158). Philosophers work through habit, which is

sin and moral defect, which is an invariable mark of the holiest natures, is absent in Christ. Christ's perfection is admitted. How is the difference to be explained?

conservative, improving the good and confirming the bad, but initiating nothing; Christ through faith, which is creative Such contrasts as these involve much more than a difference of degree. Christ's teaching is on a new, an opposite line. Its effect must be the creation of a new type of morality. To say that all this is explained by religious genius is not enough, because genius after all does not create entirely new types, but carries existing types to a higher point.

e. The influence of Christianity in the world. In the same work, Mr. Row argues very powerfully that the influence of Christ and Christianity amounts to a moral miracle (pp. 91, 101). The argument supposes that there is a fixed order in the moral as in the physical world, and that there are laws which limit the extent of human action. Everything, therefore, going beyond these laws is a miracle. Human experience is now long enough to enable us to ascertain what man's unaided powers can and cannot do. The question then is, Can Christ's influence be explained as the result of these natural powers? And the question must be answered by an appeal to facts, and a comparison of the position of Christianity to-day with that of other systems. As matter of fact, countless lives of the finest purity, to say nothing of the great characters and movements of Christendom, have owed their origin to Christ. Can it be said that the force which dwelt in him, and which has been the spring of so much other force, was merely human?[1]

D. *Personal Experience.*—This evidence arises from reflection on what Scripture has been and is to the individual Christian. What did it find me? What has it made me? Is not its influence on me different in kind from that of every other book? If so, is it not the voice of God? If God has spoken to me at all, has he not spoken here? This argument is peculiar to the Christian. It cannot be adduced to others, but

[1] Storrs, *Divine Origin of Christianity;* Brace's *Gesta Christi.* See criticism in Bruce, *Miraculous Element in the Gospels,* p. 294; Row, *Manual of Christian Evidences;* Schmidt, *Social Results of Early Christianity.*

to him it is the most powerful of all. The conviction it begets is more than intellectual. It is sufficient of itself in the absence of the others, as the experience of the majority of Christians proves. Protestantism has always laid stress on it under the name of *testimonium Spiritus Sancti.*

The cumulative force of these lines of evidence must be taken into account. Each strengthens the other. Their aggregate forms the firm foundation of Christian faith in Scripture as a revelation from God.

Sec. 2.—Inspiration.

A.—Doctrine of Inspiration.

The most feasible distinction between Revelation and Inspiration is the one which applies the former to the divine communication to selected agents, and the latter to the special divine influence ensuring the accurate record of the communication in writing. Even without the latter we have at least as good reason for regarding Scripture as a substantially accurate record of the original revelation as we have for receiving ordinary historical narratives; and this might seem to be sufficient. If, however, not merely the source but the medium of revelation is divine, if, that is, we have reason to believe that special divine influence presided over the recording of revelation, we have the best guarantee that the revelation comes to us uncorrupted. There might be revelation without inspiration. It might be the divine will simply to make known certain truths and then leave their preservation to human fidelity. Whether this is the case or not, we can only learn from the facts. This is the view taken of the office of inspiration by Dr. Pope, who says, "Inspiration, distinguished from revelation, denotes the specific agency of the Holy Ghost in the creation and construction of Holy Scripture." "The Scriptures, fairly compared and interpreted, declare it to be that special influence of the Holy Ghost on the minds of holy men, selected for the purpose, which

qualified them to communicate from age to age an infallible record of divine truth concerning the redeeming will of God."[1] Dr. Hodge says, "The effect of revelation was to render its recipient wiser. The effect of inspiration was to preserve him from error in teaching. . . . Revelation is the act of communicating divine knowledge by the Spirit to the mind. Inspiration is the act of the same Spirit, controlling those who make the truth known to others."[2] Dr. Lee says, "By Inspiration I understand that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit, guided by which the human agents chosen by God have *officially* proclaimed his will by word of mouth, or have committed to writing the several portions of the Bible."[3]

The work of Revelation is generally connected in Scripture with Christ (John i. 18; Gal. i. 12; Matt. xi. 27; Heb. iii. 1), that of Inspiration with the Holy Spirit (2 Pet. i. 21; 1 Pet. i. 11).

Inspiration is proved from Scripture itself. This may seem like arguing in a circle, but it is not really so. We here simply assume, what has been already established, that Scripture is a divine revelation, that its statements are generally as trustworthy as those of other similar records. And we ask, What does it say about itself? What claims does it make? What do its claims presuppose? It will be seen that the idea of inspiration is not so much matter of express statement as a belief made necessary by the tone and style of Scripture teaching, or in other words it is an inference from the phenomena of Scripture. It may indeed be objected that such a mode of argument would commit us to belief in the claims of the Koran and other sacred books. But if the previous argument holds good, the difference is evident. We have already ascertained the substantial historical truth of Scripture.

[1] *Compend.* i. 156, 168. [2] *System. Theol.* i. 155, 162.

[3] *The Inspiration of Holy Scripture*, p. 27; Bannerman, *Inspiration of the Scriptures*, p. 151 (Clark).

a. The Old Testament.

The Inspiration of the Old Testament may be established by a short and easy method, namely, by an appeal to the fact that Christ and the apostles treat it as a final divine authority. They endorse the Jewish belief of their day on the subject. What that belief was, we know on the testimony of Jewish authorities like Josephus and Philo.[1] It was the same that the belief of the Christian Church has always been, the same as ours. The books forming the Old Testament were separated from the rest of Jewish literature and invested with divine authority.

The term Scripture carried with it the same connotation for the Jews that it does for us. And we find it used in this sense (of course in reference to the Old Testament) about forty times in the New Testament (John v. 39, x. 35; Luke iv. 21; Matt. xxii. 29), the Scripture, the Scriptures, Holy Scriptures (Rom. i. 2); "the sacred writings" (2 Tim. iii. 15). The same Old Testament words are quoted both as divine (Matt. xv. 3, 4, 6) and as human (Mark vii. 10). See Mark xii. 36; comp. Acts xxviii. 25, and John xii. 41; Heb. x. 15, iii. 7; Acts i. 16. "That which was spoken by the Lord through the prophet" (ὑπὸ κυρίου διὰ τοῦ προφήτου, Matt. i. 22). The New Testament argues from the very words of the Old (Gal. iii. 16; John x. 34–36; Matt. xxii. 32, 43–45).

The bearing of the statement in 2 Tim. iii. 16 on this subject is not materially changed by the acceptance of the new translation. If the phrase "inspired of God" is thus transferred from the predicate to the subject, inspiration is simply assumed instead of being asserted. The new translation may indeed seem to leave an opening for a distinction between inspired and non-inspired portions of the sacred writings. But no such distinction was known to Jewish thought; and the apostle, as a Jew, would be the last to suppose it.

[1] Pope, i. 177; Lee, p. 53.

A possible objection is that Christ and the apostles merely accommodated themselves to current Jewish opinion. But nothing is more certain than that they exercised discrimination, condemning some beliefs and endorsing others (see Mark vii. 8–13; Matt. xii. 2–8). If, as the objection supposes, Christ and the apostles endorsed erroneous beliefs, either ignorantly or wilfully, their authority as teachers is gone.

The only Old Testament books not referred to in the New are Ecclesiastes, Canticles, Esther, Ezra, and Nehemiah.

b. The New Testament.

The proof of the inspiration of the New Testament depends on the proof of two other facts, the promise of special help to the apostles in their official work, and the New Testament books being the work of apostles or of those immediately connected with them. Neither of these two facts is difficult of proof.

a. In Matt. x. 19, 20 and parallel passages the help of the Holy Spirit is promised to the apostles in their public apologies for the faith. If these passages stood alone, no more help would be promised than is given to all believers in like circumstances. But there is a series of passages in St. John's Gospel (xiv. 16, 17, 20, 26, xv. 26, 27, xvi. 7, 12–15) which affirm much more. The Holy Spirit will enable the apostles to recall the past, and will communicate all further knowledge that is necessary. They are directed to wait in Jerusalem for the power from on high, which power they receive in its fulness at Pentecost. The transformation in their character is marvellous. This endowment of power bore upon every part of their apostolic work; and in that work none could compare in importance with the recording for all after time of the origin and doctrines of the Christian faith.

b. The New Testament books all bear the names of apostles and helpers of apostles. The proof that this repute is genuine may be postponed till the question of the Canon comes up.

The historical evidence is the same in both cases. We assume then for the present that the Christian tradition on this subject is to be trusted.

The authority claimed by the apostles is the highest possible, Gal. i. 8, 12. St. Paul could not have used such language unless he had been conscious of teaching in the divine name. If the "prophets" mentioned in Eph. ii. 20 are the Old Testament prophets, as is most probable (comp. 2 Pet. iii. 2), the apostles are put on a level with them. It has often been observed that in 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16, St. Paul's writings are implicitly called "Scriptures."

An objection is sometimes drawn from the way in which the Old Testament is quoted in the New. These quotations, it is said, are so free that the writers cannot have ascribed divine authority to the ancient Scriptures. Dr. Lee,[1] however, has shown that the quotations are by no means so inexact and capricious as is represented. A fourfold law governs them:— (1) Where the Septuagint agrees with the Hebrew in meaning, it is quoted literally. (2) Where it gives a wrong meaning, the Hebrew original is translated. (3) In a few cases the quotation agrees with neither. (4) One New Testament writer follows the Septuagint, another the Hebrew in the same passage. There are no doubt some difficult cases, which need to be considered by themselves.

B.—DOGMA OF INSPIRATION.

There is no uniform theory of inspiration universally received in the Church. Indeed, there is no subject on which there is less approach to unanimity as regards formal definition. At the same time there is no subject on which there is closer agreement as regards substance. The substance of inspiration may be said to be, that Scripture is divine in form as well as in contents. It is to the very absence of controversy on this point (and controversy has always been the occasion of

[1] P. 349.

definition) that the absence of definition is due. The way in which Scripture has always been appealed to as God's word in a special sense is proof enough of the Church's faith in inspiration.

Before we are asked to decide on the Verbal theory of Inspiration, we need to have it defined. If it means that every word of Scripture was equally given by the Spirit to the human writer, it is doubtful whether any one holds it. All, when pressed to define, admit distinctions and modifications. How is the rigid theory applicable to the historical portions of Scripture? How is it reconcilable with differences in narratives of the same events and records of the same discourses? Such differences are explicable from different writers speaking from different points of view, but are scarcely compatible with the same mind taking different points of view with little or no apparent reason. How, too, is the theory reconcilable with the different styles of writing? No doubt it is reconcilable, for we can suppose the Holy Spirit adapting himself to different mental constitutions. But the explanation makes Scripture appear unnatural, allowing too little play to the human agent.

But if strict verbal inspiration is confined to some portions, all admit it. That we are unable to distinguish the portions is no difficulty, for we do not need to do so. The portions which do not come under the head of rigid verbal inspiration are just as really inspired as the rest, but not in the same degree.

The holders of the rigid theory, when they come to apply it to historical Scripture, so limit and qualify it that it ceases to be what it professes to be. It becomes identical in substance with the theory known as Dynamical.

The latter term is used to denote that the Holy Spirit works in and through the natural faculties and gifts of the writers. This theory explains all the phenomena without strain. The divine and the human interpenetrate each other. Each is distinct, and yet each exists in indissoluble union with the other. We

have here then the same mystery as in the incarnation. Origen says, "Scripture as a whole is God's one perfect and complete instrument; giving forth to those who wish to learn, its one saving music from many notes combined." [1]

The inspiration of Scripture is specifically different from that of ordinary Christians. Otherwise no authority can be ascribed to it simply as Scripture; it only appeals like other forms of teaching to human reason, and we are only bound to receive its doctrine in so far as we can comprehend it. What will be the fate of mysterious doctrines is easily seen.

The tendency in early days was to a rigid theory. The human writer was made all but passive, the favourite illustration of his office being the lyre. In modern days the most extreme form has been found in confessions of the Reformed side, where not merely a verbal but a literal inspiration has been taught.[2] But it is foolish to write, as Romanist writers do, as if Protestantism were committed to such views. The subject is one on which still further inquiry is necessary and desirable.

[Lee, *Inspiration of Holy Scripture;* Gaussen, *Theopneustia*, Given, *Revelation, Inspiration, and the Canon;* Bannerman, *Inspiration of Scripture;* Charteris, *N. T. Scriptures*, Lect. ii.[3]]

Sec. 3.—Canon of Scripture.

This truth follows from the two previous ones. If Scripture is divinely revealed and inspired, it must be the canon of religious faith and conduct.

[1] "At length all is finished. A profound piece of music, a vast oratorio, perfect and of elaborate unity, has resulted from a long succession of strains, each for itself fragmentary. On such a final creation, resulting from such a distraction of parts, it is indispensable to suppose an overruling inspiration, in order at all to account for the final result of a most elaborate harmony." De Quincey in Lee, p. 113.

[2] Pope, *Compend.* i. 181.

[3] Blunt, *Dict. Theology*, "Inspiration;" Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 183.

The term canon (*κανών*, rule)[1] has two shades of meaning, passive and active. It is first measured, *i.e.* itself made a rule; then it measures other things. We cannot speak of Scripture being made a canon by human authority, but only of its being recognised as such.[2]

A. *Passive*,—the recognition of Scripture as a rule of faith and conduct. Undoubtedly the formal statement of this idea was of slow growth, taking several centuries to arrive at completeness. As the phrase, "History of the Growth of the Canon," may be easily misunderstood, some explanation is necessary. It might mean, and is often represented as meaning, that books of the New Testament, once not regarded as divine, came gradually to be regarded in this light. But how was this possible? Which of the early Christian Churches or writers ever pretended to confer authority on any book? They never professed to do more than believe and teach as the Christians before them did. If any book was without divine authority in the Church, it could never acquire it. The position here is precisely the same as in the other dogmas, *e.g.* the Trinity. All that is new is the formal, precise statement of the idea of supreme authority attaching to certain books and no others, and the expression of this idea in an apt phrase. The substance of the truth is as old as Christianity. We are again met by the Romanist statement, that we owe the Canon of Scripture to the Church. Undoubtedly we owe to the Church what has just been stated, and no more. We do not owe to it the idea of scriptural authority, which is the kernel and essence of the truth. If we do, let any one tell us when and where the Church made any book authoritative that was not so before. The local Synod of Carthage, 397 A.D., only professed to state what books were received in the Church as Scripture; and in doing even so much it went grievously wrong, like the Council of Trent nearly twelve centuries afterwards.

[1] Other applications are ecclesiastical ones, — canonical, canons of councils, etc.

[2] Blunt, *Dict. Theology*, "Canon;" Smith, *Dict. of Bible*, "Canon."

a. Old Testament.

The identity of our Old Testament with the Jewish canon is established by a long line of witnesses. The two Jewish schools of Babylon and Jerusalem were in accord on the subject. Josephus and Philo arrange the books differently from what we do, but the books are the same. The tradition is continued through the Talmudists (2nd to 6th century A.D.) and the Masoretes (6th to 9th) to our own days. Among early Christian writers, Melito of Sardis (179 A.D.) has our Old Testament with the exception of Esther; Origen omits the Minor Prophets, but the imperfect state in which his writings have come down to us must be remembered; Jerome, a high authority on this question, has ours; Augustine is wavering about the Apocrypha.

The *Apocryphal* books arose in Alexandria, and were generally associated as a supplement with the Septuagint. The Septuagint was naturally used extensively in the West both for reading and as the basis of translation; and in this way the Apocrypha passed into the West. Augustine, whose authority on such a subject is as slight as Jerome's is great, gave countenance to it, and to his influence the action of the Carthage synod is due. The Apocrypha never formed part of the Hebrew and Jewish canon. There are no Targums on it. Jerome, Melito, Origen, Athanasius, Hilary, Cyril of Jerusalem, Epiphanius, Gregory Nazianzen do not acknowledge it. It is not quoted in the New Testament, a decisive fact in face of the numerous quotations from the Old. Yet the Tridentine Council endorsed it. The English and Lutheran Churches read the Apocrypha for instruction and edification, a course to which there can be little objection. The books of Maccabees, Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom, The Song of the Three Children, are well worth attention.

b. The New Testament.[1]

The principal difficulty is in the period ending with the third quarter of the 2nd century, and the difficulty arises from the scantiness of the remains of early Christian literature. If we may suppose that the writers, whose works have perished, were as full of incidental references to the New Testament as those whose works remain in whole or in part, nothing could be more abundant than the evidence.

First, the Apostolic Fathers. *Clement of Rome* (96 A.D.).[2] His Epistle to the Corinthians mentions Paul's to the same church, "Take up the epistle of the blessed Paul the apostle. . . . He charged you concerning himself and Cephas and Apollos." He has many allusions to the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as to Matthew, Luke, and Romans. His quotations begin with "It is written," "God saith." The Epistle of *Barnabas* (72) is steeped in the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews, though greatly inferior in spirit and tone. He introduces a quotation from Matthew with "as it is written." *Polycarp* has more references to the New Testament than any other writer of his day, but they are all tacit. He says to the Philippians, "The blessed and glorious Paul wrote letters to you." Peter's influence on him is marked. *Hermas* bears the same relation to St. James that Barnabas does to the Hebrews. He seems to speak for the Judaizing party. James and Revelation are often alluded to. There are clear allusions to Matthew, Luke, John, and Acts. Christ's words are paraphrased. *Ignatius* (107) refers almost exclusively to Paul, whose teaching on the relation of Christianity to Judaism he reproduces. He has also reminiscences of Matthew and John.

The Apostolic Fathers contain references then to Romans, 1 and 2 Cor., Gal., Eph., Phil., 1 and 2 Tim., Heb., Jas., 1 Pet., 1 John, and Revelation. Many of the facts of Christ's earthly life are mentioned, such as the miraculous Birth, Baptism, the Star, the Resurrection, and Ascension.

[1] See p. 52.

[2] See Phil. iv. 3.

The writer, however, on whom controversy chiefly turns is Justin Martyr (150), whose two Apologies and Dialogue with the Jew Trypho are extant. Not the least valuable part of his testimony is his recital of all, or nearly all, the facts of Christ's earthly life in exact coincidence with the Gospels. So close is the correspondence that, were the Gospels lost, we could recover the substance of the history from Justin.[1] The points of discrepancy are so slight as not to be worth mention.[2] Either, then, Justin got his knowledge from our Gospels, or from other documents essentially identical with them. For all that is vital to our position, it matters little which is the fact. But really the writers who speak so fluently of other documents lying behind our Gospels should give some proof of the existence of such documents. Our Gospels exist, no others do. Of course as matter of abstract possibility our Gospels may have been derived from earlier writings. But where is the evidence of such derivation? How is it that those earlier documents, which, as the earliest depositories of the faith, must have been unspeakably precious to the Church, have passed away and left no trace behind? Their existence is mere conjecture and possibility.

Justin uses the term "Gospels," but his ordinary name for the writings he refers to is "Memoirs of the Apostles." If these are not our Gospels, what are they? He speaks of them as "composed by apostles and those who followed them."

Justin probably refers to Matthew, Mark, Luke, (John), Revelation, Colossians, Romans, Corinthians, 2 Thess., Hebrews. "The Catholic Epistles, Titus, Philemon only left no trace."

The testimony of *Papias* is only known to us through Eusebius. His five books, *Exposition of Oracles of the Lord*, would have been invaluable[3] if they had survived. He speaks of the Gospel of Matthew in Hebrew, and of Mark as a disciple of Peter, not of Christ. We gather also that he knew John's

[1] Westcott, *Hist. of Canon*, p. 94. For Justin's life, see Smith, *Dict. Christ. Biogr.* [2] *Ibid.* p. 138.

[3] So of the Five books of Memoirs by Hegesippus.

Gospel. Eusebius says that he quoted 1 John, 1 Peter, and held the inspiration of Revelation. His silence about Paul is significant, because it arose from his Judaizing tendencies.

Two other witnesses are the Muratorian Canon (end of 2nd century) and the Syriac Version of the New Testament (Peshito, first half of 2nd century). The first derives its name from the scholar who unearthed it in the Ambrosian library in Milan in a MS. of the 7th or 8th century. It is evidently a translation from the Greek, and is imperfect at the beginning and end. Internal evidence fixes its great antiquity. It professes to give an account of the New Testament books. What is its account? Luke is put in the third place, and is mentioned as Paul's companion. The fourth place is assigned to John. The Acts is a record by Luke "of those acts of all the apostles which fell under his notice." 13 Epistles of Paul are mentioned, 9 to churches and 4 to individuals. There is also mention of 1 and 2 Cor., Eph., Phil., Col., Gal., 1 and 2 Thess., Romans, and less clearly of Revelation, 2 and 3 John, and Jude. Those not mentioned are 1 Pet., 1 John, James, 2 Pet., and Hebrews. No apocryphal books are added.

The Peshito is the most venerable of translations. It became the basis of translations into Arabic, Persian, and Armenian, and is still used by all Syrian sects. It omits only 2 and 3 John, 2 Pet., Jude, and Revelation.

The only book of which hitherto no mention is found is 2 Peter. All the rest—namely, 4 Gospels, 13 Epistles of Paul, 3 of John, 1 Pet., James, Jude, Rev., Hebrews—are referred to more or less. Dr. Westcott says: "With the exception of Hebrews, 2 and 3 John, 2 Pet., James, Jude, and Revelation, all other books of the New Testament are acknowledged as apostolic and authoritative at the close of the 2nd century."[1]

After this we find references to the less known books as follows: to 2 Peter "perhaps," Revelation of John, Heb., James, Jude, in Origen; to Heb.,[2] Jude, 1 John, and Revelation, in Clement of Alexandria; to Heb., 2 and 3 John,

[1] P. 293. [2] "Written in Hebrew and translated by Luke."

Revelation,[1] in Dionysius; to Jude and Revelation, in Tertullian, Cyprian, etc.; to Revelation, in Hippolytus; to Heb. and Revelation, in Methodius. No book is added.

Eusebius (270–340 A.D.) closes the list. His testimony is valuable for two reasons. He had in his hands works which have since perished. He had also made a special study of early Christian history. Treating of the present subject, he divides the New Testament books into three classes, Acknowledged, Disputed, and Spurious. The first class includes the 4 Gospels, Acts, Paul's Epistles, 1 John, 1 Pet., Revelation; the second, James, Jude, 2 Pet., 2 and 3 John; the third, Revelation, "if not by the Apostle John," of which evidently he had no doubt. "Disputed" may easily be misunderstood. It is plainly used to indicate books which were less generally known and used. It will be seen that the books coming under this head are not those which are much used in the establishing of doctrine.

Two circumstances that would seem to put forgery and interpolation out of the question are, that the Christian Scriptures were read in public worship,[2] and the existence of different parties and sects which appealed to the same books. Some of the first commentaries issued from writers who stood apart from the majority of the Church. Witness the *Diatessaron* of Tatian, and the commentaries of Heracleon.[3] The fanciful argument of Irenæus, to show that only four Gospels were possible, is well known.[4]

We may well ask, What other works of the ancient world are attested by such various and converging lines of evidence?

B. *Active sense.*—The Scripture is the rule of Christian doctrine and practice, the sole and final court of appeal in the Christian Church.

[1] "Inspired, but not John's."

[2] Referred to by Justin, Tertullian, Origen. The first says, "The memoirs of the apostles, or the writings of the prophets, are read as time allows; and when the reader has ended, the president makes a discourse," etc.

[3] Quoted in Clement and Origen.

[4] Charteris, *N. T. Scriptures*, Lect. iii.–vi.

The only heresy to be noticed on the subject is that of the Roman Church. Protestant creeds are unanimous in rejecting every other source and standard of revealed truth. Eng. Art. vi.: "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite and necessary to salvation." West. Conf. i. 6: "The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture; unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men." *Form. Conc.:* "We believe the only rule and standard, by which all dogmas and all teachers are to be measured and judged, is no other than the writings of the prophets and apostles, as well in the Old Testament as the New."[1]

The Roman Church receives Scripture as we do, but co-ordinates Tradition with it. *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv.: "The holy Synod . . . ever keeping in view the removal of error, and the conserving of the purity of the Gospel in the Church . . . and seeing this truth and discipline to be contained in the written Scriptures, and the unwritten traditions, which, received by the apostles from Christ's own lips, or handed down by the apostles themselves at the Holy Spirit's dictation, have come down to us,—following in the footsteps of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with equal feeling of piety and equal reverence all the books, as well of the Old as of the New Testament, the same God being the author of both, and also the traditions, whether pertaining to faith or morals, which

[1] Credimus . . . unicam regulam et normam, secundum quam omnia dogmata omnesque doctores æstimari et judicari oporteat, nullam omnino aliam esse, quam prophetica et apostolica scripta cum V. tum N. T. Winer, *Conf.* p. 42; Cramp, *Text-Book of Popery*, Rule of Faith, p. 39; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* i. 104, 151.

were dictated, so to speak, by the very lips of Christ or by the Holy Spirit, and have been preserved by continuous succession in the Catholic Church."[1]

Bellarmin says: "We assert that all essential doctrine, whether as to faith or morals, is not expressly contained in the Scriptures, and therefore, beside God's written Word, God's unwritten Word (*i.e.* the divine and apostolical traditions) is necessary."

Let the official definition of tradition be marked. They are doctrines "received from Christ's own lips by the apostles," or "handed down by the apostles at the Holy Spirit's dictation" to our days. If, then, the distinctive doctrines of the Roman Church—Transubstantiation, Eucharistic sacrifice and worship, devotion to the Virgin, the Immaculate Conception, Purgatory, Masses for the Dead — are traditions in this sense, we must suppose that they were taught by Christ and the apostles, but for some reason or other were not recorded, but handed down by word of mouth, and only brought out to light ages afterwards? It is needless to say that if this could be proved, every Christian would at once bow to such authority. As matter of fact, the only traditions which answer to this definition are those contained in Scripture. Where were these doctrines during the long interval between Christ's days and the time of their publication? "Preserved by continuous succession in the Catholic Church." Where, in what writers?

[1] Synodus . . . hoc sibi perpetuo ante oculos proponens, ut sublatis erroribus puritas ipsa evangelii in ecclesia conservetur . . . perspiciensque hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, quæ ex ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptæ, aut ab ipsis apostolis, Spiritu Sancto dictante, quasi per manus traditæ, ad nos usque pervenerunt: orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta, omnes libros tam V. quam N. T., cum utriusque unus Deus sit auctor, nec non traditiones ipsos, tum ad fidem tum ad mores pertinentes, tamquam vel ore tenus a Christo, vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas et continuâ successione in ecclesiâ catholicâ conservatas, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ suscipit et veneratur. *Ibid.* pp. 38, 40.

The Roman Church is not faithful to its only official definition of tradition. A much wider range, indeed a totally different meaning, is ascribed to the term. The traditions "received from Christ's own lips," or "handed down by the apostles at the Holy Spirit's dictation," are simply opinions and interpretations advanced at different periods by different teachers, allowed to remain for a longer or shorter time in this nebulous condition, then taken up, discussed, and stamped with official authority. Thus it is evident that some authority is needed to sit in judgment on these individual opinions, and separate the true from the false. The Roman Church does not accept all indiscriminately, it rejects many even of Augustine's views. This final interpreting authority is the Church, and in the last resort (according to the newest definition) the Pope. To this the doctrine of Tradition has come. For ages it was disputed whether the interpreting authority was the whole Episcopate speaking through General Councils, or the Pope, or both combined. Now we are told that the voice of the Church is the voice of the Pope speaking officially. The difference is immaterial.[1]

Where is the voice of the Church or the Pope to be heard? In Papal Bulls, in Canons and Decrees of Councils. Nowhere else. None else are infallible. A bishop or priest interpreting these is as fallible as any Protestant teacher. Now the great argument against Scripture as the sole divine authority is its supposed obscurity and difficulty of interpretation. But what of Papal rescripts and Conciliar definitions, with their ecclesiastical Latin and highly technical phraseology? "Scripture is difficult and needs to be interpreted." Here is the interpreter —the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, the Bull *Ineffabilis* of December 8, 1854, etc. etc.! This is called explain-

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv.: Sancta mater ecclesia, cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione Scripturarum Sanctarum, Winer, p. 50. "The Catholic Church enjoys to-day the same authority and the same divine assistance as in the days of the apostles; it therefore possesses the same infallibility," Malou quoted in Winer, p. 41.

ing the obscure by the simple![1] If it be said that, as in other concerns of life, we may trust competent interpreters, may not precisely the same be said of Scripture? What have we gained on the head of directness or greater simplicity? Besides, where is the infallible teaching which was held out as a bait? We are no nearer to it than before. We are left as much as ever at the mercy of fallible teachers and of our own understanding.

One retort we cannot withhold. A favourite popular argument of Roman disputants is that on the Protestant standpoint divine authority attaches to the original text of Scripture only, and that in trusting to translations we have only human authority. So, we may reply, on the Roman theory divine authority belongs only to the *ipsissima verba* of Papal and Conciliar decrees and definitions, not to any translations of them. How are we better off, if we are left to the teaching of fallible bishops and priests?

Another argument in favour of a living infallible interpreter is the alleged incompleteness of Scripture. The inspired Epistles are a supplement to the Gospels. But where is there any hint of a further designed supplement of the same kind?

Another alleged advantage of such a standing authority is just as illusory. It is supposed to deliver us from the uncertainty and liability to err belonging to private judgment. But is no action of individual judgment necessary in the Roman Catholic? Has he not to decide on the claims of the Church? Must he not satisfy himself, first, that it was Christ's will that the Church should possess this power, and secondly, that the Roman Church is the Church? The first is a question of Scripture interpretation, the second involves a vast historical investigation. We think that any one competent to decide these questions is *à fortiori* competent to decide any question of essential Christian doctrine, and shall continue to think

[1] See the alleged obscurity of Scripture fully and conclusively discussed in Dean Jackson, *Works*, Bk. ii. chs. xii.–xvi.

so until we see proof to the contrary. The latter question especially is one that would tax the greatest powers. The authority of the Church cannot be appealed to, for it is this very authority that is in question. To take such a conclusion on trust is not very rational. The only difference then between Romanist and Protestant is that the former brings his judgment to bear on a different and vastly more difficult question. He decides, as the result of inquiry, that the Church is the authority which God intends him to trust absolutely. And yet there is no action of private judgment in the Romanist position! The fact is, the acceptance of the entire theory rests and can rest on nothing else. A Romanist performs a gigantic act of decision once for all, a Protestant spreads it over the whole of life. The former, because he is not always deciding, thinks he never does so. Really it is very unkind and unwise in writers to say such harsh things of a power on which their own position depends. Indeed it is more than unwise, it is suicidal. Unless the action of the human mind, under proper guards and checks, is to be trusted, the Roman as well as the Protestant case is lost. To decide, as the Romanist does, by means of private judgment that private judgment in matters of faith is wrong and a root of all evil, is a strange proceeding.

The difficulty of interpreting Scripture is immensely exaggerated, for a purpose. No doubt there is difficulty enough in all that relates to points of language, history, science, chronology, and so forth. But these matters are quite apart from the knowledge necessary to Christian living. The two things, however, are dexterously and fallaciously mixed up. But does infallibility give any aid in inquiries into the subjects which form the real difficulty of Scripture? Are Roman exegetes and scholars in advance of Protestant? Is the humble member of the Roman communion wiser on such questions than an ordinary Protestant? We trow not. The dissensions springing from the exercise of private judgment are exaggerated in the same way. As has been already shown, there is far greater unity of belief among Christian Churches than is generally supposed.

A strong objection to the Roman theory is, that it weakens the sense of individual responsibility. Blind belief and obedience become the highest virtue. Where else is such unreasoning, indiscriminate submission and dependence required of us? Why should we suppose that to be the law in the religious life which is the law nowhere else? Everywhere else the consciousness of responsibility, of the possibility of mistake, is the keenest spur to caution and energetic effort. Remove this, and we sink into slaves and machines, the greatest check upon error and fraud is destroyed. Dependence, indeed, is the natural condition of childhood; and the strongest condemnation of the whole tendency of Roman teaching is, that it keeps Christians in a state of perpetual childhood; moral independence, and the strength that comes of it, are at an end.

It is a mistake to suppose that Protestantism undervalues the traditions and teachings of the Church as such. It simply repudiates Tradition as a co-ordinate authority with Scripture, practically above Scripture. In every other aspect Protestantism values at its highest the light to be gained from the unfolding thought of the Church. Fathers, doctors, schoolmen, Reformers, are all witnesses and teachers from whom there is much to be learnt.

Dr. Newman, in his theory of development, gave a new form to the Roman argument. According to this theory, the specially Roman doctrines are not present in Scripture, but are developed out of germs in Scripture. It is evident that we here come back to the same view of the Church as an infallible interpreter, because amid the countless developments that have appeared, we need some authority to separate the true from the false. We can as little discover the supposed germs in Scripture as the fully formed doctrine. But then we are told, "The Church discovers them there," and we have to acquiesce.[1]

Moreover, the interpreting authority of the Church is itself a development. If it guarantees everything else, what guarantees it? We are said to receive the Scriptures on the authority of

[1] Mozley, *Theory of Development;* Archer Butler, *Letters on Romanism.*

the Church. Yes, we reply, on its authority as a witness, but not as a judge. If in the latter sense, how is the authority of the Church established but by the authority of Scripture? If Augustine meant the latter in the oft-quoted words, "Evangelio non crederem nisi me Ecclesiæ Catholicæ commoveret auctoritas," he is entangled in this vicious circle.[1]

Again, no such living authoritative interpreter was known in Judaism, where it would have been more necessary, if necessary at all. The Rabbins, indeed, claimed such authority for their interpretations, but we know how Christ treated the claim. To set up such authority now, is to make Christianity less free and spiritual than Judaism.

There is, indeed, a true doctrine of development, which is a universal law of life; every doctrine has undergone change of form. But to apply the term to quite new doctrines is a misnomer. For the rest, the theory of Dr. Newman has not found much favour in the Roman Church, for it gives up the old claim of antiquity made in behalf of Roman doctrine.

It is evident that the Roman doctrine of the Church is

[1] "If they say, 'We must believe the Scriptures to be the word of God before we can believe the infallibility of their Church,' they overthrow their own and establish our own positions. For thus they make the Scripture a rule of our faith, at the least in this one article of the Catholic Church's infallibility. . . . But if the Scriptures may be the immediate and infallible rule of their belief in this article, what reason possibly can be imagined why they should not be the infallible and immediate rule of their faith in all other parts or articles of their creed? For I call heaven and earth, men and angels, to witness betwixt ours and the Romish Church, whether the articles of Christ's Incarnation, his Death, his Passion, his Burial, his Resurrection, his Ascension, his Intercession for us, the Resurrection of the Dead and Life Everlasting, etc., be not to any man's capacity in the world, much more plainly set down in sundry places of Scripture, than the infallibility of the present Romish Church, in these words, 'Peter, feed my sheep; Peter, to thee I give the keys of heaven; Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church. It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and us:' or in any place her sons can challenge for it." Jackson, Bk. ii. ch. xxx. 9, and all the chs. xix.–xxxi.

fundamental. It carries all the rest. If there is such an infallible interpreter of the divine will, a standing organ of revelation, we have no choice but to believe whatever it says. And if there is not, the entire Roman system collapses.

[On Canon, see Westcott, *Hist. of Canon of N. T.;* Charteris, *N. T. Scriptures, their Claims, etc.;* Reuss, *Hist. of the Canon;* Redford, *Christian's Plea against Modern Unbelief*, p. 361.

CHAPTER III.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES—THE TRINITY.

SEC. 1.—ATTRIBUTES.

THE relation of essence or substance to attribute is not readily defined. Is the essence simply the sum of the attributes? Are the attributes simply the unfolding of the essence? In other words, are the two things identical or different? In favour of a difference the usage of thought and language may be appealed to. Substance is conceived as underlying attribute, attribute as characterizing substance. If the distinction of the two is a necessity of thought, this is a strong argument in favour of a real distinction. It may then be asked, If essence is different from attributes, what is it? Take the attributes away, and where is the essence? It may be impossible to give an answer, and yet inseparable things are not necessarily identical. The point is immaterial to us here. We have, however, to guard against the two most prevalent errors respecting the nature of the divine attributes. One is, that they are simply human conceptions, with nothing corresponding to them in the divine nature. Although, it is said, we cannot help forming such conceptions, we must remember that they are mere anthropomorphisms on our part and accommodations on God's. This mode of thought has always been popular among writers of a philosophical cast, such as Augustine, Aquinas, the Scholastics, and some Lutheran and Reformed divines.[1] Mediæval Nominal-

[1] "Et sic intellectus noster distinguit quæ a parte rei distincta non sunt." The truth is, the attributes are neither more nor less distinct in God than the analogous qualities in us.

ism also favoured it.[1] But it is most unreal and unmeaning. Whence do we obtain the conceptions but from Scripture? Is the revelation there given a mere illusion? If man is made in God's image, must not his nature be an index of the divine? When we are told to ignore all distinctions, and to think of God as simple, abstract being, essence or act, we find it difficult to obey. Is it not enough at every step to bear in mind the imperfection of human language, and to try to avoid everything unworthy of God? To class the divine attributes with such anthropomorphisms as ascribe human organs to God is strange confusion. Martensen describes the attributes truly enough as "not human modes of apprehending God, but God's mode of revealing himself." A kindred error consists in the denial of all distinction between the attributes themselves. The same criticism applies here. We can no more conceive of power and knowledge as identical in God than in ourselves. And are these two attributes more distinct than justice and love?

Attributes are to be distinguished from predicates, such as Creator, Ruler, etc. The latter are derived from divine acts, and are indefinitely numerous. The former are permanent characteristics of the divine nature, and are limited in number.

It is not easy to find a classification of the divine attributes, perfectly free from objection.[2] In the Middle Ages, a threefold classification was generally adopted, *viâ negationis*, *eminentiæ*, *causalitatis*. Denying imperfections of God gives us one class; affirming good qualities in the highest degree, the second; the necessity for a cause, the third. The modern arrangement is a twofold one. Absolute, essential, immanent, quiescent, incommunicable attributes are set in contrast with relative, transitive, etc. Objections may be raised against every division. The chief point is to remember that no division is perfect. The terms absolute and relative are as acceptable as any. Under the

[1] Blunt, *Dict. Theology*, "Conceptualism."

[2] Luthardt, *Comp. d. Dogmatik*, p. 87; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* i. 374; Pope, *Comp.* i. 289; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* i. 420; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 91.

former term are included the attributes which belong to the Divine Being in himself, apart from creation; under the latter, such as belong to him in relation to creatures. The latter are subdivided into those relating to all creatures and those relating to moral creatures only. But we must be careful to avoid the notion that the relative attributes originate anything new in God, they can only be the manifestation of powers already existing. Every divine attribute is necessarily existent, but not necessarily active.

It is scarcely accurate to reckon spirituality and infinity as attributes. God *is* spirit (John iv. 24). Spirit is his essence. We know the nature of spirit to some extent from ourselves. We know it as the seat of knowledge, feeling, and action, in a word, as the seat of personality; and the divine perfections will be found to come under one or other of these heads. But we have only an imperfect conception of pure spirit. The fact that the very word spirit, and all terms denoting spiritual powers and acts, are taken in the first instance from material things, makes it difficult for us to exclude material notions altogether. Add infinite, and we have a brief definition of God—infinite Spirit, *i.e.* a Spirit infinite in all the attributes of spirit. Like absolute, the term infinite is vague, and needs to be defined. Fill it with such contents as power, etc., and the several divine attributes follow. Whether infinite is a positive or negative idea is a disputed point. Although the term is negative, the idea need not be so. In our attempts to approach the infinite, the finite is our starting-point, and every enlargement of the idea represents our effort to leave the finite behind. Here especially the difference between apprehension and comprehension is to be borne in mind. Both, however, represent real knowledge.

One of the most august features of the divine existence is that it is self-existence, unoriginated, necessary, independent, the cause of all other existence, itself uncaused. Even the phrase *causa sui*, sometimes applied to the Divine Being, is wrong. He could not but be; he could not but be what

he is. He is at once the most necessary and most free of all beings.

The Absolute attributes made prominent in Scripture are ETERNITY and IMMUTABILITY, both in awful contrast with creaturely existence. Eternity is infinity in duration. The 90th Psalm is a magnificent tribute to its glory. It is generally thought of as excluding the successions of past, present, and future, which are designations of time. Augustine defines it as that in which *fuisse et futurum esse non est sed solum esse.* Time began with the world. It is a question, however, whether in using such language we are not using words without meaning to us. Certain it is that we can only think of eternity as unbeginning and unending time. *Immutability* is akin to eternity. See Jas. i. 17; Ps. cii. 25–27. Immutability refers to the divine nature and character, not to divine action. It does not preclude acts of creation, of redemption, and retribution. God changes his works without changing his counsels, says Augustine. To Augustine this was the dominating attribute.

The Relative attributes are OMNIPOTENCE, OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPRESENCE, INFINITE WISDOM, and GOODNESS. *Omnipotence* is infinity in power, and may be defined as the power to do everything that is a conceivable object of power. A contradiction is not this (Matt. xix. 26). A distinction is sometimes made between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata.* The former is God's free unconditioned power, the second his power as conditioned by second causes. *Omniscience* is infinity in knowledge (Ps. cxlvii. 5; Heb. iv. 13). Although belonging to the relative attributes in one respect, omniscience no less rightly belongs to the essential. The divine knowledge is incapable of growth. Once God knew himself and knew creation as possible; now he knows creation as actual. A difficulty has been raised to the effect that omniscience involves predestination, and does away with human freedom. How can an act be certainly foreknown and yet free? But the nature of knowledge must be remembered. It no more influences

action in God than in us. God may foreknow without foreordaining. God's knowledge does not determine our action, but the converse. At all events we are free, and God does foreknow. Both facts are equally certain. The objection would also make God the author of evil, for he certainly foresees evil, as prophecy proves. Distinctions have been drawn between *scientia naturalis*, *libera*, and *media*.[1] The first is God's necessary knowledge of himself and his acts; the second, his knowledge of things dependent on his will; the third, his knowledge of what would take place in circumstances different from the actual ones. For the latter, see Matt. xi. 23; 1 Sam. xxiii. 12. When *omnipresence* is distinguished from Immensity, by the latter is meant God's transcendence above space, by the former his intimate presence in space (Jer. xxiii. 24; Ps. cxxxix. 7–12). His presence must be thought of as real, not merely a presence by influence and operation. As far as possible, we must put away all material ideas of extension and diffusion. *Wisdom* is applied knowledge, using the best means for the best ends. It has been argued that the idea of the use of means, and so of wisdom, implies imperfection, and is a mark of the creature. This term, like all others, needs to be modified and corrected when applied to the Divine Being. In the divine works, the distinction between means and ends is less sharply drawn. Both in nature and grace the same acts wear both characters; the means are ends, and the ends are means. The *goodness* spoken of under this head means Benevolence, not moral rectitude. Misery, which is the consequence of sin, is no impeachment of the divine goodness. The real difficulty is the permission of moral evil, which must be argued on other grounds (Ps. xxxiii. 5).

The Attributes referring to moral beings may be summed up under two heads, JUSTICE and LOVE. Holiness again is a convenient designation to include both. Both in the Old Testament and the New, justice and love are constantly distinguished from each other, and are celebrated with equal

[1] Luthardt, p. 290.

emphasis. One may, in a sense, be called the virtue of the Old Testament, and the other of the New, the Old Testament giving prominence to righteousness, the New to love. Still the two covenants acknowledge both attributes as equally essential to God. God's eternal hatred of sin is as certain as his love of sinners. Faithfulness and truth are righteousness in word. Grace, compassion, mercy, complacency, are different forms of love.

Attempts are made in some quarters to resolve justice into love. But the distinction is too emphatically drawn in Scripture to allow this to be done. According to this representation, God's acts in punishing sin and rewarding virtue are expressions of the same feeling. If Scripture uses different language so habitually to express the same meaning, it is most confusing and misleading. 1 John iv. 8 is quoted, but see also 1 John i. 5. The distinction is confirmed by human reason and experience. Justice demands, love gives; one seeks right, the other happiness; one insists on what is due, the other foregoes what is due.[1] The two qualities are certainly not opposed to each other; they are in perfect harmony, but they belong to different relations. A just character and a loving character are different in conception. They suggest different ideas and awaken different feelings. Quite as good a case might be made out for resolving love into justice.

Man having been made in the divine image, all the divine attributes are reflected in his nature. Naturally, as well as morally, he is a partaker in the divine nature. It is easy to see that the consideration of God's perfections supplies abundant motive for reverence, fear, and trust.[2]

[1] German writers say, the principle of one attribute is self-affirmation, of the other self-communication.

[2] Charnock, *Discourses on Divine Essence and Attributes;* Dean Jackson, *Treatise of Divine Essence and Attributes*, Bk. vi.

Sec. 2.—The Trinity.

The existence of a distinction of persons in the Godhead is a truth of pure revelation. It could be known in no other way, because it relates to the inner life of the Godhead, the constitution of his nature (1 Cor. ii. 11). The doctrine includes two elements, unity and distinction, each element being equally essential. So far from the doctrine being inconsistent with the divine unity, the Unity is an integral part of the Trinity. The removal of the unity would as effectually destroy the idea of the Trinity as the removal of the distinction.[1] The combination of the two elements involves no logical contradiction, because they refer to the Godhead in different respects, one to the nature, the other to the persons. The mere fact of incomprehensible mystery is no objection, every truth respecting God being no less mysterious.

Of the technical terms used on this subject (Trinity, nature, essence, person), the most important one is person (subsistence, hypostasis), which is employed in a special sense. It must not be understood as when used of human beings, a sense which would result in Tritheism.[2] The term was selected in early days, in order to indicate that the distinction meant is more than one of aspect or attribute, which was the Sabellian view.

[1] "Neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance," Athan. Creed.

[2] "Dictum est tres personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur omnino; non enim rei ineffabilis eminentia hoc vocabulo explicari valet," Aug. *Trin.* v. 9. Owen in his treatise on the Trinity is able as ever, *Works*, ii. 377. He distinguishes between the "substance" of the doctrine and its technical statements, arguing cogently the necessity and use of technical terms. Objectors are fond, he says, of attacking the latter while ignoring the former. "Their disputes and cavils shall be against the *Trinity, essence, substance, personality, respects, properties* of the divine persons, with the modes of expressing these things; whilst the plain *scriptural revelation* of the things themselves, from whence they are but explanatory deductions, is not spoken to nor admitted into confirmation."

It may not be easy to preserve the mean between Sabellianism and Tritheism, but it is necessary.[1]

A distinction is sometimes made between the Immanent (or Essential) and Economical (Dispensational, Revealed) Trinity, but it is a very formal one. The latter implies and rests upon the former, unless we are to accept Sabellianism.[2]

A.—DOCTRINE OF TRINITY.

The sole question is, Does Scripture teach this doctrine? We say, it does, in three ways.

1. *Old Testament Intimations.* — The doctrine is not one of those clearly made known in the Old Testament. Those who discover it there do so by means of the light reflected from the New. The fact that the Jews did not know the doctrine is sufficient proof that it is not an Old Testament doctrine. It may seem strange that so great a truth was kept in reserve; but this was only in accordance with the law of development which governs all revelation. It is a question whether there is not as great an advance in respect to other truths. A reason for the divine reserve may perhaps be found in the necessity for time to allow the doctrine of the divine Unity to take deep root in human thought. The proneness of the Jews to idolatry is evident enough from their

[1] "To return to the personality of God and man, it comes to this, that with all simplicity of mind we must receive God's three propositions, that three persons of men are three beings, three persons of angels are three beings, the three persons in God are *not* three beings; so that, *in theologizing*, I have risen to the word 'person,' and found in it a certain uniqueness of meaning, which is an induction from Scripture texts; leaving the mystery which is round about it as an *ultimatum*, which I cannot use in deductive reasoning. But I need *some word* to express the distinction within the divine nature, and I find the personal pronoun 'He,' and a personal act, 'He will send,'" Duncan, *Colloquia Peripatetica*, p. 105. "A divine person is nothing but the divine essence, upon the account of an especial property, subsisting in an especial manner," Owen. See his reply to objections, *Works*, ii. 409.

[2] Pope, *Comp.* i. 255, 363; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Trinity."

history. And we can easily see that such a doctrine as that of the Trinity might have been perverted in the same direction. Still there are hints, which readily expand into the New Testament doctrine.

a. The use of the divine name in a plural form (Elohim), along with a verb singular, is certainly remarkable (Gen. i. 1, 26), especially remembering the stress laid on the divine Unity and the idolatrous tendency of the Jews. If the phrase is to be explained as a plural of majesty or an anticipation of royal style, why is not the verb plural too? That the phrase is a remnant of polytheism may be asserted, but cannot be proved. The triple Benediction (Num. vi. 24–26) and Doxology (Isa. vi. 3) may also be referred to in the same connection.

b. There is a remarkable series of incidents in the Old Testament which seem to be more than angelic appearances, and which are best explained as Theophanies.[1] The speaker is an angel, and yet more than angel. The divine name and authority are used in a way that is out of place in a creature. An ambassador never speaks as the angel does. There has always been a school of exposition that has seen in this angel the Son of God anticipating the Incarnation. Observe the case of Abraham, Gen. xviii. 17; Jacob, xxxii. 24 (Hos. xii. 4, 5); Joshua, Josh. v. 14; Moses, Ex. xxiii. 20; the scene at Bochim, Judg. ii. 1–5; Manoah, xiii. 20–23; Mal. iii. 1.

c. In the book of Proverbs (ch. viii.), Wisdom speaks like a person. If this is a mere poetical personification, it is a striking one. Philo's doctrine of the Word at Alexandria grew out of Solomon's use of the term Wisdom. There is a great interval, however, between Philo's Word and St. John's. Even if the first is personal, it is a creature.[2]

d. Prophecy describes the person and work of the Messiah in terms that point to a divine Being. We rely less on particular names and titles than upon the entire position assigned to him,

[1] Oehler, *Theology of Old Testament*, i. p. 188.

[2] See Westcott, *Introd. to Comm. on St. John's Gospel*, p. xviii.; Jackson, *Works*, Bk. vii. ch. xxvii.; Schaff's *Comm. on St. John*, p. 3.

and the character of the work he was to do. Whether the Jews expected the Messiah to be divine is uncertain; and whether they did or not, we can judge of the range of prophecy for ourselves. See Gen. iii. 15; Ps. ii., xlv.; Isa. vi., vii., ix., xlii.; Micah v. 2, etc.

2. *Inferential Argument.*—Scripture, on the one hand, undeniably teaches the Unity of God. Of this there is no question anywhere. On the other hand, it speaks just as clearly of three divine persons, distinguished from each other in name and office, and yet standing in certain definite relations to each other and to the world. The only way of explaining and harmonizing these, at first sight discrepant, teachings, is the doctrine of the Trinity.

a. The divine Unity is taught. There is no need to argue this.

b. Three divine persons are spoken of.

The Father is again and again distinguished from the Son and the Spirit.

Christ is represented as the divine Son of God. The proof of this is reserved until we come to the doctrine of Christ's Person. Here the fact is assumed.

The Holy Spirit is spoken of as a divine Person. The proof may conveniently be indicated here. He is called God, cf. Acts xxviii. 25 and Isa. vi. 9; Acts v. 3, 4. He is the object of blasphemy, Matt. xii. 31. He is the agent in Regeneration, John i. 13, iii. 6, and Sanctification, 2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Pet. i. 2. He performs miracles, Acts ii. 4, x. 45; Rom. xv. 19; Heb. ii. 4. He is the source of Inspiration, 1 Pet. i. 11; 2 Pet. i. 21; Eph. iii. 5; Heb. iii. 7. He is Creator, Gen. i. 2, omnipresent and omniscient, Ps. cxxxix. 7; 1 Cor. ii. 10.[1]

That the Spirit is a person is clearly shown by the use of the masculine pronoun (ἐκεῖνος) in John xvi. 7, 13, xv. 26. This is the more striking as the pronoun is in apposition with a neuter noun. He makes intercession, Rom. viii. 26; testifies,

[1] Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xxxiv.

teaches, hears and speaks, bestows gifts, etc. See also Acts x. 19, xiii. 2.[1]

c. Since there is but one God, and Father, Son, and Spirit are each God, it is clear that within the divine unity there are personal distinctions. The only other possible interpretation is the Sabellian one, to the effect that Father, Son, and Spirit are simply different aspects or manifestations of God. But this is excluded by the sharp distinctions drawn in Scripture between Father, Son, and Spirit. The Father loves and sends the Son; the Son leaves and returns to the Father, loves, intercedes with, and prays to the Father. So the Father and Son send the Spirit; the Spirit intercedes with the Father—the Spirit takes Christ's place. If, then, Father, Son, and Spirit are only God under different aspects, the New Testament is a mass of confusion.

3. *Express Statements.*—The terms of the Baptismal formula, Matt. xxviii. 19, and Apostolic Benediction, 2 Cor. xiii. 14, should be carefully considered. See also Eph. ii. 18; Jude 20, 21; 1 Pet. i. 2.

B.—DOGMA OF TRINITY.

We have hitherto dealt with the doctrine of Scripture on the present subject, but every doctrine has also a dogmatic form. Doctrine summarizes the statements of Scripture on a particular point, adding and diminishing nothing; dogma formulates the principles and relations involved in the doctrine and the inferences following from it. Every dogma, therefore, is of the nature of a theory, giving the *rationale* of the facts. Owing to the rise of error and controversy, the dogma of the Church on the present subject was formulated early, assuming its final shape in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, and has never been altered since. For different reasons, Romanists and Rationalists are fond of saying that we owe the dogma of the Trinity, not to Scripture, but to the Church: the former, that they may

[1] Smeaton, *Doctr. of the Holy Spirit*, Cunningham Lect. (Clark); Donne, *Sermons on Whitsunday*, i. 515, and vol. ii.

compel us to receive other dogmas on the same authority; the latter, that they may discredit the doctrine altogether. The reply to both is, that although the form of the dogma is due to the Church, the substance is found in Scripture. Let the Romanist satisfy us that the same can be said of his special dogmas, and we will receive them. Let the Rationalist satisfy us that the substance of the dogma is not scriptural, and we will discard it, as he has done. The form or technical statement is useful as a test of accurate interpretation of Scripture and a guard against error, but it is not essential. The Church did without it once, and could do without it again. It may be technically true to say that the Ante-Nicene Church had no dogma of the Trinity, just as ordinary Christians have none now. But both the one and the other worship the Son and the Spirit as divine persons; and where this is done, we have the material facts of the case. That the Ante-Nicene Church was Trinitarian in this sense, *i.e.* as ordinary Christians are Trinitarian now, is amply shown by Dr. Burton in his *Ante-Nicene Testimonies.*[1]

The first occasion of the formal definition of the doctrine was the appearance of the Sabellian error, which was known also as Monarchianism and Patripassianism.[2] Sabellianism had two phases. According to one, the three persons are simply different aspects of God,—the Father is God immanent, the Son God revealed, the Spirit God active. Praxeas (200 A.D.), against whom Tertullian wrote, Sabellius of Ptolemais, Noetus of Smyrna (230), Beryllus of Bostra (250), converted to orthodoxy by Origen, held this view. According to the other opinion, held by Artemon, Theodotus (two persons of this name) and Paul of Samosata (260), the Son and Spirit are powers emanating from God. One view makes the Son and Spirit divine, the other anticipates Arianism. In both cases there is no personal distinction, the Trinity is only a nominal one. Sabellianism never had much influence in the Church, and was never the

[1] See Treffry, *Doctr. of Eternal Sonship*, p. 421.
[2] Luthardt, *Comp. d. Dogmatik*, p. 100.

creed of a community; it is too obviously opposed to the teaching of Scripture. There have often been individual cases of Sabellianism. In modern days Schleiermacher and Rothe occupy this position.[1]

The second occasion was Arianism, a much more formidable error. Arianism—originated by Arius, an Alexandrian presbyter—directly denied Christ's Deity, and so made a Trinity impossible. According to Arianism, Christ was a super-angelic creature, the first creature, through whom all other creatures were made. Pre-existence was ascribed to him, but not eternity,—divinity, but not deity (θειότης, Rom. i. 20; but not θεότης, Col. ii. 9). He was a fallible creature, actually but not necessarily impeccable. Arianism had a long history, rising and falling with the favour of the imperial court. Athanasius was the leading champion against it, and through his influence it was condemned at the first General Council of Nicæa, 325 A.D. Great difficulty was experienced in finding a decisive test of the views held by Arians. They were ready to ascribe the divine name and attributes, as well as divine worship, to Christ,—of course in a secondary, delegated sense, as the Socinians did in later days. But they could not ascribe eternity to Christ. According to them, "there was once a time when he was not." Nor could they say that he was "of the same substance" with the Father, ὁμοούσιος. They said that he was "of like substance," ὁμοιούσιος, which is true of man. Accordingly, these two points became the accepted tests of Arian views and of the true Deity of Christ. The clauses, "Begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father," in the Nicene Creed, condemn Arianism.[2] Arianism again has never been the creed of any sect in the Church, but there have been individual Arians.[3]

[1] Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, etc. p. 510; *Dict. of Theol. passim;* Pope, *Comp.* i. 272, and Fernley Lect.; Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* i. 257; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* i. 367.

[2] ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός, γεννηθεὶς οὐ ποιηθείς, ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρί. See also first part of Athanasian Creed.

[3] On Arianism, see Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, etc. p. 44; *Dict. of Theol.* "Arianism," 'Nicene Creed;" Pope, *Comp.* i. 274, and Fernley Lect.;

The Council of Nicæa merely put into formal shape what had been taught substantially by writers like Tertullian, Irenæus, and Origen. The term "trinitas" appears first in Tertullian.[1] Origen greatly influenced the development of thought on the question. He asserted the eternal generation, laid just emphasis on the distinction of the divine persons, and gave currency to the Scripture term "Son" in preference to "Logos;" but, failing to lay equal stress on the unity of nature, and giving too great prominence to the subordination of the Son, he unconsciously paved the way for Arian teaching. He called the Father ὁ θεός, the Son θεός. He would not call the Son αὐτόθεος, and thought ὁμοούσιος favoured Sabellianism, which certainly proves that he was no Sabellian.

The internal relations of the Trinity which it is important to notice are the *Eternal Generation* of the Son and the *Eternal Procession* of the Holy Spirit. These are names for mysterious, hyperphysical processes, which we can only accept on trust. What the difference is between generation and procession no one can explain. Pearson ventures to say, "Though everything which is begotten proceedeth, yet everything which proceedeth is not begotten."[2]

The idea of *Generation* is implied in the title "Son." Strong objection has been made against the phrases Eternal Generation and Eternal Son as a combination of contradictory terms. Generation and sonship imply posteriority in time, which eternity directly excludes. The objection is conclusive if such terms are applied to the divine life in precisely the same sense as to human, but it is not so. The terms are the nearest and fittest supplied by human language to denote divine relations.[3]

Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* i. 307; Newman, *Arians of the Fourth Century;* Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* i. 371. On Nicene Council generally, see Stanley, *Eastern Church*, Lect. ii.–v.

[1] In the treatise against the Sabellian Praxeas.

[2] Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Procession," "Eternal Generation."

[3] Dean Jackson, *Works*, Bk. vii. ch. xxv. 8; Hooker, v. 54. 2; Pope, *Comp.* i. 273; see also Treffry, *Doctr. of Eternal Sonship*, pp. 9, 37, 47, 219, 247, 338, etc.

In so applying them, we must exclude from them everything inconsistent with the idea of God. The term "eternal" is added for the express purpose of negativing the idea of temporal posteriority. What else can be done? What term could be substituted for "Son," against which the same objection would not lie? What other names are there for the eternal Persons of the Trinity? An eternal Father implies an eternal Son, and eternal Son implies eternal generation. The phrase is also intended to exclude the idea of creation. Generation from God, not creation by God. What the Son is, he is by necessity of nature, not by the will of another, as the creature is. The very term "Son" at once asserts identity of nature, and implies some sort of dependence. "Whatsoever Christ hath common unto him, the same of necessity must be *given* him, but naturally and eternally given," Hooker.[1]

No doubt the relation of Son implies also the idea of subordination. There is no difficulty in regard to official subordination, which necessarily attaches to the work of Mediator, and which no one denies. Nor is there any difficulty in accepting a subordination of order in the case both of the Son and Spirit. The difficulty is how to answer the question, Does the subordination apply to the divine nature of the Son and Spirit? The point is one of the utmost delicacy. History shows that where subordinationism in this sense is accepted, Arianism is not far off. How can such subordination be reconciled with Deity in the supreme sense? How can it be applied to such attributes as eternity? Yet some ancient writers, whom Pearson follows, have not hesitated to hold that perfect identity of nature is quite consistent with subordination in respect of the mode in which the nature is possessed. Pearson says: "That privilege or priority consisteth not in this, that the essence or attributes of the one are greater than the essence or attributes

[1] Passages in which the Father is called God in an eminent sense, John i. 1, iii. 16, 17, 18, xiv. 1; Rom. viii. 3; Heb. i. 1-3; 2 Cor. xiii. 13, etc. See also 1 Cor. iii. 23, xi. 3; John xx. 17; Rev. iii. 12; John xvii. 3; 1 Cor. viii. 6, xv. 28.

of the other; but only in this, that the Father hath that essence of himself, the Son by communication from the Father." "Because he is from the Father, therefore he is called by those of the Nicene Council in their creed, *God of God, light of light, very God of very God.*[1] The Father is God, but not of God, light, but not of light; Christ is God, but of God; light, but of light. There is no difference or inequality in the nature or essence, because the same in both; but the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ hath that essence of himself, from none; Christ hath that essence not of himself, but from him." In other words, the Son has the same essence as the Father, but has it by eternal communication from the Father, and this communication is eternal generation. The words, *The Father is greater than I* (John xiv. 28), were applied in support of this view. The Westminster Confession (ii. 3) puts these distinctions well: "The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding, the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, the Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son." "The Holy Church throughout all the world" acknowledges its Head to be "the everlasting Son of the Father."[2]

The idea of *Procession* is taken from John xv. 26. If the term "proceedeth" referred to the temporal mission of the Spirit, not to an eternal process, it would repeat what is said in the previous clause. The present tense is also noteworthy.

The twofold Procession, namely, from the Father and the Son, is purely a theological inference from Scripture. In Scripture the Spirit is called "the Spirit of the Father," and said to proceed from the Father. He is also called the Spirit of Christ and of the Son, though he is not said to proceed from the Son. But it is argued that the two things must go together in one case as in the other. If the procession from the Father is the ground of his being called the Spirit of the Father, a like reason must exist in the other case. The Son also sends the Spirit as the Father does. "And from the Son"

[1] θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ.

[2] Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, i. ch. ix.

(*filioque*) formed no part of the Nicene Creed as formulated by the first four Great Councils. It was first added at the Synod of Toledo, 589, and was confirmed by subsequent Councils which are acknowledged by the Latin Church. The addition, as stated before, was one of the occasions of the separation between the Eastern and Western Churches.[1]

The divinity of the Spirit never gave rise to serious controversy, because it was virtually decided in the rejection of Arianism. An Arian necessarily regarded the Spirit as a creature. The sect of the Macedonians[2] (named after Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople) contested the divinity of the Holy Spirit for a time, but they were condemned at the General Council of Constantinople, 381. The clauses of the Nicene Creed, referring to the Spirit, were probably added at that Council: "The Lord and Giver of Life, who proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the prophets."

The faith of the Church on this subject is well expressed by Dr. Pope: "The One divine Essence exists in a Trinity of coequal, personal Subsistences: related as the Father, the eternal Son of the Father, and the Holy Spirit eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son."[3]

Beside forming the basis of divine worship, the doctrine gives

[1] "Seeing therefore the Father is of none, the Son is of the Father, and the Spirit is of both, they are by these, their several properties, really distinguishable from each other. For the substance of God with this property *to be of none* doth make the Person of the Father; the very self-same substance in number with this property *to be of the Father* maketh the Person of the Son; the same substance having added unto it the property of *proceeding from the other two* maketh the Person of the Holy Ghost. So that in every Person there is implied both the substance of God which is one, and also that property which causeth the same person really and truly to differ from the other two," Hooker, Bk. v. 51. 1. See also Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. 329; Treffry's treatise, *The Eternal Sonship of Christ;* Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Filioque."

[2] They were Arians or Semi-Arians; Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, p. 433; Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. 358.

[3] *Comp.* i. 259.

us a glimpse into the inner life of Deity. That inner life is a scene of reciprocal activity and affection. It contains the eternal archetypes of the noblest human relations. Personality, fatherhood, sonship in creatures, are faint copies of the ideal realities in God. See Eph. iii. 14, 15: "The Father, from whom every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named."[1]

The technical terms employed are *οὐσία*, *substantia*, *essentia*, *natura*, for the one common essence; *ὑπόστασις*, *πρόσωπον*, *substantia*, *persona*, hypostasis, person, personal subsistence, for the separate persons; *ἰδιότης*, for the distinctive characteristic of each person, namely, self-existence, generation, procession. Perichoresis is the intercommunion of nature and attributes. In the second set of terms a change of usage took place. Before the Nicene Council, hypostasis, substantia, was frequently used of the essence. We read at that time of one hypostasis, where afterwards we read of three, the term being appropriated to person.

[See the exhaustive and able treatment of the doctrine in Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. 344–465.]

[1] "We *speak* of these things in a poor, low, broken manner,—we *teach* them as they are revealed in the Scripture,—we labour by faith to adhere unto them as revealed; but when we come into a steady, direct view and consideration of the *thing itself*, our minds fail, our hearts tremble, and we can find no rest but in a holy admiration of what we cannot comprehend," Owen, i. 330; Donne, *Works*, ii. 228; South, Serm. xliii., on the Trinity.

CHAPTER IV.

CREATION AND PROVIDENCE.

SEC. 1.—CREATION.

CREATION may mean either the act of creation or the created universe. Creation in the first sense is either primary [1] or secondary, the creation of matter itself, or giving shape to matter already existing. It is only of the first that we need to speak here.

The specifically Christian definition of creation is the creation of matter out of nothing. This idea was unknown, or rather rejected, in heathen antiquity, where the maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit* was held to limit even divine action. This maxim, founded on man's inability to originate new matter and on the observation of nature, where there is no absolute beginning, is true enough in reference to man. But its application to Deity is another proof that "the world by wisdom knew not God." Creation in the highest sense is the characteristic of omnipotence in distinction from finite power; otherwise the difference is merely one of degree. The idea neither involves a self-contradiction nor violates the causal principle, for an adequate cause is assigned. At the same time it maintains the supremacy of spirit over matter in the fullest degree. The alternative is the eternal existence of matter, which was held universally in the heathen world. On that view spirit and matter are co-ordinate, and the divine independence is abrogated.

Although primary creation is not expressly asserted in Scripture, it is implied. "The heaven and the earth" (Gen. i. 1) is

[1] Synonyms of primary are essential, absolute, immediate.

the Hebrew equivalent for "universe," in which the substance of matter is included. The same may be said of "all things," John i. 3. "Things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Heb. xi. 3. The Hebrew and Greek words for create do not indeed originally imply absolute creation, but they acquire this meaning from the context. However, the Hebrew ברא is used with peculiar dignity of divine action only.

Origen, who is always original and often eccentric, held the notion of eternal creation. According to him, matter is eternal, but eternally dependent on the divine will. Its existence is not absolute and underived. An argument used in support of this notion is, that as creation is an effect of the divine goodness, and this goodness is eternal, there can never have been a time when creation was not. But it does not follow from the eternity of the divine goodness that it was eternally active. This would be to make, not merely its existence, but its operation necessary. The argument also implies that God has done all he can do, in which case the universe is as infinite as God. Besides, the very idea of goodness requires that it be free in its exercise.

The doctrine was put at the head of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds ("Maker of heaven and earth") as a protest against the Manichæan principle of the necessary evil of matter and the pantheistic view of nature as an emanation from God. It is still necessary as a protest against current Materialism. Even if the theory of evolution were established, it would leave the necessity for creation as strong as ever. The only change it would make would be to put the act of creation farther back, and to alter our views of the mode followed. Everything which development has brought out must once have existed in a potential state, just as the tree and fruit exist in the seed. Certainly creation is not made less essential or less wonderful on this scheme.[1]

[1] Pope, *Comp.* i. 361 ; Pearson, Art. i. ; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine,* ii. 21 ; Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xii.

Sec. 2.—The Divine Image in Man.

That man was made in the divine image, is the uniform teaching of Scripture, Gen. i. 26, 27; Ps. viii. 5; 1 Cor. xi. 7. But the constituents of this image have been variously conceived. The choice lies between two views. The image consists either —(1) in the powers of man's rational and moral nature, and the conformity of those powers to the divine will; or (2) assuming the first as constitutive of man, in the second alone. The first is the more usual view. It was the view of the Schoolmen, who made God's image in man consist of man's natural attributes and their moral conformity to God's will. Augustine, like many others, distinguished between "image" and "likeness," making the first consist in *cognitio veritatis*, the second in *amor virtutis*. Roman Catholic divines generally make man's nature correspond to the "image," and original righteousness to the "likeness;" but they regard the second element as a supernatural addition, not a part of man's original nature. If the first view be adopted, then it is only the second part of the image that was lost or could be lost by sin. For man to have lost the first would have been to cease to be man, and so to cease to be responsible and capable of recovery. In favour of the second view is the consideration that it makes the original image coincide with what is restored in redemption. Redemption does not give back any substantive faculty of human nature, which had never been lost, but only restores every faculty to its normal state. See Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10.[1] Righteousness, which is the gift of redemption, is not a faculty like reason or conscience, but a quality, it is the normal exercise of moral powers. Is it not then better to regard this as forming the divine image? Man's rational and moral nature is implied as constituting the capacity for righteousness. As matter of fact, all the powers of man's nature exist in full action in the wicked; it is their right action that is wanting.

What man's original perfection included is not stated in

[1] Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man*, pp. 105, 109, etc.

Scripture, and can only be matter of speculation. There is no need to put that perfection extravagantly high. Error and evil were of course excluded. Adam was made subject to the law of growth, though the growth might and ought to have been in knowledge and goodness only.[1]

The doctrine of the Divine Image has important bearings on the questions of Redemption, Incarnation, and Immortality. It made the first two possible. It is only a rational and moral being who is capable of redemption. The same powers which constitute the capacity of redemption constitute the capacity of Incarnation. Animal incarnations are the grotesque caricatures of heathenism. It seems most reasonable to reckon Immortality among the fundamental elements of human nature. It seems inseparable from the powers of reason and divine knowledge. Like these powers, it is not lost in the Fall, its character is changed.

Respecting the way in which the soul or spiritual nature of man is transmitted, three theories have been advanced. Origen was alone in holding the *Pre-existence* of individual souls, a Christianized transmigration. The notion has much against it, and little in its favour. Memory supplies no trace of a former state. The sense of unity in the race and the likeness between individuals are unexplained. The truth lies between Traducianism and Creationism. According to the first, the soul is transmitted like the body ; according to the second, it is directly created by God. Both theories have always had advocates in the Church, and for both something can be said. The former best explains the fact of hereditary qualities and the transmission of sin. On the other hand, it is alleged that the theory has a materialistic taint, implying that spirit is transmitted by division like matter. But this need not be implied ; division may not be the only mode of transmission ; the laws of spirit must differ from those of matter. It is also objected that on this theory our Lord's soul could not be sinless ; but the circumstances of his human nature are altogether unique. As there was miracle

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 77.

in respect of the conception, so there may have been in other respects. In early days Tertullian favoured Traducianism. Creationism has found the greatest amount of favour. The Greek Church, Jerome, the mediæval divines, Calvin accept it, Augustine being doubtful. The theory seems to maintain most firmly the independence and high prerogatives of spirit, Heb. xii. 9. On the other hand, it fails to explain the intellectual and moral likeness between individuals, and it fails to explain original sin. These are qualities of the spiritual nature, and to find their source in the flesh is unphilosophical and Manichæan. The whole question is speculative rather than practical.[1]

[Beck, *Biblical Psychology;* Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man;* Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology.*]

Sec. 3.—Providence.

This subject is fruitful in practical edification. We only notice here one or two points. Providence is generally described as General and Special, and made to include Preservation and Government.[2] It negatives both the deistic and pantheistic views of God's present and constant relation to the world. According to the former, the relation is one of pure Transcendence, *i.e.* God is not merely distinct from, but altogether unconcerned in, the world's life; according to the second, it is one of pure Immanence, *i.e.* it has no existence apart from that life. Standing between these two extremes, holding the truth and rejecting the error involved in them, the doctrine of Providence asserts against one a true divine immanence, and against the other a true divine transcendence. God is at once intimately present and active in every point of creation, and, at the same

[1] Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Creationism," "Traducianism," "Pre-existence."

[2] Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 22: πρόνοια, providentia, in his maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxime autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit atque omnis ornatus. He is arguing against the Epicurean deists, who said, Deos nihil curare humana. Nihil Deus agit, nullis cogitationibus implicatur, nulla opera molitur. Luthardt, *Comp. d. Dogmatik*, p. 120.

time, distinct from and above the world's life. The divine life and the human life are not separated by an impassable gulf, as deism says, nor do they run into each other, as pantheists say.

The mode of God's action in Providence has been much discussed. To describe it as *Continuous Creation* is to go too far, and to merge Providence in creation. The world would then have no continuous existence. So far as the phrase asserts the constant dependence of the creature on the Creator (Acts xvii. 28), it is useful.

The theory of *Concursus*, in some form or other, must be admitted. God works through second causes, through the established order of things; and in saying this, we say that these have no necessary or absolute existence. Their independence, while real, is derived and limited. Man himself belongs to the order of second causes, though in the highest rank. God's ever-present action is universal in the strictest sense. Even the power by which men do evil is from God, the power being from God, and the moral quality from the abuse of man's will. Quenstedt uses as an illustration the act of writing, which depends, not partly on the hand and partly on the pen, but equally and entirely on both.[1] Confronted with the difficulty of moral evil, he makes the distinction between the act and its quality just mentioned.[2] The phrase Concurrence also implies that God respects the nature of the beings he has created. "Concurrit Deus cum causis secundis juxta ipsarum naturam, cum liberis libere, cum necessariis necessario, cum debilibus debiliter, cum fortibus fortiter, pro sua suavissima dispositione universali operando."

God's acts of government are sometimes described as Permission, Restraint, Direction, Final Determination. Deus quidem permittit, sed non vult τὸ permissum.

[Dorner's discussion of Creation, etc., will well repay study, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 9–103.]

[1] Pope, *Compend.* i. 447; Luthardt, p. 122.

[2] Coinfluit Deus in actus peccaminosos quoad entitatem et speciem naturæ, non quoad deformitatem et speciem moris.

CHAPTER V.

ACTUAL AND ORIGINAL SIN.

Scripture says nothing on the question, which has never ceased to awaken and baffle curiosity, of the real or metaphysical origin of moral evil. So far as Scripture is concerned, any theory is admissible which does justice to all the facts of the case. It refers only to the historical origin of sin in the world. According to Genesis, sin was imported into the world from without. It arose at first, as it arises still, through temptation. Beyond this point Scripture does not go. Only the bare facts of the first sin are recited; the significance of that sin for the race is gradually revealed afterwards.

A good definition of sin is found in St. John's word *ἀνομία* (1 John iii. 4), lawlessness, deviation from or contrariety to law. Other terms, such as *ἁμαρτία*, iniquity, transgression, unrighteousness, include the same idea of deviation, which again presupposes a fixed rule or law.[1] This rule or law exists first. Right comes before wrong. One is that which ought to be, which has a right to exist; the other, that which ought not to be, which has no right to exist. Some, who explain good and evil as two sides of a necessary antithesis, argue as if wrong were necessary to the existence of right. Certainly the idea or notion of wrong is given in the idea of right, but not the fact or reality of wrong. The two things are not co-ordinate, as this theory supposes. The rule in the present case is God's law in all its breadth. The very giving of that law to man implies that he is a free moral being, capable of keeping or

[1] Luthardt, *Comp. d. Dogmatik*, p. 150.

violating it. A brute is incapable of sin. God's law commands as well as forbids, commands love to God and our neighbour as well as forbids hate. The absence of such love, indifference, is sin as well as active wrong. "Sin is disobedience to the law of God in will or deed." It is to be remembered also that all sin, as sin, is against God. Strictly speaking, we do not sin against men. Dr. Pope's definition of sin,[1] "the voluntary separation of the soul or the self from God," is taken from the contents of God's law. That law requires man to acknowledge God's right in him, and surrender himself to God's service. Sin is the rejection of this demand.

Sin, both actual and original, assumes two forms, or is known by two signs, guilt and corruption. Guilt, again, is distinguished as liability for the act and liability to penalty, *reatus culpæ* and *reatus pœnæ*. Both these forms of guilt meet in actual sin; the second only is found in original sin. Actual sin includes sins of desire and intention as well as of word and deed. Corruption or depravity, denotes the evil state of man's nature which is the secret fount of actual sin, and is perhaps best described as sinfulness.

The penalty which certainly follows guilt is death, both physical and spiritual. Rom. v. 12 can scarcely leave it doubtful that in man's case the former is the effect of sin. He was designed originally for physical immortality. As physical death is the separation of soul from body, so spiritual death is the separation of the soul from God. This separation is the opposite of the state of divine fellowship for which man was made, and which constitutes eternal life. The perpetuation of this state of separation is eternal death.

The two axioms by which all theories must be tried are God's holiness and man's freedom. Tried by these tests, all the theories hitherto proposed fail. *Dualism* derives moral evil from the nature of matter. Spirit is pure, matter impure, sin is the result of contact between the two. This was the

[1] This definition applies to actual sin only. In reference to original sin, it applies to its beginning in Adam.

doctrine of Manichæism and Gnosticism, and Manichæism was an offshoot of the old dualistic religion of Persia. If matter is regarded as created by God, God is made the author of sin; if it is held to be eternal, God is not supreme. In either case sin is necessary. According to another theory, sin is the consequence of a *finite* nature.[1] The finite as such is evil. Sin springs from limitation of knowledge and power. On this view also sin is necessary. The finite as such cannot be good, and can only become so by passing into the infinite. The pantheistic tendency is evident. Moreover, good and evil are made quantities instead of qualities. F. C. Baur and others of pantheistic tendencies favour this theory. A kindred, though not identical view makes sin a mere negation, the simple absence of good. Augustine seems to have been the author of this favourite idea. He thought that, if sin was a mere nonentity, the necessity for seeking a cause for it was done away. But sin is more than a negation, more than the mere absence of what ought to be; it is just as positive as good, it is the presence of what ought not to be. The will is not passive but antagonistic in evil. A third theory, which traces sin to the possession of a *sensuous nature*, has a Manichæan taint.[2] Besides being open to the objections already mentioned, it leaves spiritual sins unexplained. The seat of all sin is in the will, of which the flesh is the instrument.[3]

All that we can say in the way of theory is that the very idea of freedom implies the possibility (not the fact) of evil. The conversion of possibility into fact is man's work. The sole question of interest is whether a world constructed on the basis of freedom, or one constructed on the basis of necessity, is best. In the latter case, not only is evil excluded, but good also. Virtue is then as necessary as the action of physical law. It is not man's own act or choice. He has nothing to say to his own moral character. The guilt and misery of sin are no doubt

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 362.

[2] *Ibid.* ii. 375–382.

[3] Pope, *Comp.* ii. 20; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 18; Müller, *Christ. Doctr. of Sin*, vol. i. 271–412, and the whole treatise.

excluded, but so also are the merit and the true happiness of virtue. It is open to argument whether this would not be a greater evil than the permission of sin. Besides, while sin is permitted by God, it is eventually overruled for good, perhaps even for greater good.

Sec. 1.—Actual Sin.

The universality of guilt with all its consequences is taught in passages like Gen. vi. 12; Ps. xiv. 1–3; cf. Rom. iii. 10; Isa. liii. 6; Gal. iii. 22. The universal commands to repent and believe in order to forgiveness imply the same truth. The first chapters of the Epistle to the Romans expressly assert and argue the sin and guilt of all mankind. This fact constitutes the necessity for the work of redemption, which the apostle goes on to expound.

The universal extent of inward depravity may be inferred from the universality of outward sin. So general a fact can only be explained by as general a cause. An invariable effect requires an invariable cause; and the effect is invariable. However different in form and degree, sin is universal. The universal necessity of conversion, as taught in Scripture, is another proof. See Gen. vi. 5, viii. 21; Ps. li.; Matt. vii. 11, xv. 19; John iii. 3; Eph. ii. 3, iv. 22. Another testimony to the same truth is found in St. Paul's antithesis of Flesh and Spirit. The germ of this idea is contained in Christ's words, John iii. 6. Here "the flesh" must mean the whole of human nature,[1] including flesh, soul, and spirit in its sinful state. The whole nature is designated from the part which governs the rest. The idea is fully worked out in St. Paul's Epistles, Rom. vii. 19–25, viii. 6, 7, 8, 18; Gal. v. 19, 22. "The spirit" may be interpreted either as the whole nature, so designated from the part which has become the governing power, or as the Holy Spirit who

[1] See also John i. 14. Note by Dr. Gifford in *Speaker's Comm.* Introduction, p. 48; Godet, *Comm. on Romans*, i. 127; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 318.

creates the new spiritual life. "The flesh" is an awfully vivid description of man as morally corrupt.

Sec. 2*a*.—Doctrine of Original or Hereditary Sin.

Peccatum originis or *originale*. "The fault and corruption of the nature of every man," Eng. Art. ix. It consists of the same two elements, guilt and depravity, which, however, undergo a modification. Guilt here means simply the *reatus pœnæ*, the *reatus culpæ* being cut off. Depravity means a tendency or bias to evil. The *reatus culpæ* in the case of original guilt resided in the first sinner, as representing the race. We inherit the consequences of his act. The two ideas of responsibility for the act, and liability to consequences, are separable under a federal constitution such as that on which man was created. An important question is, which is first, guilt or depravity? An attempt has been made to represent depravity as transmitted in the way of natural consequence, and the guilt to follow from this. This was the theory of the French Reformed School of Saumur (17th cent.), known as the mediate theory. But it only raises another difficulty. How, on this theory, is the transmission of moral evil to be justified? There is no justification. Moral evil is transmitted just like physical.[1] On the other hand, the transmission of guilt, in the restricted sense already explained, is perfectly justifiable, if the representative or federal principle is justifiable in the moral as in other spheres. And then the transmission of guilt becomes the basis for the transmission of a corrupt nature.

The classical passage on Original *Guilt* is Rom. v. 12–19. All through the passage a parallel or contrast is struck between the two men who are treated as the two Heads or Representatives of the race. The apostle's thought is centred on the benefits coming to the race through the one man, Christ,—coming independently of our action. He sets off these benefits

[1] Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* ii. 350; Pope, *Comp.* ii. 78; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* ii. 205.

by contrasting them with the evil coming to the race through one man, Adam, coming independently of our action. Unless this is the apostle's meaning, his parallel has no force. And the details of the passage bear out the central thought so understood. The unfinished protasis of ver. 12 would run, "As through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin, and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned; so through one man righteousness entered into the world, and life through righteousness, and so life passed unto all men, for that all became righteous, or were justified." If this is not expressly said, it is implied through the rest of the passage; see ver. 14, "who is a figure of him that was to come." According to ver. 12, "death entered and passed unto all men," *i.e.* virtually, when the one man sinned. The "passing of death unto all men" is then justified by the statement, "for that all sinned." When? When all virtually died, *i.e.* in Adam. The converse also is implied, namely, that all were justified in Christ, *i.e.* conditionally, provisionally, so far as God's purpose is concerned. If the reference were to the sin and death of individuals apart from Adam, we should expect "for that all have sinned," as well as "death has passed unto all men." Augustine, in saying "all sinned in Adam," was technically wrong, but substantially right. To suppose the apostle to mean that individuals die because of their personal sin, would contradict the main teaching of the paragraph. Besides, how could the death of infants be explained? No doubt, at first sight St. Paul's teaching might seem to lead to Universalism. But he is here dealing with the objective aspect of salvation, its general provision by God, under which aspect it is universal. It is on the subjective side that conditions come in, and these are dealt with elsewhere. See also ver. 19, "were made," or constituted "sinners," 2 Cor. v. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 22, 45.[1]

Original *Depravity* is taught in passages like Ps. li. 5; John

[1] Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* ii. 339. Jacet ab Oriente ad Occidentem usque ingens ægrotus. De cœlo venit Dominus, ut sanaret ægrotum, Augustine.

iii. 6; Eph. ii. 3; see also Gen. v. 1–3; Job xiv. 4. "Flesh," as we have seen (p. 97), is the designation of a certain moral state, namely, of human nature as fallen or corrupt. "That which is flesh" (John iii. 6), thus, is equivalent to "corrupt nature." And the reason assigned is that it is "born of the flesh;" like begets like. In the same way "spirit," *i.e.* renewed human nature, is so because "born of the Spirit." "We were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest," Eph. ii. 3. "By nature," the apostle says, we were exposed to the divine wrath. Attempts have been made to explain "children of wrath" by "children of disobedience," Eph. v. 6, the possessive being subjective instead of objective. But what authority is there for supposing "wrath" to be a special characteristic of Paul and the Ephesian Christians, and indeed all Christians, "even as the rest"? "Wrath" is constantly used by St. Paul, without qualification, for the divine anger; see Rom. ii. 5, 8, v. 9, ix. 22, xii. 19; 1 Thess. i. 10, ii. 16, v. 9; also Matt. iii. 7; John iii. 36; Rom. i. 18, etc.

It must be remembered that the Scripture doctrine of Original Sin is simply a way of explaining certain undeniable facts of human history, the facts of sin and death. Apart from it, the power and universality of sin are without explanation, and death is without moral justification. That death is not a normal, natural event in the case of man is shown by our instinctive, inevitable shrinking from it. Deny Original Sin, and actual sin remains, with its mystery deepened. We know little of the mystery of evil now; we should know still less, indeed nothing at all in the other case.

The doctrine is also in harmony with the principle of the solidarity of the race. Man is not an isolated unit in his physical, intellectual, or social life. He comes into the world with a certain endowment, which he can improve, but to which he cannot add. One man is born a prince, another a beggar; one a poet, another an artist; one clever, another dull; one inherits abilities, position, connections, intellectual, moral, and social qualities which render success certain and easy; another

"by nature" is heavily, even hopelessly, weighted in all these respects. All these things we owe to the race, not to ourselves. We do not make them, and cannot alter them. Not individualism but organic unity is the principle on which man's life is constituted. The human world, like the material one, is not a mass of unconnected atoms, but a system, a cosmos, whose parts act and react at every point. This doctrine says that the same law holds good in man's spiritual life. Redemption is founded on the same principle. Pelagianism, in denying the possibility of a Fall in Adam, denies the possibility of Redemption in Christ.

Arminianism calls attention to the fact that Redemption was coeval with the Fall. Man was never left under the unchecked dominion of sin and death. Mr. Wesley says, "Allowing that all the souls of men are dead by nature, this excuses none, seeing there is no man that is in a state of mere nature; there is no man, unless he has quenched the Spirit, that is wholly void of the grace of God."[1] Thus, no one is abandoned to the power of evil. Even in the wicked the spirit strives against the flesh, and checks its power. When it ceases to resist, spiritual death is complete. Extreme doctrines of original sin, such as Augustine's, assume that man actually is what he would have been if he had been left entirely to the power of sin, apart from all modifying, restraining action of divine grace.[2]

Redemption cuts off the entail of original guilt, at least provisionally, and provides a remedy for original corruption. In the case of infants dying before sinfulness issues in actual sin, the remedy takes effect of itself; in the case of adults, it needs an act of individual appropriation. No one dies eternally through original sin alone.

Sec. 2*b*.—Dogma of Original Sin.

While the substance of the dogma is common to all Churches, its formal statement varies. The common truth is the fall of

[1] Serm. "Working out our own Salvation."

[2] Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* ii. 329–333.

the race in Adam and its redemption in Christ. The two go together. If one is impossible, so is the other. In that case we are left to work out our own salvation in the most absolute sense. It is to the West that we owe the formal definition of this doctrine. The East has taken little or no interest in the question. The occasion of the definition was the error of Pelagianism, which knows only individual sin. According to it the individual is everything, the race nothing; every man comes into the world in the same moral state as Adam, he falls through influence and example, he saves himself in the same way; death is a natural occurrence, not a penalty.[1] The teaching was condemned at Councils like Carthage, 412 A.D., and Ephesus, 431.[2]

It was in opposition to this theory, which undermined the very foundations of redemption, that Augustine formulated a theory of Original Sin. In doing so, however, he only gave definite expression to the thoughts of preceding teachers like Cyprian, Ambrose, Tertullian, and Hilary. With immense wealth of argument from Scripture, reason, and experience, he established the moral unity of the race, the federal headship of Adam, and the transmission of his sin to mankind. He undoubtedly pushed these ideas too far, at least in statement, saying, "In Adam all sinned, for we were all that one man."[3] It is not always easy to separate the true ideas in Augustine's teaching from their extremes. Overlooking the fact that divine grace began to operate contemporaneously with the Fall, he made human nature really an unrelieved mass of corruption. On this supposition, man's only possible attitude to grace is a passive one—he has no power to accept or resist. As all men

[1] Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* ii. 93; Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, p. 415; *Dict. Theol.* "Pelagianism."

[2] Dorner, vol. ii. p. 338.

[3] Augustine translates Rom. v. 12: "In quo omnes peccaverunt;" omnes fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, Luthardt, p. 146. The translation is verbally wrong, but substantially right. See his *Anti-Pelagian Treatises*, edited by Canon Bright (Clar. Press). Shedd, ii. 50.

are equally impotent, while all are not saved, the cause of the difference cannot be in man, but must be in God. That cause can only be God's determination to save some and not others. Here we have the primary germ of predestinarianism. But, setting aside extreme statements and inferences, the substance of Augustine's teaching has passed into the creeds of all Churches.

The extreme doctrine provoked reaction as early as the 5th century. The Semi-Pelagianism which arose then was an attempt at compromise. It dwelt on the negative aspect of sin, and made man capable of originating good which divine grace completes. This was the doctrine of John Cassian, Faustus of Rhegium, etc., while Hilary, Prosper, Cæsarius of Arles, took Augustine's line. The local synods of Arles and Lyons in 475 favoured the new movement, which again was condemned by those of Orange and Valence, 529.[1] While Pelagianism has never been adopted by any Church, and never could be, Semi-Pelagianism infects many Churches. The Roman Catholic doctrine of original sin is not free from it.

The only Churches which accept Augustine's doctrine in full are those which follow Calvin, who simply gave logical completeness to the teaching of the greatest of the Fathers. Luther indeed followed Augustine as fully as Calvin, but the Lutheran Church has not done so.

The best form of Arminian doctrine, as held by the Methodist Churches, teaches that, while in human nature of itself "dwelleth no good thing," on the ground of Christ's redemption it shares universally in prevenient grace. Such grace comes to man unconditionally, and is the power by which men consent to and accept further grace. Here the essential truth of Augustine's doctrine is preserved, while the errors of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism are avoided. Any original goodness in man is denied, but he is not reduced to utter impotence. Every man loses in Adam and gains in Christ. The legal and moral headship of the Second Adam is as effective

[1] Shedd, ii. 104; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* ii. 342.

as that of the first Adam; the former is more potent for good than the latter was for evil.[1]

> "In him the tribes of Adam boast
> More blessings than their father lost."

The grace which comes to every man in Christ, if rightly used, will lead to salvation: "The natural man is without the power to co-operate with divine influence. The co-operation with grace is of grace." The good seen in unregenerate men is due to redemption.[2] In affirming the action of grace as well as of sin from the time of the Fall, Arminianism avoids the prime error of Augustine.

Some further remarks on confessional differences may be useful. The Roman view of man's original nature and the effects of the Fall is as follows. Man's nature consists of flesh and spirit, each opposed to the other, and each seeking supremacy The original righteousness, which kept the flesh in due subjection to the spirit, was no part of this nature, but a superadded gift. Only this latter was lost by the Fall. Thus man was simply thrown back into his original state; he lost nothing belonging to his nature, but something supernatural. It is obvious to remark that on this view man's nature as created was morally neutral; it was not actually moral, but only capable of a moral character, the moral element residing in the supernatural addition.[3] Indeed, a Manichæan taint seems present; for, without the bridle of the supernatural gift, the triumph of the flesh seemed assured. The Roman Church calls the natural contrariety of flesh and spirit concupiscence, which, while the material and source of sin, is not itself sinful; it is in fact a mere natural propensity.[4] The effect of the Fall is thus much more negative than positive. Yet the original nature is supposed to have suffered some weakening from the Fall,[5] and the fact of inherited sin is taught, which baptism

[1] Rom. v. 15, 17, 20, 21.

[2] See chap. iii. *infra.*

[3] Jackson, Bk. x. chs. iii., xii., xiii.

[4] Winer, *Conf.* pp. 89, 99.

[5] Bellarmin says: "Homo nunc nascitur pronus ad malum, infirmus, ignorans," *ibid.* pp. 86, 88.

washes away.[1] On the other hand, the Protestant confessions make original righteousness a constituent of man's nature, not something additional. In the Fall, therefore, the nature itself suffered loss. Not of course that any substantive part or faculty of it was lost. By its very idea righteousness is not a substance or faculty, but a quality or character of substance or faculty. Protestants have always held their position on this point to be involved in the statement that man was created in the divine image. The loss inflicted by the Fall was positive. *Conf. Augsb.* p. 9 : "They teach that after the Fall of Adam, all men, begotten in order of nature, are born with sin, *i.e.* without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence."[2] Eng. Art. ix. : "Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the fault or corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit, and therefore, in every person born into the world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation; and this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek φρόνημα σαρκός, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God; and though there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin."[3] The

[1] Winer, *Conf.* p. 103.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 89 : Docent, quod post lapsum Adæ omnes homines, secundum naturam propagati, nascantur cum peccato, h. e. sine metû Dei, sine fiduciâ erga Deum, et cum concupiscentiâ.

[3] "Hath *the nature of sin*," *i.e.* is of sinful tendency. This is not so strong as the *Apology*. "*The bias to evil* is innate and congenital; and this makes it the nature of man, as being inherent and not accidental," Dr. Pope, *Comp.* ii. 64, and *Higher Catechism*, p. 122. Yet the Augustinian and Lutheran extreme is nearer the truth than the Semi-Pelagian one.

Apology for the *Augsb. Conf.* says: "Our adversaries argue that concupiscence is penalty, not sin; Luther argues that it is sin. It has been said before that Augustine defines original sin as concupiscence. Let them find fault with Augustine, if this view is inconvenient. Moreover, Paul says (Rom. vii. 7): I had not known concupiscence to be sin, unless the law had said: Thou shalt not lust. Again (Rom. vii. 23): I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into subjection to the law of sin which is in my members. No cavilling can overthrow those testimonies, for they plainly call concupiscence sin."[1]

It was from their not recognising the action of divine grace in the unregenerate that the Reformers were so unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of any good works before conversion. Hence all the Reformation creeds speak in the sense of Art. xiii., often in stronger language.[2] The Lutherans, holding baptism to be the means of regeneration, make a difference between the baptized and unbaptized in this respect, holding the former capable of good works. The jealousy shown for the honour of divine grace was admirable but mistaken.

[Tulloch, *Christian Doctrine of Sin;* Wesley's *Treatise on Original Sin.* Dorner's discussion of the whole subject is very thorough, *Syst. Christian Doctrine,* ii. 297–405, and iii. 9–142; Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin,* 2 vols.; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.*, Art. "Original Sin."]

[1] Winer, p. 105; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine,* ii. 348.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 112–114.

PART SECOND.

DOCTRINES OF REDEMPTION.

CHAPTER I.

PERSON OF THE REDEEMER.

The doctrine of Sin would naturally be followed by that of the Atonement. But as the value of redemption depends on the character of the Redeemer, a previous question is, Who and what is Christ, the Redeemer? The reply of the Church, founding on Scripture, is the doctrine of the Incarnation. A divine Incarnation includes three points, — perfect Divinity, perfect Humanity, and a perfect union between the two.[1] The most perfect union known to us is the one called personal, a union constituting the natures into a new,[2] indissoluble personality. Even the union of body and soul in man supplies only an imperfect analogy, because the elements united are not complete natures, but only parts of natures, and because the union is dissoluble. The Church has always guarded the

[1] "Some things he doth as God, because his Deity alone is the well-spring from which they flow; some things as man, because they issue from his mere human nature; some things jointly both as God and man, because both natures concur as principles thereunto," Hooker, v. 53. 3. See Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Incarnation;" Donne, Seven Sermons on Nativity, *Works*, vol. i.; Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xxiii., xxiv.

[2] An acute Irish critic objects to the word "new," with some reason, inasmuch as the divine person of the Son pre-existed. Still, we speak of the divine-human person, and one is afraid of docetism.

integrity of these three elements with great jealousy. The loss or mutilation of either one is fatal to the idea of incarnation. As we shall see afterwards, all error on the subject has touched one or other of these three points. One error has mutilated the human nature; another has denied the divine; a third has substituted transmutation or absorption for union; a fourth has reduced the union to a relation of moral likeness and sympathy, like the one existing between every believer and God.

Thus, the person of Christ is absolutely unique. Christ is not God simply, nor man simply, but God-man. Two natures, each complete in its several attributes, meet in him, neither confounded together nor acting independently, but so constituting one person that the acts of each are the acts of the person. It is this feature of absolute uniqueness which makes it impossible to bring illustrations from other sources. The Incarnate life is different in its constituents from every other life. The union is as mysterious as that of the three Persons of the Trinity, only the terms nature and person are here transposed. In the Trinity we speak of one nature and three persons, here of one person and two natures.[1]

Each of the three elements is equally important in relation to the idea of Incarnation. In one age such stress is laid on the Divinity that the Humanity is obscured, as in the first Christian centuries. In the present day the converse tendency is strong. Sometimes the union is pressed until it becomes identity, in another it is so relaxed as to make of Christ two persons. The first is Eutychianism, the second Nestorianism. But union is not identity, it implies distinctness as really as oneness. The importance of the Humanity is often overlooked from the fact of the doctrine taking the form of a proof of Christ's Divinity. The reason of its taking this form is that only the divinity is called in question, the humanity is admitted on all sides.

[1] See p. 76.

Sec. 1.—Doctrine of Christ's Divinity in Scripture.

The old method of proof is to select and classify the passages bearing on the question, irrespective of the part of Scripture in which they are found. The new one, followed by writers like Liddon and Whitelaw,[1] is to epitomize the testimony of each inspired writer separately. Each method has its obvious advantages and disadvantages. Here we take the first course as the most compendious.

1. The Divine Name given to Christ in the highest sense. John i. 1. This is the only passage in which the reference to Christ is quite undisputed. The context is too clear to admit of doubt. The first clause affirms Christ's pre-existence, and is of course inconsistent with simple humanitarianism. The "beginning" was evidently before the creation mentioned in ver. 3. The second clause affirms Christ's distinctness from and yet presence with God.[2] It precludes Sabellianism, but not Arianism. The third clause directly excludes Arianism. Note also the verbs. The Word "was;" all other things "were made" or "became." The Word did not become, was not made. The only way of evading the force of the passage is to say that "God" in the third clause of ver. 1 means "God" in a delegated, secondary sense. Where is the authority for saying this of "God" in the third any more than in the second clause? This sense is precluded by the ascription in the third verse of creation to Christ, unless Christ is a delegated Creator also. But the statement that "all things"

[1] *How is the Divinity of Jesus depicted in Scripture?* Hodder & Stoughton.

[2] "The phrase 'was with God' is remarkable. The idea conveyed by it is not that of simple co-existence, as of two persons contemplated separately in company (εἶναι μετά), or united under a common conception (εἶναι σύν), or (so to speak) in local relation (εἶναι παρά), but of being (in some sense) directed towards and regulated by that with which the relation is fixed. The personal being of the Word was realized in active intercourse with and in perfect communion with God," Westcott in *Speaker*, p. 3. See also pp. 10, 11. Comp. 1 John i. 1, 2.

were created by Christ excludes him from the class of created things. The use of the divine name in the highest sense is also in harmony with the entire strain of the Gospel, the purpose of which is to set forth Christ's divine glory.

Rom. ix. 5. The reference of the verse to Christ is disputed, but on insufficient grounds. The view that the last clause is a doxology to the Father[1] is untenable—(*a*) because a doxology would be out of harmony with the strain of the paragraph, which is one of profound sorrow for the unbelief of the Jews. What has occurred to turn the wail into an anthem? The mention of Christ's Jewish descent according to the flesh? But this is simply the crowning privilege (the adoption, the glory, etc.) of the Jewish people; and these privileges are enumerated, not as grounds of joy or praise, but as aggravations of the apostle's wonder and sorrow at the unbelief of his nation. So sudden a transition as the doxological interpretation implies would be abrupt, and out of step with all that has preceded. (*b*) "As concerning the flesh" is a limitation, implying that in another relation Christ did not come of the Jews. This other relation should surely be stated in some form. It is so stated substantially in Rom. i. 3, 4; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 18. On the ancient interpretation of the present passage it is so stated, but not on the new one. (*c*) The position of "blessed," which ordinarily precedes its subject in doxologies, as in Luke i. 68 and many other places, while here it follows. (*d*) The words of the last clause occur in Rom. i. 25 and 2 Cor. xi. 31 in a declaratory sense. There the reference, no doubt, is to the Father, but the sense is declaratory, not doxological. In the present paragraph the Father is not mentioned. The strongest argument on the other side is that it is not St. Paul's usage to call Christ God, and therefore that it is unlikely he would do so here. But precisely the same might be said of St. John, who yet, as all admit, does call Christ God in the first verse of his Gospel.[2]

[1] See margin of Revised Version.

[2] See an excellent note by Dr. Gifford in *Speaker's Commentary*, p. 178.

These passages are sufficient on this head. No adequate reason, however, can be given for contesting the reference to Christ in 1 John v. 20. There is no need to insist on the new rendering in Tit. ii. 13. Even on the old rendering the co-ordination of God and Christ is significant. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, external authority is for the Revised Version, internal probability for the old. The use of the relative pronoun without antecedent, or even a reference to "God" in ver. 15 as antecedent, is singular. Accepting, however, the new version, we then observe that the phraseology of the verse is inapplicable to a mere man,—"manifested" in the flesh.

2. Passages implying Christ's possession of the divine nature. John v. 17, 18. Christ justifies his work on the Sabbath by the divine example. He compares his own act of healing to the Father's work of providential government which is continued on the Sabbath. The Jews understood him to claim sonship of the most absolute kind, making God "his own Father;" and Christ, instead of correcting, accepts and confirms the interpretation.

x. 30. Here also the context fixes the meaning. None can pluck believers out of "my hand" or out of "the Father's hand." Christ then justifies the interchange of phrase by saying, "I and my Father are one." The unity meant, therefore, is one of power and so of essence, not merely of likeness and sympathy such as obtains between believers and God, xvii. 21.

Phil. ii. 6–8. Christ's humility is illustrated by his descent from a higher to a lower state of being (ver. 7), and by his conduct in that lower state (ver. 8).[1] The descent is the becoming man (ver. 7), as is evident both from the terms employed, and from the fact that the second act of lowliness (ver. 8) was done in the human state. What then was the previous state of being (ver. 6) from which Christ descended? It was a "being in the form of God." "Form," though not equivalent to "nature," implies the possession of the nature; it is the expression of the nature. The form of one order of

[1] Note the distinction of principal and subordinate clauses in vers. 7 and 8 in Revised Version.

being cannot be united with the nature of another, as *e.g.* man and angel. If "the form of a servant" and "the likeness of men" imply Christ's possession of the nature of a servant and of men, then "the form of God" implies his possession of the nature of God. The divinity and humanity of Christ stand or fall together, for one is expressed in the same terms as the other. Or, rather, the divinity is expressed in stronger terms than the humanity. "Form" is stronger than "likeness" and "fashion." His humanity may be denied with more reason than his divinity. Note also "being made" and "taking" in reference to the lower state, in contrast with "being" in the higher.[1] The interpretation of this passage is a decisive test of the humanitarian view of Christ's person. It is only possible at all on this view by diluting the spirit of the passage and the separate phrases to the lowest minimum of possible meaning.

Col. i. 15–17. "Image" is St. Paul's equivalent for St. John's "Word," and is akin to the "form" of Philippians. It includes both likeness and representation. "First-born" of all "creation" has at first sight an Arian look, and was eagerly seized on by the early Arians. But so to interpret it would be

[1] Both Lightfoot's and Ellicott's exposition of this passage should be consulted, as well as that of the following one. See Owen on "Christ as the Image of the Father," *Works*, i. 69. Assuming Christ's proper divinity, two applications of the whole passage are admissible. Either, ver. 6 describes the Son's pre-existent state, ver. 7 the act of Incarnation, and ver. 8 acts in the incarnate state. Or, the whole passage applies to the incarnate state, ver. 6 describing Christ's divine nature, and ver. 7 his concealment, or abstinence from the use, of his divine attributes. The first seems the best, though some Lutheran divines favour the latter. Much indeed is made of the objection that the name "Christ Jesus," ver. 5, cannot apply to the pre-incarnate Son. But is it absolutely unallowable to transfer the designations of one state of Christ's being to another? Do we not apply the designations of his two natures indifferently to the one person? As to the objection, that the humility of the act of incarnation cannot be proposed as an example to us, it applies just as strongly to the second interpretation. Properly divine acts are constantly so proposed to us, *e.g.* the divine forgiveness. Our forgiveness of others is only a shadow of God's forgiveness of us.

to make it contradict the rest of the paragraph, in which all creation is ascribed to Christ.[1] A creature who is also Creator would be a strange combination of ideas. "First-born of all creation" (πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως) = "first-born in respect of all creation." The genitive is that of the point of view. The genitive, like our possessive, case has so many shades of meaning that it has constantly to be interpreted from the context, *e.g.* the love of God. "The first-born from the dead" (ver. 18) is a different phrase (πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν). St. Paul's "first-born" is equivalent to St. John's "only-begotten," but the idea of comparison is added, "first, only." The chief point of the passage is the ascription of all creation to Christ. This is done in universal terms of the strongest kind. Christ is the medium or agent in creation (in him, through him), the end of creation (unto him), before creation (before all things), the support of creation (in him all things consist). The idea of medium or agent is quite consistent with the inner relations of the Trinity.

Heb. i. 3. "The very image of his substance," the strongest possible language, implying distinction and equality at the same time. "Substance" (R.V.) is better than "person." The term *hypostasis* or *substance* was early appropriated to signify "person" in the Trinitarian controversy, but the New Testament use is of course anterior.

3. Christ the Son of God. This is Christ's standing designation in the New Testament on the lips of St. Paul and St. John, and on Christ's own lips.[2] In what sense is the title used? Christ is either the Son of God in the same sense as Christian believers and the angels, or in a higher sense peculiar

[1] "First-born" in regard to creation; cf. 1 Pet. ii. 19, "conscience toward God." Westcott says, "Christian writers from early times have called attention to the connection of the two words applied in the N. T. to Christ 'the only Son' (μονογενής) and 'the first-born' (πρωτότοκος, Col. i. 15), which present the idea of this Sonship under complementary aspects. The first marks his relation to God as absolutely without parallel; the other, his relation to creation as pre-existent and sovereign," *Speaker's Comm.* p. 12.

[2] "Son of Man" is Christ's most usual phrase, but the other occurs, see Matt. xi. 27 and St. John's Gospel, v. 19–23, etc.

to himself. If the first were the true sense, how could Christ be called *the* Son of God, just as he is called Jesus Christ? A designation which a person shares with many others can never become a proper name of that person. It is evident that the title has a special meaning in reference to Christ. Whether that sense is a divine one must be learnt from the context and the surroundings of the phrase. A careful consideration of passages like Matt. xi. 27, xvi. 16, xxii. 42, xxvi. 63, Rom. i. 3, 4, and numerous passages in St. John's Gospel, can scarcely leave the matter doubtful. *We* become children of God by receiving Christ, and believing on his name. As Son he is above the angels (Heb. i.), above Moses (iii. 5, 6). He is the eternal Son (Heb. i. 8). He is God's "own" Son (John v. 18; Rom. viii. 3, 32), "only-begotten" Son (John i. 18, iii. 16).[1] It is true, the miraculous conception and the Resurrection seem assigned as reasons for Christ's Sonship (Luke i. 35; Acts xiii. 33), but they can only be subordinate reasons. They would not alone justify all that is predicated of Christ in this character.[2] An official sense has sometimes been given to "Son," as though it were equivalent to Messiah. But no one would choose the term "Son" to denote office. It denotes natural relation, and nothing else. The official idea is already expressed by such terms as Messiah, Lord, Prophet, Priest. On the official interpretation we should have tautology in Matt. xvi. 16 and John i. 49.

[1] "The rendering (*only-begotten*) somewhat obscures the exact sense of the original word (*μονογενής*), which is rather 'only-born.' That is, the thought in the original is centred in the personal Being of the Son and not in his generation. Christ is the One only Son, the One to whom the title belongs in a sense completely unique and singular, as distinguished from that in which there are many children of God (ver. 12 f.). The use of the word elsewhere in the New Testament to describe an only child (Luke vii. 12, viii. 42, ix. 38; Heb. xi. 17) brings out this sense completely," Westcott, *Speaker's Comm.* p. 12.

[2] Owen, *Works*, xii. 177, etc. (Goold's ed.), a full and unanswerable argument from Scripture; Kennedy, *The Self-Revelation of Jesus Christ*, p. 155; Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xxi.; Treffry, *Eternal Sonship*, p. 166 and *passim*.

4. Christ the Lord. In some passages of the New Testament this title, in reference to Christ, seems to be used interchangeably with Jehovah, cf. Matt. iii. 3 with Isa. xl. 3 and Mal. iii. 1; John xii. 41 with Isa. vi.; 1 Pet. ii. 3 with Ps. xxxiv. 8; 1 Pet. iii. 15 with Isa. viii. 13; Heb. i. 10–12 with Ps. cii. 25. But apart from these special cases, wherever in the New Testament the term Lord occurs Christ is meant, except in quotations from the Old Testament. In most places this is certainly the case, and in no place is it impossible. See *e.g.* Heb. ii. 3 and context, Jas. ii. 1. The argument used above of "Son" applies also to "Lord." Why is the title not given to any prophet or apostle? If Christ were only a greater prophet or apostle, there is no reason why it should not be so given. Surely there might be lords of different rank and authority. But Christ and Christ only is designated the Lord.[1]

5. Christ Pre-existent. Though this cannot be inferred merely from Christ being "sent" into the world (see John i. 6), the number of times the phrase is used of Christ (nearly thirty times in St. John's Gospel) is remarkable, and can only be explained by supposing that it has a special sense in reference to him. Other similar phrases are quite unequivocal in meaning: John iii. 31, "cometh from above, from heaven;" xiii. 3, "came forth from God and goeth unto God" (vi. 33, 38, 51, 62, xvi. 27, 28, xvii. 5; 1 Cor. xv. 47; Mark i. 38; Eph. iv. 8–10). See also John i. 1, 15. Westcott finds in the latter passage absolute, essential priority, including, of course, priority in time.[2]—John viii. 58. The Jews understood Christ to affirm his own actual existence before Abraham. If Christ did not mean the same, he trifled with them and with words. He uses his accustomed solemn preface, "Verily, verily, I say unto

[1] Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xxii.

[2] "The precedence in dignity (iii. 33) which Christ at once assumed when he was manifested was due to his essential priority. He *was* in his essence (viii. 58) before John, and therefore at his revelation he took the place which corresponded with his nature. The original phrase in the second clause (πρῶτός μου, Vulg. *prior me*) is very remarkable. It expresses

you." If he only meant existence in the divine thought or purpose, this is true of every human being, and of every great man especially. Note again the different verbs, "Before Abraham *became*, I *am*;" Vulgate, "Antequam fieret Abraham, ego sum." Pre-existence does not indeed necessarily imply eternity and divinity; but taken in connection with the other proofs, it can mean nothing else.

6. Divine Acts. Creation and Judgment are the two greatest acts of God in the physical and the moral world respectively, implying possession of the highest divine attributes and authority. Both are ascribed to Christ. For Creation, see John i. 3; Heb. i. 3; Col. i. 16; and Judgment, Matt. vii. 23, xiii. 42, xxv. 31; John v. 22, 27; 2 Cor. v. 10, etc. Creation is indeed said to be "through" and "in" Christ; but this precisely expresses the divine function or relation of the Son in creation, providence, and redemption alike. The early mention of Christ as Judge in Matthew's Gospel should be noticed, disproving as it does the assertion that the Synoptic Gospels differ from St. John's Gospel on this subject.

7. Unique Claims and Position of Christ. He ever preaches himself as the object of faith, the Way to the Father, the Light of the world, the Resurrection and the Life. Who else could do this? The apostles preach Christ, Christ preaches himself. Paul says, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ;" Christ says, "He that believeth in me." This expresses all the difference between Christ and those who stand nearest to him, and the difference is immense. It implies a corresponding difference in the nature of Christ and of the apostles. Matt. xi. 27 speaks of a mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son, which is quite unique. In John iii. 16 the greatness of the Father's love is

not only relative, but (so to speak) absolute priority. He was first altogether in regard to me, and not merely former as compared with me," *Speaker's Comm.* p. 13. In the light of this exposition Westcott's previous remark, that "the supposed reference to the pre-existence of the Word seems to be inconsistent with the argument," sounds strange. "Absolute priority" means every kind of priority, temporal included.

determined by the greatness of the Son. In Rom. v. 8, God commends "his own love" to us "in that *Christ* died for us." In viii. 9, "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of Christ" are used interchangeably. In vers. 35 and 39, "love of Christ" and "love of God" are used interchangeably.[1] In 2 Cor. viii. 9, Christ is said to have been rich, and to have shown his grace by becoming poor for us. If he was a mere man, when and in what sense was he rich, and how did he become poor for our sakes? In Gal. i. 1, "from man" and "through man" are expressly opposed to "through Jesus Christ and God the Father." In Jude 21 believers are exhorted to look "for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life," just as they are to "pray in the Holy Spirit," and "keep themselves in the love of God,"—the strongest possible testimony to the supreme Deity of Christ. The salutation at the head of nearly all the epistles runs, "Grace and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ," Rom. i. 7, etc. What meaning could the comparison in John xiv. 28 have on the lips of a mere man? See also John xiv. 13, 14, Heb. i., Matt. x. 32, 33, 37, xi. 28, John x. 17, 18, for incidental evidence. "When I ask myself what are the proofs of Christ's divinity which the Scripture affords, when I inquire whether he did himself claim to be God, I find evidence of this not so much in texts where this in as many words is asserted,—though these are most needful,—but far more in the position toward every other man which he uniformly, and as a matter of course, assumes. What man, that was not man's Maker as well as his fellow, could have required that father and mother, wife and children, should all be postponed to himself; that when any competition between his claims and theirs arose, he should be everything and they nothing? That not merely these, which though very close to a man, are yet external to him; but that his very self, his own life, should be hated, when on no other conditions Christ should be loved?"[2]

[1] In ver. 32 there is another reading, "love of God," but the Revisers prefer the old reading.

[2] Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, p. 251; Lacordaire, *Jesus Christ*,

Sec. 2.—Inferences from the Doctrine.

a. Unity of Christ's Person. We saw before that the Church formulated the doctrine of the Trinity as a means of harmonizing different statements of Scripture, which affirm the existence of three divine persons and the divine unity. Scripture gives the materials which human thought then elaborates. The doctrine of Christ's person is arrived at in a similar way. Scripture ascribes human attributes and acts to Christ, implying the complete human nature in him; it also ascribes divine attributes and acts to him, implying the divine nature in him, and yet it knows but one Christ. One person speaks and acts, both in a divine and human way. He is the subject of both classes of attributes and acts. All this is compendiously expressed in the statement that in Christ there are two natures in one person. This is what is meant by the hypostatic union. In Christ there are not two centres of life, but one, just as in ourselves. The life has two sides, but it is one. We conceive the person as underlying the natures or constituted by them. The bearing of this on the Atonement is obvious. The death of Christ is the death of a divine person, his death in a human nature, but still his death. Hence its extraordinary value. If the human nature merely existed side by side with the divine without personal union, its acts and sufferings would be apart from and unaffected by the divine. But it is not so. The nature which suffers and dies has become an integral part of the life of the divine Son. See John iii. 13, vi. 62; Acts xx. 28; 1 Cor. ii. 8.[1]

b. Christ's Absolute Sinlessness. For this characteristic, so

"Conferences" (Chapman & Hall); Godet, *Defence of Christian Faith*, Lect. vi.

[1] Owen, *Works*, i. 235; Jackson, Bk. vii. ch. xxx. "Inasmuch as the whole human nature in itself was but an appendix of his divine person (no person distinct from it), whatsoever Christ Jesus did do or suffer in this nature, was done and suffered by the Eternal Son of God," viii. ch. i., folio ed. i. 763. Hooker, Bk. v. 53, 4. The phrase "appendix" is not happy.

essential to a perfect Atonement, the Incarnation is an absolute guarantee, 2 Cor. v. 21 ; Heb. iv. 15, vii. 26. As to the fact of Christ's absolute sinlessness, there is perfect unanimity in the Church. But on one point two opinions are held, namely, whether sin was possible to Christ or not, some affirming the possibility, others denying it. Both schools of thought equally deny the fact. One holds the *posse non peccare*, the others the *non posse peccare*. Certainly at first sight there is much to be said for the possibility. Otherwise, Christ's temptation seems unreal, his victory seems to lose force for us, his sympathy with us to be imperfect. But what is meant by the reality of temptation? Is temptation more real to the good or the bad? Which suffers most from inducements to dishonesty, the honest or dishonest? Does the reality of temptation increase with the liability to yield to it? In point of fact, it is the most upright and virtuous who feel most keenly the assaults of sin. The purer the nature, the keener the pang of solicitation to wrong. Absolute purity, then, instead of neutralizing temptation, would lend it greater keenness. The argument from sympathy would prove too much. If sympathy depends on actual identity of circumstances, actual sin in Christ would surely have still further heightened his sympathy. Really the argument lies the other way. The farther any one is removed from sin, the more valuable his sympathy. We need the help of the strong, not of the weak. Is sympathy with man impossible to angels? Edward Irving saw the tendency of the argument, and ascribed a sinful nature to Christ. This the whole Church has ever denied. As to example, is not God himself proposed as our example? The insuperable barrier to the possibility of sin in Christ is the idea of the Incarnation. How is the possibility of sin conceivable in the case of a human nature personally united to the divine? We see no way of meeting this difficulty. The unique position in which human nature is placed in the Incarnation must have modifying effects.[1]

[1] Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. vi. "It is not necessary to have had every experience in order to recognise the truth of different feelings in human

c. Christ's Human Nature Impersonal.[1] Here again we have two schools of opinion, one affirming the impersonality as necessary to the unity of Christ's person, the other denying it as infringing on the perfection of his humanity. The dispute really seems to be one of definition of terms. The two sides understand personality and impersonality in different senses. When writers like Canon Liddon, following in the wake of the whole Catholic school, affirm impersonality, they mean that the human nature never existed and acted apart from the divine, a surely indisputable proposition. From the instant of its creation, Christ's human nature was assumed into union with the divine. To give it a separate centre of life and action is to divide

nature, and to have sympathy with them. The possession of a common humanity, with love at the heart, gives the power. Christ did not need to take every place and trial to qualify himself. Those recorded are more than enough to make us feel his oneness with us. . . . The soul of man through one experience can transfer itself into many. So with a great poet. Christ, through his human experience, has infinite powers of such realization. In regard to sin he took upon him all connected with it, except that which would have unfitted him for being our Saviour,—an actual participation in sin. . . . Sin more than aught else blunts the tender edge of sympathy, whereas sinlessness which has struggled with temptation gains power to understand it without losing sensitiveness," Dr. Ker, *Thoughts for Heart and Life*, pp. 5, 104.

[1] John of Damascus and Peter Lombard first developed the idea, Luthardt, p. 174. "If the Son of God had taken to himself a man now made and already perfected, it would of necessity follow that there are in Christ two persons, the one assuming and the other assumed ; whereas the Son of God did not assume a man's person unto his own, but a man's nature unto his own Person, and therefore took *semen*, the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of our nature, before it was come to have any personal human subsistence," Hooker, Bk. v. 52, 3. "We deny that the human nature of Christ had any such subsistence of its own as to give it a *proper personality*, being from the time of its conception assumed into subsistence with the Son of God," Owen, xii. 210. And further on the point, "Christ was a true man, because he had the true essence of a man, soul and body, with all their essential properties. A peculiar personality belongeth not to the essence of a man, but to his existence in such a manner. Neither do we deny Christ to have a person as a man, but to have a human person," etc. See also Jackson, Bk. vii. ch. xxx. 7.

Christ into two persons, the error of Nestorianism. The personal Word existed previously, and took into union with himself, not an individual already existing, but human nature. Again, those who affirm the personality seem to mean by it completeness, an equally indisputable truth, asserted by the other side and by the whole Church. If by personality we understand the presence in Christ of all the elements of the human—body, soul, spirit—thought, feeling, will—then his human nature was personal by universal acknowledgment. But if by it is meant that Christ's humanity existed and acted apart from the divine, how can any believer in the unity of his person assert it? The impersonality, then, is a corollary of the unity, and is affirmed in this sense. It seems best to say, "Christ was man," not "Christ was a man."[1] It is a mistake to suppose that the idea of the impersonality of Christ's human nature is taught only by the Catholic school of divines. Dr. Owen is on the same side. He says, "The eternal person of the Son of God, or the divine nature in the person of the Son, did, by an ineffable act of his divine power and love, assume our nature into an individual subsistence in or with himself; that is, to be his own, even as the divine nature is his" (i. 329). Thus, "the eternal person of the Son" did not assume "a human person," but "human nature." "The prevention of that nature (the human) from any subsistence of its own—by its assumption into personal union with the Son of God, in the first instance of its conception—is that which is above all miracles." "Although the person of Christ, as God

[1] "The attempt to express the truth with precision is beset with difficulty, and even with peril. Thus, in using the words 'personality' and 'impersonal' in relation to Christ, it is obviously necessary to maintain the greatest reserve. For us 'personality' implies limitation or determination, *i.e.* finiteness in some direction. As applied to the divine nature, therefore, the word is not more than a necessary accommodation, required to give such distinctness to our ideas as may be attainable. The word 'impersonal,' again, as applied to the Lord's human nature, is not to be so understood as to exclude in any way the right application of the word 'man' to him, as it is used both by himself (John viii. 40) and by St. Paul (1 Tim. ii. 5)," Westcott in *Speaker*, p. 11.

and man, be constituted by this union, yet his person absolutely, and his individual subsistence, was perfect, absolutely antecedent unto that union."[1] Trench says, "This question could never have been so much as started, except in a Nestorian severance of the Lord into two persons, and this in the contemplation of a human person in him as at some moment existing apart from the divine. When we acknowledge in him two natures, but these at no time other than united in the one person of the Son of God, the whole question at once falls to the ground. Christ was perfect man in the sense of having everything belonging to the completeness of the human nature; but there is not, and there never at any moment has been, any other person but the Son of God; his human body and soul at the very moment of their union with one another were also united unto the eternal Word, so that there is not, nor ever has been, any human person to contemplate."[2]

Sec. 3.—Dogma of Christ's Person.

This is the only dogma in the whole range of theology which the whole Christian Church receives without important variation or modification. With respect to other doctrines, such as Original Sin and Atonement, while there is agreement about essentials, the differences in dogmatic statement are considerable. But all Christendom substantially accepts the teaching of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. None give a more uncompromising support to the creeds than the great Puritan divines. They knew full well that it is not a question of Nicene metaphysics, but of vital doctrine. In nothing is the wisdom of the early councils and creeds more clearly seen than in their being content with negativing error; they do not go on to frame positive theories.

Among the many forms of error discussed and rejected in

[1] *Works*, vol. i. pp. 15, 45, 229, 234; see also pp. 224, 226, 239, and note on previous page.

[2] *Studies in the Gospels*, p. 27.

early days, Unitarianism was not one.[1] Individuals within the Church may have betrayed Unitarian tendencies, but this was all. Each of the great heresies on this subject, even Arianism, was far removed from such teaching, and as a rule tended in the opposite direction. Not Unitarianism, but Docetism, which reduced the human in Christ to mere illusory appearance, and made the divine everything, expressed the prevailing spirit of the early ages. Perhaps Ebionitism may be thought to be an exception; but too little is known of it to allow it to be taken into account. There is no proof whatever that it had any place within the Church, or was recognised as a form of Christian life and thought. The same is true of Gnostic speculations.

Among the pioneers of Christian thought Irenæus is an interesting figure. He is fond of speaking of Christ as the recapitulation of humanity.[2] The idea is a many-sided one, embracing the notions of summing up, fulfilment, and reparation. Christ's person recapitulated human nature, his work recapitulated the old dispensation, his obedience recapitulated Adam's disobedience. Both to Adam and Christ the title *homo universalis, principalis* is given. The idea is taken from Eph. i. 10.

The erroneous speculations which gave rise to definitions, and which were formerly rejected, were Arianism, Apollinarianism, Nestorianism, and Eutychianism. Of the first we have already said enough (p. 82).

[1] Except in so far as Unitarianism is akin to Sabellianism.

[2] Filius Dei existens semper apud Patrem, et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem præstans, ut quod perdideramus in Adam i.e. secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse Dei, hoc in Christo Jesu reciperemus. Quia enim non erat possibile, eum hominem, qui semel victus fuerat et elisus per inobedientiam, replasmare et obtinere brabium victoriæ; iterum autem impossibile erat ut salutem perciperet, qui sub peccato ceciderat. Utraque operatus est Filius, Verbum Dei existens, a Patre descendens et incarnatus, et usque ad mortem descendens, et dispensationem consummans salutis nostræ, quoted in Owen, *Works*, i. 26.

Apollinarianism[1] (Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea) denied to Christ a human spirit (πνεῦμα), allowing to his human nature only a body and an animal soul (ψυχή). The place of the higher principle was taken by the divine Logos. The theory was supported by three arguments. First, the exclusion of the human spirit was supposed to be necessary in order to Christ's sinlessness, as though contact with a sensuous nature necessarily defiled the spirit. Then, it was said that only on this supposition is the unity of Christ's person conceivable. If the spirit, which is the seat of will and personality, is present, we have two persons. And again, a human spirit was said to be superfluous, inasmuch as it was of the same nature as the divine Logos or Reason, which was well fitted to take its place. Whatever these arguments are worth, they are far outweighed by a single objection on the other side. To take away the spirit from human nature is to take away its distinctive element. A body and animal soul do not constitute human but brute nature. The humanity is thus mutilated, and the idea of Incarnation destroyed. It was also urged by the Church, that if the human spirit was not assumed by Christ, it did not share in redemption (τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον, "that which is not assumed is not healed"). All the great Fathers opposed the heresy, which was condemned at Constantinople, 381 A.D. Long afterwards, the clause "he descended into Hades," *i.e.* in spirit, was adopted in the Apostles' Creed as a protest against it.[2]

Nestorianism (Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople) divided Christ into two persons. Whether Nestorius intended to do this is more than doubtful, but such was the tendency of his teaching. He started with the principle that the human is incapable of the divine, and so could never get from one to the other. He admitted only a unity of relation, not a personal one. The test in the controversy was the term θεοτόκος, which

[1] On these heresies, see Blunt, *Dict. Sects*, and *Dict. Theol. passim*; Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* i. 394; Pope, Fern. Lect. p. 189; *Comp.* ii. 135; Cunningham, *Hist. Theology*, vol. i. ch. x.

[2] Pearson on *Creed*; Barrow on *Creed*, Ser. xxviii.

Nestorius would not accept. At first sight, indeed, the term seems objectionable. But all that was meant to be asserted by it was that in Christ there is but one person, that Mary did not give birth to a man who was afterwards united to the Logos. Staunch Protestants have defended the theological, not the devotional, use of the term.[1] Nestorius would only call Mary Χριστοτόκος. His opponent, Cyril of Alexandria, was personally a far less estimable character, but he took the right side on this question. While preserving the distinctness of the two natures as jealously as Nestorius, he gives them only one centre in the personality of the Logos, who, existing antecedently, assumed the human nature into union with himself. Nestorius's connection with the Antiochian school of teaching partly explains his aberration. His error was condemned at Ephesus, 431.[2]

Eutychianism (Eutyches, presbyter of Constantinople) was a reaction from the former error. In his anxiety to avoid a duality of persons, Eutyches merged the human nature in the divine. After the Incarnation he acknowledged but one nature. This error was condemned at Chalcedon, 451.

It is important to observe that the last three errors were not propounded by deniers of the Incarnation, but were intended as theories of the Incarnation.[3]

The clauses of the Chalcedon Creed which were directed against these errors are the following: "Perfect as to his godhead and perfect as to his manhood, truly God and truly man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting; consubstantial with the Father as to his godhead, and consubstantial with us as to his manhood; acknowledged in two natures

[1] Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. 399; Dr. David Duncan of the *Colloquia Peripatetica*, but the reference has escaped me.

[2] Luthardt, *Comp.* p. 172; Owen, *Works*, i. 230.

[3] "Athanasianism is just the negation of all possible theory on the subject of Christ's person; and so, too, of his work. All the heresies are just explanations of the mystery," Duncan, p. 104. See Hooker, Bk. v. 51, etc. Another point that has exercised theological speculation is, why it was the Son in particular who became incarnate. See Hooker, Bk. v. 51, 3; Owen, *Works*, i. 27; Jackson, Bk. vii. ch. xxv. 6.

without mixture, without conversion, without division, without separation. We confess not a Son divided and sundered into two persons, but one and the same Son." The four important terms are ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως. The Athanasian Creed says: "Perfect God and perfect man; of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting. Who, although he be God and Man, yet he is not two, but one Christ; one, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God; one altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person." Dr. Pope says: "Christ is truly God, perfectly man, unconfusedly in two natures, indivisibly in one person."[1]

The three errors just noted were afterwards revived in other forms, Eutychianism in Monophysitism, Apollinarianism in Monothelitism, Nestorianism in Adoptianism. Monophysitism left only one nature in Christ, a composite one, in which the human became merely an accident of the divine. Monothelitism robbed the human nature of the faculty of will, replacing it by the divine will. The Church rightly held to two wills, as integral parts of the natures, the human being harmonious with and subordinate to the divine. The errors were condemned at the fifth and sixth Councils of Constantinople, 553 and 680. Adoptianism arose in Spain in the 8th century. According to it, Christ was God's Son by nature as to his divine nature, by adoption as to his human. Its Nestorian tendency was instinctively felt and rightly condemned, Council of Frankfort, 794.[2]

[1] *Comp.* ii. 107.

[2] It may be well here to give the Nicene Creed, "drawn up at, or soon after, the Council of Nicæa," bracketing the clauses added at the Council of Constantinople, 381: Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν, Πατέρα παντοκράτορα, ποιητὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, ὁρατῶν τε πάντων καὶ ἀοράτων. Καὶ εἰς ἕνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ μονογενῆ, [τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων·] φῶς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρί· δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τόν τε δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν, κατελθόντα ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ σαρκωθέντα [ἐκ Πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου,] καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, [σταυρωθέντα τε ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου,] καὶ παθόντα, [καὶ ταφέντα] καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ

We need not linger on such idle speculations as the Nihilianism of the Middle Ages, which argued that the Incarnation made no change in the life of the eternal Son. The Docetic spirit shows here again its persistent force. The divine life no doubt remains unchanged in itself, but not in its relations. Peter Lombard favoured, Aquinas and Scotus opposed, the notion.

Another point on which opinions differ is, whether the Incarnation would have taken place if there had been no sin. In the Middle Ages, Rupert of Deutz argued that it would, Aquinas that it would not. In our days, Martensen and Dorner and others advocate the first alternative.[1] They argue that it is unworthy to make the greatest work of divine grace depend on man's sin, so that if there had been no sin there would have been no incarnation. On their view, all that depends on sin is the form which the incarnation took. Apart from sin, redemption, suffering, and death would have been unnecessary, and the incarnate life of the Son of God would have taken a glorious form. But all such speculations and assertions are beyond our competence. Undoubtedly the obvious suggestion of Scripture is that incarnation is in order to redemption. Sin is in no case

κατὰ τὰς γραφάς· καὶ ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐράνους, [καὶ καθιζόμενον ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ Πατρὸς,] καὶ πάλιν ἐρχόμενον μετὰ δοξῆς κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς· [οὗ τῆς βασιλείας οὐκ ἔσται τέλος]. Καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον [τὸ Κύριον, καὶ τὸ ζωοποιὸν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν. Εἰς μίαν ἁγίαν καθολικὴν καὶ ἀποστολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν· ὁμολογοῦμεν ἓν βάπτισμα εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, προσδοκῶμεν ἀνάστασιν νεκρῶν καὶ ζωὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος]. Ἀμήν. See Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 256 ; the other creeds also are given with comments. Also A. Hahn, *Bibliothek d. Symbole d. alten Kirche*, pp. 78, 82 ; Pope, *Comp.* ii. 138, 189 ; Fern. Lect. p. 195.

[1] Augustine says : Tolle morbos, tolle vulnera, et nulla causa est medicinæ. Si homo non periisset, filius hominis non venisset, Luthardt, p. 167. The other school maintain that the Incarnation is necessary to the perfection even of unfallen humanity. See also Dean Jackson's excellent remarks, Bk. viii. ch. iii. ; Owen, *Works*, i. 23 ; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 260 ; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, etc., ii. 217, iii. 141.

the cause or source, but merely the occasion of incarnation as of redemption. While it is quite true that the Incarnation not only fulfils purposes of grace, but is also God's highest revelation of himself, we cannot say that a perfect revelation would have been impossible in any other way. "Secret things belong unto the Lord."

Socinianism took its name and its rise from two Italians of noble rank, Laelius and Faustus Socinus, uncle and nephew, who in the 16th century migrated from Italy, first to Switzerland and then to Poland. Faustus embodied their views in the *Racovian Catechism* (1605), and his work, *De Jesu Christi Servatore*. Socinianism utterly rejected the doctrines of the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, and vicarious Atonement, going much further than ancient Arianism and Sabellianism. Still, while making Christ a mere man, it ascribed to him several prerogatives which have fallen away in Unitarianism. He was preserved from taint of sin by miraculous conception; he was specially endowed with the Holy Spirit at his baptism, and early in his ministry was taken up to heaven to receive special instruction and authority; his Resurrection was held fast, as well as his exaltation at the Ascension to dignity and power over angels as well as men; worship is due to him, of course only such worship as the Roman Church gives to the Virgin Mary. The Holy Spirit is explained away as a divine influence. The forensic view of the atonement was also an object of special attack.

In the last century, and somewhat earlier, an Arian party arose in England, represented by Samuel Clarke, as well as by Whiston, Whitby, and others. The chief permanent effect was in calling forth the replies of Bull (*Defence of the Nicene Faith*) and Waterland. Views ranging from Socinianism through Arianism to Unitarianism prevailed extensively both in the English Church and Dissenting communities, witness the names of Hoadley, Blackburne, Lindsey, Belsham. The two latter became avowed Unitarians. The chief Unitarian teacher was Dr. Priestley. The history of many of these writers and move-

ments shows that Unitarianism is often a reaction against extreme Calvinism.[1]

The Lutheran Christology presents some points of peculiarity.[2] Its starting-point is the *Communicatio Idiomatum*, by which is meant the communication of the properties of the divine nature in Christ to the human, the latter being thus endowed with omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc. This is held to be a necessary consequence of the Incarnation. No one, it is said, can hold the Incarnation in earnest and deny this inference. But the inference is one-sided. Why does not the communication of the properties of the human to the divine follow by like necessity? This, of course, is not asserted; indeed, is strenuously denied. But if logical necessity is good in one case, how can it be bad in the other? The Eutychian confusion of natures is not held, but it is dangerously near. Besides, the doctrine seems to reverse the aspect under which the Incarnation is contemplated. Scripture ever presents it as an act of condescension on the part of the divine; the Lutheran doctrine represents it, in effect at least, as principally an elevation of the human.[3] The doctrine of the *Communicatio Idiomatum* is practically applied to support the Lutheran idea of Consubstantiation. It is in virtue of this effect of the Incarnation that Christ's body is

[1] Blunt, *Dict. of Sects.*

[2] Luthardt, p. 179; Pope, *Comp.* ii. 191.

[3] Non confundimus naturarum diversitatem; veruntamen Christum non ut tu asseris Deum factum, sed Deum factum Christum confitemur. Quia non cum pauper esset, dives factus est, sed cum dives esset, pauper factus est, ut nos divites faceret; neque enim cum esset in formâ servi, formam Dei accepit; sed cum esset in formâ Dei, formam servi accepit; similiter etiam nec, cum esset caro, Verbum est factum; sed cum esset Verbum, caro factum est, Maxentius, quoted by Owen, i. 16. Owen says of the Lutheran doctrine, "For that which some have for a long season troubled the Church withal, about such a *real communication of the properties of the divine nature into the human*, which should neither be a transfusion of them into it, so as to render it the subject of them, nor yet consist in a *reciprocal denomination* from their mutual inbeing in the same subject,—it is that which neither themselves do, nor can any other, well understand," i. 233.

endowed with ubiquity and unites itself with the Eucharistic elements. Whether there is any further connection between these two Lutheran articles, we need not inquire. Lutheran expositors generally interpret the whole of the passage, Phil. ii. 6–8, of the Incarnate Son, giving it this peculiar turn (p. 112, note).

The doctrine of the *Communicatio* at once raised other questions. How is the asserted possession of divine attributes by Christ's human nature to be reconciled with the phenomena of his earthly life, in which those attributes are absent? In the Reformation age two answers were given to this question. The great theologian, Brentz of Tübingen,[1] said that these attributes were really possessed and exercised by the human, but both possession and exercise were veiled under infirmity, suffering, and death. The Ascension was the first display of these attributes on the part of the man Christ Jesus. Brentz's followers were called Kryptists. Another equally great theologian, Chemnitz of Giessen, said that while the attributes were communicated in the Incarnation to the human, they were not exercised or only partially exercised. This was the self-emptying of the Incarnate Son. At the Ascension divine powers began to be fully and openly exercised by the human. The Kryptists and Kenotists both equally held the common Lutheran doctrine of the *Communicatio*. They differed as to what followed. One made Christ during his earthly life veil the use, the other made him renounce the use, of divine powers. The emphasis laid on the difference between the States of Humiliation and Exaltation should be noticed.[2]

The Kenotists just mentioned must be distinguished from the Kenotists of our own days. The latter school, which includes considerable divines, both of the Lutheran and Reformed Church,[3] applies the idea of self-emptying (Phil. ii. 7) to the divine nature of the Son itself. It is in fact an attempt to explain the mode of the Incarnation, *i.e.* to explain the inex-

[1] Luthardt, p. 187. [2] Pope, *Comp.* ii. 193; Fern. Lect. p. 206.

[3] Lutheran — Liebner, Hofmann, Thomasius, Luthardt, Delitzsch, Martensen, Gess; Reformed—Ebrard, Godet.

plicable. According to this theory, the eternal Son in the act of Incarnation voluntarily stripped himself of his divine attributes and powers, reduced himself to the dimensions of human nature, became in the most literal sense a man, and then by a process of development unfolded again to the consciousness of full divinity. The theory assumes different forms, some more extreme than others. According to one form, the divine Son renounced only the relative attributes; according to another, the absolute attributes also. Even on the latter view the divine nature or essence of the Son remains, as a sort of germ or potency which again unfolds. The Kenotists apply Phil. ii. 6–8 to the incarnate state. The human nature of the God-man, having been invested according to the Lutheran *Comm. Idiomatum* with divine powers, at once renounced them, to recover them gradually, and to recover them completely in the state of Exaltation. How such a doctrine, in any form, can be reconciled with the divine Immutability, it is difficult to understand. It professes to receive and start from the Christology of the ancient Church, but really contradicts it. An essential part of the ancient doctrine is that the Word in becoming Flesh did not lose or give up anything that he was, but in addition became something that he was not before.[1] Remaining by necessity of nature all that he was before, he assumed a perfect human nature into union with himself. According to Kenotism, the divine Son underwent a mighty

[1] "The word *became* must not be so understood as to support the belief that the Word ceased to be what he was before; and the word *flesh* must not be taken to exclude the rational soul of man. The clear apprehension of the meaning of the phrase, so far as we can apprehend it, lies in the recognition of the unity of the Lord's Person before and after the Incarnation. His Personality is divine. But at the same time we must affirm that his humanity is real and complete. He, remaining the same Person as before, did not simply assume humanity as something which could be laid aside; *he became flesh.* He did not simply become 'a man:' he became 'man.' The mode of the Lord's existence on earth was truly human, and subject to all the conditions of human existence; but he never ceased to be God," Westcott in *Speaker*, p. 10.

change, he ceased for a time to be what he had been from all eternity, the divine was lost in the human and then emerged again. It seems to be Eutychianism reversed. Kenotists say that the alternative of their theory is Nestorianism, that unity of Person is otherwise unattainable. We can only reply, that in that case the whole Church up to recent days was Nestorian without knowing it.[1]

Sec. 4.—The Two States of the Incarnation.

1. The State of *Humiliation* extends from the Miraculous Conception and Birth to the death of Christ inclusive. The Incarnation itself is not included in this state, for it continues still in the state of Exaltation. The Humiliation, strictly speaking, includes all those acts and states of Christ's life which are extra to the idea of Incarnation, such as the Conception and Birth, the Circumcision, Baptism, Fasting, Temptation, Sinless Infirmity, Death and Burial. The Incarnation might have taken place, Christ might have been perfect man, apart from these circumstances.

2. The State of *Exaltation* begins with the Resurrection, is continued in the Ascension, and completed in the Session at God's right hand. Some make it begin earlier, with the descent of Christ's Spirit into Hades. But this view depends on a doubtful interpretation of a difficult text, 1 Pet. iii. 19. Lutheran and Catholic divines all make the passage refer to such a descent, though they are not agreed as to the meaning and purposes of the descent. There are, however, other interpretations, which have on their side an equally eminent series of expositors. A strongly disputed interpretation is too slender a basis on which to found doctrine.[2]

[1] A good exposition and criticism may be seen in Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. iv. Dr. Bruce does not think the divine Immutability an inseparable barrier to the theory. The student must judge for himself. Let him also ask what the effect of the theory is on the divine Trinity.

[2] See Dr. Salmond in Schaff's *Commentary*, vol. iv. 215.

The Resurrection is the first stage of the Exaltation. It is God's reversal of the world's judgment passed on Christ in the crucifixion. Christ died on the assertion that he was the Son of God, Matt. xxvi. 63. The Father in raising him from the dead confirms the assertion, Rom. i. 4.[1] The Resurrection is also a divine seal on Christ's work, Rom. iv. 25, viii. 34. In it the Prophet is glorified.[2]

The Ascension glorifies the High Priest, who now enters the eternal Holy Place, Heb. iv. 14, ix. 25. He ascends to intercede and bless.

The Session is the glorification of the King. He now assumes the mediatorial crown and sceptre, which he will continue to bear till the consummation of all things, 1 Cor. xv. 28. His attitude is the sign of triumph past and the pledge of triumph to come.

[Liddon's Bampton Lecture; Pope, Fernley Lect. on *Person of Christ;* Whitelaw, *Divinity of Christ;* Wardlaw, *Socinian Controversy;* Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 145–373; Pye-Smith, *Scripture Testimony to Messiah;* Owen's two treatises, *The Glorious Mystery of the Person of Christ*, and *Meditations and Discourses on the Glory of Christ* (vol. i. of his works), are most noble; Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Cunningham Lecture.]

[1] "Justified in the spirit," 1 Tim. iii. 16; "Convince of righteousness," John xvi. 8, 10.

[2] Farindon, Sermons on *Nativity, Resurrection*, i. 31. ed. 1849.

CHAPTER II.

DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT.

The constitution of Christ's Person gives value to his Work. It is significant that, when Christ's work is spoken of, our thoughts fix at once on this part of it. This is his work pre-eminently, but not the whole of it. In the full sense his work embraces everything he does in his threefold office of Prophet, Priest, and King. These Old Testament offices and orders found their fulfilment in Christ, in whom they all meet, and meet perfectly. He is the ideal Prophet, Priest, and King. His title of Messiah refers to all three mediatorial offices. The Atonement is simply his work as Priest, but it is central, fundamental to the rest.

He is the Ideal Prophet. The old prophets were inspired teachers. They owed their office, not to right of birth, but to a direct divine call. They were specially chosen for and called to their work, thus foreshadowing the Christian ministry. Their function was moral and religious teaching. Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, were simply the chief leaders of a "goodly fellowship." Christ is greater than Moses, not merely a guide in the Way, but himself the Way, the Truth, the Life, the Light of the World. He speaks of himself and in his own name.

The Ideal Priest. He is not only Priest but sacrifice, and perfect in both capacities. "He offered himself." He is thus at once the culmination of the priestly order, and of the sacrifices for sin which they offered. In one capacity he is our representative, in the other our substitute.[1]

[1] Pope, *Comp.* ii. 216–248.

The Ideal King. Ancient prediction from its very first utterance looked forward to a regal conqueror; and, as time went on, the person, empire, and triumphs of the King became clearer and clearer. David's and Daniel's predictions especially fed the Jewish expectations of a coming King. But the expectations took a wrong colour. They were intensely, perhaps exclusively, secular. Christ is a King and has a kingdom, but "not of this world." His authority is founded on free consent. His empire is in and over human hearts. We need not wonder at the mistake of the Jews, for Christians have repeated it. The persecutions of the Roman Church, and the attempts made by Reformers like Calvin to enforce morality by means of the civil power, proceed on the same mistaken views. Christ's ideal kingdom of heaven has yet to be realized.[1]

We must carefully distinguish between the doctrine and the dogma of Atonement, or between fact and theory. The doctrine or fact, taught in Scripture, is matter of universal Christian belief. There is no Church that does not take its stand on the position that Christ's death is the meritorious ground of human salvation, which is the core of the atonement. Apart from the necessity of atonement, it would be hard to justify the incarnation and suffering of the Eternal Son. But as to the theory or dogma there is considerable diversity of view. Even here, however, there is more substantial agreement than is sometimes thought.[2]

[1] Dorner on "Three Offices," *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 381; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 295.

[2] "The doctrine of redemption and atonement lay outside the dogma-forming work of the ancient Church. Just as little as the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation by faith did it become the subject of ecclesiastical discussion and action; hence both sides of Christ's work found no confessional expression in ancient times. Not that the thing itself was absent from the Church's faith. Redemption and atonement through Christ rather formed its vital centre, the basis of the whole of Christianity and the postulate of all other dogmas," Thomasius, *Christ's Person and Work*, 3rd Part, p. 169. No heresy arose in this field to compel the Church to define and formulate its faith, as was the case with the doctrine of Christ's Person.

It is sometimes questioned whether the vital idea of the vicarious purpose of Christ's death belongs to the doctrine or to the dogma, *i.e.* whether it is got from Scripture or is supplied by human thought. We wonder at the doubt, for the fact is both expressed and implied in Scripture. Christ himself says, "The Son of Man came . . . to give his life a ransom for many" (δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν), Matt. xx. 28. Substitution is here expressed twice over, in the "ransom" and the "for" = instead of.[1] St. Paul's language is so similar as to suggest quotation, "who gave himself a ransom for all" (ὁ δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων), 1 Tim. ii. 6. The ἀντί is here combined with the noun, and the more common ὑπέρ is put in its place. The latter preposition is the one most frequently used in the New Testament to express the bearing of Christ's death on us, and is the most suitable as implying benefit, advantage.[2]

The idea of substitution is implied in such passages as Rom. v. 6–8; 2 Cor. v. 14, 15, 21; Gal. iii. 13; 1 Pet. iii. 18; John x. 15; Tit. ii. 14; Heb. ii. 9. Christ's conduct in dying for us is compared to that of one dying for a good man. It is most natural to suppose that the thought in the latter case is that of one dying instead, in the place, of a good man. In the other passages there is no doubt respecting the meaning. In 2 Cor. v. 14, the inference, "therefore all died," only holds good, if "one died for all" by dying instead of all (comp. Philem. 13; 2 Cor. v. 20; 1 Cor. i. 13).[3] The idea is also implied when it is said that Christ bore our sins, Heb. ix. 28; 1 Pet. ii. 24;

[1] See also John x. 11.

[2] See Tischendorf's note in Crawford, *Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 495.

[3] "It is, of course, certain that ὑπέρ in itself, and also in the passages cited, is not = ἀντί; but it can only be meant in this sense," Thomasius, *Christ's Person*, etc., 3rd Part, p. 101. See Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. N. T.* i. 232, on 1 Pet. iii. 18: "The contrast which is made so prominent between the righteous and the unrighteous necessarily gives the idea, that the suffering which was endured in behalf of these ought to have been endured by the unrighteous themselves." See also Schmid, *Bibl. Theol. N. T.* p. 391, and Meyer on Gal. iii. 13.

1 John iii. 5 (John i. 29). The phrase "to bear sin" is a Jewish one with a fixed meaning.[1] See Lev. x. 17, xix. 8, xxii. 9, xxiv. 15, 16; Ezek. xviii. 20. When transferred to Christ by Jewish writers, it must have the same meaning. But whose sin can Christ bear except the sin of others? Bushnell tries to explain away bearing sin as sympathy for the sinner, and refers to Christ being said to bear our sicknesses, Matt. viii. 17. But, in addition to the answer just given, according to St. Peter Christ bore our sin "on the tree." Besides, he showed sympathy with sickness by removing it. Respecting the Atonement, we have to consider the Doctrine, the Theory, and modern divergent Theories.

Sec. 1.—Doctrine of Scripture.

In itself, Christ's death is a Sacrifice; in its effects, it is a Propitiation, Redemption, and Reconciliation or Atonement.

1. In itself, in its nature or essence, it is a *Sacrifice*. This is the subject of elaborate argument in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The description of Christ's divine glory in the first chapters is merely an introduction to the description of his priestly work. The subject is presented in the form of a parallel and contrast to the Jewish priests and sacrifices, which are represented as divinely intended types of Christ; see especially chs. ix. and x. The Jewish sacrifices needed constant repetition, Christ's one offering is sufficient; their merit was by imputation, his is intrinsic; they are temporary, his sacrifice is for ever. Express sacrificial terms are applied to Christ, ix. 14, 28.[2] To suppose that the language is a mere accommodation to Jewish ideas, and is to be taken in some improper or figurative sense, is to reduce a whole book of Scripture to mere word-play.[3] "Unless we are to treat the

[1] Crawford, *Scripture Doctrine of Atonement*, p. 33.

[2] Owen, xii. 425.

[3] "They say, it is true Christ was a priest; but only he was a *metaphorical* one. He offered sacrifice; but it was a *metaphorical* one. He

Epistle to the Hebrews as a portion of Scripture possessing no permanent value to the Church as a source of instruction in Christian truth, we must regard Christ's priesthood as a great reality, as *the* reality, whereof the legal priesthood was but a rude shadow, not even an exact image."[1] If, then, the parallel is to hold good, Christ's sacrifice means whatever the Jewish sacrifices meant; and on this point doubt is impossible. Lev. xvii. 11 defines the purpose of sacrifice in unmistakable terms; it is to make atonement or expiation.[2] Maurice's teaching, that sacrifices were nothing but a symbol of the offerer's self-devotion, finds no support in the Old Testament. On this supposition they had no reference to sin, but were simply pictorial ways of expressing religious truth or sentiment. The expiatory phraseology and ideas connected with the sin-offering would then be inexplicable. Besides, to suppose that the sole purpose of the vast sacrificial system of the Jews was to symbolize spiritual truth, is to suppose an immense expenditure of means for a comparatively small end.

Again, the uniform language of the New Testament respecting the effect of Christ's death is only explicable on the supposition of its sacrificial nature. How is the emphasis so constantly placed on Christ's *blood* to be explained save on the ground that it was shed sacrificially? See Heb. ix. 12, etc.; Rom. iii. 25; Eph. i. 7; 1 Pet. i. 2, 19; 1 John i. 5, 6, 7, 8. Christ says, "This is my blood, which is shed for the remission of sins," Matt. xxvi. 23. Unless Christ's blood is sacrificial, what special connection is there between it and the remission of sins? We are "justified by his blood," "we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son," Rom. v. 9, 10. The same question may be asked here. See also Luke xxii. 19, 20;

redeemed us; but with a *metaphorical* redemption. And so we are justified thereon; but with a *metaphorical* justification. And so, for aught I know, they are like to be saved with a *metaphorical salvation*," Owen, ii. 430.

[1] Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. vi.

[2] See also Lev. i. 4, iv. 20, 26, v. 16.

John x. 11; Rom. viii. 32; Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 20; 1 Thess. v. 9, 10; Tit. ii. 14; Heb. ii. 9; 1 John iii. 16.[1]

The efficacy of Christ's death is traced in Scripture to Christ's divine dignity, 1 John i. 7; Heb. ix. 14; to his holiness, 1 Pet. i. 18, 19; Heb. vii. 26, 27; his love, Eph. v. 2; the voluntariness of his suffering, John x. 17, 18. These are the requisites of a perfect, all-sufficient sacrifice.

2. In its effects, Christ's sacrificial death is a Propitiation, Redemption, Reconciliation.

Propitiation, of which God is the object, Rom. iii. 25; 1 John ii. 2, iv. 10; Heb. ii. 17 (Luke xviii. 13); ἱλασμός, ἱλάσκομαι. The word "atonement," as it occurs often in the Old Testament, corresponds to "propitiation," not to "reconciliation."[2] The Hebrew word for "expiate, propitiate" (כִּפֶּר), is invariably rendered in the Septuagint by some form of the words above given,—a striking evidence that it is the Godward aspect of sacrifice that is the principal one. Propitiation is the appeasing of anger. Rom. iii. 25 is full of interest. However ἱλαστήριος is construed, the sense is the same. Some expositors think that the adjective had hardened into a noun and become equivalent to "propitiatory" (כַּפֹּרֶת), the name for the mercy-seat. God set forth Christ as a propitiatory, a mercy-seat or means of propitiation. We see the interconnection of ideas again in כֹּפֶר, *ransom*.[3]

Redemption, of which man is the object, Col. i. 14, etc., ἀπολύτρωσις. Generally some form of this word is used; but the phraseology is varied by the use of the ordinary word for "buy, buy back," ἀγοράζειν, 1 Cor. vi. 20; Gal. iii. 13. It is

[1] Crawford, *Scripture Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 96; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* iii. 411.

[2] See Trench, *Syn. of N. T.* p. 279. Trench supposes that "atonement" has changed its meaning. This seems doubtful. It would rather seem that the word has always had a double aspect. Its use by our translators in the O. T. to represent propitiation, and in the N. T. to represent reconciliation, favours this view, and is against Trench.

[3] Crawford, *Scripture Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 78. See Meyer on the passage. Dale, *Atonement*, p. 236.

true that redemption came to mean simple deliverance, without reference to the means by which it is effected. But it retains its proper force in the New Testament, as is shown by the fact that the price or ransom is often mentioned, 1 Pet. i. 18; Matt. xx. 28.[1] He gave "himself," "his life." Christ bought us with this price, he did not buy salvation for us. Hence we are called a "people of possession," Tit. ii. 14; 1 Pet. ii. 9.[2]

Reconciliation, of which God and man are the objects, καταλλάσσειν, κατάλλαγη. It is true that the term is often used of the reconciling of one party, and in Scripture refers apparently to the reconciling of man only, 2 Cor. v. 18–20; Rom. v. 10; Col. i. 21; Eph. ii. 16. Still in its full sense the idea is a reciprocal one; and it would be hard to explain the use of the term, if only half the meaning were included. We can only get the true meaning of words from usage and the context. Reconciliation means the mutual laying aside of enmity. In God, of course, the enmity is judicial, not personal.[3] That there is such enmity in him is implied in propitiation. The latter term, however, describes only one side of the process, while reconciliation includes both. Matt. v. 24 and 1 Sam. xxix. 4

[1] "Indeed, Moses is called λυτρωτής, Acts vii. 35, in reference to the metaphorical redemption of Israel out of Egypt,—a deliverance by power and a strong arm; but shall we say, because that word is used improperly in one place, where no price could be paid, where God plainly says it was not done by a price but by power, therefore it must be so used in those places where there is express mention of a price, both the matter of it and its formality as a price, and speaking not a word of doing it any other way but by the payment of a price?" Owen, xii. 419, also the whole of ch. xxviii.

[2] Crawford, as before, p. 605.

[3] Owen distinguishes between the "*real enmity* on our part against God" and the "*law enmity* on the part of God against us,' one being "physical," the other "legal or moral," *Works*, xii. 414. On the whole idea of reconciliation, see Owen, ch. xxix. "It is not said anywhere expressly that God is reconciled to us, but that we are reconciled to God; and the sole reason thereof is, because he is the *party offended*, and we are the *parties offending*. Now, the party offending is always said to be reconciled to the party offended, and not on the contrary. So Matt. v. 23, 24," p. 535. Crawford, pp. 67, 427, 448.

show that, while one side of the process is spoken of, the other is meant. "Be reconciled to thy brother" evidently means that the man addressed is to go and obtain his brother's forgiveness. See ver. 23, "there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee." There is much to suggest the same sense in Rom. v. "Reconciled" in Rom. v. 10 must be partly equivalent to "justified" in ver. 9, *i.e.* "justified" must be included in reconciled."[1] And what is justifying but God's laying aside his anger against us? So in ver. 11 we are said to "receive" reconciliation, an inappropriate phrase if it means only an act of our own. We are also said to be reconciled "through the death" of Christ, which again points to an objective act. On the other hand, it is quite possible that in the passages in 2 Cor. v., etc., the human side of the transaction is meant.[2] In order that God's reconciliation, accomplished in the propitiation of the cross, may take effect on us, our enmity to God must be laid aside, in purpose at least; and when this is done, and we receive the reconciliation (*i.e.* "are justified by his blood"), "the carnal mind," which "is enmity against God," gives place to the spiritual mind, which is "life and peace." Yet another explanation of the phraseology of Scripture is possible. God is already propitiated, reconciled by the death of Christ. All that is needed to make the benefits of this propitiation ours, and to complete the work, is our humble submission to God's mercy. Perhaps this is the explanation of the fact that the human reconciliation is specially referred to in St. Paul's epistles as the only part of the work of salvation still to be done.[3]

[1] Owen, xii. 415.

[2] Yet in 2 Cor. v. 19 the objective reconciliation is pointed at, "not imputing their trespasses."

[3] See Trench on this group of words, *Synonyms of N. T.* p. 276. "The Christian καταλλαγή has two sides. It is first a reconciliation, 'quâ Deus nos sibi reconciliavit,' laid aside his holy anger against our sins, and received us into favour,—a reconciliation effected for us once for all by Christ upon his cross; so 2 Cor. v. 18, 19; Rom. v. 10, where καταλάσσεσθαι is a pure passive, 'ab eo in gratiam recipi apud quem in odio fueras.'

Sec. 2.—Dogma of Atonement.

The principal fact to be accounted for in any theory is that Christ's death is a sacrifice for sin; the other aspects of his death, representing its effects, follow as matter of course. If, then, according to Scripture, Christ's death is a sacrifice to God for man's sin, the question at once arises, what was there in God to make such a sacrifice necessary? What can it be but justice? In this way the idea of satisfaction has arisen.[1] Add to the idea of sacrifice that of vicariousness, also found in Scripture, and the conclusion is placed beyond doubt. What other rationale is possible of the statement that Christ's death is a vicarious sacrifice for sin? The defect of all other theories, presently to be noticed, is that they leave these facts unexplained. Essentially they resolve themselves into representations of Christ's death as an act of self-sacrificing love, which is something altogether different from a sacrifice for sin. The latter aspect, the fundamental one in Scripture, is thus ignored or denied, as well as the element of vicariousness. If Christ's death is mere self-sacrifice, it may be for us; but how can it be in our room and stead? The orthodox view does full justice to the self-sacrifice and love shown in Christ's death for us. Christ shows such love in his willingness to die for us. But why does he die for us? Not as a mere example of self-sacrifice. This can never be the sole or principal end, or indeed the proper end, of any action. It is a mere incident of something else. No one would throw himself into

But καταλλαγή is secondly and subordinately the reconciliation, 'quâ nos Deo reconciliamus,' the daily deposition, under the operation of the Holy Spirit, of the enmity of the old man toward God. In this passive middle sense καταλάσσεσθαι is used, 2 Cor. v. 20, cf. 1 Cor. vii. 11. All attempts to make this the primary meaning of the word, being indeed the secondary, rest not on unprejudiced exegesis, but on a foregone determination to get rid of the reality of God's anger against sin," p. 279. Crawford, as before, p. 65.

[1] Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Satisfaction," a good article.

the sea as an example of self-sacrifice. The unselfish spirit must be shown in serving some practical end. What is the practical end in Christ's death?[1] To make expiation for sin, says Scripture. The other theories have no answer, or an inadequate one. The Father showed his love in the surrender of his Son. But what did he show in receiving the sacrifice of Christ's death? As loving and merciful, God provides and bestows the sacrifice which we owned but could not give; as just, he required and received it. We thus see that the ideas of strict sacrifice and vicariousness on the one hand, and of justice and satisfaction on the other, are correlative, and stand or fall together. When the first two are denied, the others must be got rid of. On this account divine justice is sometimes resolved into love, sometimes explained as an arbitrary act of will or a mere anthropomorphism. It is denied a place among the essential perfections of God. Socinus early said, "If we could but get rid of this justice, even if we had no other proof, the fiction of Christ's satisfaction would be thoroughly exposed and would vanish."[2] Ritschl joins hands with Socinus on this point. Man's consciousness of the distinctness of justice and love in himself, and of their equal importance, will always be an invincible security for the doctrine of atonement.

It may seem strange at first sight that there should be no universally received dogma of the atonement, corresponding to the dogma of Christ's Person found in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. But the explanation is not far to seek. The rise of error and controversy has invariably been the occasion of the formal definition of doctrine. Such error and controversy arose respecting the nature of Christ's Person, but not respecting the Atonement. One subject afforded more room for the speculation of curious brains than the other. The Church was ever at one in teaching the dependence of human salvation on Christ's

[1] "Self-sacrifice for its own sake is no religious act at all," F. W. Robertson, *Sermons*, iii. 102.

[2] Shedd, *Christian Doctrine*, ii. 376.

death. Not to teach this was to break with Christianity completely, because atonement is the very soul of the Christian message to the world. Thus, the absence of defined doctrine is the effect and the proof of the Church's unanimity on the subject.

The essentials of the theory have been the common property of the Church in all ages, but there has been growth as well as variety in expression. The Apostolic Fathers, as might be expected, go little farther than the letter of Scripture.[1] All the great Fathers recognise the substitutionary character of Christ's work. The very term "satisfaction" occurs in Hilary and Ambrose. Thus Anselm[2] (†1109), in formulating his theory of satisfaction, did little more than combine and systematize the thoughts of his predecessors. But in him the satisfaction is rather to God's honour than to law or justice. Sin is a great infringement of God's honour; reparation is due; forgiveness without it would be unbecoming; man cannot make such reparation for himself; it can only be made for him by the God-man,[3]—such are the leading thoughts which have been substantially accepted by all Christendom as part at least of a complete theory. Aquinas repeats Anselm's teaching. Both Roman and Protestant creeds continue the tradition. Counc. Trent. vi. 7, says: "Christ made satisfaction to God the Father

[1] Pope, *Comp.* ii. 297; Shedd, ii. 207, 305.

[2] In his *Cur Deus Homo?* Luthardt, *Comp. d. Dogm.* p. 210; Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctrine*, ii. 273.

[3] "The debt was so great that none but God could pay it, and none but man owes it; therefore one must pay it who is God and man," Anselm. The metaphor of a debt is not, of course, meant to be a complete account of the nature of sin, though objectors often argue as if it were, making a metaphor the basis of absurd inferences. The single point of comparison is the obligation of the debtor to make restitution, an unfortunate circumstance for the objectors, who maintain that no restitution is due from the sinner or required by God. "Sin is not properly a debt, for then it might be paid in kind, by sin itself; but is called so, only because it binds over the sinner to *punishment*, which is the satisfaction to be made for that which is properly a transgression, and improperly only a debt," Owen, ii. 431. Crawford, pp. 429, 451.

for us." Augsb. Conf. p. 10: "By his own death he made satisfaction for our sins." Conf. Helv. ii. 15: "Christ assumed and took away the sins of the world, and made satisfaction to God's justice." Westm. Conf. viii. 5: "The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father." The Communion Office of the English Church says that Christ made on the cross "a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world." Art. xxxi. says: "The offering of Christ once made is the perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual."

It is objected that the doctrine supposes God to be inexorably just, implacable, and only moved to mercy by the sacrifice of his Son. But is he not just? Is this a defect? Would not the absence of the most perfect justice be a defect? Is he not angry at sin, a Sovereign as well as a Father? According to Scripture and experience, both anger and justice are quite compatible with love. The objection to other theories is that they ignore one side of God's moral character. The doctrine of atonement exhibits both sides. To say that the purpose of atonement is to render God merciful, is to reverse the fact. God is not made merciful by the atonement; on the contrary, because he is merciful he gives it. Justice demands, but mercy provides the sacrifice, John iii. 16; Heb. ii. 9. "Never let us think of Christ as prevailing with God to grant us a salvation which he was unwilling to bestow, but always as the substitute whom God himself was pleased to provide, because in his great mercy he desired our salvation."[1] If it be said, again, that this is to make God give with one hand and receive with the other, we admit the fact, but do not see the objection. Satisfaction is due from us; it is made for us by the God-man, our Head and Brother; but, when we had no satisfaction of our own to give, the riches of God's grace abounded to the supply of our poverty.[2]

[1] Crawford, *Scr. Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 193, also p. 447.

[2] See Owen, *Works*, xii. 431, 432.

The crux of the whole question is the legal or penal character of Christ's suffering, which is defended as vital on one side, and rejected as unjust, impossible, immoral, on the other. No objection is made to mere suffering, without legal force or effect. That Scripture recognises a penal character in Christ's suffering is certain, Isa. liii.; Gal. iii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 21. Besides, Christ did die; death is the penalty of sin, Christ had no sin. Of whose sin then was Christ's death the penalty? In any case, the innocent suffers. Here is the injustice, if there is any. The addition of the reason "for the guilty" neither makes nor aggravates injustice. On the contrary, it helps to relieve any appearance of it by assigning an adequate moral purpose. "The just suffered" in any case. If we refuse to say "for the unjust," we refuse to add the consideration which removes the impression of inequity. Every day we see the innocent inherit the consequences of others' wrongdoing. It is true the suffering is not penalty to them; they suffer involuntarily; they suffer with the guilty, not for them, for the guilty are not exempted from suffering. And yet we believe that the government of God which permits this is just. Why do we believe this? Because men are treated, not individually, but as members of a race, with common corporate responsibilities. How then can it be wrong for that to be suffered voluntarily which it is right to suffer involuntarily? How can it be unjust to suffer for a worthy purpose, with benefit to others, when it is just to suffer without benefit to others? What is a justification in one case is a justification in the other. The constitution of the world is not a perfect analogy to the fact of atonement, but it is a preparation for it. Atonement simply carries the principle a step further and higher. Objectors seem here to forget their favourite attribute of love. Here they limit its omnipotence, saying in effect, "You may sympathize with the sinful and unfortunate, but you must not carry your sympathy so far as to assume their obligations at the bar of justice." This is precisely what love would desire to do, supposing it to be possible. And how can it be impossible to assume penalty,

apart from guilt? If God's love cannot do so, it is weaker than human love. Dr. Bruce says: "Looking at this question from our peculiar point of view, that of Christ's voluntary humiliation, I remark, that if descent into the legal standing of a sinner were at all possible, Christ would gladly make the descent. It was his mind, his bent, his mood, if I may so speak, to go down till he had reached the utmost limits of possibility. So minded, he would be predisposed to find the imputation of men's sin to himself, to the intent of his bearing their penalty, within these limits."[1] The act of Christ, in assuming the penalty of man's sin, is quite within the range of divine love, and is its grandest manifestation.[2]

Care is necessary in the use of such phrases as Christ "bearing our punishment, suffering God's wrath." They are not meant in the sense they bear in reference to us, nor do we think that they were ever used by the thoughtful in such a sense. Some latitude is permissible in the language of devotion, as in that of poetry. Dr. Magee objects to the word "punishment" in this connection, and substitutes "judicial infliction." This is really all that is meant in the other phrases. Dr. Crawford (p. 191) observes that Magee's own words "concede all that those who adopt the expression are disposed to contend for." The term "penal" is used of Christ's suffering, not in the sense of "suffering inflicted on an offender on account of sin," but of "suffering inflicted judicially, or in the execution of the provisions of law, on account of sin." Mr. Oxenham, in his interesting but somewhat discursive work, *The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement*, makes the most of some extreme statements of Reformation divines, who speak of Christ as bearing "vicarious punishment," and suffering the same wrath and torment as the lost. He forgets that these are opinions of individuals, not of Churches. He further prejudices the question by bringing it into forced connection with predesti-

[1] *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. vi.

[2] Owen, xii. chs. xxiii.–xxvi. Dorner has some noble passages on Substitution and Satisfaction, *Syst. Christ. Doctr.* iv. 79–124.

narianism and extreme views of the extent of original sin. These are the grounds of his opinion that the teaching of the Reformation "has served first to distort, and then to alienate, the moral and religious convictions of a large section of Christendom" (p. 183). He says that "the dominant idea" with Catholic writers "is that of Sacrifice, which is a more comprehensive one than that of satisfaction only." Sacrifice, of course, is the Scripture idea. Satisfaction is a step towards the explanation of sacrifice. Substantially the theory of all Churches, so far as they have one, is the same. But Churches ought not to be held responsible for all the opinions of individual writers, to whom on minor points a certain latitude is allowable.

A great change for the better has come over theology, in applying moral instead of material measurements to the value of Christ's sufferings. We hear less than formerly of these being equivalent in amount to all the penal suffering due to all sinners. That they could not be the same in kind, is self-evident. Whether such commercial and mathematical estimates were ever carried as far as is sometimes represented by objectors, is doubtful, although some of the statements referred to above are startlingly material. On such views, it is hard to see what room is left for moral conditions. The tendency now is to dwell rather on the moral elements which gave atoning efficacy to Christ's sufferings,—the person of the sufferer, the divine appointment, the love they express, the purpose they aim at. Dr. Bruce will only say, "Christ suffered all that it was possible for a holy being to suffer in the way of penalty."[1]

Let it be observed that we are speaking here of the features which gave Christ's death value as a sacrifice for sin. Its other aspect as a gift of divine love to man is altogether different. Here another set of influences begins to work, scarcely less important. The appeal which Christ's death makes under this aspect to gratitude, the insight it gives into God's character,

[1] See Bruce, as before, Lect. vi. pp. 339, 341, 347.

the example it supplies of self-sacrifice, are full of moral force of the highest and purest kind. It is a mistake to make these things all, to find in them the essence of the atonement; their place is, after all, but secondary. Still their value is inestimable. They will be considered afterwards. We only note here that they are perfectly compatible with the sacrificial character of Christ's death.

The germs of modern aberrations appear as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Duns Scotus made atonement only relatively necessary, and ascribed the value of Christ's sacrifice to the divine will. His theory bears the name of *acceptilatio*.[1] The question as to whether the necessity of the atonement is absolute or conditional, has called forth different opinions. The majority of voices, however, support an absolute necessity, grounded in God's essential justice. Abelard makes the manifestation of love the sole purpose of Christ's work. God is already reconciled. Christ lived and died to declare this fact, and so to win sinners back to God. All the effect of Christ's work is on man, not on God.

A strange fancy existing in early ages, was to the effect that the ransom in the atonement was paid to Satan. To say, as Baur and others do, that the whole theory of atonement grew out of this fancy, is a great exaggeration. The only writer in whose case it seems to form a complete theory is Gregory of Nyssa (†395). He thought that Satan had acquired certain rights over man, as a master over slaves or a conqueror over captives, and these rights must not be extinguished by force, but satisfied by moral means. Unaware of Christ's divinity, Satan agrees to accept Christ's human soul in exchange, hoping to gain by so doing. But directly the divine comes into the region of sin and death, the power of sin and death is shattered. Thus Satan is really deceived, guile is met by superior guile. It is merely said that he deserves it. This theory in its unqualified and most revolting form is only held by Gregory of Nyssa. In the case of others,

[1] "In Roman law an acquittance from obligation by word of mouth, without real payment," Pope ii. 306, 313; Shedd, ii. 347

like Irenæus,[1] Origen, Theodoret, Augustine, Leo the Great, it is either shorn of some of its most objectionable features, or it is held along with the ideas of propitiation and vicarious sacrifice offered to God, and redemption from sin and death, these ideas not being harmonized. Thus Irenæus acknowledges no right of Satan, saying, "injuste dominatur nobis," "injuste hominem captivum duxerat inimicus." He makes Christ conquer Satan in the wilderness. Baur applies Irenæus's words, secundum suadelam, "by persuasion," to Satan; but they apply to man. Even Gregory the Great (†604), who repeats his namesake's offensive notions, adds the idea of sacrifice to God. The mistake underlying the theory is that death is entirely in Satan's power. It was not regarded as a divine penalty. Great theologians like Athanasius and Hilary, not to mention Cyril of Alexandria and Gregory Nazianzen, know nothing of the theory. In fact, they anticipate the line of thought taken by orthodox teaching. Anselm gave the death-blow to the error.[2]

Sec. 3.—Other Divergent Theories.

A. First comes a group of theories, different in detail but substantially one, which only take into account the effect of Christ's work on man, ignoring and denying the Godward aspect altogether. They all err, not in what they affirm, but in what they exclude. Each one, while more or less expressing a scriptural truth, goes far towards turning the truth into error, by making it the whole truth, and especially by substituting what is secondary and incidental for what is primary and

[1] See p. 123.

[2] "Was it the law of Satan we had transgressed? Was he the judge that cast us into prison? was it him to whom we were indebted? was it ever heard that the price of redemption was paid to the jailer? Whether any of the ancients said so or no, I shall not now trouble myself to inquire, or in what sense they said it; the thing in itself is ridiculous and blasphemous," Owen, xii. 519; Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* ii. 245; Pope, *Comp.* ii. 300; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, Part 3, Abth. i. p. 184, etc.

essential. They all, however, agree in rejecting the sacrificial idea entirely. Substitution, penalty, expiation, satisfaction, they will not hear of. The problem with them is, to explain all that Scripture says about Christ's death, without the aid of these ideas. They are also alike in this, that they leave merely a difference of degree between Christ and other benefactors. Christ only did more perfectly what good men are constantly doing for their fellows. He is the greatest of all teachers, examples, benefactors, but only the greatest. He holds no unique position, renders no unique service. We confidently ask whether this is the position assigned to Christ in Scripture? According to Scripture, is our relation to Christ in the matter of salvation of the same kind as to Paul, Augustine, à Kempis, Fénélon? Another common defect in these theories is, that they fail to explain the close connection which Scripture declares to exist between our salvation and Christ's death (Rom. v. 9, 10; Eph. i. 7). How can we be saved by his death, unless his death has some unique character? On any other supposition, the death takes its place among the incidents of Christ's history; his teaching and example are equally effective factors in human redemption. This point furnishes a decisive test of all theories on this subject. It may, indeed, be said that the death is mentioned as the principal part, or the seal, of Christ's work. This might be a sufficient explanation of an incidental allusion, but not of a continuous, definite strain of teaching. If the universal Church has erred in making Christ's sacrificial death the ground of salvation, Scripture is responsible for the error. The following theories do not always exist apart, but often run into each other.[1]

a. Early Socinianism placed the Prophet in Christ above the Priest, if it did not, indeed, entirely merge the second in the first. We are saved solely by believing Christ's teaching and following his example. His death attests his truthfulness and fidelity, and so is simply that of a martyr. On this view it

[1] See Dr. Rigg, *Modern Anglican Theology*, on Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, Kingsley, and Jowett, *i.e.* on the Broad-Church theology.

is difficult to explain Christ's distress and anguish in presence of the cross; many of the servants have shown greater fortitude than the Master. Early Socinianism took a far higher view of Christ than modern Unitarianism.[1] While making him a mere man, it held fast to his Resurrection and Ascension. As a reward for his extraordinary merit, he was supposed to be invested with special dignity and power; he was made man's Lord and Judge; his readiness to sympathize and help constitutes his priestly function. The difficulties mentioned above apply in full force here, as well as to the following theories.[2]

b. The school represented by Bushnell's name, resolves Christ's Priesthood into Sympathy. Sympathy is certainly a necessary qualification for a priest, Heb. iv. 15, v. 2. But it is only a qualification for priestly work, not the work itself. The Epistle to the Hebrews, after showing that Christ possessed the requisite qualifications, goes on to speak of the work he did as priest,—he offered a sacrifice for sin, the sacrifice being himself. Sympathy is a requisite for a priest, not for a sacrifice. The advocates of this theory are driven to explain all that is said in the epistle about Christ's proper work as priest, which forms the very theme of the epistle, as mere figure of speech and condescension to Jewish notions, a course which makes a whole book of Scripture practically meaningless, in fact mere rhetorical artifice. "Christ is called a Priest by poetic licence rather than in plain prose." Dr. Bruce justly says, "Unless we are to treat the Epistle to the Hebrews as a portion of Scripture possessing no permanent value for the Church, as being indeed nothing more than an ingenious piece of reasoning for a temporary purpose, we must regard Christ's priesthood as a great reality."[3] Bushnell in his later writings goes so far as to admit that Christ, in the fulness of his sympathy, imputes man's sin to himself, which is a considerable advance towards orthodox doctrine. If such subjective

[1] See Winer, *Confessions of Christendom*, p. 64.

[2] Crawford, as before, p. 287; Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, vol. ii. chap. xxiii.

[3] *Humiliation of Christ.*

imputation on Christ's part is right, it is hard to see how an objective imputation of man's sin to Christ on the Father's part can be wrong. Moreover, as already remarked, sympathy and self-sacrifice must be shown in securing some practical end.[1] What was the practical end in Christ's death on the present theory? If he did not atone for sin, what did he do? The orthodox or the Socinian answer is the only alternative. Christ's death is supposed, truly enough, to act as a motive, inducing us to forsake sin and seek forgiveness. But it can only have this influence on us, when we see that it delivers us from some great evil or procures us some priceless good. Failing this, how can it inspire gratitude or lead to obedience? Again, we ask, what on this theory was the great service rendered by Christ's death, the sight of which is to have this effect?[2]

c. Another form of the theory, held by Maurice, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Irving, Menken, is known as the Mystical theory, "Redemption by Sample" (Bruce). According to it, Christ is the perfect example of what we ought to be. He rendered to God the perfect devotion and obedience which we ought to render. This is the only meaning of sacrifice in Scripture, — self-consecration to God's service, self-sacrifice. The sole purpose of the Jewish sacrifices was to set forth this truth symbolically. Dr. Bruce well states Maurice's view thus: "Christ, as the root and archetype of humanity, in his own person offered up man as an acceptable sacrifice to God, in the sense of exhibiting in his life and death the entire surrender of the whole spirit and body to God, and the complete renunciation of that self-will which is the cause of all men's crimes and misery. Such self-sacrifice was what was really meant by all the legal sacrifices; for the victims died, not as substitutes for the offerer, but as symbols of his devotion. What these legal sacrifices dimly foreshadowed, Christ perfectly realized. In his life and death he offered up the one complete sacrifice ever offered, the perfect example of self-surrender and devotion to the divine

[1] Crawford, *Scripture Doctrine of Atonement*, pp. 297, 335.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 371.

will; and God accepted the sacrifice, as made, not by an individual, but by the race as represented by its archetypal man."[1] It might seem at first sight as if in these words the fact of representation or substitution were accepted; but it is certain that nothing could be more opposed to the entire drift of Mr. Maurice's teaching. Christ is simply, as with Schleiermacher, the ideal man, and is accepted as such by God. All that he did he owed to God on his own account. Ritschl expressly says that everything he did as priest, he did for himself. Here then we are still at the Socinian standpoint. Christ's life and death can only benefit us by acting as an example and stimulus. Both Irving and Menken made Christ the possessor of a sinful nature.[2] His perfect holiness was shown in never allowing it to issue in sinful act.[3]

d. A peculiar theory, advocated by Dr. M'Leod Campbell,[4] makes the essence of the Atonement to consist in Christ having made a Perfect Confession of sin for us. He saw, as we cannot, into the depths of sin, and was thus able to make an adequate acknowledgment of it for us. The necessity of reparation is admitted, and the reparation is found in what is really an act of vicarious repentance on Christ's part. Not to say that the sense of personal guilt, which forms the core of repentance, must be wanting in Christ's case, we find it impossible to think of repentance as performed vicariously. If there is any act that is essentially and exclusively personal, it is repentance. But even if this objection were removed, we have to ask whether repent-

[1] *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 310.

[2] They appeal, of course, to Rom. viii. 3, and say that unless Christ assumed our nature with its sinfulness, he was not man like us. Yet, according to Menken, Christ was never tempted from within. He absolutely suppressed sin from the first. This constituted the atonement. Christ's being "without sin" means that he was without actual sin; a very limited interpretation. All this Christ did as a man without help from his divine nature.

[3] Crawford, p. 318; Rigg, *Modern Anglican Theology*, ch. xvii.

[4] *Nature of the Atonement*, etc. Dr. Bruce traces the notion to Jonathan Edwards and Rupert of Deutz. Crawford, pp. 327, 331, 369.

ance alone is a sufficient atonement. Campbell's teaching, like Socinianism, assumes that it is. In this case man's repentance alone would suffice, if it were higher in degree. Nothing but a difference of degree is left between what Christ did and what man himself might do.

It thus appears that all these four theories in different degrees make self-sacrifice the central idea of Christ's death, and they have undoubtedly rendered good service in calling attention to this truth. If self-sacrifice as the showing of sympathy cannot be the proper or main end of any action (p. 142), how was it shown in Christ's dying for us? None of these four theories can say more than this: by fidelity to truth and right even to death, by perfect surrender of self-will and devotion to God's will, by a perfect acknowledgment of God's justice in punishing sin. In all this Christ would simply do perfectly what we do more or less imperfectly. There is no unique service or benefit on Christ's part. The orthodox doctrine says: Christ showed sympathy and gave a perfect example of self-sacrifice in offering himself as a sacrifice for man's sin, thus propitiating God's righteous anger and making satisfaction to his law. On the former view important Scripture elements are ignored.

F. W. Robertson's views on this subject are important because of the influence of his name. But it is not easy to define them. In truth, Robertson speaks with two voices. So far as profession goes, nothing could be more definite and satisfactory than many of his utterances. In the sermon on "The Sacrifice of Christ" (iii. 90), he emphatically teaches its "vicarious" character, although his exposition only seems to amount to this, that Christ was the victim of the world's sin in general, and that he is "the realized ideal of humanity." In the sermon on "The Good Shepherd" (ii. 265), he rejects "the meagre explanation" of Unitarians; "they say that Christ merely died as a martyr, in attestation of the truths he taught." Again, in the sermon on "Caiaphas's view of Vicarious Sacrifice" (i. 132), whatever may be thought of the exposition given,

Christ's vicarious sacrifice is expressly affirmed: "It was a sacrifice for the world's sin." But when we ask what the nature of this sacrifice was, the only answer we get is that it is the spirit of self-sacrifice in Christ. This is asserted again and again. There is not a word about expiation or propitiation, so far as we know. The drift of the sermon on "The Sacrifice of Christ" (iii. 101) is, that we receive the benefit of Christ's act of self-sacrifice only by imitating it. In the sermon on "Christ the Son" (ii. 144), after making "entire surrender to the divine will" the essence of sacrifice, he adds, "all other notions of sacrifice are false," and characterizes certain extreme statements as "borrowed from the bloody shambles of heathenism, and not from Jewish altars." Here he seems quite to coincide with Maurice's teaching. In the sermon on "Caiaphas," it is not easy to decide whether he is arguing against expiation and satisfaction in every form, or only against certain inferences from it or ways of putting it. How the statement that Christ's death was the inevitable result of his character and work is reconcilable with his own words in John x. 18, xix. 11, it is not easy to see. "The self-sacrifice of Christ was the *satisfaction* to the Father."[1] Throughout, the main, if not the sole, reference is to the effect on man's mind and heart.

B. A theory, favoured by High-Church and Catholic writers,[2] inclines to make Redemption coincident with the Incarnation. The very union of the divine with human nature is supposed in some way to have sanctified the race. The grace is actually experienced when the believer is united with the humanity of Christ, which is done in the Sacraments, the Sacraments being regarded as an "extension of the Incarnation." It is hard to know what is the Scripture warrant for the speculation. Redemption is never there specifically connected with the Incarnation, nor is the act of the Incarnation made specially

[1] See also sermons on "Reconciliation by Christ" (iv. 208), and "The Sinlessness of Christ" (iv. 77).

[2] Wilberforce, *Doctrine of the Incarnation*; Oxenham, *Catholic Doctrine of Atonement*; Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 268, etc.

prominent. Compare this reticence with the emphasis laid on Christ's passion and death, both in the Gospels and Epistles, and the frequent, we may say constant, ascription of atoning efficacy to the death. Moreover, if the work of atonement was accomplished in the Incarnation, the passion and death were superfluous and unjustifiable. It may also be worth while to add, that the theory is irreconcilable with the prominence given to the cross and passion in High-Church and Catholic forms of worship. The Communion service of the English Church commemorates the love of God in giving his "only Son Jesus Christ to suffer death upon the cross for our redemption, who made *there* a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world." The High-Church school, whatever it may think of the Thirty-nine Articles, acknowledges the Prayer-Book as a rule of doctrine. It is difficult to avoid the impression that much that is said by writers of this class against the notion of vicarious satisfaction, and especially against extreme forms in which it has been held by individual writers, is prompted by prejudice against the Reformation, which, without exception, was rigidly faithful to the central doctrine of Atonement.[1]

Mr. Norris, in his excellent *Rudiments of Theology*, raises the cry, "Back to the Fathers," whose teaching he greatly prefers to that of the Reformation, and even of Anselm (p. 311). We are sorry we do not find his views very clear or consistent. We are told that "in Athanasius's view (as in St. Paul's) the efficacy of Christ's Death and Resurrection was due to that mystical union with us which his Incarnation had established" (p. 289); and that "the thought in St. Augustine's mind here, as ever in treating of this subject, is that of the *mystical union* between Christ and those whose nature he had assumed" (p. 297). And again, "the doctrine of *forensic justification* was unheard of until the Reformation" (p. 297). Now (to speak only of Athanasius) we find both the idea of Satisfaction and that of Union in Mr. Norris's own exposition of his views.

[1] South, Sermon xxxiii., on Messiah's Sufferings, penal and expiatory.

What is the meaning of the dilemma to which Athanasius refers? "God could not leave mankind to perish; his law of holiness could not be relaxed; only the Logos could regenerate" (p. 286). How is this dilemma to be escaped, but by reparation or satisfaction? Athanasius himself says, "The Logos, surrendering unto death that Body which he had assumed, as an unblemished victim and sacrifice, was able to cancel death's empire over all partakers of His likeness, *by the oblation of an equivalent*" (p. 290). And much else in the same strain. The extract given on p. 290 is Anselm's theory *in nuce*.[1] What, again, is the meaning of the Satisfaction taught by Mr. Norris himself? (pp. 55, 57). Is not this a "forensic" idea? The truth is, that in the Fathers, as in Scripture, both aspects are present. Perhaps the Reformers erred in dwelling on one exclusively, the one that had been neglected so long. Do not let us dwell on the other exclusively. Scripture speaks of a union of believers with Christ in his death, resurrection, ascension, session, but never of union with him in his Incarnation. How is that possible? The Incarnation is simply the necessary precondition of union with him in the other respects. We again press the question, If Christ's death was not a satisfaction and not vicarious, how could it benefit us more than any other death? It is to these very elements that its power to redeem

[1] It is quite certain that, nearly seven centuries before Anselm, Athanasius anticipated all the essentials of the Anselmic doctrine. The penal character of death, the equal claims of divine holiness and love, the necessity of the death of the God-man to meet those claims, the vicarious, sacrificial purpose of Christ's death, are all present. Sometimes Athanasius makes the sacrifice to be offered to God, sometimes to the law. The life-giving power of the atonement is specially emphasized. "By giving up the temple of his body to death instead of all, he offered a sacrifice for all." "It is we who in him were obedient to the Father, as we now rule in him." "His death is the death of all, the death of mankind; in him all died." "He took on himself the sentence of the law, and by suffering in the flesh for all bestowed salvation on all." "The Logos assumed a mortal body to fulfil the law in it for us, to offer a vicarious sacrifice, to destroy death, to give immortality, and so restore God's image in men." Thomasius, *Christi Person u. Werk*, Theil 3, Abth. i. p. 203.

others is due. To say that "the mystical union between Christ and man explains the truly *sacrificial* character of his death," is to unite incongruous ideas. As Priest, Christ is our representative; as Sacrifice, our substitute. We can speak of union with a Representative, but not with a Substitute. At the same time, one must acknowledge that the Christian Church has not yet found a perfect adjustment of these different aspects of the atonement.[1]

C. The Governmental or Rectoral theory of Grotius and Dr. Wardlaw,[2] finds the chief purpose of atonement in the public vindication of the divine law and government. It was much more for man's than God's sake, to prevent the laws which are so closely bound up with man's welfare being trifled with. This, indeed, is one of the purposes or results of the atonement, but it can scarcely be regarded as the chief or only one. The theory has too utilitarian an aspect. It gives God's greatest act too much the air of an expedient. Nothing but the highest moral necessity, grounded in God's nature, would justify such humiliation on the part of God's everlasting Son. Even the incidental results of the Incarnation, such as the present theory supposes, are great; still, they are only incidental.

We may here mention, and partly repeat, some points ever to be borne in mind on the present subject. 1. One is the harmony of the principle of atonement with the "solidarity" of

[1] "In so far we may say, In the Incarnation fellowship with God is already established," *i.e.* in the person of Christ individually considered. "But it is not yet *re*-established. For in the fellowship as existing in Christ the sinful race is not yet reconciled to God, and consequently not the actual object of his complacency. Neither Christian experience nor Scripture derives the reconciliation from this source. The Incarnation is merely the postulate of the latter," the *conditio sine qua non* (Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, Abth. 3, p. 52). The same holds good of the personal holiness of Christ's life. Thomasius then adds, "The *re*-establishing of fellowship with God could only be effected by the suffering of the God-man, the *surrender* of his life, the offering up of himself." At the same time, of course, "the Redeemer's self-surrender to death cannot be isolated from his preceding life, which was already a continuous suffering under sin, through sin and with sinners." See Thomasius, pp. 57, 65.

[2] *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols.; Crawford, p. 380; Shedd, *Hist.* ii. 356.

the race, and the law of substitution at work in society. "The one for the many" represents a principle that is one of the chief factors in the world's progress. The mission of some is to think, suffer, sacrifice for others. The whole gain of their lives descends to the race because of the unity binding individuals together.[1] 2. The difficulty, if there is any, does not lie in Christ dying for the guilty, but in his dying at all. The high moral purpose does not increase, it rather lessens, the difficulty. Christ being sinless, death had no claim on him; yet he died. His sinlessness and his death are facts admitted by all with whom we need to argue on this question. But, indeed, where is the supposed wrong? Whenever in extraordinary circumstances men are found willing to face danger and suffering for the good of others, they are looked upon as examples of the highest virtue. Why should Christ's act be judged differently? So far as it was an instance of self-sacrificing love, where is the difference? "For a good man some would even dare to die." The most heroic human virtue only reaches so far as to do this for friends. Christ did the same for a world of enemies. 3. Christ's act was legitimate and voluntary in the most perfect degree. No man has absolute power over his own life; Christ had. "No man taketh my life from me," John x. 18. 4. An enlightened conscience can only be satisfied with forgiveness that does not infringe on law and justice. Mere safety from merited penalty may satisfy selfish fear; but it cannot satisfy a conscience awake to the majesty of righteousness. Such a conscience puts the glory of God and the good of the whole before its own peace.

[Dale, *Christian Atonement;* Crawford, *Scripture Doctrine of Atonement;* Gilbert, *Christian Atonement;* Pye-Smith, *Four Discourses on Christ's Priesthood;* Smeaton, *The Lord's and the Apostles' Doctrine of Atonement*, 2 vols.; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* iii. 401–429, and iv. 1–124; T. Goodwin, *Christ the Mediator*, *Works*, vol. v.; Lyttleton, Essay in *Lux Mundi.*]

[1] Dorner, *Syst.* iv. 89, 99, 107; Gilbert, Lect. iii., vi., vii.; F. W. Robertson, *Sermons*, i. 138; Simon, *Redemption of Man*, ch. ii.

Sec. 4.—Universal Extent of the Atonement.

This is one of the points of difference between Arminianism and Calvinism. The idea of a limited atonement was not and could not be learnt directly from Scripture. The absence of all restriction (John i. 29, iii. 16; 1 John ii. 1, 2), the universal terms used (1 Tim. ii. 4–6; Heb. ii. 9; Rom. v. 18; 2 Cor. v. 14; Tit. ii. 11, 12), the statement that Christ died even for the lost (Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 11), the commands to all to repent, point to the opposite conclusion. The idea really arose as a necessity of the theory of predestination, with which the statements of Scripture just referred to had then to be brought into harmony by inserting qualifications. Admit the unconditional election of individuals to salvation, and other consequences follow, such as particular redemption, irresistible grace, the denial of free-will, unconditional perseverance. The argument is, "All are saved for whom Christ died, and yet all are not saved; for, unless we accept the first position, we must believe that God's purpose fails." But does God will our salvation unconditionally? And if his purpose is conditional, there is no failure. Another argument, to the effect that unless God had decreed the salvation of some absolutely, all might have refused, and so God's plan have fallen utterly to the ground, is very far-fetched. Unscriptural and dangerous as the theory of Predestination is, it is unjust to charge it entirely upon Calvin and Luther. Augustine was its real inventor. He adopted it in extreme recoil from Pelagianism. Admit his extreme doctrine of Original Sin, and then, if any one is to be saved at all, it can only be the work of divine power without assent or concurrence of man. Man can have no more to say to his own personal salvation than to his original redemption. Here is the fountain-head of the whole theory. Calvin simply borrowed Augustine's system, and worked it out completely on every side.[1]

[1] "There's no such thing as Calvinism. The teachings of Augustine, Remigius, Anselm, and Luther were just pieced together by one remark-

Supra-Lapsarian Calvinism includes even the Fall in the divine decree; Infra-Lapsarian puts the decree after the Fall. The Roman Church, though it has no formal definition on the subject, has always been anti-Augustinian on this question; so with Lutheranism and the High-Church school. On the other hand, the Low-Church school, the Reformed Churches of the Continent, the Presbyterian Churches, the old Independents, and the Baptists, are all Predestinarian or Augustinian.

able man, and the result baptized with his name," Duncan, *Colloquia Peripatetica*, p. 9. The Jansenists or Port-Royalists in the Roman Catholic Church held Augustine's doctrine of predestinarianism, but they were quickly suppressed by the bull Unigenitus and the secular power; see J. H. Blunt's *Dictionary of Sects*, art. "Jansenists." See also under "Supralapsarians," "Calvinists," etc.

CHAPTER III.

THE EXPERIENCE OF SALVATION.

The blessing of atonement just considered is universal, unconditional, objective; the blessings now to be considered are individual, conditional, subjective. Calvinism speaks of their "application;" Arminianism prefers to speak of their "administration." The Holy Spirit is in a special sense the administrator.[1]

The question of the relation of divine to human agency in this field is the question of the relation of divine grace to free-will.[2] Augustine denied the second, Pelagius denied the first. Arminianism tries, while avoiding the two extremes, to maintain the truth in both. Not that it puts the two factors on a level. On the contrary, it puts grace first, and makes it supreme. The Spirit is given to all men as the fruit of atonement, and grace works in all, works towards salvation. This holds good of all without exception, has held good since the beginning. It holds good of the unconverted before conversion, of those who never are converted, of the heathen who have never heard of Christ. Anticipating human desire and effort (hence called prevenient grace), it checks and counteracts sin, inspires and fosters good inclination, and allures to the search for more grace. This universal divine working is the source of moral good and beauty in the irreligious. When welcomed and followed up, it passes into saving grace. Nothing but neglect

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 168.

[2] T. Goodwin, *Work of Holy Ghost in our Salvation*, *Works*, vol. vi., except the Calvinism.

or resistance prevents its having this issue in any case. It is here that Arminianism and Predestinarianism part company. The latter holds what it calls "common grace," which it credits with all the effects just mentioned, but which never becomes or can become effectual saving grace. Common grace belongs to all, effectual grace only to the elect individuals. Such a distinction can never be reconciled with Scripture, with the divine justice, or with human responsibility. If we are asked whether the power by which man accepts God's proffered grace is from God or from man, we answer, From God. "The power by which man co-operates with grace is itself of grace" (Pope). But every man has it by divine gift. According to Augustine,[1] there is no power to co-operate with God until after regeneration, and if so, no responsibility. We hold that such power and responsibility exist from the first dawn of moral life. Arminianism is often charged with the error of semi-Pelagianism, which gives to man the power to originate good in himself, and only makes divine help necessary to its completion. The above statement shows that the charge is without foundation.

Although Augustine's doctrine of Predestination was never adopted by the Church as a whole, it led to fierce controversy and much division.[2] In the 9th century it was defended in all its severity by Gottschalk, a Saxon monk, and as strongly resisted by Hincmar and Rabanus Maurus. Synods condemned it, and Gottschalk died in prison. The schoolmen only adopted portions of Augustine's system. Bradwardine, Archbishop of Canterbury in the 14th century, like Gottschalk, held the twofold decree of election and reprobation. Wiclif and Huss are on the same side. It may be said that the whole of the Protestant Reformation was at first Predestinarian. There is reason to think that Luther's views on this question softened somewhat in his later years, and it is certain that Melanchthon's did. The Lutheran symbols are not predestinarian. Zwingle

[1] See Smith's *Dict. Biogr.* "Augustine."

[2] Luthardt, *Comp. d. Dogmatik*, p. 110; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 342; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Election."

was like Calvin in his predestinarianism, but, unlike him, he betrays a tendency to universalism, not to speak of pantheism. It was Calvin who first worked out Augustine's doctrine to its final issues, and made it the cardinal point of a theological system. His starting-point, like his great predecessor's, was the complete bondage of man's will to evil. Salvation, therefore, can be nothing but the execution of a divine decree, which fixes its extent and conditions. The Incarnation, the work of the Spirit, the agencies of the Church, are simply the necessary means for accomplishing a necessary end. The Church consists of the elect. Reprobation is involved in election. Fore-knowledge and fore-ordination are identical. Calvin asks: "Why do we speak of permitting, except because he so wills?" And all this is for the glory of God! Calvin's definition runs: "Predestination is the eternal decree of God, by which he has decided with himself what is to become of each and every individual. For all are not created in like condition; but eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal condemnation for others."[1] "A horrible decree, indeed, I confess. He so foreknew, because he so determined by his own decree." Yet he tries to throw the blame on man: "Man therefore falls, God's providence so ordaining, but he falls by his own fault." The 17th article of the English Church teaches a moderate form of predestination.[2]

[1] Cur permittere dicemus, nisi quia ita vult? Prædestinationem vocamus æternum Dei decretum, quo apud se constitutum habuit, quid de unoquoque homine fieri vellet. Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes; sed aliis vita æterna, aliis damnatio æterna prædordinatur, *Instit.* iii. 21. 5.

[2] Winer (*Conf. of Christendom*) classifies the "Reformed" creeds as "those which maintain a stricter predestination," and those "which have a milder expression, or give prominence to universal redemption, or keep silence on the question." In the first class are the Gallic and Belgic Confessions, Canons of Dort, Formula Consensus Helvetici, Westminster Confession; in the second the Basle Confession, Helvetic ii., Thirty-nine Articles, Art. xvii. Ample quotations are given from these as well as from the Arminian and Lutheran Creeds, p. 162. Pope, *Comp.* ii. 351; Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, "Arminians," p. 51; *Dict. Theol.*

The scriptural use of the term Conversion well illustrates the union of the two factors in actual salvation, denoting as it does both the divine (Jer. xxxi. 18; Acts iii. 26) and the human (Acts iii. 19, xi. 21) side. The term itself is ambiguous. It is generally applied to the commencement of spiritual life and to the work of inward renewal, but it may cover the whole process.

Sec. 1.—Conditions of Salvation.

Man's co-operation comes out clearly in the two great conditions of Repentance and Faith. "Repentance is true sorrow for sin, with sincere effort to forsake it." "Faith in Christ is a saving grace, whereby we receive him, trust in him, and rest upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel."[1] These definitions rightly call attention to the fact that in each case the emotional element is the principal one,—"sorrow, trust." Both repentance and faith are acts of the whole man; intelligence, feeling, and will are all engaged, but the determining element is feeling. Knowledge leads on to feeling, and feeling to action. The knowledge involved in repentance is specific knowledge, knowledge of the personal character and heinous nature of sin as done against God. Such personal conviction issues in sorrow for sin, "repentance toward God," Acts xx. 21. Confession and amendment are the final step, Matt. iii. 8.[2]

"Arminianism;" South, Serm. xxxiii., teaches the Dutch federal theology and predestination.

[1] See also Pope, *Comp.* ii. 371, 376, 411. Mr. Wesley draws a distinction between the sense and degree in which repentance is necessary and that in which faith is necessary. The efficacy of repentance depends on the presence of true faith. "Repentance and its fruits are only *remotely* necessary; necessary in order to faith; whereas faith is *immediately* and *directly* necessary to justification. It remains, that faith is the only condition which is *immediately* and *proximately* necessary to justification," Serm. xliii. See also Serm. v.

[2] Farindon, *Sermons*, vol. i. 496; Hare, *Mission of the Comforter*, Serm. ii.

Saving Faith, according to the teaching of Protestant Churches, is personal trust in Christ. Apol.: "The faith that justifies is not merely historical knowledge, but it is to assent to the promise of God, in which the remission of sins and justification are offered freely for Christ's sake. . . . Faith is not only knowledge in the understanding, but also trust in the will, *i.e.* it is to will and accept what is offered in the promise," etc.[1] "It is to believe, to rely on the merits of Christ, that for his sake God is certainly willing to show mercy to us," Apol. A. C. "A very firm confidence and abiding assent of the mind," Helv. ii. "A hearty confidence which the Holy Ghost works in me through the Gospel, that not only for others, but for me also, the forgiveness of sins, everlasting righteousness and blessedness with God, are bestowed of his grace," Cat. Heidelberg.[2] "A sure trust and confidence that Christ died for *my* sins, that he loved *me* and gave himself for *me*."[3] Faith is thus trust in Christ for a specific purpose. Of course, it presupposes both knowledge and intellectual faith in God's revelation and in Christ. But the latter kind of faith may and often does exist without leading to trust. Roman teaching makes faith intellectual and general. It does not recognise faith in the particular sense just mentioned. Winer says justly: "The Romanists most assuredly require faith as a personal disposition on the part of him who shall attain justification; but that faith is not a trust in the merit of Christ, it is that general credence of the doctrines of the Christian revelation which is rooted in the understanding."[4] Bellarmin says: "The object of faith, which heretics restrict to the promise of special mercy alone, Catholics would make as wide as the Word of God. . . . Then they

[1] "Illa fides, quæ justificat, non est tantum notitia historiæ, sed est assentiri promissioni Dei, in quâ gratis propter Christum offertur remissio peccatorum et justificatio." "Fides est non tantum notitia in intellectu, sed etiam fiducia in voluntate, h.l. est velle et accipere hoc quod in promissione offertur," etc.

[2] Winer, *Conf. of Christendom*, p. 186, etc.

[3] Wesley, vol. v. p. 60.

[4] Winer, p. 189.

differ as to the faculty and power of the mind, that is the seat of faith. The former put faith in the will, defining it as trust, and so confounding it with hope. Catholics teach that faith has its seat in the understanding. Lastly, (they differ) as to the intellectual act itself. For they define faith by knowledge; we by assent."[1] The Protestant interpretation is abundantly justified by the habitual phrase used in Scripture in describing the faith necessary to salvation,—believing *in* and *on Christ* (John iii. 15, 18, 36, vi. 40, 47; 1 John v. 9, 10, 12; Gal. iii. 26; Acts xvi. 31).[2] Faith has been well described as "the flight of a penitent sinner to the mercy of God in Christ."

The repentance and faith of a penitent are to be distinguished from those of the Christian believer.[3] In the latter case, repentance and faith are in order to a further degree of holiness. A believer has also a faith of assurance, a persuasion "that I, even I, am now reconciled to God." The latter is frequently confounded with penitent faith in order to forgiveness. The confusion is pernicious. It can never be a seeker's duty to believe that he is already forgiven. He must believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, *i.e.* as he is set forth in Scripture, and he is set forth as the universal, sufficient, accepted propitiation for sin. The same mistake is made in some creeds. *Conf. Aug.*, "and believes that his sins are remitted for Christ's sake."[4]

Faith is not only a condition, like repentance, but also an

[1] Winer, p. 190. Bellarmin goes on to say, "Judgment or assent is twofold, for one kind follows the reason and evidence of the case, the other follows the authority of the speaker; the former is called knowledge, the latter faith."

[2] Even Peter Lombard says: Aliud est credere in Deum, aliud credere Deo, aliud credere Deum. Credere Deo est credere vera esse quæ loquitur, quod et mali faciunt, et nos credimus homini, non in hominem. Credere Deum est credere quod ipse sit Deus, quod etiam mali faciunt. Credere in Deum est credendo amare, credendo in eum ire, credendo ei adhærere et ejus membris incorporari, Luthardt, p. 249; Owen, v. 85, 100.

[3] See Wesley on *The Repentance of Believers*, Sermon xiv.

[4] Winer, p. 191.

instrument. We are justified through, not on account of, our repentance and faith.[1]

Only Arminianism does justice to these conditions. Calvinism is naturally shy of them, its writers either ignoring them or confounding them with the repentance and faith of believers. But in doing so they overlook or set aside an important aspect of the teaching of the New Testament, which speaks often and emphatically of these acts as preceding, and necessary in order to, personal salvation. It is folly to say that the fulfilment of conditions interferes with the sovereign freeness of salvation, and would form a ground of pride. Are we purely passive in receiving other gifts of God? Does our action detract from the freeness of those gifts?

Sec. 2.—Blessings of Salvation.

Justification, Regeneration, and Sanctification are contemporaneous and inseparable. Every one who experiences the first blessing experiences the others at the same time. In thought, however, the order cannot be changed. It would be unnatural to suppose man born again before he is justified or forgiven. Speaking of the first two blessings, Wesley says: "The former relates to the great work which God does *for us*, in forgiving our sins; the latter to the great work which God does *in us*, in renewing our fallen nature. In order of *time*, neither of these is before the other; in the moment we are justified by the grace of God, through the redemption that is in Jesus, we are also 'born of the Spirit;' but in order of *thinking*, as it is termed, justification precedes the new birth," Serm. xlv.

A.—JUSTIFICATION.

(*a*) The Roman and Protestant Churches differ fundamentally not only as to the condition, but also as to the nature, of justifica-

[1] Owen, vol. v. 109.

tion.[1] According to the former, it is making man just by infusing righteousness of nature, being thus equivalent to sanctification or to the entire process of salvation ; according to the latter, it is making just by declaring or pronouncing just.[2] This difference of view as to the nature of the blessing has probably much to do with the difference of view as to its condition. If the Roman view on the first point is the scriptural one, there is some reason for including good works at least among the means of the blessing. This difference of meaning must be borne in mind throughout. Thus, when the Council of Trent says, "If any one shall say that the wicked is justified by faith alone, so that he understands nothing else to be requisite to his obtaining the grace of justification, . . . let him be anathema,"[3] the wide range given to *justified* must be remembered. When, again, Protestant Churches declare with Paul that "a man is justified by faith apart from the works of the law," the limited range given to the same term must be remembered.

A single quotation from the Tridentine Council will set forth the Roman idea with sufficient clearness. "Justification is not the remission of sins alone, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inner man by the voluntary reception of the grace and gifts, by which man from unrighteous becomes righteous, and from being an enemy becomes a friend, that he may be an heir according to the hope of eternal life, . . . by the righteousness of God, by which he makes us righteous ; endowed with which by him we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reckoned, but are truly called and are righteous, receiving righteousness in us."[4] The Protestant symbols declare with one

[1] Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* iii. 114 ; Dorner, *Syst. Chr. Doctr.* iv. 194 ; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Justification," mixes up the Protestant and Romanist views ; Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, vol. ii. ch. xxi.

[2] It is not a declaring innocent. Man is guilty, and can never be acquitted as a criminal in a human court is acquitted.

[3] Winer, p. 184.

[4] Justificatio non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum unde homo ex injusto fit justus et ex inimico amicus, ut sit heres

voice that justify means in Scripture to declare just. "Justification here signifies not to be made righteous, from being wicked, but in the forensic usage to be pronounced righteous. . . . To be justified is to obtain remission of sins. . . . To justify in the forensic usage means to absolve the guilty and pronounce righteous, but on account of another's righteousness, namely Christ's, which righteousness of another is imparted to us by means of faith," Apol. A. C.[1] The 11th Article of the English Church and the Westminster Confession speak to the same effect.[2] Mr. Wesley says: "The plain scriptural notion of justification is pardon, the forgiveness of sins. It is that act of God the Father, whereby, for the sake of the propitiation made by the blood of his Son, he 'showeth forth his righteousness (or mercy)[3] by the remission of sins that are past.'" While, however, justification is substantially the same as forgiveness, it is also different. Otherwise, why two terms instead of one? Justification is forgiveness in accordance with law, a putting right in relation to law. There might be forgiveness without justification. The very term just or righteous suggests the idea of law, implying as it does a standard of comparison. According to Liddell and Scott, the Protestant interpretation is the only one known to classical usage (δικαιόω, "to hold as right or fair, deem right, think fit," implying a judgment passed respecting something).[4]

secundum spem vitæ æternæ . . . justitia Dei, quâ nos justos facit, quâ videlicet ab eo donati renovamur spiritu mentis nostræ et non modo reputamuf, sed vere justi nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes, Winer, p. 179. It must not be forgotten that Dr. Pusey, and the great party which agrees with him, teach this doctrine of Trent as well as other doctrines. On the whole difference between the Roman and Protestant doctrine, see Dean Jackson, Bk. iv. ch. vii.; also Cramp, *Text-Book of Popery*, p. 73.

[1] Justificari hic significat non, ex impio justum effici, sed usu forensi justum pronuntiari. . . . Consequi remissionem peccatorum est justificari. . . . Justificare h.l. (Rom. v. 1) forensi consuetudine significat reum absolvere et pronuntiare justum, sed propter alienam justitiam, videlicet Christi, quæ aliena justitia communicatur nobis per fidem, *ibid.* p. 180.

[2] Winer, p. 187. [3] An incorrect exposition.

[4] "How can δικαιοῦν possibly signify 'to make righteous'? Verbs indeed

The final decision turns upon the Scripture use of the term. The best way to ascertain this is to observe its use in relation to other subjects. In passages like Ex. xxiii. 7; Deut. xxv. 1; 1 Kings viii. 32; Ps. li. 4, cxliii. 2; Prov. xvii. 15; Isa. v. 23, l. 8, 9; Luke vii. 29, 35, x. 29, xvi. 15; Matt. xi. 19; 1 Cor. iv. 4, the sense of making intrinsically just is out of the question.[1] In every case it is the passing of a judgment that is meant. When, then, Paul, "a Hebrew of the Hebrews," with his mind steeped in the Jewish Scriptures and in current Jewish ideas, takes the term, and, without any intimation of a change of meaning, applies it to God's relation to man, we have no reason for departing from the meaning fixed by usage, especially when this is in perfect harmony with the context. See Rom. iii. 19, 20, 24–26; Acts xiii. 38, 39.

In Rom. v. 18, viii. 34, justify is opposed to condemn. To condemn is not to make really bad, but to pronounce an adverse judgment. What then must justify mean?

In Rom. iv. 4–8, justifying is plainly treated as equivalent to imputing righteousness, forgiving iniquities, covering sin, not imputing sin. Otherwise the quotation from the Psalms has no pertinence. Here also there can be no question of making internally righteous. See Gal. iii. 6; Jas. ii. 23, 24; Luke xviii. 13, 14.

The most powerful evidence, however, in behalf of the Protestant interpretation, is that supplied by the whole strain of the first five chapters of the Romans. In chs. ii. to v. the apostle is moving in a circle of legal or forensic ideas,—law, guilt, condemnation, propitiation, justification. All these terms hang together. To make justify mean the imparting of intrinsic

of this ending from adjectives of *physical* meaning may have this use, *e.g.* τυφλοῦν, 'to make blind.' But when such verbs are derived from adjectives of *moral* meaning, as ἀξιοῦν, ὁσιοῦν, δικαιοῦν, they do by usage, and must, from the nature of things, signify to *deem*, to *account*, to *prove*, or to *treat as* worthy, holy, righteous," Canon Evans on 1 Cor. vi. 11, in *Speaker's Comm.* See also Godet's Excursus in *Comm. on Romans*, vol. i. 157.

[1] Luthardt, *Comp.* p. 257; Owen, v. 125, etc.

righteousness, would be out of harmony with the rest of the exposition. The latter idea is first introduced in ch. vi., where we have an entirely new set of figures and terms. In the earlier argument, all men are pronounced guilty before the law, and then on the ground of the great propitiation (iii. 25) they are "justified." What can this mean, in the connection of thought, but to be set free from guilt and condemnation?

The nature of the objection which the Apostle supposes to be raised against his teaching (iii. 31, vi. 1), confirms our interpretation. Some one objects that the doctrine of a man being justified "by faith apart from the works of the law," makes the law of none effect. Now if "justify" meant on the Apostle's lips to make a man internally righteous, how could such an objection ever occur to any one? It would be absurd; and it is not likely that St. Paul or Scripture would condescend to notice mere nonsense. But according to the Protestant interpretation, such an objection seems plausible at first sight. Some one might ask, If justification, so defined, is by faith only, what is the use of the law, what room is there for obedience to it? And precisely the same objection is made by Roman and other controversialists against the Protestant doctrine of justification, which is denounced as immoral and opposed to the interests of holiness,—a tolerably conclusive proof that Paul's doctrine and ours are the same.[1]

There is a close connection between the forensic aspect of the atonement and the forensic nature of justification, the former being the ground of the latter. It is true that the forensic is not the only aspect of atonement, as we have seen, but it is one aspect; and justification is not the whole of salvation, but it is part. Simple forgiveness would remit penalty without regard to law and its satisfaction. Justification does

[1] Thomasius (*Christi Person und Werk*, Theil 3, ii. 223) gives interesting quotations from Origen, showing that that keen thinker very early saw the true relation between faith and works. "Et puto quod prima salutis initia et ipsa fundamenta fides est; profectus vero et augmenta ædificii spes est, perfectio autem et culmen totius operis caritas."

so on the ground of the satisfaction made to law. It is, so to speak, legal forgiveness. It is difficult to see where the legal element in the work of atonement finds practical application, if the legal nature of justification is denied.

An objection is sometimes made, that the Protestant doctrine makes God, in declaring a sinner just, declare what is contrary to fact. The objection is a mere verbal cavil. What is meant is that for the sake of Christ God treats guilty man, when penitent, as if he were righteous. Christ's merit is reckoned his, so that the divine action is not contrary to truth and fact. The same objection might be raised against forgiveness in any form. In forgiving a sinner, God treats him as he does not deserve to be treated, *i.e.* regards him as not a sinner. Is this unjust?

The objection, that the doctrine is inimical to the interests of morality, has been already considered. There would be weight in it if Protestantism or Scripture made this blessing the whole of salvation. But the necessity of sanctification is just as earnestly maintained. In fact, it is inseparable from the earlier blessing.

According to the Protestant definition, justification is complete at once; according to the Roman one, it is progressive.

A peculiar phraseology, used in Calvinistic and other circles, to describe justification, is the imputation of Christ's righteousness.[1] The term to impute or reckon is used in Scripture in reference to this subject, but it is faith, not Christ's righteousness, that is said to be reckoned for righteousness (Rom. iv. 3–9; Gal. iii. 6; Jas. ii. 23). The argument used to justify the phrase in question is, that as the object of faith is Christ's righteousness, the imputation of faith involves the imputation of its object. But this consequence does not necessarily follow. Even granting that the object of faith is correctly stated, the question is, In what aspect or for what purpose is that righteousness believed in? It need not be in order to personal appro-

[1] Advocated by Owen, vol. v. p. 162, etc. See Crawford, *Scr. Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 444; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.*, art. "Imputed Righteousness."

priation, but simply as constituting a valid expiation. The argument, in short, is a *non-sequitur*. Other developments of the phraseology are still more suspicious. Christ's righteousness is divided into active and passive, the first being his perfect observance of God's law, the second his expiatory suffering, and both are said to be reckoned to us. If the former is reckoned to the believer, so that he is regarded as having kept God's law in Christ, it is hard to see how this is consistent with the requirement of holiness in us. We know how earnestly the inference is disavowed, but we do not see how it is to be logically avoided. It is said in defence that we just as much need Christ's perfect obedience to supply the defects of our obedience, as we need his meritorious suffering to atone for our guilt; otherwise we must suppose the demands of the law to be lowered to meet our weakness. But is not the same mercy which cancels our guilt equal to the forgiveness of our imperfections? Why resort to the artificial and unnatural notion of a vicarious holiness? If there are spheres of life in which substitution is out of place, surely the region of personal holiness is one of them. Mr. Wesley accepts the phraseology, putting his own meaning upon it. He takes it as another way of denying human merit and affirming that we are justified solely for Christ's sake. But those who use the language mean more by it than this. He says: "As the active and passive righteousness of Christ were never, in fact, separated from each other, so we never need separate them at all. It is with regard to these conjointly that Jesus is called 'The Lord our Righteousness.' But when is this righteousness imputed? When they believe; in that very hour the righteousness of Christ is theirs; it is imputed to every one that believes, as soon as he believes. But in what sense is this righteousness imputed to believers? In this: all believers are forgiven and accepted, not for the sake of anything in them, or of anything that ever was, that is, or ever can be done by them, but wholly for the sake of what Christ hath done and suffered for them," Serm. xx. It need only be remarked that the language thus explained is a round-

about way of saying what might be said far more clearly and simply.[1]

(*b*) Faith the ONLY CONDITION of justification.[2] Protestantism is as unanimous in making faith the sole condition, as it is in making forgiveness the sole content of the blessing. *Solâ fide* is its watchword here. "Solâ fide nos justificamur coram Deo, quia solâ fide accipimus remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, propter Christum, quia reconciliatio seu justificatio est res promissa propter Christum, non propter legem," Apol. A. C., Article xi. of English Church. Westminster Confession, ch. xi. sec. 1.[3] The Roman condemnation of this view, with its different definition, has been already quoted.

It is clear that Scripture is with us on this point, see Rom. iii. 20–28, iv. 4; Eph. ii. 8–10; 2 Tim. i. 9; Tit. iii. 5; Acts xvi. 31. The last passage is enough to settle the question. The apostle says, concluding his argument, "We reckon therefore that a man is justified by faith apart from the works of the law." Whatsoever justification means, works of the law are excluded from the means by which it is obtained. If justification means sanctification, as Rome says, works are excluded from it. This passage does not stand alone, as the above enumeration shows. The reference cannot be to works of the ceremonial law, for in the whole context "the law" is spoken of in general terms. The ceremonial law did not exist in Abraham's days, iv. 2. In ch. iv. 4, the apostle even argues that the blessing must be

[1] Pope, *Comp.* ii. 446.

[2] Justification by faith alone is often called the material, the sole authority of Scripture in matters of faith the formal, principle of Protestantism. On Faith and Good Works see Dean Jackson, Bk. xi. chs. xxx., xxxi. "We are justified by faith *alone;* but we are not justified by that faith which *can be alone.* Alone, respects its influence unto our justification, not its nature and existence. And we absolutely deny that we can be justified by that faith which *can be alone;* that is, without a principle of spiritual life and universal obedience, operative in all the works of it, as duty doth require," *Treatise on Justification,* Owen, *Works,* v. 73.

[3] Winer, p. 185.

through faith, in order that it may be of grace. The explanation given by the Council of Trent, "We are said to be justified by faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification,"[1] is like saying that a man is made wise and learned by the alphabet, because the alphabet is the beginning of all knowledge.[2]

Nothing has done more to obscure the truth on the present subject in the Roman Church, than the doctrine of the possibility of merit in man. This merit is said to be of two kinds or degrees. When man before justification yields to prevenient grace, he is said by a merit of congruity (*meritum de congruo*) to deserve an increase of grace. The justified merit eternal life in a higher sense by a merit of condignity (*m. de condigno*). "Since Christ himself is ever infusing, as the head into the members, virtue into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes and accompanies and follows their good works, and without which they (the good works) cannot in any way be pleasing and meritorious before God, it is matter of faith that nothing more is wanting to the justified themselves, to entitle them, by those good works, which are done in God, to be considered as having satisfied God's law as to this earthly life, and, if they die in a state of grace, as having merited the eternal life to be attained in due time."[3] So Bellarmin says, "The common judgment of all Catholics is, that the good works of the righteous are meritorious in the true and proper sense, and that they merit not this or that reward, but eternal life itself."[4] It is true, human merit is traced to Christ's merit

[1] Winer, p. 184. [2] Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. iv. and v.

[3] Con. Trid. vi. 16: Cum ille ipse Christus tanquam caput in membra . . . in ipsos justificatos jugiter virtutem influat, quæ virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur, et sine quâ nullo pacto Deo grata et meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis justificatis amplius deesse credendum est, quominus plene illis quidem operibus, quæ in Deo sunt facta, divinæ legi pro hujus vitæ statu satisfecisse et vitam æternam suo etiam tempore, si tamen in gratiâ decesserunt, consequendam vere promeruisse censeantur, Winer, p. 196.

[4] Habet communis catholicorum omnium sententia, opera bona justorum

as its source, and Christians are warned against self-confidence and pride. But the doctrine is a dangerous one; fine distinctions are soon rubbed off in common use, and the modicum of truth at the basis of the doctrine may be put in safer and more moderate terms.

St. James (ii. 14–26) seems at first directly to contradict St. Paul. In vers. 15, 16, 19, he gives an example of the kind of faith which is too little for justification, a simply intellectual, inoperative faith, faith without fruits of holiness. Paul never said that such faith would save. In fact, he says over and over again precisely the same as James (Gal. v. 6; Eph. ii. 10; Tit. iii. 8; Rom. iii. 31, viii. 4, 13, xiii. 8–10; Rom. vi.). The two writers are treating of different subjects. One is instructing a seeker respecting the means of salvation, the other is exposing a pretended believer. Substantially, James is treating of the kind of faith that saves. Or we may say that one apostle speaks of a sinner's justification, the other of a Christian's, two different justifications being meant. A Christian justifies his faith, proves it to be genuine, by works.[1]

Dr. Pope in his *Compendium*[2] gives a valuable and interesting account of the history of thought on this subject. We will merely indicate the points which deserve attention. One is the source of the error of the Roman Church in Augustine, who does not distinguish between justification and sanctification. "God justifies (man) not only by remitting the evil he has done, but

vere ac proprie esse merita, et merita non cujuscunque præmii, sed ipsius vitæ æternæ, Winer, p. 197. On the doctrine of Merit, see Jackson, *Works*, Bk. xi. chs. xxvii., xxviii.

[1] "Works justify and perfect faith, not in the nature of the thing, but in the sight of man, to whom they witness the livelihood and perfection of faith, not as causes, but effects and signs of our justification; they are not only signs, but conditions concomitant or precedent;" and more in Jackson on *Creed*, Bk. iv. sec. 1, ch. xi., folio ed. i. p. 686, also sec. 2, ch. vi. Owen, v. ch. xx. Owen argues that Paul and James have a different purpose, intend a different kind of faith, and speak of justification in a different sense.

[2] ii. 418–451.

also by bestowing charity, that he may forsake evil and do good by the aid of the Holy Spirit." Another sentence is quoted, which seems to indicate a sense of the distinction, "Sequuntur opera justificatum, non præcedunt justificandum."[1] A favourite distinction of the Middle Ages is between *Fides informis*, bare intellectual faith, and *Fides formata charitate*, faith informed by love. The latter is sanctifying faith, the former does not amount to justifying faith.

Calvinism, which misplaces repentance and faith, makes justification a consequence of regeneration. According to it, man is first regenerated in fulfilment of an eternal decree, and then Christ's righteousness, active and passive, is imputed to him. He is regenerated through union with Christ, and he is united to Christ by faith, which again is the gift of God. Some Lutheran teachers have followed Calvin in this order.[2] Arminians also have used erroneous language. Thus Limborch speaks of Faith, "on account of which God is graciously willing to bestow on man remission of sins and the reward of eternal life" (p. 443).

In a series of quotations, Dr. Pope shows that the practice of good men, who teach error, is often better than their creed. Augustine says: "Our righteousness is true, on account of the truly good which is before it; but in this life it is so slight and impoverished, that it consists rather in the forgiveness of sins than in the perfection of virtues." "My sole hope rests on the death of my Saviour. His death is my merit, my refuge, my salvation, my life, my resurrection; my merit is the mercy of the Lord. He who doubts of the pardon of sin denies that God is merciful" (p. 421). Anselm gives these directions for dealing

[1] Luthardt, *Comp.* p. 258. One is surprised to find Canon Norris saying that Augustine does not confound the two blessings (*Rudiments of Theology*, p. 297). No doubt the sentences he quotes seem to bear him out. But we cannot gather the views of the Fathers from detached sentences, but from the strain of their teaching. This seems here to be on the other side.

[2] Pope, pp. 440, 441.

with a dying man: "Dost thou believe that thou canst not be saved but by the death of Christ? The sick man answereth, Yes. Then let it be said to him: Go to, then, and whilst thy soul abideth in thee, put all thy confidence in this death alone, place thy trust in no other thing, commit thyself wholly to this death, cover thyself wholly with this alone, cast thyself wholly on this death, wrap thyself wholly in this death. And if God would judge thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy judgment, and otherwise I will not contend, or enter into judgment with thee. And if he shall say unto thee that thou art a sinner, say, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and my sins. If he shall say unto thee that thou hast deserved damnation, say, Lord, I put the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thee and all my sins; and I offer his merits instead of my own, which I ought to have but have not. If he shall say that he is angry with thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy anger."[1] But the most remarkable testimony is that of Bellarmin: "Because of the uncertainty of our own righteousness and the danger of empty boasting, it is safest to place our whole trust in God's sole mercy and benignity. This only we say, it is safer to forget merits, however obtained, and to look to God's mercy alone, both because without revelation no one can certainly know that he has real merits, or will persevere in them to the end, and also because nothing is more easy in this scene of temptation than for arrogance to spring from contemplating good works" (p. 434).[2]

[For full details, see Dorner's *History of Protestant Theology*, 2 vols.]

B.—REGENERATION.

The nature and limits of this blessing are by no means so clear as in the case of its sister blessings. The very various

[1] P. 425; Shedd, ii. 281.

[2] T. Goodwin, *Object and Acts of Justifying Faith*, vol. viii.

definitions of it given in the Church are, in part at least, the consequence of the comparatively slight treatment of it in Scripture. It sometimes stands in theology for the outward rights and privileges of the Christian state, to which baptism is the introduction. But if this were all that is meant, it would be hard to explain the solemnity of Christ's teaching or the ground of Nicodemus's wonder in John iii. It cannot denote less than the beginning of a new inward, spiritual life. Taking it in this sense, others have only put a difference of degree between it and sanctification. But if this be so, it is not a distinct blessing at all; it is merely another name for the first stage of sanctification, and two terms are needless. It seems better, therefore, with Dr. Pope (iii. 5), to limit the first term strictly to the communication of the new life, of which sanctification then takes charge. The new birth thus corresponds to natural birth. Regeneration is as decisive and instantaneous a work as justification, and as little capable of degrees.[1] This interpretation also explains why the blessing is seldom named in the Scripture biography of the new life.

The idea of a New Birth is only found in John iii. 3 (compared with i. 12, 13); 1 John iii. 9, etc.; Tit. iii. 5, which is of doubtful interpretation; 1 Pet. i. 3, 23. Other figures, however, have been explained as having the same meaning,—Creation, 2 Cor. v. 17; Eph. ii. 10; Gal. vi. 15; Eph. iv. 24: Resurrection, Rom. vi. 4, 5; Col. ii. 13, iii. 1; Eph. ii. 5, 6: Renewal, Col. iii. 10; Rom. xii. 2; Eph. iv. 23; Tit. iii. 5. It is evident that a complete, radical change is meant, the

[1] "It is that great change which God works in the soul when he brings it into life; when he raises it from the death of sin to the life of righteousness," Wesley, Serm. xlv. He says, it is wrong to speak of regeneration "as a progressive work, carried on in the soul by slow degrees, from the time of our first turning to God. This is undeniably true of sanctification; but of regeneration, the new birth, it is not true. This is a part of sanctification, not the whole; it is the gate to it, the entrance into it. . . . The same relation which there is between our natural birth and our growth, there is also between our new birth and our sanctification."

Divine Spirit being the agent, the Divine Word the means. The Psalmist prays for this blessing, Ps. li. 10.

Dr. Pope's view of Adoption differs from the ordinary one in annexing it to Regeneration rather than to Justification. It is the bestowal of the rights and privileges of the regenerate state. It is quite true that, like justification, adoption is a legal idea. Still it is a different legal idea. In one case man is a criminal treated as righteous, in the other case he is a stranger treated as a child. Why should not the Second Birth carry legal privileges with it? It seems natural that privilege should follow state, not the converse. It will be observed that Adoption is St. Paul's word, the New Birth St. John's. And there can be little doubt that Paul is thinking more of privilege, Rom. viii. 14–17. St. Paul uses both *υἱός* and *τέκνον* of the Christian, St. John only the latter, reserving the former for Christ. The term *υἱός* rather connotes privilege and dignity, the term *τέκνον* community of nature and the affection springing out of the relation. The privileges are such as Filial Access to God (Rom. viii. 15; Matt. vi. 9), Freedom (John viii. 32; Gal. iv. 5), the Possession of the Spirit (Luke xi. 13), Inheritance, Life, Glory, God.[1]

C.—SANCTIFICATION.

Sanctification is the growth and perfecting of the new regenerate life. Holiness denotes the finished result of the process. We have to notice the Nature, Progressiveness, and Perfection of the blessing.

[1] See Watson's *Works*, v. 159, xi. 248. "The idea of 'child,' as distinguished from 'son,' which does not occur in this connection in St. John except Rev. xxi. 7, is that of a community of nature as distinguished from that of a dignity of heirship. . . . St. John dwells characteristically upon the communication of a new life, while St. Paul dwells upon the gift of a new dignity and relation. When St. Paul brings out the newness of the Christian's being, he speaks of him as a new 'creation.' The language of St. James (i. 18) and of St. Peter (1 Pet. i. 3, 23) corresponds with that of St. John," Westcott, *Speaker's Comm. on Gospel of St. John*, p. 9.

(*a*) Nature of Sanctification.—On its negative side it is the removal of evil from human nature, on its positive the creation or infusion of good, and especially of love to God and man, which is the sum of goodness (Rom. xiii. 10).

The *negative* work of purifying is expressed by καθαρίζω, καθαρός, καθαρότης, the words used of the cleansing of lepers, Matt. viii. 2, 3, x. 8, xi. 5, etc. In the spiritual application, the presence of evil is always supposed, 2 Cor. vii. 1; Heb. ix. 14, 22, 23; 1 John i. 7, 9.

The *positive* side is expressed by the great word, occurring so frequently in the New Testament, ἅγιος ("saints," 1 Cor. i. 2, Eph. i. 1, etc.; ἁγιάζω, ἁγιωσύνη, ἁγιάσμος), corresponding to the equally sacred term of the Old Testament, קָדוֹשׁ. See Eph. v. 26; 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. ii. 11, ix. 13, x. 10, xiii. 12, etc. Whatever the derivation of the word, the idea which it came to express was undoubtedly that of being set apart, consecrated to the divine possession and service. Inanimate things—places, vessels, buildings—were so set apart from common for sacred uses. They were God's, not man's. This idea was then transferred to human beings, Ex. xix. 6. Moral was substituted for material excellence. According to Ex. xix. 6, the whole of Israel was to be holy to God. The design was never realized, but it was God's purpose. The two ideas of Possession and Service then combine into the Priestly idea. The priests were God's *possession* (κλῆρος) and *servants*, ministers waiting upon the Lord in his temple. All this is transferred to Christians, Tit. ii. 14, λαὸν περιούσιον; 1 Pet. ii. 9, λ. εἰς περιποίησιν; Rom. xii. 1, vi. 13; 2 Cor. v. 15; Eph. v. 27; Rev. i. 6. This spiritual, universal priesthood of believers is the only human priesthood acknowledged in the New Testament.

Whether we speak of sanctification or consecration, the act is God's. Dedication seems a better word to describe our act of self-devotion to the divine will. But why depart from the old usage, which speaks of God sanctifying man, and of man consecrating himself?

The "spiritual sacrifices" which Christians are to offer are all the duties of a Christian life, duties of gratitude, obedience, and worship to God, and of justice, truth, mercy to man. It is evident that they include the whole of human life, nothing is outside them or apart from them. It is only another way of stating the same truth, to say that a Christian offers himself to God, not a part of his life, but himself in all his thoughts, intentions, and acts. If a Christian himself is God's, all his life is God's, all is religious and sacred,—business, time, study, intellect, wealth, influence. "In that day shall there be upon the bells of the horses, Holiness unto the Lord," Zech. xiv. 20. No idea is more comprehensive or more practical than that of Christian holiness.

Mr. Wesley thinks there is a direct witness of the Holy Spirit to the fact of sanctification as to forgiveness (*Works*, xi. 420). But neither the reasons he gives, nor the quotations in support from Scripture, are quite convincing. The change wrought in the former blessing is in God's attitude to us, and requires, or at least admits, outward attestation. The change in the latter case is from first to last in us, and may be expected to "shine in its own light." The passages of Scripture quoted are general in their terms. No one will question the possibility of this second direct witness. But its necessity is not so clear. Nor can it be said to be common. It has not been made prominent in Methodist teaching.

This would be the place for an exposition of Christian Ethics, for what is ethics but applied holiness, the detailed working out of holiness in practical life? Martensen calls holiness "the last word of theology, the first of ethics." The usual defect in the treatment of this subject is the failure to bring out the distinctively Christian aspects of ethical teaching. Christian ethics is to natural ethics as the Christian religion is to natural religion. Undoubtedly there is a morality that is independent of religion and religious faith, a morality that is never to be thought lightly of. But Christianity brings man into new relations, out of which arise new duties and sentiments. It

also gives a new colour, new sanctions and reasons, to old virtues and obligations. The province of Christian ethics is to bring out this side of the subject into the clearest light.[1] The ethical teaching, of which the New Testament is full, is charged with the religious and Christian spirit.

(*b*) Progressiveness.—The work of holiness, both on its negative and positive side, as a dying to sin and a living to righteousness, is a gradual one, 2 Cor. vii. 1; 2 Pet. iii. 18. The new life grows to maturity. Scripture implies and experience proves that the evil nature remains after conversion, held down, never allowed to emerge into act, in process of transformation, but still there, and from time to time giving signs of its presence. Of course, as matter of possibility, the work of inward holiness might be perfected in the moment of conversion; we are speaking of what is the rule and what is according to analogy. God brings his works to perfection by degrees. Perhaps we may suppose that he does so because he would have the creature co-operate in the process, instead of doing all the work himself at a single stroke. Why should the highest work of all be an exception? The higher we rise in the scale of creation, the higher the order of being, the slower we find growth to be. After St. Paul has said (Rom. vi. 11), "Reckon ye yourselves dead unto sin," he says (ver. 12), "Let not sin reign in your mortal body." What necessity could there be for the latter exhortation, if the former statement meant that sin was utterly destroyed? We must not take a single passage by itself, but consider the whole of St. Paul's teaching together. The state described in vers. 2 and 11, "dead to sin," is consistent with the possibility of sin remaining, and with the necessity constantly to yield the members in service to God. If no danger of sin remained in any shape or form, how is this language to be explained? We pray to be forgiven our trespasses. What is the source and spring of these trespasses,

[1] Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, 3 vols. (T. & T. Clark); Wardlaw, *Christian Ethics;* Harless, *Christian Ethics;* Dorner, *Syst. of Christian Ethics;* Davison, Fern. Lect. *The Christian Conscience.*

which need forgiveness, if no inward evil is left? The apostle speaks of the destroying of sin as "mortifying" and "crucifying" the flesh, Rom. viii. 13; Gal. v. 24. We do not see why the particular form of death, "crucifying," should be chosen, except to mark its lingering nature. "Mortifying," indeed, simply means killing in any way. Still, sudden death is the exception, not the rule. Usually, and mercifully, dying is a slow process. And when it is the death of an evil nature that is in question, we should expect the process to be proportionately slow.

The practical danger of saying that the work of sanctification is complete at conversion, is that of lowering the idea of perfect holiness, and the danger is a serious one. Tell the Christians of everyday life that they are already perfect, and their conceptions of the meaning of holiness and of the extent of its demands will be greatly narrowed, the motives to further effort will be weakened. Let the standard for the converted be set as high as possible, but let it be a standard still to be attained, not one "already attained." The difference in point of stimulus is immense. In practical life we find that those who look on themselves as "already perfect" at conversion, abandon church fellowship and means of grace, and relapse into selfish isolation and indolence.

Mr. Wesley in his first Sermon, commenting on the words, "Whosoever is born of God sinneth not," says that believers sin not habitually, wilfully, by evil desire or by infirmity, *i.e.* they are free from actual sin. But in Serm. xiv. he earnestly maintains the necessity of repentance and faith in order to entire sanctification. The highest degrees of grace are to be attained by the same means as the lowest. He speaks of "the mischievousness of the opinion that we are *wholly* sanctified when we are justified. It is true we are then delivered from the dominion of outward sin; and at the same time the power of inward sin is so broken that we need no longer follow or be led by it. But it is by no means true that inward sin is totally destroyed; that the root of pride, self-will, anger, love of the

world, is then taken out of the heart; or that the carnal mind and the heart bent to backsliding are entirely extirpated." We believe that this statement is true to Scripture and the facts of experience. See also Serm. xiii. "On Sin in Believers."

(*c*) Entire Sanctification possible in the present life.—The possibility and necessity of perfect holiness form part of the universal faith of Christendom. The only point on which Methodist doctrine goes beyond that of other Churches is in earnestly maintaining its possibility in the present life. Some say at death, some say after death in an intermediate state of purification. Purgatory is a device for perfecting the good and fitting them for the vision of God. But why at death or after death rather than before? What prerogative is there in time, or what power will be at work then that is not at work now? If there had been limitation or restriction, it would surely have been stated in Scripture. The mere absence of any such restriction is a presumption in favour of the Methodist doctrine.

We need go no farther than the first law of perfect love to God, given through Moses (Deut. x. 12), and renewed by Christ (Luke x. 27). This, with the second great commandment, includes all that any one meant or ever could mean by any phrase used on this subject,—Christian perfection, entire sanctification, perfect love, or perfect holiness. The law was surely meant to be kept. We do not keep it, but we might and ought. Mr. Wesley often says that his doctrine says no more than these precepts say.[1] The apostle must have expected his prayer in 1 Thess. v. 23 to be answered. See also Tit. ii. 14; 1 John i. 7, iii. 8, 9; Heb. ix. 26; Eph. iii. 14–21; Matt. v. 48. The Sermon on the Mount is a picture of moral and spiritual perfection, and we cannot suppose Christ to have given impossible precepts. To think that our natural evil, our

[1] "What is implied in being a perfect Christian? The loving God with all our heart, and mind, and soul, Deut. vi. 5," vol. xi. 387. "It is love excluding sin; love filling the heart, taking up the whole capacity of the soul," Serm. xliii.

temptations or the circumstances of life, put obedience to God's law out of the question, is to make these superior to the grace of God and the power of the Spirit. It is to limit what God has not limited,—the virtue of the Atonement and the efficacy of faith. After describing, if words can describe, a perfect religious character (Eph. iii. 14–19), the apostle directs us to the power by which it is to be attained: "Unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us."

Any one who will read Mr. Wesley's own account of his teaching on this subject, in his two sermons, "Christian Perfection," and "The Scripture Way of Salvation,"[1] will see how careful he is to guard it against misunderstanding, self-deception, and abuse. He does not teach some impossible, absolute perfection, one that excludes progress or makes falling away impossible, one that is independent of Christ and faith, of watchfulness and prayer, but one that is relative to our nature and condition, that is wholly derived from and dependent on God's grace in Christ, and therefore, instead of encouraging pride, is merely another and the strongest motive to humility. A perfect character is one that is perfect in humility, as well as in every other grace. The two sermons, on "Sin in Believers" and "The Repentance of Believers," are especially clear and definite in their exposition of the conditions and means of the higher blessing.[2] Repentance in this case means a sense of sinfulness still remaining, a sense of its guilt in itself, sorrow for it, and intense desire to be delivered from it. Faith means "a divine evidence and conviction" that God has promised such deliverance, is able and willing to make good the promise, and that he does it. Thus, sanctification in its completeness, like justification, is by faith, not by works, by faith that it may be

[1] And still more his treatise on the subject, *Works*, xi. 366, "Plain Account of Christian Perfection," published separately (T. Woolmer). Mr. Wesley's most important sermons are published in a cheap form, *The Marrow of Methodism*.

[2] See also Serm. xliii., vol. vi. 50

of grace. "By this token you may surely know whether you seek it by faith or by works. If by works, you want something to be done *first*, *before* you are sanctified. You think, I must first *be* or *do* thus or thus. If you seek it by faith, you may expect it *as you are;* and if as you are, then expect it *now*. It is of importance to observe that there is an inseparable connection between these three points,—expect it *by faith*, expect it *as you are*, and expect it *now*."

The qualifications with which Wesley surrounded his teaching, and which most persons will think a merit, are made by Canon Mozley the subject of sharp criticism.[1] Dr. Mozley makes much of Mr. Wesley's admission of the possibility of involuntary transgressions or mistakes in a state of perfection, as well as of Mr. Wesley's avoidance of the phrase "sinless" perfection. Of course, if Mr. Wesley had denied such possibility, and had favoured the latter phrase, his teaching would have been still more repugnant to the critic. Indeed, such extreme teaching would have been instantly refuted by facts. Thus the whole question is whether a state, qualified in this way, deserves to be called perfect. Dr. Mozley evidently regards it as a sorry sort of perfection at best. "It is plain that a complicated state of the question like this, full of artificial and fine distinctions, and of balks to and checks upon both sides, is not one in which a doctrine of perfection can properly be put forward. A doctrine of perfection ought to be a simple transparent doctrine, otherwise it is not worth having." In other words, there is no perfection but angelic and absolute! The admission of such qualifications as involuntary transgression is not fairly described as a "complicated" doctrine, "full of artificial and fine distinctions." Even the highest perfection possible to a creature, say angelic, would still have to be limited in comparison with the divine. Would such a statement be "complicated," "full of artificial and fine distinctions"? Mr. Wesley says, "I believe a person filled with the love of God

[1] Lectures and other Theological Papers, *Modern Doctrine of Perfectibility*.

is still liable to involuntary transgressions. Such transgressions you may call sins if you please: I do not." Would Dr. Mozley have called them sins in the strict sense? And if they are not, how are they a deduction from a state of moral perfection? Yet this qualification is said "to vulgarize and degrade the very standard idea of perfection altogether." Dr. Mozley also thinks that Wesley insists on a perfect Christian being taken by others at his own estimate. "Wesley is always forcing his perfect men" upon the public. "This virtually gives any man whatever the right of declaring himself a perfect man, and throwing the *onus probandi* that he is not perfect upon others. They must prove some definite sin against him. . . . The objector is prevented then from all power of disproving the man's perfection, provided he only abstains from open sins, and behaves with general fervour. The gift is vulgarized and degraded by the low standard of proof which is required for it." We quite agree that a profession of the highest state of grace should be justified by corresponding fruit. But it does not follow that the fruit will be such as will commend itself to a worldly judgment. At what price does such a judgment assess the qualities which Christ puts first in the ethical scale, Matt. v. 3–12? Wesley does not say that a Christian can never be mistaken in his profession, but only that, if he uses all the means, mistake is highly improbable, which is true. "Whence is it that some imagine they are thus sanctified, when in reality they are not? They do not judge by all the preceding marks, but either by part of them, or by others that are ambiguous. But I know of no instance of a person attending to them, and yet deceived in this matter. I believe there can be none in the world." Besides, the one who condemns may be in error. "'But he does not come up to my idea of a perfect Christian.' And perhaps no one ever did, or ever will. For your idea may go beyond, or at least beside, the scriptural account. It may include more than the Bible includes therein, or, however, something which that does not include. Scripture perfection is, pure love filling the heart, and governing all the words and

actions. If your idea includes anything more or anything else, it is not scriptural; and then no wonder that a scripturally perfect Christian does not come up to it." Another objection of the critic is to the alleged possibility of so high a gift being lost, "which vulgarizes and empties the gift of reality." Wesley may have been mistaken in saying "it is an exceeding common thing for the persons to lose it more than once, before they are established therein." The probability seems to be strongly the other way. But we do not see at all how the simple possibility can be excluded, or how it "vulgarizes" the doctrine. While probation lasts, it must apply to every possession of man. May not a state of pardon be lost, and is it "vulgarized" by the possibility? But a state of perfect grace implies such a degree of insight and stability as seems to put man practically beyond the reach of danger.

The prayers in the Anglican liturgy, "Grant that this day we fall into no sin," and "Cleanse the thoughts of our hearts . . . that we may perfectly love thee," imply the whole "Modern Doctrine of Perfectibility," if they are understood in the natural sense. The Roman Catholic Church holds the possibility of perfect sanctity on earth, but confines it to very rare cases and conditions. Its idea of sainthood and use of the term "saint" are quite different from St. Paul's (1 Cor. i. 2; 2 Cor. i. 1; Eph. i. 1, etc.). This restriction of the idea and term has undoubtedly done great harm in encouraging the opinion that perfect Christian character is only possible under exceptional conditions, and in making such a wide distinction between "saints" and the "religious" and ordinary Christians. The result must be to lower the average of Christian life. Still the admission that Christian perfection is possible is valuable.

"(1) Not only sin properly so called (that is, a voluntary transgression of a known law), but sin improperly so called (that is, an involuntary transgression of a divine law, known or unknown), needs the atoning blood. (2) I believe there is no such perfection in this life as excludes these involuntary transgressions, which I apprehend to be naturally consequent

on the ignorance and mistakes inseparable from mortality. (3) Therefore *sinless perfection* is a phrase I never use, lest I should seem to contradict myself," Wesley, xi. 396. "Is this death to sin, and renewal in love, gradual or instantaneous? A man may be dying for some time; yet he does not, properly speaking, die till the instant the soul is separated from the body; and in that instant he lives the life of eternity. In like manner, he may be dying to sin for some time; yet he is not dead to sin, till sin is separated from his soul; and in that instant he lives the full life of love. And as the change undergone, when the body dies, is of a different kind, and infinitely greater than any we had known before, yea, such as till then it is impossible to conceive; so the change wrought, when the soul dies to sin, is of a different kind, and infinitely greater than any before, and than any can conceive till he experiences it. Yet he still grows in grace, in the knowledge of Christ, in the love and image of God; and will do so, not only till death, but to all eternity. How are we to wait for this change? Not in careless indifference, or indolent inactivity; but in vigorous, universal obedience, in a zealous keeping of all the commandments, in watchfulness and painfulness, in denying ourselves, and taking up our cross daily; as well as in earnest prayer and fasting, and a close attendance on all the ordinances of God. And if any man dream of attaining it any other way (yea, or of keeping it when it is attained, when he has received it even in the largest measure), he deceiveth his own soul. It is true, we receive it by simple faith; but God does not, will not, give that faith, unless we seek it with all diligence, in the way which he hath ordained. This consideration may satisfy those who inquire why so few have received the blessing. Inquire how many are seeking it in this way; and you have a sufficient answer," p. 402.[1]

In Dr. Pope's *Compendium* (iii. 61–99) will be found an original and complete history of the doctrine of holiness in the Church, doing full justice to all efforts and movements in the

[1] See also Fletcher's "Last Check to Antinomianism." *Works*, v. 413.

right direction. The account given of Methodist doctrine is succinct, yet full, pp. 88–99. Augustine admitted the possibility of Christian perfection: "And so we cannot deny the possibility of such perfection even in the present life, because all things are possible to God, whether those things which he does by his own will alone, or those the doing of which he has made dependent on the co-operation of his creature." "They cannot, indeed, find any such perfect man; yet it must not be said that God lacks the power so to assist human will that righteousness may be perfected (*perficiatur*) in every respect in man, not merely the righteousness which is of faith, but also that which will qualify us to live in his presence for ever. For, if he should will that even now in some one corruption should put on incorruption, and a man should live immortal amid the mortal, so that, all old things being at an end, the law in his members shall not contradict the law of his mind, and he shall discern God's presence everywhere as the saints will do afterwards, who will dare to affirm that he could not? But men ask why he does not do this; and they who ask forget that they are men." He thus questions the fact of such perfection having been realized. One reason he gives is curious. A state of imperfection is best for man, anything else would be unsafe (Pope, p. 73). Dr. Mozley greatly prefers Augustine's doctrine to Wesley's.[1] One ground of the preference is "that Augustine regards the perfect state in this life, should it ever be realized, as a miracle, and contrary to all the ordinary laws of God's working; Wesley regards it as only in keeping with, and consistently carrying out, the natural growth of Christian grace." But in what sense is perfect holiness miraculous or supernatural in which all holiness is not so? What other difference than of degree is there between the lowest and the highest state? The increase of spiritual life is only miraculous in the same sense in which its beginning is so.

The Ascetic and Mystical schools, with whatever defects, have rendered great service in asserting the claims of the spirit

[1] *Lectures*, p. 174.

and keeping the thought of a perfect life before the mind of the Church. Writers like à Kempis and Fénélon may be read with profit, if it is remembered that they only represent one side of Christian life.

After referring to the Antinomian danger lurking in Calvinist teaching, Dr. Pope says: "It is in its noblest representatives a most mighty stimulant to the pursuit of personal perfection. Union with the Lord is the soul of their doctrine, of their ethics, and of their hopes; and, where the aspiration after fellowship with Christ has its full unhindered influence, it excites an unbounded horror of sin and thirst for holiness." The idea of imputation applies also here.

It is shown that in the Roman teaching on this subject truth and error are subtly and inextricably interwoven. The possibility of keeping God's law perfectly, and the non-sinful character of "venial" transgressions, are maintained. Nay, the first truth is exaggerated into the possibility of works of supererogation, as if the highest degree of excellence were not required by the divine law interpreted by a spiritual mind. "Counsels of perfection," so called, represent a higher degree of obedience to law, but they are still obedience. The doctrine of Purgatory is the provision made for perfecting the work of holiness in the great majority of the good. According to Roman doctrine, although "concupiscence," the evil principle, remains, it is not regarded as sinful. Nothing is said about its being extinguished or destroyed.

Methodism has always made the destruction of inbred sin part, and the chief part, of perfect holiness. At the same time this is kept in the closest connection with the atonement as the power, and faith as the condition; and who will set limits to either the one or the other? We believe that Methodism has not gone beyond the highest aspiration of the best Christians in all ages, either in its account of the blessing or in the prominence given to it. On this subject the saints of all Churches are in advance of theologians, and better represent the mind of Scripture. Methodism simply puts their faith and

experience into formal statement, and gives it due prominence. To do this is part of its mission.[1]

Sec. 3.—The Assurance of Personal Salvation.

Scripture expressly asserts, and all Churches hold, the fact of a witness of the Holy Spirit to the spirit of the believer, Rom. viii. 16; Gal. iv. 6. The only point of dispute is whether the witness is direct as well as indirect.

Methodism teaches that there is a *Direct* Witness of the Spirit, in addition to the Indirect. Such teaching is at least justified by the passages referred to, and Methodists think is the only teaching which satisfies the terms used by the apostle. If the first passage is rendered "bears witness to," instead of "bears witness with," the statement is even stronger. That our interpretation is not putting a strain on the passage, is shown by Eph. i. 13, 14, iv. 30, etc., where the Holy Spirit is spoken of as a seal. The very purpose of a seal is to certify or give evidence. If, then, I have the Holy Spirit, as all true Christians have, I have a seal or evidence of my salvation. Joying and glorying in God (Rom. v. 3, 11) implies certainty as its ground. Otherwise it is unjustifiable. See also 1 John iii. 24, iv. 13. The indirect witness, or that of our own spirit, being our own judgment on a comparison of our experience and life with God's law, is of slow growth, and may not always give undoubting certainty. It may indeed be said that God's will may not be to give us such certainty. Yet the apostles and the Christians to whom they wrote had it. If it was not hurtful for them, how can it be so for us? If they needed it in order to the highest form of joyous obedience, do we not need it for the same reason? Besides, as has often been said, our adoption being an act of God towards us,[2] not an act of God in us, needs to be notified to us by outward testimony. Certain knowledge

[1] T. Goodwin, *Gospel Holiness in Heart and Life, Works*, vii. 131; Swinnock, *Christian Man's Calling, Works*, vols. i.–iii.

[2] It is so even on Dr. Pope's view of its place, see *ante*, p. 182.

of God's love to us is the spring of our love to him. Mr. Wesley defines this testimony as "an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me and given himself for me; and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God." "That this testimony must needs in the very nature of things be antecedent to the testimony of our own spirit, may appear from this single consideration: We must be holy of heart and holy in life before we can be conscious that we are so; before we can have the testimony of our spirit, that we are inwardly and outwardly holy. But we must love God, before we can be holy at all; this being the root of all holiness. Now we cannot love God, till we know he loves us. And we cannot know his pardoning love to us, till his Spirit witnesses it to our spirit. Since, therefore, the testimony of his Spirit must precede the love of God and all holiness, of consequence it must precede our consciousness thereof, or the testimony of our spirit concerning them."[1] Not that Mr. Wesley or Methodists would make such a direct testimony necessary to salvation or an ever-present mark of Christian experience.[2] There are Christians without it. It is a privilege open to all. Of course those who think that a state of suspense and fear is the best for a Christian, and that a profession of certainty involves presumption and danger, denounce such a doctrine as the offspring of enthusiasm. As if it would be dangerous for a child to be certain of a parent's love, and therefore a parent ought to keep his children at a distance, in doubt and terror! "Ye have received, not the

[1] Sermons x. and xi.: "The Witness of the Spirit." See Dr. Young's Fernley Lecture on the doctrine.

[2] "When I say every believer may be assured of his salvation, I don't say that every believer is assured of it. Every one is to labour for it, but every one has not yet obtained it. Assurance is not of the essence of a Christian. A man may be a true child of God, and certainly saved, though he have not assurance. 'Tis required to the *bene esse*, not to the *esse* of a believer," N. Culverwel, *Discourses*, 1654.

spirit of bondage, but the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father."

Any danger of fanaticism is guarded against by the Indirect Witness, which is the evidence of our own consciousness and life. It is practically identical with "the testimony of our conscience," 2 Cor. i. 12. Mr. Wesley describes it as "a consciousness that we are inwardly conformed, by the Spirit of God, to the image of his Son, and that we walk before him in justice, mercy, and truth, doing the things which are pleasing in his sight." It may be thought that the first witness, giving direct certainty, makes the second unnecessary. But the first is only for him who experiences it, it is no evidence to others. The second is both for the individual and others. One is instantaneous, the other gradual.

The result of the twofold testimony is full Assurance, πληροφορία, "plenitudo, abundantia, copia, plenissima persuasio, certissima fiducia,"[1] of faith, hope, and understanding (Heb. x. 22, vi. 11; Col. ii. 2), *i.e.* faith, hope, and understanding at their highest point, 1 Thess. i. 5, and Boldness of Speech, both before man and God (παρρησία, Heb. iv. 16).

Sec. 4.— Conditional Perseverance.

The point in debate between Arminianism and Calvinism is, whether the perseverance of believers is conditional or unconditional, or whether it is possible for believers finally to fall away. The Calvinist view, like the idea of a limited redemption, is scarcely derived in the first instance from Scripture, but is part of a general theory. The teaching of passages like John xv. 4, 6; 1 Cor. ix. 27; Heb. iii. 14, iv. 11, vi. 4, x. 26, 35, 39; Jude 24; 2 Pet. i. 10, ii. 20, as well as the case of Judas, is distinctly in favour of the Arminian interpretation. David and Peter fell into sin, though they were afterwards restored. Rom. viii. 29, 30, describes the successive steps or stages in the process of salvation in the case of the actually

[1] Grimm, *New Testament Lexicon.*

saved. Foreknew, "as them that love God." "The apostle's statements in this passage are limited to the class of persons already doubly defined—(1) as those who love God, and (2) as those who are called according to his purpose. His whole subject is their predestination to glory: no opposite view concerning the ungodly, no doctrine of an eternal reprobation, is even suggested."[1] The conditions stated in other passages are here assumed.

At the same time it is unwise to dwell unduly on the perils of the Christian life. The means of security, the power and glory of Christ as a Saviour, the greatness and certainty of the divine promises, the unfailing efficacy of prayer, should be as earnestly set forth. No Christian need or ought to be overcome, Matt. vii. 7; Phil. ii. 12, 13; Col. i. 11; Eph. iii. 20; 1 Pet. i. 5, v. 8–10; Jude 24. Cases of real apostasy are perhaps less numerous than is often supposed.

[1] Dr. Gifford in *Speaker's Comm. on Romans.*

CHAPTER IV

THE CHURCH.

The whole body of the saved, whose experience has been just described, constitutes the Church. Article xix. of the English Church defines the Church as "a congregation of faithful men, in which the pure Word of God is preached and the sacraments are duly administered according to Christ's ordinance," a definition more suited to the Congregational than the Episcopal system. The Westminster Confession makes the Church consist of "all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children," ch. xxv. 2. Both these definitions apply to "the visible Church."

The term Church[1] (ἐκκλησία) in the New Testament seems to denote — (1) the whole body of Christians in one city, Acts xi. 22, xiii. 1; Col. iv. 16, etc.: (2) a congregation, 1 Cor. xiv. 19, 35: in house, Rom. xvi. 5; Col. iv. 15: (3) the whole body of believers on earth, Eph. v. 23. It is significant that Christ himself only uses the word twice, Matt. xvi. 18, xviii. 17. His phrase is "the kingdom of heaven" or "of God," a phrase of wider and more spiritual import. Christ did not found his Church proper till Pentecost. He did it by the hand of Peter, thus fulfilling his promise in Matt. xvi. 18. It is remarkable that all the elements of Church-life are found in the second

[1] "Church" comes to us through the Teutonic races (*Kirche*, kirk) from the Greek term κυριακός, 1 Cor. xi. 20; Rev. i. 10. Another set of terms (ecclesiastic, etc.) comes from the New Testament word ἐκκλησία. Dale, *Manual of Congregational Principles*, p. 210; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Church."

chapter of the book of Acts,—common prayer and worship, the preaching of the Word, the two sacraments, fellowship, the conversion of unbelievers, the edifying of believers.

In the course of time three types of Church polity have arisen. (1) Episcopalianism, far the oldest, yet not as old in anything like its present form as its advocates often claim. Its distinctive mark is the division of the ministry into three orders,—bishop, priest or presbyter, and deacon,—the powers of ordination and confirmation being reserved for the bishop exclusively.[1] (2) Presbyterianism holds tenaciously by one order of ministers, possessing equal rights and prerogatives. Its institution of ruling elders or presbyters is peculiar. In its series of ecclesiastical courts, the representative principle is very thoroughly carried out.[2] (3) Congregationalism or Independency. In it each congregation forms a complete, self-governed Church, owning no human authority outside itself. The Churches form so many independent republics, without any attempt at confederation or connection in a formal way. The system is the perfection of simplicity, but it sacrifices the great power of organization and combined action in Church life and work.[3] The second and third systems arose in the 16th century, Presbyterianism being due to the genius of Calvin.

The argument for or against these several systems may be based either on the ground of New Testament authority and the example of New Testament Churches, or on the ground of advantage and expediency, regard, of course, being had to the spirit and purpose of New Testament teaching. Formerly all three systems alike were advocated on the high ground of New Testament authority. The early Presbyterians and Independents, just as much as Episcopalians, maintained that they, and they only, conformed to New Testament teaching and precedent. In the present day all Presbyterians and Independents, as well as reasonable Episcopalians, take the other

[1] Hooker, vii. 2, 3, 6. Rigg, *Comparative View of Church Organizations.*
[2] Macpherson, *Presbyterianism* (Clark).
[3] Dale, *Manual of Congregational Principles.*

ground. The Roman Church and High Church writers, indeed, claim divine sanction and authority for their polity as much as for their doctrine, but the authority can only be indirectly derived from Scripture. On the ground of Scripture, perhaps there is most to be said for the third system, and least for the first. The elaborate arrangements of Episcopalianism are far removed from the simple details of Church-life disclosed in the New Testament, and are manifestly the growth of a later age. The entire absence of organization, marking the third system, is much nearer the simplicity of the beginnings of Christian Church-life. But this very fact is proof enough that the simple arrangements, which met the wants of a young community, could never have been intended to be a law to the Church in altogether different conditions. Accordingly, the advocacy of Congregationalism, as well as of Presbyterianism, has moved to other and better ground. As for the claim of divine authority made for Episcopalianism, it is put briefly thus: "It is quite true that episcopal jurisdiction and ordination, ecclesiastical laws and regulations, such as we know, are not found in the New Testament. But Christ established the Church, put over it certain officers, and gave it full authority to make such laws and regulations as changing times and circumstances might require. And our system has come in unbroken descent from Christ and the apostles, just as the British constitution has come by development from Norman and Saxon days." This, of course, is the theory of Apostolical Succession, which we shall consider presently. Meantime, those who take this ground can never get over the fact that Christ and the apostles make little in their teaching of questions, of which, if this theory is true, they ought to have made much. Where in the New Testament is the order and polity of the Church, which in the Roman and High Church system is at least co-ordinate with doctrine, put on the same footing as doctrine? Where do the apostles speak like our modern "priests"? Where is there any indication of an intention on Christ's part to attach the vital importance, which this theory attaches, to a definite Church-order? No

one has ever yet shown any teaching in the New Testament, which bears the same relation to the constitution of the Church on the so-called Catholic theory, as the teaching of the New Testament on spiritual truth bears to the later dogmatic statements of that truth. We ask no more than this. We do not ask for all the orders of an episcopal hierarchy in the New Testament. We only ask for its outlines, or for the authority to establish it and impose it on others. To whom was the authority given? To Peter or Paul? Show us where it is even hinted that they were to transmit to somebody else power to make laws and regulations which they themselves did not make.[1] This is taken for granted, because otherwise it would follow that they had made no provision for the permanence of their work! Taken for granted! Suppose, on the other hand, that we say, it is taken for granted that if they had meant to transmit such tremendous power to other hands,—power equal to their own,—they would have said so. There is surely much to be said for such a supposition. The fact is, the whole Roman and High Church theory of the Church is a series of taken-for-granteds. That Christ and the apostles had any such intention, that they expressed and carried out the intention, that the Roman Church is the legal heir of the apostles, are all taken for granted. It is assumed that Christ must have had certain intentions, that certain forms and institutions were essential to

[1] "If St. Peter's seat or chair had been as the pole-star, whereto our belief, as the mariner's needle, should be directed, lest we float we know not whither in the ocean of opinions; were the bosom of the visible Church the safest harbour our souls in all storms of temptation could thrust into: this Apostle (St. Peter) was either an unskilful pilot, or an uncharitable man, that would not before his death instruct them in this course for the safety of their souls, whose bodily lives he might have commanded to have saved his own. Had perpetual succession in his see, or Apostolical tradition never interrupted, been such an Ariadne's thread, as now it is thought, to guide us through the labyrinth of errors, such was St. Peter's love to truth, that he would have so fastened it to all faithful hearts, as none should ever have failed to follow it, in following which he could not err," Dean Jackson, Bk. iii. ch. xxiii. 1.

the wellbeing of Christians, *e.g.* that without a standing, living interpreter of revelation, the truth would be lost in a wilderness of error; and then the whole theory is worked out with admirable completeness. These speculations remind us of the speculations of other theorists, as to how the world might have been constituted differently from what it is, speculations which the sober sense of Butler rebukes so justly. There is just as much or as little reason for the assumptions of the free-thinking Deists of Butler's days, as for the Roman and Anglican theory of the Church of our days.

What we see clearly in the New Testament is that Christ and the apostles had a great spiritual end in view, the establishing and perfecting of God's kingdom on earth. For this end they set on foot certain means and agencies,—the preaching of the gospel, the gathering of believers into Christian fellowship, their edification in character and life. Only two simple outward rites, setting forth spiritual truth, and channels of spiritual grace, are enjoined. The particular form which these means took, was determined by local circumstances. There is no intimation that this form is binding for all time.[1] As matter of fact, there is no religious community that does not vary the incidental features of these means to a greater or less extent. Even supposing that the Episcopal or Congregational system conformed most nearly to the usages of the New Testament Churches, this would be no argument in its favour.[2] The excellence of outward forms and regulations must be measured by their suitableness in particular circumstances to promote the spiritual ends for which

[1] Dale, *Man. of Congr. Principles*, p. 4; Gregory, *Holy Cath. Church*, p. 31.

[2] "The Lord founded no order of priests, and just as little did he found a system of Church government. Everything lying in this sphere he left to be shaped by the needs and circumstances of the time. Even the institutions established by the apostles for the guidance of particular Churches are merely finger-posts and examples, not a binding law; all that is binding on Christendom is the method of salvation, which again is not a legal one, but a method of grace," Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, Part 3, ii. p. 411.

Christianity exists, and by nothing else. The wisdom of the Church is to take and allow a large latitude in such matters in different countries and ages. Why should it be assumed that Church-order and Church-life must be of the same unvarying type in America, Europe, Africa, Asia, where the conditions are so different? Is not every presumption the other way? What new Christian communities need is not so much rigid law and control, as wise guidance. Otherwise the new wine will burst the old skins.[1]

We have no difficulty in deciding that a system of Church-government in which those who form the overwhelming majority of the Church have no voice, is contrary to the spirit and aim of Christianity, as if the self-government which is good everywhere else were bad here, as if the final and perfect religion only trained men to the one duty of submission to human authority, as if the clergy were the Church, and the Christian laity had no rights and no independence. The account of the memorable council in Jerusalem in Acts xv. indicates a different course. It is true that in ver. 6 we read that "the apostles and elders came together for to consider of this matter." And yet from the phrase used in ver. 12, "all the multitude," it is clear that the people were not excluded, unless we can suppose that the number of "the apostles and elders" could be called a "multitude." The words used in ver. 22, however, settle the matter: "Then pleased it the apostles and elders, *with the whole*

[1] Bk. iii. of Hooker's *Eccl. Pol.* is an argument in favour of freedom in matters of polity as distinct from matters of doctrine, chs. ii. 1, iii. 4, vi. 1, x. 1, 7. Granting even that Hooker is only arguing for the power of the Church, supposing it established by Christ, to make and vary laws, the principles of his argument have a much wider application, like much of his language. "He which affirmeth speech to be necessary among all men throughout the world, doth not thereby import that all men must necessarily speak one kind of language. Even so the necessity of polity and regiment in all Churches may be held without holding any one certain form to be necessary in them all." This language is broad enough to cover all our position. "To make new articles of faith and doctrine, no man thinketh it lawful; new laws of government, what commonwealth or Church is there which maketh not, either at one time or another?"

Church, to send chosen men." The written message which they bring begins, "The apostles and elders and *brethren*, greeting." [1]

Sec. 1.—Notes of the Church.

Putting together the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, we have four such notes,—Unity, Holiness, Catholicity, Apostolicity. Even if these terms and the meanings attached to them had been taken direct from Scripture, greater importance could not have been attached to them by High Church writers. As matter of fact, while there is a certain amount of scriptural truth at the basis of some of them, the phrases themselves and their application are ecclesiastical rather than scriptural, like the creeds of which they are part. The Roman and Protestant theories of the Church understand these notes in different senses.[2]

According to the first, the Unity is outward and visible, as in the case of a municipal corporation or nation. The Church consists of a definite number of persons, bound by a common badge or profession, subject to the same outward authority and laws, forming, in short, one community. The term "unity," let it be noticed, is ambiguous. It may mean the internal harmony existing between the several parts of a whole, or a numerical unity excluding plurality. In the first sense we speak of the unity of a state, in the second of the unity of God. The first is the kind of Church unity spoken of in our Lord's great prayer in John xvii., and, for anything we can see, may exist apart from the second. The same kind of unity is meant in the epistles. The unity of the Roman theory is the second kind, *i.e.* a unity consisting of a certain number of persons, who constitute the sole existing Church. Where is a unity of this kind predicated of the Church in the New Testament? All the unity spoken

[1] D. D. Bannerman, *Script. Doctr. of Church*, Cunningham Lecture; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* iv. 333.

[2] Luthardt, *Comp.* p. 275; Jackson, *Works*, Bk. xii. chs. iii.–vi., and all that follows on the Visible Church and just causes of separation. Pope, *Comp.* iii. 266.

of there is perfectly consistent with the existence of separate communities. Such separate communities, called Churches in a certain sense, may, when viewed in the aggregate, form the Church in the widest and highest sense. The Anglican is the same as the Roman theory. Only, the reality does not correspond to the theory. Anglicans are obliged to admit that the outward and visible unity, which they make one of the predicates of the Church, does not exist. According to them, the Anglican, Roman, and Greek Churches (or branches of the Church) together form the one Church, so that outward division, after all, is not fatal to Church-life. They are as much separated outwardly as other religious communities. Where, then, is the visible unity, which they declare essential to the very existence of the Church?[1]

Holiness, again, is understood as inherent in some sense in the visible community apart from the individuals comprising it. There is a corporate as well as an individual sanctity. But it is difficult to conceive a holiness that is independent of individual character. If, as Bishop Pearson contends, a holy calling and obligation confers sanctity, wicked persons are holy in some sense, but a very unreal one.

Catholicity is explained as the universal extension of a particular visible society, and Apostolicity as consisting in personal, lineal succession from the apostles.

Let us now turn to the Protestant interpretation. Church Unity consists of the oneness of faith and feeling and aim for which the Saviour prayed, and to which the apostles so often exhort. Such unity is perfectly compatible, as experience shows, with existence in separate communities. In many cases, are not common moral aims, such as temperance and thrift, better

[1] "I believe in the holy catholic Church." Does not "believe" show that the reference is to the invisible Church, *i.e.* the whole body of real Christians in the world? "I believe in the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, the life everlasting,"—all unseen. Barrow, *Unity of the Church* (1818 ed.), p. 495; Gregory, *Holy Cath. Church*, p. 140, etc.

advanced by separate action? Is not competition, within reasonable limits, a necessary check and healthy stimulus? It is a fact, which cannot be gainsaid, that the ages of the Church which were distinguished by outward unity, were ages when the worst abuses and corruptions grew apace. The fact of such corruptions was lamented by many who did not adhere to the Reformation. And unless outward unity is plainly commanded, outward division is no sin. The best way to secure real unity would be the universal acknowledgment that the holding of vital truth, along with holiness of life, is the note of the Christian Church, and that all other matters should be relegated to a secondary place. On this basis all Christians in the world might meet and work together.

The Holiness of the Church is the aggregate of the holiness of its members. All other holiness is merely nominal. When members of the Church are addressed as "saints," it is implied that their lives bear out the profession. The Parables of the Tares and the Net are often quoted in support of the laxer view, which makes Church-membership partially independent of personal character; but with little reason. The Tares are to be tolerated either when they cannot be distinguished, or cannot be removed without injury to the wheat. And the Protestant theory of the Church has never said anything to the contrary. It simply says that when the tares are discernible and can be removed, nay, when they cannot be tolerated without grave scandal, they should be removed. The parable applies to those cases in which human tests and judgment are at fault, not to others. The opposite doctrine would logically require the toleration of any and all evil, and abolish the distinction between the Church and the world.

The note of Catholicity is fulfilled by the universal extension of the Church in its widest sense, *i.e.* in any of its several branches. Apostolicity may be conceived of as likeness to the apostles in doctrine, instead of lineal succession. But of this, more presently.

The view taken of the Unity of the Church determines the

meaning of Schism and Heresy.[1] Indeed, the modern meaning of these terms, separation from the Church and false doctrine, grew out of the view of the Unity first mentioned. The terms are used in a different sense in Scripture, and the modern one has been grafted on to that sense. Schism occurs six times in an ethical application (John vii. 43, ix. 16, x. 19; 1 Cor. i. 10, xi. 18, xii. 25; see Matt. ix. 16), where it means dissension, division, party, or school within a body, which, of course, may issue in separation. Heresy is used in 1 Cor. xi. 19 almost synonymously with schism. Generally, it means "sect" (used of Pharisees, Sadducees, Nazarenes, or the early Church, Acts v. 17, xv. 5, xxiv. 5, 14, xxvi. 5, xxviii. 22). In this sense it has not the opprobrious tinge now belonging to it. The derivation of the word suggests that what is condemned is a wilful, obstinate temper, "a self-chosen view," something very different from wrong teaching or difference of view, except in so far as the latter springs from a wrong spirit. See also Gal. v. 20; Tit. iii. 10; 2 Pet. ii. 1. Accordingly, we regard the present divisions of the Church as divisions within, rather than separations from the Church, and hold that the blame, so far as matter of blame exists, rests with those whose narrowness, exclusiveness, or erroneous teaching makes such divisions necessary. "The term 'divisions' signifies not *schisms*, as in the marginal rendering, but *dissensions*, not separations from the Church, but dissensions within the Church."[2] Of course, if the apostle condemns the one, he would still more condemn the other; then the above remarks apply. "The Greek *schismata* may be literally rendered by our word *splits* in the modern sense, as 'splits in the cabinet,' marked dissensions threatening disruptions. It should be remembered that this epistle says nothing of separation into sects, but speaks of partition into schools, as Pauline, Apolloite, Petrine, Christine; it describes an arrogant party spirit, tending, indeed, to a breach of outward unity, but

[1] Pope, *Comp.* iii. 270; Gregory, *Handbook of Scriptural Church Principles*, Pt. i. p. 110; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.* "Schism."

[2] Canon Evans in *Speaker's Comm.* on 1 Cor. i. 10.

not yet sundering the bond."[1] "Not *heresies* in the sense of 'false doctrines,' nor *sects* as in the margin of the A. V. The word in Greek means 'self-chosen view,' differing from received opinions," *ibid.*

The Protestant confessions recognise a distinction between the Visible and Invisible Church, which Roman teaching repudiates. The Invisible Church consists of all the really saved on earth, known only to God, and is not necessarily coincident with the Visible Church. All attempts, and many have been made, to make the two coincident, must fail; but this is no reason why the visible should not be the closest approximation possible to the invisible. In other words, the wisest and most faithful application of the best tests will never secure an absolutely pure Church, but that is no argument against the use of tests. Rather it is an argument in their favour. If strictness often fails, laxity must be still worse. Unless purity is the aim, the reason of the Church's existence falls to the ground. In the heavenly state the visible and invisible Church are one, every one is what he seems.[2]

Sec. 2.—Theory of Apostolical Succession.

Two points are vital in this theory, (1) That only ordination by bishops makes a real minister of Christ, giving authority to absolve from sin and administer sacraments, and (2) That the only bishops are those who are appointed in direct, unbroken succession through the bishops of Rome, from the days of the Apostles. All others are pretenders. Apostolical succession is the real mark of the true Church, far more vital than the notes before mentioned. This is the doctrine held in common by the Roman Church and the High Anglican school, for the two stand on the same ground up to the Reformation. It is through the Bishops or Popes of Rome that Anglicans derive their authority.

[1] Canon Evans in *Speaker's Com.* on 1 Cor. xi. 18.

[2] The High Church theory is set forth in Blunt, *Dict. Theol.*, art. "Church," "Apost. Succession," etc.

The theory is worked out most completely in the Roman Church. The Anglican Church is burdened, not merely with the difficulties of the Roman case, but with the break at the Reformation. The break, indeed, is denied by the Anglican, though asserted by the Roman. Still, the former has to show that the authority was validly transmitted through the changes of the Reformation time.

(1.) "Only ordination by bishops makes a true minister of Christ, with power to absolve from guilt and administer sacraments." There is not a trace in the New Testament of bishops as a separate order, with exclusive right to ordain. This is now so generally acknowledged, that there is little need to illustrate it. In the New Testament, bishop and presbyter or priest are one, the first being a title taken from Greek life, the second from the Jewish synagogue, cf. Acts xx. 17 and 28. Unless they are one, the presbyters are passed by in the salutation in Phil. i. 1. Cf. also Tit. i. 5 and 7; 1 Tim. iii. 1 and 8. In the last passage, also, St. Paul mentions bishops and deacons only. The New Testament bishops or elders rule the Church (Acts xxi. 28; 1 Tim. iii. 5; 1 Pet. v. 2), but do not rule ministers. In the Jerusalem council we read of "apostles and elders" (xv. 6, 22), not bishops and elders. Timothy was ordained by presbyters, "with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery," 1 Tim. iv. 14. St. Peter exhorts "the elders" only, calling himself a "fellow-elder," 1 Pet. v. 1. It is somewhat singular that the apostles knew nothing of the distinction of orders that is a vital element of "apostolical" succession.[1]

The distinction between bishops and presbyters grew up afterwards, how soon or how long after is of no concern to our argument. It is not apostolic or scriptural. Whatever may be supposed or probable as to the first germs of episcopacy, in the modern sense, being in accordance with the apostolic mind or spirit, that is a long way short of proof; and the amount of probability will vary to different minds.

[1] *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* knows only of bishops and deacons. It says, "*Elect for yourselves* bishops and deacons," ch. xv., translation by Rev. H. de Romestin.

(2.) "The only bishops are those regularly appointed in succession from the apostles." According to the complete theory, it was the divine purpose that Christ should have a successor, and that successor is, and always has been, the Bishop of Rome; and also that the apostles should have successors, and the bishops of the two Churches named are the successors. We want proofs of the divine purpose, and of its actual fulfilment. Surely it is reasonable to expect that the scriptural authority for so tremendous a position shall be as clear and full as that for the doctrines of the Trinity and Atonement. Where is it? In Matt. xvi. 18? Granting that the reference is to Peter personally, we see an ample fulfilment when Peter in Christ's name founds the Church at Pentecost, and admits Jews and Gentiles into it, Acts ii. 41, x. 44–48, xv. 7. Bengel well asks, *Quid hæc ad Romam?* To make these words mean that Peter took Christ's place, that he was invested with supreme authority over the other apostles and the Church, that he was intended to transmit it to others, and did transmit it, is not interpretation, but arbitrary assertion. Where did he ever claim such authority? When was it acknowledged by others? The binding and loosing power given to Peter in ver. 19 is at least given equally to all the apostles in ch. xviii. 18. The words in John xx. 23, about the power of remitting and retaining sins, however they are to be interpreted, were spoken to "the disciples," ver. 19, which phrase, according to the parallel account in Luke xxiv. 33, includes "the eleven and them that were with them," *i.e.* the disciples generally, the Church, not the apostles merely. Moreover, if the bishops were the designed successors of the apostles, why was the name changed? Why was the ancient and scriptural term "apostles" discarded for "bishops"?[1]

[1] Hooker, Bk. vii. 4, argues that bishops are the successors of the apostles. The proof given is slender enough. He jumps from Scripture to Cyprian and the opinions of the later Fathers. However, Bks. vi., vii., and viii. of Hooker are suspected of interpolation, like some of the witnesses for episcopacy. On the whole subject see Barrow's *Treatise on the Pope's Supremacy*, ed. 1818, vol. vi

It is here that the weakness of the whole theory is found. If we could be shown that it was ever the divine purpose that the Church should be constituted in this way, and in no other, we might be willing to assume a great deal as to the fulfilment, and to explain the deficiency of evidence by the scantiness of early records, as we do on other questions. But it is not so. There is no doctrine of the Church in Scripture, standing in the same relation to the Roman and Anglican dogma, as the doctrine of the Trinity bears to the dogma of the Trinity, or as the teaching about the Lord's Day and Baptism in Scripture bears to the belief and practice of the Church on these questions.

This being so, we have a right further to point out the difficulties in the historical evidence. The presence of Peter at Rome as bishop, and the transmission of his office to successors, are quite unproved, and indeed uncertain at the best.[1] It is needless to refer to later links in the chain, to the great schisms, when there were several Popes at once, to the heresy of Popes Liberius and Honorius, which was condemned by the Council of Constantinople in 680, and to the infamies of Popes like John IX., XIII., XXII., XXXIII., and Alexander VI. The heresy of the two Popes will be denied. Archbishop Trench, a High Churchman, had no doubt about it. These cases, he says, are "sufficient to defeat the claim to infallibility."[2] He says also, "For fifty years and more (904–962), the election to the throne of St. Peter lay in the hands of three infamous women, a mother and her two daughters. The moral outrages which this time beheld are not to be told, nor shall I attempt to tell them."[3]

[1] "The attempt to decipher the early history of episcopacy in Rome seems almost hopeless, where the evidence is at once scanty and conflicting," Lightfoot, *Christian Ministry*, p. 215. Clement of Rome, writing "probably in the last decade of the first century, though he has occasion to speak of the ministry as an institution of the Apostles, mentions only two orders, and is silent about the episcopal office." "He still uses the word 'bishop' as a synonyme for presbyter." Barrow, *Pope's Supremacy* (ed. 1818), p. 137.

[2] *Mediæval Church History*, p. 154.

[3] P. 114. On Liberius, see Jackson, Bk. xii. ch. xvii. 6; Honorius, ii. 14. 5.

And yet Dr. Trench's own orders came through this channel. Granting that the foulness of the channel need not affect the official authority transmitted through it, it is a hard necessity for good men to be forced by a theory into association with such characters. The validity of the Anglican ordinations depends on the question whether Archbishop Parker's ordination was valid. The debate lies between Roman and Anglican, and we need not interfere in it. We will only remark, that on the theory of Apostolical succession the Roman Church is in the best position. If the theory is true, if there is no true Church without this mark, the Roman Church is best off. The Anglican may be right, the Roman must be right.[1]

With the episcopal system, when it is advocated on the ground of human authority, of expediency and utility, we have no quarrel. We recognise its advantages as well as its defects. The growth of such an organization was inevitable and of immense advantage in the early centuries. Dr. Lightfoot,[2] while giving up the ground of Scripture authority for the distinction of order between bishops and presbyters, is naturally anxious to push the rise of the diocesan episcopate as far back as possible. Though he could never be unfair, he often sees more in some of the earliest officers and offices of the Church than others can see. It is easy to speak of the "episcopate" of James and Simeon at Jerusalem (p. 206), but what sort of an episcopate? The episcopate of Acts xx. 28? Or diocesan episcopacy? Or something between the two? To the latter view there can be little objection. A presbytery, or college of elders, borrowed from the synagogue, would naturally require a head, perhaps a permanent head or president, a *primus inter pares*.[3] This president would have an official

[1] See also *An Essay on Apostolical Succession*, by Thomas Powell, Wesleyan minister, 2nd ed. 1840, an able and racy essay; Moberly, *The Great Forty Days*, pp. 151–191, on the Papal Supremacy.

[2] "The Christian Ministry," *Epistle to Philippians.*

[3] "Rather the chief of the presbyters than the chief over the presbyters," said of Clement of Rome, Lightfoot, *Essay*, pp. 219, 225. "If bishop

superiority, which by slow growths became eventually a distinction of order. Nothing is more likely than that some of the later writers referred to by Bishop Lightfoot transfer the ideas of their own times to earlier times. "As early as the middle of the second century, all parties concur in representing St. James as a bishop in the strict sense of the term," p. 206. If "the strict sense of the term" means the modern one, we doubt whether it can be proved by unexceptionable testimony that this was the sense of the term "as early as the middle of the second century." Some of the "parties" quoted in the note (*Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, Apostolic Constitutions*) are not very trustworthy. St. Ignatius is "the recognised champion of episcopacy," or rather the great witness for episcopacy, but he is a witness who has been extensively tampered with. We doubt whether even yet the "true" has been separated from the false Ignatius. The extravagance of his language is more than suspicious. We have just seen that Clement, writing in the last decade of the first century, mentions only two orders, and is silent about the episcopal office; and yet Ignatius, writing shortly afterwards,[1] speaks in the most dogmatic way about "the three orders of the ministry, the bishop, the presbyters, and the deacons." At the same rate of development, we should have expected to see the whole Papal college and hierarchy in half a century more. There is no use in accumulating references to "bishops" in the beginning and the middle of the second century, unless there is evidence to show what kind of bishops is meant. It is far more probable that the earlier kind is meant than the later.

was at first used as a synonyme for presbyter, and afterwards came to designate the higher office under whom the presbyters served, the episcopate, properly so called, would seem to have been developed from the subordinate office. In other words, the episcopate was formed not out of the apostolic orders by localization, but out of the presbyterial by elevation; and the title, which originally was common to all, came at length to be appropriated to the chief among them" (p. 194).

[1] "During the earliest years of the second century," p. 208.

Sec. 3.—Church Offices.

In the references to these offices in the epistles (Rom. xii. 6, 7; 1 Cor. xii. 28; Eph. iv. 11), there is no attempt at exact and complete statement. Presbyters and deacons are not mentioned by name. "Teachers," "pastors and teachers," most probably stand for the first, indicating their functions. "Helps" and "ministration" may denote the second. Apostles, prophets, and evangelists were evidently not meant for permanence; else why did they not continue? If the office of apostles was meant for permanence, how is it that we do not read of the apostles having taken steps to appoint their successors? The only two offices which continued, and so proved that they were meant to do so, were those of the presbyter and deacon.

a. Presbyters.—It is not a little remarkable that there is no account of the institution of the office. Both the office and term were evidently taken from the arrangements of the Jewish synagogue. The Jewish presbyter or elder had two functions, those of teaching and ruling. Each elder would, of course, exercise the one for which he was best fitted. Some would possess both orders of gifts. This explains 1 Tim. v. 17: "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honour, especially they who labour in the word and doctrine." Dr. Binnie, in his exposition of the Presbyterian office of ruling elders,[1] says the passage "is most naturally understood as implying that, while all the elders ruled, some of them did not teach." This may be so, but it by no means follows that the ruling eldership was erected into a distinct office as in Presbyterianism. The terms are quite explained by supposing that each elder did the work for which his peculiar gifts best fitted him. Dr. Binnie is right enough in pointing out that in New Testament days each local Church had a plurality of elders, following the example of the synagogue. "The apostolic plan of assigning a plurality of rulers to every Church, and

[1] *The Church*, p. 129, Clark's Handbooks.

the prelatic plan of assigning a plurality of Churches to every ruler, are as contrary as can be imagined." Such deviations, found in all communities, are covered by the principle laid down by Dr. Binnie: "The Church, being a divinely instituted society, possesses the rights common to all societies, and, among the rest, the right of electing appropriate officers, with authority to act in its behalf," p. 126.

The two presbyterial functions are referred to in Scripture—"teachers," 1 Cor. xii. 28; "pastors and teachers," Eph. iv. 11. So, again, Heb. xiii. 7, 17; Rom. xii. 8. In the Pastoral Epistles, where Church organization is more prominent, the office is presented in the same light, 1 Tim. iii. 1–7; Tit. i. 5–9. All elders are equal. Distinctions of office and function among them are quite consistent with this equality. High Church writers constantly write of Timothy and Titus as Bishops of Ephesus and Crete. But there is not a word or hint in Scripture to show that they possessed or exercised any authority but that of ordinary elders. Timothy had received "the gift" that was in him "by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery," not by episcopal ordination in the modern sense. His presbyterial ordination gave him authority to take oversight of the Church at Ephesus. To Titus the apostle says: "For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldst set in order the things that were wanting, and appoint elders in every city, as I gave thee charge," i. 5. Titus is to complete the work begun by the apostle. How can a modern bishop be made out of this? After Titus has discharged his temporary mission in Crete, he is to meet the apostle at Nicopolis in Epirus, iii. 12. Strange to direct a "bishop" to leave his diocese so soon! Titus went into Dalmatia, which is north of Nicopolis, 2 Tim. iv. 10. To say that they were bishops without the name, is to say that they were not bishops.

Of all the transformations that history has witnessed, none is more complete or startling than that of the New Testament presbyter, with the simple function of religious instruction, into the priest in the sacerdotal sense. The process of transforma-

tion is carefully traced by Bishop Lightfoot in his essay on "The Christian Ministry," appended to the *Comm. on Philippians*, pp. 242–266. The term for the sacrificing priest in the Old Testament is the Hebrew *cohen* and Greek ἱερεύς, which is quite distinct from presbyter, and is never connected with it in the New Testament. Yet by degrees the sense of the former has been bodily transferred to the latter, for our word "priest" is simply "presbyter" writ small.[1] If sacrifice had been among the functions of the presbyter, how is it that it is ignored in St. Paul's account of the office in the Pastoral Epistles? According to the modern theory, this is not a secondary, but the essential work of the office, and yet it is passed by in silence. How is it that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the Old Testament priesthood and sacrifices and their New Testament analogues are expounded, no mention is made of a Christian taking the place of the Jewish priesthood? Christ is the only priest spoken of.[2] It is incorrect to say that this is an argument from silence; for the officers of the Christian Church are frequently mentioned, and sacrificing priests are not among them. It is remarkable that there is no sacerdotalism in the writings of the Apostolical Fathers, though the topics treated of would naturally require reference to it, if it had existed. The same is true of Justin Martyr, and Irenæus, and

[1] "Whether we call it a Priesthood, a Presbytership, or a Ministry, it skilleth not: although in truth the word *Presbyter* doth seem more fit, and in propriety of speech more agreeable than *Priest* with the drift of the whole gospel of Jesus Christ. . . . The Holy Ghost, throughout the body of the New Testament making so much mention of them, doth not anywhere call them Priests," Hooker, v. 78. 4.

[2] "This apostolic writer teaches that all sacrifices had been consummated in the one Sacrifice, all priesthoods absorbed in the one Priest. The offering had been made once for all; and as there were no more victims, there could be no more priests. . . . The epistle deals mainly with the office of Christ as the antitype of the *High Priest* offering the *annual* sacrifice of atonement; and it has been urged that there is still room for a sacrificial priesthood under the High Priest. The whole argument, however, is equally applicable to the inferior priesthood; and in one passage at least is directly so applied (x. 11, 12)," Lightfoot, p. 263.

Clement of Alexandria. "Irenæus, if he held the sacerdotal view, had every motive for urging it, since the importance and authority of the episcopate occupy a large space in his teaching. Nevertheless he not only withholds this title as a special designation of the Christian ministry, but advances an entirely different view of the priestly office. He recognises only the priesthood of moral holiness, of apostolic self-denial," p. 251. Tertullian and Origen are the first to use sacerdotal terms of the Christian ministry, and this of course implies that they were not alone in such use. Still the idea cannot have gone very far in their days, for the former strongly affirms the universal priesthood of believers, and the latter gives the terms the same general meaning and application. Cyprian is the first to transfer the sacerdotalism of the Old Testament broadly and boldly to the Christian Church, and from his days the idea grew apace. The most probable view is that it was imported from heathenism, not from Judaism, the Jewish priesthood being afterwards used to support it. If Judaism had been the source of Christian sacerdotalism, it would have appeared in the earliest days, and in the East; for it was then and there that the Jewish element in the Church was strongest. As matter of fact, it was in the West, where the influx of heathens into the Church was greatest, that the sacerdotal view spread most widely. It is evident that the heathen converts were unable to shake off the sacrificial notions in which they had previously moved, and brought them into the Church. Two circumstances accelerated the growth of the theory: first, the early attachment of the idea of sacrifice in a special sense to the Eucharist; and, secondly, the parallel between the three orders of the Christian ministry and the Jewish high priest, priests, and Levites. "So entirely had the primitive conception of the Christian Church been supplanted by the sacerdotal view of the ministry before the northern races were converted to the Gospel, and the dialects derived from the Latin took the place of the ancient tongue, that the languages of modern Europe very generally supply only one word to represent alike the priests of

the Jewish or heathen ceremonial, and the presbyter of the Christian ministry," p. 244. There is nothing objectionable in the representative view of the Christian ministry, the minister representing man to God and God to man. But this is not priestism or sacerdotalism in the sense of the Roman or Anglican theory. The latter has been described as "vicarial," in distinction from representative.

b. Deacons.—Though the term "deacon" does not occur in the account of the appointment of the Seven (Acts vi. 1–6), the ancient and general view is that the Seven were the first Deacons. The duties in both cases are the same. The qualifications for the office are described at length, 1 Tim. iii. 8–13. This office soon underwent great modifications in the early Church. At the present time it would be hard to find any office in the Church exactly corresponding to the New Testament diaconate. Perhaps the nearest is the deacon of the Congregational polity. The Anglican Deacon is simply a presbyter on probation. The episcopal system has no permanent order of deacons. Singularly enough, "minister," which is equivalent to "deacon," has come into use instead of presbyter.

It is doubtful whether there was any order of Deaconesses in the New Testament Church. Rom. xvi. 1 may be meant in a general sense. The other passages sometimes quoted in this connection are certainly to be understood differently (1 Tim. iii. 11, v. 9; Tit. ii. 3). Woman's work in the Church is not organized as it might be and ought to be, at least within Protestant Christendom, and thus much power is lost.

Free scope is left in Scripture for the adoption of new and the adaptation of old agencies of Christian work. Comparing the later with the earlier epistles, we see that the new life of the Church at once created for itself new forms of activity, some conservative, some aggressive. Their spontaneousness, their variety, the changes they underwent, are the charter of the Church's liberties. The test of institutions and organizations is their power to conserve the purity of Christian life, and

extend the dominion of Christian truth. In early Church history, again, we see the same freedom exercised in the use of Church forms and agencies. The early Church was the most flexible of institutions in its outward forms. Not only bishops, presbyters, and deacons, but grave-diggers, janitors, readers, sub-deacons, are spoken of as separate orders; Cyprian ordained readers and sub-deacons. We claim simply the same liberty in things constitutional and ceremonial that was exercised by the early Church. We fail to discover that the early Christians any more set themselves up as legislators to the Church for all time than we do.

No one can read such passages as Rom. xii. 4–8; 1 Cor. xii. 4–11, xiv., without seeing that the fixed offices of the early Church were far from representing the whole of its activity. Each Christian had a gift of some kind, which he was expected to use in God's service. The epistles rebuke excess and abuse in the exercise of these spiritual gifts, but no more. They would no doubt have just as earnestly condemned their suppression. Apollos is a busy, active figure in the Church, but there is no intimation that he held any office. We have supposed it probable that Titus was a presbyter, but there is no evidence on the point. In later days Justin Martyr's is a similar case. He did the work of a missionary evangelist both by word and pen; yet there is no record of his having held office in the Church.

A chief feature of Methodist Church-economy is the fuller provision it makes for Church-fellowship. "The communion of saints" is an article of the Apostles' Creed[1] which has found little practical expression. It has no doubt entered more or less into Christian life, and is incidentally present in common worship. Still its importance is such as to demand more formal recognition. It has quite as good scriptural warrant as the "notes" of the Church mentioned above. The first Christians "continued stedfastly in the apostles' fellowship." The

[1] Introduced into the creed, with the term "catholic," in the sixth century. See Lumby's *History of the Creeds.*

apostle thanks God for the fellowship of the Philippians in the gospel. Christians are often exhorted to edify one another, teach and admonish one another, speak to one another in psalms and hymns, confess their faults one to another, and pray one for another. Such precepts are not met by public instruction merely. They require something more formal and intimate; besides, they imply mutual action. It is quite true that they are, or may be, kept in the daily intercourse of Christians. Still there must be great advantage in making provision for the recognised, systematic exercise of fellowship. Mutual edification seems the needful supplement of public. The necessity and the benefit of religious fellowship are perhaps still more strikingly set forth in the apostle's favourite comparison of the Christian community to a body, Rom. xii. 4, 5; 1 Cor. xii. 12; Eph. iv. 15, 16. The love-feast is a revival of a primitive custom, which soon fell into disuse in early days.[1]

Sec. 4.—Worship—The Lord's Day.

The Lord's Day (Rev. i. 10) is the Jewish Sabbath in Christian form, filled with Christian contents. To the idea of rest is added that of worship. The sacredness is not lessened but increased, increased in proportion as the facts commemorated and the truths declared are higher and more spiritual than those of the earlier dispensation.

A point in dispute is whether the Jewish Sabbath was instituted at Creation or at Sinai. There is certainly nothing in Gen. ii. 1–3 to intimate that the reference is proleptic. If so many ages intervened between the fact commemorated and the commemorative institution, if the Sabbath was Judaic, not patriarchal, we might reasonably expect some indication of this in Genesis. It is true there is no mention of the observance of the Sabbath afterwards in Genesis. But we must remember the great brevity of the narrative, as well as the unlikelihood of regularly occurring observances being spoken of. There is no

[1] Gregory, Fern. Lect. on *Holy Catholic Church*, p. 75.

mention of the Sabbath in Judges, Joshua, 1st and 2nd Samuel, 1st Kings, after the Sinaitic legislation. Is the gathering of the double supply of manna in Ex. xvi. also proleptic? The need for a fresh announcement of the ancient law may have arisen during the Egyptian captivity, when religious observances must have fallen into neglect. The fact of creation commemorated and the need of rest are not specially Judaic, but of universal application.

But even if this point were conceded, the insertion of a positive law like that of the Sabbath in the Decalogue has great significance. Though it does not convert a positive into a moral precept, it raises the positive command, so treated, far above the crowd of specially Judaic laws.

The presumption, then, is all against the Sabbath being abolished by Christianity. Christ does not destroy, he fulfils, *i.e.* he gives something better. He meets universal needs more fully and effectually. He never by word or act violated the Mosaic law of the Sabbath, but only disregarded the Rabbinical misinterpretations of that law. The real Sabbatarianism is the spirit that would place the positive above the moral, mint, anise, and cummin above justice, mercy, and faith, Matt. xxvii. 6; John xviii. 28.

It may be said that when the Sabbath was transferred to Christian ground, the observance on the seventh day should have been transferred with it, and that we have no formal announcement of any change in this respect. But any candid person will admit that the particular day cannot be of the essence of the law. There is indeed no formal notice of the change of day. But there are plain indications of the change in practice, Acts xx. 7; 1 Cor. xvi. 2; Rev. i. 10. The simple fact of the absence of any definite beginning of the new practice proves that it goes back to the earliest days of the Church. If the change had been made afterwards, either by authority or general agreement, we should find some mention of it, but there is none. The observance of the first day and the reason of it are as old as Christianity, or as old as the Church. When we

are told that we receive the Lord's Day on the authority of the Church, we ask when and where the Church made any law on the subject? Outside Scripture, the historical tradition of the observance from the days of the Apostolic Fathers[1] is undoubted and unbroken.

If the proof of the divine authority of the Lord's Day is not as direct as in the case of the Jewish Sabbath, the indirect proof is very strong. This proof is supported by the argument from necessity and utility in reference to the highest interests of the individual and the race, and especially in reference to spiritual life and religious worship. Every blow struck at the Lord's Day is a blow struck at these. The allusions in Rom. xiv. 5, 6, Col. ii. 16, are to Jewish distinctions, "meat or drink, feast-day, new moon, sabbaths." The Judaizing party, whom the apostle is opposing, wished, of course, to import the Seventh-Day Sabbath, along with circumcision and other Jewish rites, into the Christian Church, where the Lord's Day had become the law. The apostle did not object to the voluntary observance of any of these rites; he only opposed their imposition by authority on others.

Sec. 5.—The Two Sacraments.

I. Scripture Doctrine.

It is remarkable that two rites so simple as Christian Baptism and the Lord's Supper were at first, have grown into the most complicated questions of Christian theology; that rites intended to be bonds of union, have given rise to fiercer controversies and wider divisions than any other subject.

The term sacrament itself (a sacred thing, an oath consecrated by religious rites) is not taken from Scripture. *Sacramentum* is used in the Vulgate, as equivalent to *μυστήριον* in Eph. i. 9, iii. 9, v. 32; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Rev. i. 20, xvii. 7. The association of the two words reminds us of the early application of the

[1] *The Lord's Day*, by Rev. J. W. Thomas, pp. 103-113: T. Woolmer; Smith, *Bible Dict.* "Lord's Day," "Sabbath."

term "mysteries" to the Lord's Supper, an application which undoubtedly did much to foster the notion of mysterious virtues attaching to the rite.

We do not see how it is possible to avoid the conclusion that the Jewish rites of Circumcision and the Passover are the starting-point of any discussion of the Christian ordinances. The analogy is supported both by a consideration of their nature and by their association in Scripture. In both cases one rite initiates a relation, which the other renews and conserves.[1] Differences in detail, such as the annual celebration of the Passover, do not destroy the general analogy, any more than the still greater difference in the significance of the rites does. As in the case of the Lord's Day, what Christianity has done is to enrich and elevate the old, to fill it with higher meaning and ideas. A fundamental feature, in the Jewish and Christian ordinances alike, is that they are covenant-acts. In circumcision, as in baptism, cleansing is the central truth signified. The ideas of commemoration, thanksgiving, communion, sustenance, are common to the Passover and the Christian Supper. Let it not be alleged that the Jewish rites had little or nothing of a religious meaning. Was not Judaism a religion as well as a national polity? Did not the Jews stand in the same relations to God, and need the same blessings, as Christians? The political or national meaning of the rites was over and above the religious. If the rites are emptied of religious meaning, the same process must be applied to the whole of the Old Testament. The occasion of the institution of the Lord's Supper shows conclusively that it was the Passover transformed and applied to a new purpose, Matt. xxvi. 17. St. Paul evidently connects circumcision and baptism (Col. ii. 11, 12). The connection, however, is sufficiently shown by the similarity of the two rites, one introducing into the Jewish Church, the other into the Christian, Matt. xxviii. 19. From the Jewish ordinances we learn the elements necessary to constitute a sacrament. Circumcision and the Passover were divinely

[1] Hooker, v. 67. 1.

instituted; they were of permanent and universal obligation; they were significant of essential religious truth. The additional sacraments of the Roman Church lack one or other of these features. As matter of fact, the definitions of a sacrament given in Protestant confessions apply to circumcision and the Passover; these were signs and seals, and so means of grace. The difference here is the same that obtains between the Jewish and Christian dispensations generally, one of degree rather than of kind, in fulness of spiritual blessing and clearness of knowledge.[1] The covenant character of the ordinances must always be kept in the foreground.

(*a*) Baptism.

The formal words of institution are found in Matt. xxviii. 19, although Christ's disciples baptized before, John iv. 2. How the apostles interpreted Christ's words, is best seen in their teaching and action, Peter at Pentecost, Acts ii. 38, 41; the Samaritans, viii. 12, 16; the Ethiopian treasurer, viii. 38; the baptism of Cornelius and his Gentile friends, x. 47, 48; of Saul of Tarsus, ix. 18; of Lydia and her household, xvi. 15; of the Philippian jailor and his household, xvi. 33; of the Corinthians, xviii. 8; of John's disciples at Ephesus, xix. 5.

Let us see what this ordinance must have meant in the light of its Jewish counterpart. Circumcision was the sign and seal of a covenant of spiritual blessing.[2] To make the covenant refer merely to temporal good, is to degrade not only it, but the whole of Old Testament teaching. Was not Abraham's faith reckoned to him for righteousness, and was not righteousness part of the covenant pledged by this sign? But was the experience of these blessings independent of all conditions? Certainly not. The insistence on moral conditions is just as emphatic in the Old Testament as in the New. The notion that any outward rites — sacrifices or anything else — could save without

[1] Hooker on *Sacraments*, v. 58. 2, etc.

[2] See Abraham's case, Rom. iv. 10, 11.

moral amendment, is the very notion which the prophets unanimously and constantly denounce. "And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart." Any other teaching would be immoral in the extreme. Plainly the rite preached to the Jews—in act instead of in word, to the eye instead of the ear—the necessity of inner purity, and the offer of the blessing by God. Performed in the case of adults, it would generally coincide with their conversion to God, and ratify that conversion by a divine pledge. In the case of infants, it was a sign of the same truths, of a spiritual change necessary, and of grace given to effect that change in connection with the fulfilment of the conditions afterwards. At the least, it was the seal of a gracious relation into which the individual was brought with God, a relation which meant much or little according to the reception it found. Just as circumcision, on its first institution, was performed in the case of adults (Gen. xvii. 23–27), so baptism, in the first missionary stage of the Church, was administered to adult converts, as we see in the Acts; but neither in the one case nor in the other does this prevent the administration of the ordinance in the case of infants.

The application to Baptism is obvious. In the use of water the truth signified is still clearer. Augustine calls a sacrament a *verbum visibile.* It preaches the whole Gospel to the eye. Sin in its guilt and indwelling is defilement, forgiveness and sanctification are cleansing. Baptism in the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, declares the divine source of the cleansing. In the case of adults the rite will generally coincide with the reception of the spiritual gift, ratifying it as a seal. In every case it declares the need of such grace, the divine provision and the conditions of its experience. It recognises the individual as within the covenant of grace, as one to whom all the provisions of the covenant apply. But such an act does not and cannot supersede the moral conditions necessary; rather these conditions are among the truths of the Gospel signified by the rite. In adults, submission to the rite signifies the fulfilment of

these conditions. It may be said that such a view makes the value of Baptism depend entirely on subjective conditions. But it is not so. It is a sign and seal of objective grace. The question is, What is the grace? Is it actual salvation, apart from all conditions? Only one answer is possible. God, indeed, gives much grace independently of all conditions, which, duly used, will lead to salvation; and of this grace Baptism is in any case the pledge. It may then be asked, What is the practical use of Baptism in such a case? "Much every way." Is the coronation of a sovereign or the ordination of a minister of no practical force? To call it a mere recognition is plainly too little. It is a ceremony without which the official character is incomplete. The right may be inherent on other grounds, but it is formally declared and ratified.

On its human side Baptism is an assumption of the Christian name and profession. In the case of adults the profession represents, or should represent, the character. In the case of children the position is different. The grace needed and received is measured by the capacity of infancy and childhood, and is given, so to speak, in anticipation. Conversion is necessary, but it may be gradual and imperceptible, one degree shading into another. It is often so; perhaps it ought to be always so. Allowing for the perversity of the human will, perhaps the failure of parents who bring children to Baptism, and of the Church which receives them, to realize the responsibility and blessing of the act, is the reason why conversion does not generally take this form. In adults Baptism is a seal of a conversion accomplished; in infants it is a prophecy of conversion to come. And the prophecy is to be accomplished through instruction, example, and counsel.

Baptismal Regeneration.

Regeneration is sometimes understood in a sense which would allow of its being made to depend on Baptism as a means, namely, as an introduction to the outward privileges of the

Christian Church. But this meaning is too weak for such a term. It is not the meaning of Scripture, or of those who hold Baptismal Regeneration in the proper sense. The privileges of a child follow the character of a child. Is this character necessarily imparted by baptism? The question has been already practically answered by anticipation. Such an unconditional bestowal of the highest spiritual blessing is even more inconceivable under the Christian than the Jewish dispensation. It would be a retrogression from the spirit to the flesh. John iii. 5 is quoted in support of the doctrine. It is by no means absolutely certain that baptism is referred to. Such reference is possible, for baptism was already practised, John iii. 26, iv. 2. But baptism is not named. And it is quite possible that the passage is to be interpreted in the same way as Matt. iii. 11, *i.e.* that the operation of the Spirit is in one passage compared to fire, in the other to water.[1] But even granting the reference to baptism without reserve, the two baptisms are not necessarily connected; it is not said that the birth of water and the birth of the Spirit always go together, or that one is the cause of the other.[2] The two are simply declared necessary; but the fuller exposition of the two things must be sought elsewhere. And, in any case, the birth "of water" is useless without the birth "of the Spirit." Tit. iii. 5 is also quoted. Granting again that "the washing" or "laver

[1] But see Hooker, Bk. v. 59. "Many have held that the birth 'of water and spirit' can only refer to Christian baptism; others have denied that Christian baptism is alluded to at all. . . . There is error in both extremes. There is no *direct* reference here to Christian baptism; but the reference to the truths which that baptism expresses is distinct and clear," Schaff's *Popular Commentary* on John iii. 5. The same view is taken of the relation of John vi. to the Lord's Supper. "In neither case is the sacrament *as such* brought before us; in both we must certainly recognise the presence of its fundamental idea," p. 86.

[2] "As the new birth is not the same thing with baptism, so it does not always accompany baptism; they do not constantly go together. A man may possibly be 'born of water,' and yet not be 'born of the Spirit,'" Wesley, Serm. xlv.

of regeneration" means baptism, which is by no means certain, the same reasoning applies. It is not enough alone, being connected with "the renewing of the Holy Ghost." They are not stated to be inseparable, or to stand in the relation of cause and effect. Gentile converts would be adults, and in their case baptism would follow as a seal of the spiritual renewal they had undergone.

We have actual cases in the Acts, in which the outward rite and the spiritual blessing are separated. Cornelius and his friends had received the Holy Ghost before baptism. In their case, therefore, the rite was the seal or completion of a blessing already experienced. Peter asks, "Can any man forbid water, that these should not be baptized, which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we?" Acts x. 47. In Acts viii. 12–17 we have the reverse order. The Samaritans under Philip's preaching believed and were baptized. But they did not receive the Holy Ghost then; for Peter and John, coming afterwards, "prayed for them, that they might receive the Holy Ghost; for as yet he was fallen upon none of them; only they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus." These cases prove demonstrably that the two things are separable.

Peter's exhortation, "Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost" (Acts ii. 38), bears out our position. He is preaching to adults, he insists on the moral condition, "Repent;" the baptism would avail nothing without the repentance. The baptism would follow as an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual transaction between them and God. This is a typical instance of what must frequently have taken place in the earliest stages of Christianity. The outward profession and the inward transformation would often coincide in point of time.

The place which Baptism assumes on this theory is irreconcilable with the practice of Christ and the Apostles. "Jesus himself baptized not" (John iv. 2). If it be said that the Spirit was not yet given, what can be made of Paul's boast,

"I thank God that I baptized none of you, but Crispus and Gaius"? (1 Cor. i. 14, etc.). The apostles must have spoken and acted very differently, if they had held this theory.

Infant Baptism.

Baptists take a different view from the rest of the Christian Church respecting both the subjects and the mode of Baptism. According to them, Baptism is a formal profession of faith in Christ for salvation, and is therefore only applicable in the case of adults. The words of Christ in Matt. xxviii. 19, and the fact that most, they say all, the baptisms recorded in the Acts are adult, are appealed to. The reply has been indicated already, namely, that Christ's command has special reference to the missionary work of the Church, and the baptisms of the Acts belong to the same stage. But this no more precludes the administration of baptism to infants, than the application of the Jewish rite to adults in the first instance, and in the case of adult converts to Judaism, precluded its application to infants. Whatever objections are made against the Christian rite might be made against the Jewish one. The reply, of course, is that the Jewish rite conveyed only temporal or national privileges. This position we have already examined. If God's covenant with the Jews was religious, it pointed to spiritual blessings. And still more, if Christianity excludes children from God's kingdom, it puts them in a worse position than Judaism did. Can that have been the intention of him who blessed little children, and commanded them to be brought to him? We fail altogether to see that the denial of recognition to children is a mark or necessary effect of the superior spirituality of Christianity. If it had been the purpose of Christ and the Apostles to depart so conspicuously from the Jewish practice, we should surely have had some clear intimation on the question. The absence of such intimation is a presumption on our side. These reasons justify the practice of Infant Baptism, even if it were certain that the baptized

households in Acts xvi. 15, 33, and 1 Cor. i. 16, included no children. In the days of Tertullian and Origen it was an old custom. Roman Catholics say that we receive Infant Baptism on the authority of the Church. In reply, we ask to be shown any decree or definition of the Church establishing the practice. It was simply received and handed down from the beginning. It needed no formal enactment, and there is none to show.

If we are asked, of what moral good or evil infants are capable? we ask in reply, Are not all capacities of good and evil present in them? Do they not share in original sin and prevenient grace? Do they not need and receive the merit of Christ and the Holy Spirit's grace? Dying, are they not saved by that merit and grace? If, then, they receive the grace, can we refuse them the seal of the grace? To do so is to concede to them the greater and refuse the less. We can understand the rejection of Infant Baptism by those who reject Original Sin and Prevenient Grace, but not otherwise. If infants need nothing from Christ and the Holy Spirit, if, dying, they are saved simply on the ground of natural goodness, then Baptism is a superfluity for them. But if they need much, the sign and seal of the grace they need and receive is due to them. And if this spiritual need does not begin with life, when does it begin? If it is said that as the grace comes in any case, the sign is unnecessary, we can only refer to what has been said before. Such objections to positive laws would carry us much farther.

Mode of Baptism.

Baptists hold that Immersion is the only legitimate mode, and thus hold implicitly that the form of a rite is of its essence. All other Churches hold that the mode—whether immersion, pouring, or sprinkling—is indifferent, though the last mode is more in consonance with Western customs. The argument in favour of immersion only appeals chiefly to the meaning of the word "baptize" and to the general Eastern custom. Both proofs are anything but conclusive. It is certain that "baptize" is often

used in and out of Scripture in other senses than immerse. In classical writers we read of a bladder floating on the sea being baptized, of the shore being baptized by the tide, of wine being baptized with water, where sprinkling or pouring is meant. The phrase is used in the Septuagint of Naaman's washing in the Jordan, of Nebuchadnezzar's being wet with dew, Dan. iv. 33, *ἐβάφη*. It is applied in 1 Cor. x. 2 to the Israelites passing through the Red Sea. We read of baptisms of cups, pots, and brazen vessels, where dipping is not the only possible mode, Mark vii. 4. "They were all baptized in the Jordan" (Matt. iii. 6; Mark i. 5) would suit either immersion or pouring. Christ "was baptized by John into the Jordan" (Mark i. 9) seems to express immersion, but we do not deny that this is a possible mode. "Except they wash themselves (baptize), they eat not," Mark vii. 4. Revised Version says, "Some ancient authorities read" *ῥαντίσωνται* ("sprinkle themselves") instead of *βαπτίσωνται*. The phrase "in water" may express more than one mode, but "in the Spirit" (Matt. iii. 11) rather alludes to pouring or sprinkling, for the Spirit is said to fall or be poured on men, Acts ii. 17, 18. As to custom, immersion for obvious reasons is a very common form of ablution in the East, but pouring is almost equally common.

But even if these arguments were as strong as they are supposed to be, we should still hold that the form or mode of a religious ceremony or rite might be varied according to national custom or local convenience without infringing its essence. We altogether doubt whether Christianity is so narrow and rigid, so bound to a point of form, as to be unable to adapt itself to different outward customs. As matter of fact, all religious communities use such liberty. It is certain that the Baptists, like other Churches, do not observe the Lord's Supper in every detail in the form of its first institution. We can concede without danger that immersion was in early times a common mode of baptism.[1]

[1] *Paraleipomena* (Dickinson), chs. viii., ix., and x., contains much good material on this subject.

(*b*) The Lord's Supper.

This phrase is found in 1 Cor. xi. 20, and "the Lord's Table" in x. 21. "Altar" is never used in any passage treating of this subject. We have four separate accounts of the institution of the ordinance, substantially identical while differing in detail, Matt. xxvi. 27, 28; Mark xiv. 22–24; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xi. 23–26. The term "covenant" is used in all four accounts. "Shedding of blood" is referred to in all the three Gospels. "All drink," "blood of covenant," "for many," are peculiar to Matthew and Mark; "new" to Luke and Paul.

We see that Christ turns the Jewish Passover into the Christian Supper, and the analogy of the first ordinance throws much light upon the second. There are indeed important additions, but the common element is large. *Commemoration* is a prominent feature in both. Commemoration of what? Commemoration of deliverance; perhaps we may say, deliverance by expiatory sacrifice in both. It is in the nature and range of the deliverance that the difference lies and the higher meaning of the Christian ordinance comes out. In one case it is mainly, if not entirely, temporal redemption; in the other, entirely spiritual. The Jewish ordinance no doubt took on a spiritual meaning, *i.e.* the lower outward redemption symbolized to the devout Jew the higher inward redemption which he needed and experienced, just as we do. Still this was not the original but an acquired meaning, as the account of the institution in Ex. xii. shows; whereas the Christian rite speaks of spiritual redemption only. Whether, indeed, the Passover belonged to the order of expiatory sacrifices, cannot be said to be absolutely certain.[1] It

[1] Smith's *Bible Dictionary*, ii. 724. Some Protestant writers have been afraid to admit the expiatory nature of the Passover, lest it should favour the Roman doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice. But the fear is groundless. The Passover, like every other expiatory rite, could only be a type of the one great expiation, and ceased with it. According to Scripture, the imperfection of the ancient sacrifices was shown in their need of repetition. It is otherwise with the true expiation, Heb. ix. 25, 26, x. 1, 2.

was established before the Mosaic ritual and priesthood. Supposing that probability is in favour of an expiatory meaning (John i. 29; 1 Cor. v. 7), its presentation by the head of the household was a relic of the days when every father was a priest. In any case, however, the commemorative and eucharistic character was prominent.[1] As to the Lord's Supper, there can be no doubt that it is the commemoration of redemption by sacrifice in the proper sense. Christ's death has been shown to be expiatory: expiation is its fundamental meaning and purpose; and the Supper is its commemoration. "This is my blood of the covenant, which is shed for many unto remission of sins. This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me. This cup is the new covenant in my blood, which is poured out for you." Matt. xxvi. 28; Luke xxii. 19, 20. The perpetual obligation of the rite is especially seen in 1 Cor. xi. 26: "As often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come."

Out of Commemoration the *Eucharistic* idea springs directly, and this is prominent in both cases. The Christian thanksgiving is in proportion to the greatness of the blessing received.

The idea of *Communion* or Fellowship is equally present. It is a common meal, partaken of in memory of common blessings. In the Passover the idea of *Sustenance* also is not far off.

Every part of the Lord's Supper is significant in the highest

[1] "As the institution of the Passover preceded the general Mosaic legislation, its laws and arrangements lie without the circle of the ordinary ritual of sacrifices, and combine ideas which were otherwise kept distinct. The paschal-supper resembles the peace-offerings, the characteristic of which was the sacred feast that succeeded the presentation of the victim,—an emblem of the fellowship between the accepted worshipper and his God. But the sin-offering also is included, as a reference to the original institution of the Passover will at once show. The careful sprinkling of the blood upon the door-posts was intended to be more than a sign to the destroying angel whom to spare. The lamb was slain and the blood sprinkled, that atonement might be made for sin; when Israel is consecrated anew to God, the sin and the deserved punishment removed, the sacred feast is celebrated," Schaff's *Popular Commentary on John* i. 29.

degree The broken bread represents the slain body, the wine the shed blood; the eating and drinking represent the living faith which unites the believer with his Lord. It is Christ dying as a sacrifice for sin that is specially set before us. While we cannot admit that John vi. refers primarily to the Supper, inasmuch as it was not then instituted, and the disciples could not have so understood Christ's teaching, we still think that the teaching finds its highest fulfilment and illustration in the Supper. "I am the bread of life. The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing" (John vi.). These words show, as the Supper does, that it is receiving Christ himself into us—receiving him spiritually, but really—that gives eternal life. We thus become spiritually one with him—"he dwelleth in me, and I in him." Christ dying is the life of the soul. He is the soul's food: he gives life and sustains it. By eating and drinking him, and in no other way, do we obtain and support life. In the Supper the whole work of salvation is pictured as in a drama,—Christ's part in dying and so atoning, our part in believing and so receiving Christ.[1]

But does partaking of the Supper necessarily convey these blessings? Not so. This would be to set aside all the other teaching of Scripture, which insists on the spiritual conditions of penitent seeking and trust. To such conditions God always gives the promised grace. And yet we may not say that the visible sign and seal is useless. What is true of the other sacrament in this respect holds good also here. In this life faith often leans on sense, and will do so until the time come when we shall no longer "see through a glass darkly, but face to face."

[1] See a good exposition of the meaning of the Supper in Dr. Candlish's Handbook, *The Sacraments*, p. 93, and *Of Baptism*, p. 54 (Clark); H. Smith, two sermons on Lord's Supper, *Works*, i. 43.

On its human side the Lord's Supper is the renewal of a Christian profession. We have no ordinance between Baptism and the Supper, and perhaps none is necessary. The life after Baptism should be a path leading to the Lord's Table. The first Communion should be suitably prepared for. Classes of the young to prepare for the Communion, and a special Communion Service, would be useful. Attendance on the Lord's Table is the universal badge of membership in the Church. Such a relation of course implies submission to test and discipline. There can be no reasonable objection to additional tests of membership in particular branches of the Church. These, however, cannot supersede the general test. The Supper is also the badge and means of the Communion of Saints with each other, who thus show that, though many, they "are one body in Christ." The inner union of character and sympathy is thus made visible.

II. DOGMA OF THE SACRAMENTS.

1. *Nature of a Sacrament.*

There are three types of doctrine on this subject—the Roman, the Lutheran, and the Reformed.

According to Roman doctrine, a sacrament produces its effect *ex opere operato*, necessarily, by the mere performance of the act. The grace is inherent in, a property of, the consecrated elements. It would not indeed be true to say that the action of the sacrament is unconditional. Intention in the priest and faith in the recipient are necessary; but the faith is reduced to a minimum. As stated before under the head of Justification, the faith required is general faith in Christianity as a whole, rather than specific faith in Christ. The necessity of intention on the part of the priest introduces uncertainty into all the sacramental acts of the Roman Church.[1] If it is essential that the priest shall always intend to produce the effect of the sacrament he is administering, what certainty can

[1] See this well argued in Jackson, Bk. xi. ch. xxxix.

we have that he does this? The condition required of the recipient is more negative than positive. He must simply not interpose the obstacle of mortal sin. On this condition the sacrament necessarily takes effect. "If any one shall say that grace is not conferred by the sacraments of the new law *ex opere operato*, but that faith alone in the divine promise suffices to obtain grace, let him be anathema," Conc. Trid. vii. sacr. 8.[1] The Roman Catechism thus defines a sacrament: "A thing under the cognisance of the senses, having the power by divine appointment both to signify and to produce holiness and righteousness."[2]

The Lutheran Church, while happily rejecting the *ex opere operato*, holds to the inherence of grace in the elements, but makes the experience of grace dependent on living earnest faith in the recipient. The grace is communicated to the elements, as in the Roman doctrine, by the consecrating words. It is the insistence on real faith that has saved Lutheranism from serious evil. "Through the Word and the Sacraments, as through instruments, the Holy Spirit is given, and he works faith, where and when God pleases, in those who hear the gospel," A. C.[3] "They therefore condemn those who teach that the sacraments justify *ex opere operato*, and do not teach that faith, which believes sin to be forgiven, is necessary in using the sacraments."[4] Lutheranism puts the necessity of the sacraments high.

The Reformed type of doctrine presents many shades and degrees, though substantially identical. The lowest point,

[1] Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novæ legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratiam, sed solam fidem divinæ promissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere, anathema sit, Winer, p. 244.

[2] Ut explicatius quid sacramentum sit declaretur, docendum erit, rem esse sensibus subjectum, quæ ex dei institutione sanctitatis et justitiæ tum significandæ tum efficiendæ vim habet, Cat. Rom. ii. 1, 11; Winer, p. 234.

[3] Per verbum et sacramenta, tanquam per instrumenta, donatur Spiritus Sanctus, qui fidem efficit, ubi et quando visum est Deo, in iis qui audiunt evangelium, *ibid.* p. 234.

[4] Damnant igitur illos, qui docent, quod sacramenta ex opere operate justificent, nec docent, fidem requiri in usu sacramentorum, quæ credat remitti peccata, *Conf. Aug.*, Winer, p. 246.

where sacraments are merely badges of profession or commemorative, is only reached in Socinianism. Zwingle is sometimes said to have held the same view, but wrongly. The Reformed confessions generally reject the inherence of grace in the elements, and put the efficacy in the co-operating Spirit. The definition given in the *Remonstrant Confession* is very fine: "By the sacraments we mean those outward ceremonies of the Church, or those sacred and solemn rites, by which, as by visible, federal signs and seals, God not only represents and adumbrates to us his gracious benefits, promised especially in the evangelical covenant, but also in a regular manner offers and seals them to us, and we in turn openly and publicly declare and testify that we embrace all the divine promises with a true, firm, and obedient faith, and desire ever to celebrate his benefits with constant and grateful memory."[1] Article xxv. of the English Church goes no farther: "Sacraments ordained of Christ be not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession, but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace, and God's goodwill towards us, by the which he doth work invisibly in us, and doth not only quicken, but also strengthen and confirm our faith in him." Westminster Confession: "Sacraments are holy signs and seals of the covenant of grace." Shorter Catechism: "An holy ordinance instituted by Christ; wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers." Wesleyan Catechism: "An outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given unto us, ordained by Christ himself, as a means whereby we receive the same, and a pledge to assure us thereof. They are signs and seals of the covenant of grace

[1] Sacramenta cum dicimus, externas ecclesiæ cærimonias seu ritos illos sacros ac solennes intelligimus, quibus veluti fœderalibus signis ac sigillis visibilibus Deus gratiosa beneficia sua in fœdere præsertim evangelico promissa non modo nobis repræsentat et adumbrat, sed et certo modo exhibet atque obsignat, nosque vicissim palam publiceque declaramus ac testamur, nos promissiones omnes divina verâ, firmâ atque obsequiosâ fide amplecti et beneficia ipsius jugi, et gratâ semper memoriâ celebrare velle, Winer, p. 238.

established in Christ; which is a covenant with promise on the part of God, and with conditions on the part of man."[1]

2. *Baptism.*

The Roman doctrine is Baptismal Regeneration in its strictest form. Baptism entirely does away original sin, leaving only concupiscence, which is not sinful, though the cause or material of sin. Sin after baptism must be removed by the satisfaction of penance. Conc. Trid. xiv. pœn. ii.: "We who put on Christ by baptism are made quite a new creature in him, obtaining full and complete remission of all sins." Cat. Rom. ii. 2, 5: "Rightly and aptly defined, baptism is the sacrament of regeneration through water in the Word."[2] Baptism being the means of the reception of salvation, its necessity is placed at the highest point. Even unbaptized infants perish. On account of this stringent necessity the sacrament may, in certain circumstances, be administered by any one.

The Lutheran Church teaches a general necessity, baptism being the ordinary means of regeneration. To save its doctrine of the necessity of faith, it holds that faith is present in some sense, even in infants. Luther's Cat. Min. says: "Baptism works remission of sins, delivers from death and Satan, and bestows eternal blessedness on each and all, who believe what the Word and the divine promises pledge." A. C.: "As to baptism, they teach that it is necessary to salvation."[3]

[1] "Roman Catholics may be said in substance to hold that the sacraments represent grace, because they apply it; Protestants, that they apply grace because they represent it," Candlish, *The Sacraments*, p. 17; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.*, arts. "Sacraments," "Baptism," "Eucharist."

[2] Per Baptismum Christum induentes nova prorsus in illo efficimur creatura, plenam et integram peccatorum omnium remissionem consequentes. . . . Recte et apposite definitur, baptismum esse sacramentum regenerationis per aquam in verbo, Winer, p. 253; Cramp, as before, pp. 109, 136, 213.

[3] Baptismus operatur remissionem peccatorum, liberat a morte et a diabolo et donat æternum beatitudinem omnibus et singulis, qui credunt

The Reformed doctrine has been indicated already. The work of the Holy Spirit is put first. The Conf. Helv. ii.,[1] after referring to the gifts of salvation, says: "By Baptism all these things are sealed: for inwardly we are regenerated, cleansed, and renewed by God through the Holy Spirit, while outwardly we receive the ratification of the greatest gifts in the water, by which also those great benefits are represented, and set forth, as it were, objects of sight." Article xxvii.: "Baptism is not only a sign of profession, and mark of difference, whereby Christian men are discerned from others that be not christened; but it is also a sign of regeneration or new birth, whereby, as by an instrument, they that receive baptism rightly are grafted into the Church; the promises of forgiveness of sin, and of our adoption to be the sons of God by the Holy Ghost, are visibly signed and sealed; faith is confirmed and grace increased by virtue of prayer unto God." All this is thoroughly in the spirit of Reformed teaching. In the office of Baptism, however, in the Prayer Book we have the Roman or Lutheran type of doctrine: "Seeing that this child is by Baptism regenerate." "We yield thee thanks, that it hath pleased thee to regenerate this infant with thy Holy Spirit, to receive him for thine own child by adoption, and to incorporate him into thy holy Church." It is scarcely open to any one, in the light of these words, to explain the regeneration spoken of here as investment with outward privileges. West. Conf.: "Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ, not only for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible Church, but also to be unto him a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remis-

hoc quod verba et promissiones divinæ pollicentur. De baptismo docent, quod sit necessarius ad salutem.

[1] Obsignantur hæc omnia baptismo; nam intus regeneramur, purificamur et renovamur a Deo per Spiritum Sanctum, foris autem accipimus obsignationem maximorum donorum in aquâ, qua etiam maxima illa beneficia repræsentantur et veluti oculis nostris conspicienda proponuntur Winer, pp. 254, 256.

sion of sins, and of his growing up unto God through Jesus Christ to walk in newness of life."[1] Dr. Pope says: "The true doctrine makes baptism the initiatory sign of a covenant the blessings of which it most aptly symbolizes: the sprinkled blood and the Spirit poured out. It makes it also the seal of a covenant which pledges these blessings to all who believe and dedicate their children to Christ; a seal, therefore, of an impartation which is quite distinct from the seal, though it may accompany it, as it may have preceded it, and may also, as in part it must do to unconscious infancy, follow the seal," *Comp.* iii. 324.

3. *The Lord's Supper.*

The basis of the Roman doctrine is the idea of Transubstantiation, the conversion of the substance of the bread and wine by the words of consecration into the substance of the body and blood of Christ. Conc. Trid. xiii. euch. 4: "Since our Redeemer, Christ, affirmed that to be truly his body which he offered under the species of bread, it has always been so held in the Church of God, and this the holy Synod now at last declares, that by the consecration of the bread and wine a conversion takes place of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of Christ's body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood; which conversion is aptly and rightly called by the Holy Catholic Church *transsubstantiatio*." "If any one shall say, that in the holy sacrament of the eucharist the substance of bread and wine remains, along with the body and blood of Jesus Christ, and shall deny that wonderful and unique conversion of the whole substance of bread into the body and of the whole substance of wine into the blood, the species of bread and wine merely remaining, which conversion the Catholic Church most aptly calls transubstantiation, let him be anathema."[2]

[1] Winer, p. 254.

[2] Quoniam Christus Redemtor noster corpus suum id, quod sub specie panis offerebat, vere esse dixit, ideo persuasum semper in ecclesiâ Dei

Let it be noted that it is only the *substance* of the elements that is affected, the *accidents* (*i.e.* properties) remain, so that in this stupendous miracle the substance of bread and wine is absent, though the properties of bread and wine remain; and the substance of body and blood is present, though the properties of body and blood are absent. We must believe that one substance is present, though not one of its qualities is present, and we must believe that another substance is absent, though all its qualities are present. This is faith, not merely without but against the evidence of the senses. Faith and sense are in direct contradiction. It is useless to refer us to the Gospel miracles. There faith and sense were one. The ground of the faith that water was changed into wine was that the senses perceived the properties of wine to be present. The proof that the blind and deaf and sick were cured, was the testimony of the senses. Christ did not require men to believe that a miraculous change had taken place, while their senses testified the contrary. In transubstantiation it is not a miracle that we are asked to believe, but a contradiction. And if our senses play us false in one case, why not in others? If our senses deceive us, why may not our reason? We know of course that both sense and reason may be mistaken. But our whole system of thought and life rests on the assumption that after we have taken all possible care, and tested the information of the senses and the inferences of reason in every possible way, they are to be taken as true. If not, nothing can ever be

fuit, idque nunc denuo Sancta hæc Synodus declarat, per consecrationem panis et vini conversionem fieri totius substantiæ panis in substantiam corporis Christi, et totius substantiæ vini in substantiam sanguinis ejus: quæ conversio convenienter et proprie a Sanctâ Catholicâ Ecclesiâ *transsubstantiatio* est appellata.

Si quis dixerit, in sacrosancto eucharistiæ sacramento remanere substantiam panis et vini, una cum corpore et sanguine Jesu Christi, negaveritque mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius substantiæ panis in corpus et totius substantiæ vini in sanguinem, manentibus duntaxat speciebus panis et vini, quam quidem conversionem Catholica Ecclesia aptissime *transsubstantiationem* appellat, anathema sit, Winer, p. 280.

known to be true; if not, universal scepticism is the only consistent course; and this is what the dogma leads to. The Trinity, the Incarnation, the Divine Attributes, present us with many mysteries, mysteries which follow from the combination of the spiritual with the material, the infinite with the finite; but they present no contradiction for our faith. Here is no question of the spiritual and infinite, but simply a combination of material elements. It is a combination of one substance with the properties of another substance, a substance without its properties and properties without their substance! The Roman Catechism avows the strange consequences which follow: "Since it has been proved that the body and blood of the Lord are truly in the sacrament, so that the substance of bread and wine no longer exists, and seeing that those accidents cannot inhere in Christ's body and blood, it follows that, beyond all order of nature (supra omnem naturæ ordinem), they support themselves with nothing else to rest on."[1] "Supra omnem naturæ ordinem" is a very mild statement of the position. A miracle is above the fixed order of nature. But this wonder contradicts every law of knowledge and faith which God has given us to guide our lives by.[2]

The sole scriptural authority for the dogma is the saying of Christ, "This is my body," Matt. xxvi. 26. We respect the feeling which thinks itself bound to accept the literal words of Christ, whatever consequences follow. But we venture to think that the consequences in this case are so tremendous, that nothing but the most absolute necessity should lead us to acquiesce in the literal meaning. Is there any such necessity? Is no other sense possible? In what circumstances were the words spoken? Christ held the bread in his hand, and said of it, "This is my body." Putting ourselves in the position of the disciples, is it conceivable that, with Christ's living body before our eyes, we could think that he held it in his hand, and gave it to us to eat? We think not. If the disciples had understood Christ as the Roman Church does, it is incomprehensible that the disciples expressed no surprise. Christ

[1] Winer, p. 281. [2] Cramp, *Text-book of Popery*, p. 249.

had often used figurative language about himself, speaking of himself as Bread, a Vine, a Door, a Shepherd. They were accustomed to such modes of speech, and perfectly understood it. But now he makes a similar statement in a literal sense, and they say nothing! Besides, the meaning, "This signifies or represents my body," was quite in the order of Paschal speech. "Eat the passover" in this very chapter; "kill the passover" (Ex. xii. 21); "This cup is the new covenant in my blood" (Luke xxii. 20; 1 Cor. xi. 25); "Drink the cup" (1 Cor. xi. 26). The Apostle Paul says, "As often as ye eat this bread; Whosoever shall eat the bread; So let him eat of the bread" (1 Cor. xi. 26, etc.); so that the bread remains after the consecrating words are spoken. What the recipients eat is bread. How could Paul have said this, if he had held transubstantiation? Does he give any hint that only the accidents of bread remain, not the substance? Accidents without substance are not bread. We fear that St. Paul would come under the anathema of Trent just quoted.

The dogma destroys all analogy with the other sacrament. There is no such transformation of the water in baptism. It signifies certain spiritual things. On the Protestant view the bread and wine signify the body and blood of Christ, and the spiritual work accomplished by the death. But what do the body and blood themselves signify? Here we have not a sign, but the things signified. Eng. Article xxviii. well says that the dogma "overthroweth the nature of a sacrament."

No doubt, language tending in the direction of a literal presence of Christ's body and blood may be found in the Christian Fathers.[1] How much of this is to be understood literally, and

[1] "In a word, it appeareth not that of all the ancient Fathers of the Church any one did ever conceive or imagine other than only a mystical participation of Christ's both body and blood in the sacrament, neither are their speeches concerning the change of the elements themselves into the body and blood of Christ such, that a man can thereby in conscience assure himself it was their meaning to persuade the world either of a corporal consubstantiation of Christ with those sanctified and blessed elements before we receive them, or of the like transubstantiation of

how much is exaggerated metaphor, it is not always easy to say. Probably, as on other subjects, language used at first metaphorically was afterwards taken literally. Active controversy began in the 9th century, Paschasius Radbertus advocating the dogma. Two centuries later, Ratramnus and Berengarius opposed it. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) adopted it.

The next step was to withdraw the Cup from the laity. This was done at the Council of Constance, 1415 A.D. Conc. Trid. xxi. euchar. 1: "The Holy Synod, taught by the Holy Spirit, and following the judgment and custom of the Church itself, declares and teaches that laymen and non-celebrant clerics are bound by no divine precept to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist under both species, and that it cannot be doubted, without detriment to faith, that communion in either species suffices for them to salvation." Conc. Trid. xiii. euchar. 3: "If any one shall deny that in the venerable sacrament of the Eucharist the whole is contained under either species and under the several parts of such species in case of separation, let him be anathema."[1] The statement of the reasons in the Roman Catechism for this course is so frank that it is worth quoting: "It is clear that the Church was led by many and grave reasons, not merely to approve, but also to confirm by authoritative decree, the excellent custom of communicating under one species. For, first, the greatest care was necessary lest the blood of the Lord should be spilt on the ground, which could not easily be avoided, if it was necessary to administer it

them into the body and blood of Christ," Hooker, v. 67. 11. *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* speaks copiously of Baptism and the Supper. It knows nothing of extra-scriptural additions, see chaps. vii., ix., x.

[1] Sancta Synodus, a Spiritu Sancto . . . edocta atque ipsius ecclesiæ judicium et consuetudinem secuta, declarat ac docet, nullo divino præcepti laicos et clericos non conficientes obligari ad eucharistiæ sacramentum sub utrâque specie sumendum, neque ullo pacto salvâ fide dubitari posse, quin illis alterius speciei communio ad salutem sufficiat.—Si quis negaverit, in venerabili sacramento eucharistiæ sub unaquaque specie et sub singulis cujusque speciei partibus separatione factâ totum Christum contineri, anath. sit, Winer, p. 288; Cramp, as before, pp. 136, 213.

in a great throng of people. Moreover, when the holy Eucharist was to be given to the sick, it was greatly to be feared that, if the species of wine were kept long, it would turn foul. Again, there are very many who are quite unable to bear the taste or even the smell of wine. Wherefore, lest what is necessary for the soul's health should injure the body's health, the Church wisely decided that the faithful should only receive the species of bread. To these reasons must be added, that in many districts there is great dearth of wine, nor can it be brought from elsewhere without great expense, and by long and difficult journeys. Again, what is most of all important, it was necessary to root out the heresy of those who deny that the whole Christ is under either species, asserting that the body without blood is contained under the species of bread, and the blood under that of wine."[1]

Other consequences which follow from transubstantiation are the Adoration of the Host, its reservation in the monstrance or sanctuary, elevation and carrying in procession for this purpose. The Roman Church also uses unleavened bread, and wine mixed with water. Conc. Trid. xiii. 6: "If any one shall say that in the sacrament of the Eucharist Christ is not to be adored with the outward worship of latria, and so is not to be venerated with special festive honour, and carried about solemnly in processions, or is not to be presented to the people to be worshipped, and that his worshippers are idolaters, let him be anathema."[2]

A still more distinctive and influential doctrine of the Roman Church is, that the body and blood of Christ veritably present in the Eucharist are a proper sacrifice for sin. "If any one shall say that in the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God, or that 'to be offered' is nothing else than that Christ is given to us to be eaten, let him be anathema." "Since in this divine sacrifice, which is performed in the Mass, the same Christ is contained and slain without blood, who once offered himself with blood on the altar of the cross, the Synod teaches that this sacrifice is truly propitiatory, and through it it comes to pass that, if with true heart and right faith we come

[1] Winer, p. 288. [2] *Ibid.* p. 285.

contritely and penitently to God, with fear and reverence, we shall obtain mercy," etc.[1] "If any one shall say that the sacrifice of the Mass is merely one of giving of thanks and praise, or a bare commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the cross, but not propitiatory, or that it benefits only the recipient, and ought not to be offered for the living and the dead, for sins, punishments, satisfactions, and other afflictions, let him be," etc.[2] Thus, according to Roman doctrine, the Eucharist is two things at once,—a Sacrament and a Sacrifice. A Sacrament is primarily something given by God to men as a sign and seal, a Sacrifice something given by or for man to God. Considered in the latter aspect, the Eucharist differs in some respects from the sacrifice of the cross. It is through it that the sacrifice of the cross is applied to men. As it is constantly repeated, its value is only finite. According to Bellarmin, who is always ready with suggestions, it is only meritorious and propitiatory in the second degree, deriving its virtue from the original sacrifice, which was "meritorious, satisfactory, and impetratory, truly and properly." This sacrifice of the Mass is only impetratory, *i.e.* it supplicates blessing. "When it is called propitiatory or satisfactory, this is to be understood in reference to the thing supplicated. For it is called propitiatory because it supplicates remission of guilt; satisfactory, because it supplicates remission of penalty; meritorious, because it supplicates grace to do good and acquire merit."[3]

[1] Si quis dixerit, in missâ non offerri Deo verum et proprium sacrificium, aut quod offerri non sit aliud, quam nobis Christum ad manducandum dari, an. sit.—Quoniam in divino hoc sacrificio, quod in missâ peragitur, idem ille Christus continetur et incruente immolatur, qui in arâ crucis semel se ipsum cruente obtulit, docet synodus, sacrificium istud vere propitiatorium esse per ipsumque fieri, ut, si cum vero corde et rectâ fide, cum metu et reverentiâ, contriti ac pœnitentes ad deum accedamus, misericordiam, etc., Winer, p. 293.

[2] Si quis dixerit, missæ sacrificium tantum esse laudis et gratiarum actionis, aut nudam commemorationem sacrificii in cruce peracti, non autem propitiatorium, vel soli prodesse sumenti, neque pro vivis et defunctis, pro peccatis pœnis satisfactionibus, et aliis necessitatibus offerri debere, an. sit, Winer, p. 294.

[3] Winer, p. 294.

No part of Roman doctrine aroused greater or juster hostility at the Reformation, as infringing, however it may be disclaimed, on the sufficiency of the Sacrifice of the Cross, than this. The Protestant confessions are filled with condemnations of the doctrine. Private masses and masses for the dead follow by direct consequence. If Christ's sacrifice needs to be continued and repeated, we have Jewish incompleteness back again. "Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entered into the holy place every year with blood of others," Heb. ix. 25, 26, x. 11–14. If it was God's purpose that the sacrifice of the cross should be carried into effect in this way, it is inexplicable that there is no hint of the kind in Scripture.

This doctrine is the complement of the Roman theory of the Priesthood. The priest offers the sacrifice of the Mass for the living and the dead, or Christ offers himself through the priest. In early days the term sacrifice was applied to the Eucharist, obviously in a spiritual sense; but this gave way to the literal sense, as the sacerdotal view of the ministry developed (p. 216). Each dogma helped the other.

The Lutheran Church, while strenuously condemning the other distinctively Roman doctrines of the Eucharist, retains the corporeal presence of Christ on the same grounds as the Roman Church. Conf. Aug.: "Concerning the Lord's Supper, they teach that Christ's body and blood are truly present, and are distributed to those partaking, and reject those teaching otherwise." "We confess that we think, that in the Lord's Supper the body and blood of Christ are truly and substantially present, and are truly offered, with those things which are seen, the bread and wine, to those who receive the sacrament."[1] At the same time, Lutheranism rejects transubstantiation, the

[1] De cœna Domini docent, quid corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in cœna Domini, et improbant secus docentes. — Confitemur nos sentire, quod in cœnâ Domini vere et substantialiter adsint corpus et sanguis Christi et vere exhibeantur cum illis rebus, quæ videntur, pane et vino, his qui sacramentum accipiunt, Winer, p. 283.

sacrificial idea, and the fleshly eating. "We utterly reject and condemn the Capernaite eating of Christ's body." Lutheranism thinks itself bound by the literal meaning of Christ's words, and yet cannot receive transubstantiation, because of the difficulties it involves. The body and blood are present, and the bread and wine are present. How are these propositions to be combined? It is said that the body and blood are present in, with, or under the bread and wine. The union between the body and the bread and between the blood and the wine is a sacramental one. The union is also not permanent, only *in usu*. Thus adoration and reservation are cut off. The peculiar Lutheran doctrine of the Incarnation, the *communicatio idiomatum*, is here practically applied to explain the Ubiquity of Christ's body. It was on the present subject that Luther showed himself so obstinate in controversy with the Swiss Reformers, and his views were adopted by the Lutheran Church. Consubstantiation is the name given to the doctrine. It is a compromise, which separates Lutheranism both from Rome and from the rest of the Reformation. According to it, two substances are present with their properties, and are equally received. Real body and blood are eaten and drunk, but in a spiritual or sacramental way![1]

The Reformed doctrine, while unanimously rejecting the special Roman and Lutheran tenets, presents some shades of difference in itself, as in the case of the other sacrament. Zwingle is generally thought to have held the bare commemorative sense. But Dr. Pope says that, while tending towards that view, "his doctrine went beyond it: Christ to the contemplation of faith is not only subjectively but objectively present; and that spiritual eating of his heavenly body, which is the appropriation of his atoning grace, is a sacramental eating or receiving of the signs and seals of a present Saviour."[2] He preferred the phrase "cum pane et vino" to "in pane et vino." The quotations given by Winer (p. 269) scarcely go beyond the

[1] On the Lutheran doctrine, see Jackson, *Works*, Bk. xi. ch. iii.

[2] *Comp. of Theol.* iii. 332.

idea of commemoration and pictorial teaching. Thus: "When the bread and wine, consecrated by the words of the Lord, are distributed to the brethren, is not the whole Christ, as it were sensibly (to say more, if words are necessary, than is common), presented to the senses? But how? Is the natural body itself to be handled and tasted? By no means; it is offered to mental contemplation, while the sensible sacrament of it is offered to sense. . . . We never denied that Christ's body is sacramentally and mysteriously present in the Supper, both because of the contemplation of faith and because of the entire action of the symbol."

Calvin holds a real, though spiritual, feeding on the body and blood of Christ. "The communicant is lifted up by faith to heaven, and his soul is as surely invigorated by the spiritual body of Christ as his body by the emblems" (Pope). Calvin says: "The chief point is that our souls are nourished by the flesh and blood of Christ, just as bread and wine preserve and support bodily life. For the analogy of the sign would not hold good, unless our souls found their food in Christ, which cannot be, unless Christ really unite with us and refresh us by the eating of his flesh and the drinking of his blood. And although it seems impossible, considering the distance of space, for the flesh of Christ to reach to us, so as to be our food, let us remember how far above all our senses the secret power of the Holy Spirit shines, and how foolish it is to measure his vastness by our limits. What, then, our mind comprehends not, let faith conceive, that the Spirit really unites things disjoined in space."[1] "If with our eyes and minds we are

[1] Winer, p. 270. Dean Jackson says: "This present efficacy of Christ's body and blood upon our souls, or real communication of both, I find as a truth unquestionable amongst the ancient Fathers and as a Catholic confession. The modern Lutheran and the modern Romanist have fallen into their several errors concerning Christ's presence in the Sacrament from a common ignorance; neither of them conceive, nor are they willing to conceive, how Christ's body and blood should have any real operation upon our souls, unless they were so locally present as they might *agere per contactum*, as physical medicines do our bodies (which is the pretended use of transubstantiation), or so quicken our souls, as sweet

carried up to heaven to seek Christ there in the glory of his kingdom, even as the symbols invite us to him in his integrity, so let us under the symbol of bread feed on his body, and under the symbol of wine drink separately of his blood, that at length we may enjoy him perfectly." Calvin objects to the corporeal presence, because it binds the divine to earthly and corruptible elements, and infringes on the integrity of Christ's human nature. The *Remonstrant Confession* is again worth quoting: "The holy Supper is the second sacred rite of the New Testament, instituted by Jesus Christ on the night in which he was betrayed, to celebrate the eucharistic and solemn commemoration of his death, in which the faithful, after duly examining and testing themselves as to their true faith, eat the sacred bread publicly broken, and also drink the wine publicly poured out; and this to declare with solemn thanksgiving the bloody death of the Lord undergone for us (by which, as our bodies are sustained by food and drink, or by bread and wine, so our hearts are fed and nourished to the hope of eternal life), and in turn to testify publicly before God and the Church their vivifying and spiritual fellowship with Christ's crucified body and shed blood (or with Jesus Christ himself crucified and dead

odours do the animal spirits, which were the most probable use of the Lutheran consubstantiation. Both the Lutherans and Papists avouch the authority of the ancient Church for their opinions, but most injuriously. For more than we have said, or more than Calvin doth stiffly maintain against Zwinglius and other Sacramentaries, cannot be inferred from any speeches of the truly orthodox or ancient Fathers; they all agree that we are immediately cleansed and purified from our sins by the blood of Christ, that his human nature, by the inhabitation of the Deity, is made to us the inexhaustible fountain of life. But about the particular manner how life is derived to us from his human nature, or whether it sends its sweet influence upon our souls only from the heavenly sanctuary, wherein it dwells as in its sphere; or whether his blood which was shed for us may have more immediate local presence with us, they no way disagree, because they in this kind abhorred curiosity of dispute. As for ubiquity and transubstantiation, they are the two monsters of modern times, brought forth by ignorance and maintained only by faction," Bk. x. ch. lv. 12; Hooker, Bk. v. 55. 67. 8-11.

for us), and so with all the benefits obtained and acquired by the death of Jesus Christ, and at the same time their mutual charity among themselves." [1] The Helv. Conf. ii. distinguishes two kinds of eating, the *manducatio corporalis* and *m. spiritualis.* Of the former it says: "By this kind of eating the Capernaites once understood that the flesh of the Lord was to be given to them to eat, but they are refuted by John vi." Eng. Art. xxviii.: "The body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten in the Supper, only after a heavenly and spiritual manner; and the mean whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is faith."

Additional Sacraments.

The five additional sacraments of the Roman Church are Confirmation, Orders, Penance, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction, the administration of the first two being reserved to the bishop. The alleged scriptural authority for them is very shadowy. The best ground on which to place them is the Church's authority in the Roman sense. Penance is the means by which post-baptismal sin is to be removed. On the penitent's contrition, confession, and satisfaction, the priest pronounces absolution. The satisfaction consists of temporal penalties imposed by the priest, which again may be commuted for fasting, prayer, and alms. The doctrine of indulgences is a means of relieving these penalties. While on the one hand the Roman Church raises matrimony into a sacrament, on the other it makes celibacy a condition of the highest perfection. These sacraments are comparatively recent innovations.[2]

[Halley, *The Sacraments*, 2 vols.; S. C. Malan, *The Two Holy Sacraments;* Candlish, *The Sacraments*; S. P. Harvard, *Christian Baptism;* Gregory, *Handbook of Scriptural Church Principles*, Part i. pp. 32–78; Dale, *Manual of Congregational Principles*, pp. 121–164.]

[1] Winer, p. 265.

[2] Pope, *Comp.* iii. 307; Luthardt, *Comp.* p. 332; H. B. Swete, *England* v. *Rome.*

CHAPTER V.

THE LAST THINGS.

SEC. 1.—THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.

THE Hebrew Sheol and the Greek Hades (the invisible, the world of spirits) represent the same idea. It is only in accordance with the law of development running through revelation, that the doctrine of a future state should be taught less distinctly in the earlier than in the later Scriptures. Accordingly we find that Sheol is, so to speak, undifferentiated. It is spoken of as the common home of the righteous and the wicked; whereas in the New Testament Hades divides into Paradise and Gehenna.[1] "Paradise" occurs in Luke xxiii. 43; 2 Cor. xii. 4; Rev. ii. 7 (Abraham's bosom, Luke xvi. 22). Hades, then, sometimes means the unseen state generally, sometimes one of its two divisions, Luke xvi. 23; Acts ii. 31. Though the two divisions are not mentioned in the Old Testament, they are implied there in the differing character and destiny of the righteous and the wicked.

Of the many paradoxes advanced respecting the future state, the most extraordinary is the one that can see no doctrine of a future state in the Old Testament. The argument is the usual one from silence; we should prefer to say comparative silence. And the present case is a good illustration of the weakness of

[1] Hades occurs twelve times in the New Testament (Matt. xi. 23, xvi. 18; Luke x. 15, xvi. 23; Acts ii. 27, 31; 1 Cor. xv. 55; Rev. i. 18, iii. 7, vi. 8, xx. 13, 14); so Gehenna (Matt. v. 22, 29, 30, x. 28, xviii. 9, xxiii. 13, 15; Mark ix. 43, 45, 47; Luke xii. 5; James iii. 6). Other phrases also are used for Gehenna.

the argument. The doctrine of immortality, like that of God, is one of the postulates of religion. There is no religion without it. If it is absent from the system of the Old Testament, that system is not a religion at all. The Old Testament never categorically asserts the existence of God, but assumes it. In the same way, it assumes the present existence of a soul in man. The same argument would prove that the Old Testament recognises no soul in man at present. The great underlying truths of religion seldom come to the surface in direct speech, but reveal their presence incidentally. The phrase, "gathered to his fathers" or "people," used of Abraham, Moses, Aaron, David, is such an intimation, Gen. xxv. 8; Deut. xxxii. 50; Num. xx. 24; 1 Kings ii. 10. The phrase for burial is quite distinct, Gen. xxxv. 29. The celebrated passage in Job (xix. 26), whatever its relation to the question of a resurrection, expresses a confident expectation of a future vision of God. The translations of Enoch and Elijah could not but deepen the general belief. Raisings of the dead, like those in 1 Kings xvii. 21 and 2 Kings iv. 34, did the same. Eccles. xii. 7 draws a clear distinction between the fate of the spirit and that of the body. Samuel's appearance at Endor (1 Sam. xxviii. 19), whatever questions may be raised as to its mode, is evidently regarded as real, and is another testimony to the belief in another world. Our Lord's argument in Matt. xxii. 32 (Ex. iii. 6) is only a strong statement in words of what every Jew thought. Otherwise it would have had no force for the hearers. Above all, who can read the glowing language of the Psalms, in which future reward and retribution play so large a part, and think that the writers believed and knew nothing of a future state? Besides, it is certain that the doctrine of immortality formed part of the religion of ancient Egypt, where the Israelites dwelt for several centuries.

Undoubtedly, Hades is regarded as an incomplete state, which comes to an end at the Resurrection and the Judgment. Excluding the ideas of future probation and purgatory, we can only think of the righteous and the wicked as becoming more and

more fixed in character. The spirit is without its companion, the body. The final, complete state, first begins at Judgment.

Purgatory.

The Roman Church adds a third division to Hades. According to it, the good, with rare exceptions, before entering Paradise, must be perfected by the suffering of Purgatory. This state is only for the good, *i.e.* those who die in a state of salvation. There is no evidence in Scripture for the idea, but much against it. The fire of 1 Cor. iii. 12–15 is different in nature and purpose. It is not for all Christians, but for Christian builders, to test and judge the quality of their work ; it is the fire of the Judgment, while purgatory precedes Judgment ; in short, it is evidently a figure of speech for the final Judgment.[1] Scripture speaks of the immediate happiness of the dead in Christ, Luke xvi. 22, xxiii. 43 ; 2 Cor. v. 6, 8. Surely ordinary Christians, after a long life of growth in grace, are as fit for heaven as the penitent thief, or as Lazarus in the parable. Besides, unlimited efficacy is ascribed in Scripture to the blood of Christ, Eph. i. 7 ; Heb. x. 14 ; 1 John i. 7. If, indeed, the existence of such a middle state were taught in Scripture, we might say that its cleansing power is derived from the atonement, as we say of the means used in the present state ; but when no such doctrine is taught, we can only regard the state as a work of supererogation. It undertakes to do what there is already ample provision for.

A passage in the Apocrypha (2 Macc. xii. 42–45) intimates a belief of the Jews in forgiveness after death. Dr. Swete says : "This proves, indeed, that the Jews of the Maccabean period believed in remission of sins after death, but not that their tradition was a true one." This is one of a multitude of Jewish notions which the New Testament entirely ignores. Clement of Alexandria speaks of a spiritual fire in the present life. Origen transferred it to the next life ; but he uses the idea to support, not a Roman purgatory, but universalism. Augustine

[1] H. B. Swete, *England* v. *Rome*, p. 80 (Rivingtons).

is indefinite on the subject. Gregory the Great, in the sixth century, was the first to teach purgatory in the full sense. And from his day the doctrine grew in definiteness and influence. In the Middle Ages, no doctrine exerted greater power over Christian thought and life. The frightful abuses of Indulgences grew up in connection with it. Other means of alleviating and shortening the cleansing process, are charity, prayer, and especially Masses for the dead. The fire is generally regarded as corporeal, as well as penal and purifying. From the nature of the doctrine, it must assume a chief place wherever it is received. It was adopted first at the Council of Florence, at which both the Greek and Latin Churches were represented, in 1443, and finally at Trent. To-day, however, the Greek Church rejects the doctrine, while retaining the practice of prayers for the dead. Some Lutheran divines adopt the notion of a semi-purgatory, extending it even to a probation for the wicked (Martensen, Kahnis, Dorner).[1]

Sec. 2.—Christ's Second Coming.

The Second Coming is mentioned in the three creeds. It is often referred to in Scripture, and clearly formed, as preliminary to the Judgment, a more frequent subject of apostolic than it does of modern preaching. It is described as the παρουσία, ἐπιφανεία (2 Thess. ii. 8), ἀποκάλυψις (2 Thess. i. 7 ; 1 Cor. i. 7). The time is, "that day" (Matt. vii. 22), "the great day" (Jude 6), "last day" (John vi. 39), "day of the Lord" (1 Cor. i. 8, v. 5), recalling an Old Testament phrase. See also Acts i. 11, iii. 20, 21 ; Rev. i. 7. The time is secret (Acts i. 7 ; Mark xiii. 32) ; the manner sudden (Matt. xxiv. 27, 39, 44). The destruction of Jerusalem is treated as a preliminary coming (xxiv. 34, 35).

There are several events, spoken of as preceding the Second Advent, which it is not easy to adjust together. St. Paul seems to foretell a general conversion of the Jews, leading to a general conversion of the Gentiles (Rom. xi. 15, 25). And Scripture in

[1] Blunt, *Dict. Theol.*, art. "Purgatory."

many places seems to justify the Christian presentiment which anticipates the conversion of mankind. Yet the same apostle foretells a great apostasy as coming before the Advent, 2 Thess. i. 8, ii. 3, 4. His Man of Sin and Lawless One is evidently St. John's Antichrist (1 John ii. 18, 22, iv. 3). Here we have a critical example of the difficulty of expounding prophecy before the time of fulfilment.

Some have thought that the apostles expected the Second Advent to take place soon, using the supposed mistake as an argument against the doctrine of inspiration. Even some orthodox writers think the evidence too strong to be gainsaid. The evidence is really far from strong. The language of passages like Phil. iv. 5; 1 Pet. iv. 7; 1 John ii. 18, might be used at any time. 2 Thess. ii. 2 expressly warns against the notion "that the day of Christ is at hand." This passage shows that the notion existed among the Thessalonians, as is evident also from 1 Thess. iv. 15–17. But the apostle, so far from sharing, disclaims the view. In the phrase, "we which are alive," the apostle, in his usual vivid style, identifies himself with those who shall be found alive at the Second Coming, and speaks in their name.

Pre-Millenarianism.

Millenarianism or Chiliasm is a certain scheme of the Second Advent. At Christ's coming the just only are raised from the dead; they reign with Christ on earth a thousand years (the binding of Satan); then the wicked are raised, Satan is unloosed, and the Last Judgment takes place. The chief points are the two resurrections and the thousand years' visible reign on earth. The whole theory is taken from Rev. xx. 1–10, and is established if that passage is meant to be taken literally. But is it? All probability is against the notion. The account is part of a description which overflows with highly-wrought symbol and imagery. No one dreams of taking the rest of the description literally; and yet it would be as reasonable to do so as to take this literally. An even stronger objection is, that it

is impossible to fit the two chief points of the theory—the interval between the two resurrections and the visible earthly reign—into the other descriptions of the same events, descriptions which are free from figure and symbol. The references to the subject elsewhere are frequent and full,—John v. 28, 29, vi. 40; Matt. xxv.; 1 Cor. xv.; 2 Cor. v. 9–11; Acts xvii. 31; Rom. ii. 16; 2 Pet. iii. 8–13; 1 Thess. iv. 13–18,—yet they give no suggestion or hint of these important features. St. Paul, indeed, says, "The dead in Christ shall rise first" (1 Thess. iv. 16), but the meaning of the "first" is, before the living are changed.

The theory is of a material cast, and is indeed a recurrence to the temporal views of the Jews and the first disciples. It supposes that spiritual means have failed or only partially succeeded; Christ has at last to rely on an overwhelming manifestation of power, and to overcome all opposition by sheer force. We may well ask, "Having begun in the Spirit, are ye now made perfect in the flesh?" If such means are to be used at all, why not at first? Why allow the long triumph of evil, if it is to be put down at last by sheer power? If the theory has not its root in despair at the slow progress of truth and the slow success of spiritual means, it finds its chief support in such a feeling.

Indeed, historically, it is not improbable that the theory had a Jewish origin. Among its first teachers are writers like Hermas, Barnabas, Papias, who betray strong Jewish leanings. It is found also in Justin, Irenæus, Methodius, Lactantius. It disappeared when Christianity finally triumphed over heathenism. Generally speaking, it flourishes most in days of religious conflict and depression. There was very little of it during the Middle Ages. It revived at the Reformation in Anabaptism, and the Fifth-Monarchy men. Since then, Millenarianism has been advocated in a purer form and on more intelligent grounds by very good men. It characterizes the Evangelical School of the Anglican Church. Bengel, Irving, and many other German and English divines have held or favoured it.[1]

[1] *Christ's Second Coming: will it be Pre-Millennial?* Dr. D. Brown (Clark); Blunt, *Dict. Theol.*, arts. "Millennium," "Second Advent."

Some good remarks on the subject will be found in a special note by Dr. Milligan in Schaff's *Popular Commentary*, p. 488.[1] The points he puts are as follows:—"If we interpret the thousand years literally, it will be a solitary example of a literal use of numbers in the Apocalypse, and this objection alone is fatal." How also will the glorified body of believers fit in with a non-glorified earth? "The great difficulty, however, presented by this view of the millennium, arises from the teaching of Scripture elsewhere upon the points involved in it. We are not entitled to separate between believers and unbelievers, for it cannot be denied that the New Testament always brings the *Parousia* and the general judgment into the closest possible connection. When Christ comes again, it is to perfect the happiness of all his saints, and to make all his enemies his footstool. The idea of masses of the nations continuing to be Christ's enemies for years or ages after he has come, is not only entirely novel, but is at variance with everything we are taught by the other sacred writers upon the point." The "first resurrection" of Rev. xx. is a state, not an act. The word "this" (ver. 5) refers to the whole of the previous description. "The writer is not thinking of any first act of rising in contrast with a second act of the same kind. He is describing the condition of certain persons in comparison with others, after an act of rising, predicable of them both, has taken place." "The thousand years are not a period of time at all. They represent that victory of the Lord over Satan which is shared by his people in him, and they complete the picture of that glorious condition in which believers have all along really been, but which only now reaches its highest point, and is revealed as well as possessed. The saints 'died' when they believed, and entered into a divine life, but are 'hid with Christ in God.' At the manifestation of Christ at his Second Coming, they also are manifested with him in glory."

[1] See also his Baird Lecture, *The Revelation of St. John* (Macmillan).

Sec. 3.—The General Resurrection.

The doctrine is contained in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. There seem to be intimations of it in the Old Testament, Isa. xxvi. 19; Dan. xii. 2; Job xix. 25, doubtful. It is frequently and emphatically taught by Christ and the Apostles, Luke xx. 35–37; John v. 28, 29, vi. 39, xi.; Rom. viii. 11; 1 Cor. vi. 14, xv. The doctrine is peculiar to Christianity, Acts xvii. 18. It distinctiy recognises the body as an integral, permanent part of man's nature. As the instrument of moral good and evil, the body is to share in the final awards. This is only in keeping with the general teaching of Christianity, which gives high honour to the body, Rom. vi. 19, xii. 1; 1 Cor. vi. 15, 19, 20, ix. 27. The Incarnation itself is the highest example of this spirit. The resurrection of "the body" or "the flesh" (as the earliest forms of the Apostles' Creed have the phrase) is not a Scripture expression. Scripture speaks only of the resurrection of the dead; but many passages show that a bodily resurrection is meant.

There have always been two schools of thought in the Church as to the nature of the resurrection body and its relation to the earthly body, one making the identity closer than the other. Origen, an Alexandrian, held a more spiritual view. The Latin Fathers generally made the identity stricter (Jerome, Augustine, Tertullian, Lactantius). Scripture, while teaching the identity, plainly indicates that the change will be considerable, passing our comprehension. All the statements and hints in 1 Cor. xv. point in this direction. The comparison of the seed and grain, the reference to the different kinds of body, the contrast between weakness and power, corruption and incorruption, dishonour and glory, between the natural and spiritual (psychical and pneumatical), the earthly and heavenly, all forbid us to think of an identity in particulars. Our Lord's is clearly the pattern of the new body (Phil. iii. 21). His risen body was the same, for he was at once recognised; and yet it is evident from the narrative that considerable change had taken place. The body undergoes great changes on earth without impairing of identity.

Lutheran divines lay great stress on the glorification of the body, as a pledge and earnest of the glorification of all nature, which they find in Rom. viii. 19–23. The natural interpretation of the words is certainly in their favour, and there are other hints of a great physical transformation, 2 Pet. iii. 11–13; Rev. xxi. 1.[1]

Sec. 4.—The Last Judgment.

The doctrine is found in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, and is exceedingly prominent in the New Testament. In all the descriptions given of the Judgment, it is represented as universal, Matt. xxv. 32; Heb. ix. 27, and yet individual, Rom. ii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 10. The person of the Judge, fitted for his office by divine and human attributes, is specially noted, John v. 22, 27; Acts xvii. 31; Rom. ii. 16. The divine character is the supreme guarantee for the rectitude of the judgment, Gen. xviii. 25. It will be according to men's deserts, Rom. ii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 10. Rom. ii. 12–14 gives a significant glimpse into the rules of the final Judgment. Men's knowledge and opportunity will be strictly regarded. "As many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law." They who sin perish, and the nature of the sin measures the punishment. There are "many stripes" and "few stripes," Luke xii. 47, 48. These Scripture principles afford far more effectual relief in all questionings respecting the future of our fellow-creatures than arbitrary theories of our own.

Sec. 5.—Eternal Life and Death.

(*a*) *Blessedness of the Righteous.*

The chief point to be remembered in respect to the nature of this blessedness, is the continuity of the present with the future

[1] Jackson, *Works*, Bk. xi. chs. xiii.–xvi.; Blunt, *Dict. Theol.*, art. "Resurrection of Body;" Donne, Sermons on Easter-Day, i. 307; South, Serm. xlii. on General Resurrection.

life. The present is to the future as the sowing to the reaping, Gal. vi. 7, 8. As the service is moral, so the reward is moral, Matt. xxv. 21; Rom. ii. 7; 2 Tim. iv. 7, 8; Rev. ii. 10. The future reward is often spoken of comprehensively as life, eternal life; and yet it is certain that this life is already enjoyed, John iii. 36; 1 John v. 11, 12. It can only be, then, a higher degree of all that constitutes religious character and happiness at present. This view is confirmed by another favourite phrase for the heavenly state, "glory" (Heb. ii. 10; Col. iii. 4; John xvii. 24; Rom. v. 2, viii. 18; 2 Cor. iv. 17), which can only mean the sum of moral and spiritual perfection, the perfect development of every capacity, the perfect satisfaction of every desire. The gorgeous imagery of Rev. xxi. needs a spiritual interpretation, which only vision can perfectly give. It is significant that material creation is ransacked for images of beauty and splendour. Yet some of the simple statements of Scripture say even more to the devout heart, for in speaking of spiritual gifts and joys they speak of what is matter of present experience, Ps. xvii. 15; John xiv. 2, 3, xvii. 24; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; Eph. iv. 27; Phil. i. 23, iii. 14; 1 John iii. 2.

> "My knowledge of that life is small,
> The eye of faith is dim;
> But 'tis enough that Christ knows all,
> And I shall be with him."

The perfection is individual, including the bodily (Phil. iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv.) and mental powers (1 Cor. xiii. 12), and social. That is the perfected kingdom of God, the scene of perfect service and perfect rest (Rev. vii. 14–17). Cicero's beautiful anticipation, one of the noblest utterances of the heathen world on the subject, will be more than realized: O præclarum diem, cum in illud divinum animorum concilium cœtumque proficiscar cumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam! Proficiscar enim non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi, verum etiam ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate præstantior; cujus a me corpus est crematum — quod contra decuit ab illo meum — animus vero non me deserens, sed

respectans in ea profecto loca discessit, quo mihi ipsi cernebat esse veniendum: quem ego meum casum fortiter ferre visus sum, non quo æquo animo ferrem, sed me ipse consolabar existimans non longinquum inter nos digressum et discessum fore. Quod si in hoc erro, qui animos hominum immortales esse credam, libenter erro, nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo; sin mortuus, ut quidam minuti philosophi[1] censent, nihil sentiam, non vereor ne hunc errorem meum philosophi mortui irrideant, *De Senect.* xxiii.

(*b*) *Eternal Punishment.*

The question of the duration of future punishment is, for the believer in Scripture, entirely one of interpretation. If we are satisfied on this point, we have no fear that difficulties raised on other grounds will not be removed either now or hereafter. In Matt. xxv. 31–46, Christ is treating expressly and formally on the subject, and he describes the issue of the judgment thus: "These shall go away into eternal[2] punishment: but the righteous unto eternal life." "Eternal punishment" is evidently equivalent to "the eternal fire" of ver. 41. Both the words have been tortured in every possible way to compel them to contradict themselves, but they obstinately refuse to do so; they emerge from every ordeal unchanged.[3] Indeed, every false theory—universalism, annihilationism, future probation—is wrecked on them. No weapon has yet been forged against them which does not bear with equal force against the other words, "eternal life." If it is said that we ought not to stake so tremendous a doctrine on a single passage, we deny that we do so. The natural sense of these words of Christ is borne out by many other passages, interpreted fairly, and by the entire strain of Scripture teaching. More may be said against other

[1] The Epicureans. Bp. Berkeley's *Minute Philosopher.*

[2] See Note at end.

[3] "Punishment" occurs again in 1 John iv. 18, where it would be difficult to translate "pruning, correction, discipline," etc.

passages, and this fact seems to weaken their testimony, but it is only in appearance. They are not as doubtful or ambiguous as is represented; and even if they were, the rule is to interpret the obscure by the plain, not the converse. However, these words of Christ are plain enough. And he knew what he was speaking about. He cared both for God's honour and man's happiness as none else does or can.

In Matt. v. 29, 30, xviii. 8, 9; Mark ix. 43–48, we have the stern sayings respecting the right eye, and hand, and foot. The terms in which the alternative is stated differ somewhat, but the meaning is the same,—"cast into hell, into the eternal fire, into hell fire, into the unquenchable fire, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Whatever amount of figurative expression may be here, the intention plainly is to exclude the idea of termination. The variation of phraseology, too, shows that the expressions are synonymous. "Hell" is explained by the other phrases. On any theory of universalism or annihilation Christ's words are not true, for then there is termination, the fire is not eternal, not unquenchable, the worm does die, the fire is quenched. At the very least, we must say that the language used is needlessly strong and calculated to mislead.

The description of Hades in Luke xvi. agrees with that of the Judgment in Matt. xxv.: "Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed, that they which would pass from hence to you may not be able, and that none may cross over from them to us," ver. 26. The "gulf" is figurative, but the idea it naturally expresses is that of an irrevocable separation, the impossibility of transition from one state to the other. Otherwise, why was it used, what does it express? We should then, again, have to say that Christ's language was too strong, and therefore misleading. This meaning is borne out by the prayer put into Dives' mouth, that a messenger may be sent to those yet living. "For them change is possible, though not for us!" On the theory of universalism, all do "cross over from thence to us," so that there is no gulf fixed; and on the other theory, Dives and the gulf, and the whole class on one side of it, are annihilated,

there is no permanent separation. Then the representation is an untrue one. It has been said that the parable applies to Hades only, not to the state after the Last Judgment. But *à fortiori*, if no change is possible before, none is possible after Judgment. It would be extraordinary to make the latter state more flexible than the former one. How would this square with Matt. xxv.?

A number of other sayings of Christ are of the same kind. He says of the betrayer, "It were good for that man if he had not been born," Matt. xxvi. 24. If less than irremediable ruin had been meant, surely other language would have been used. "Whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea," xviii. 6. In Matt. x. 28, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell," the change from "kill" to "destroy" is not without reason. What can it mean but that the body may be killed but not the soul, that destroying and killing mean different things? In the parallel place (Luke xii. 4) the phrase is simply "cast into hell." To be cast into hell is to be destroyed. Christ says to the unbelieving Jews, "I go my way, and ye shall seek me, and shall die in your sins: whither I go, ye cannot come." If these words do not mean absolute exclusion, what words can? So, Christ's words, "I never knew you, depart from me" (Matt. vii. 23), and "Depart from me, ye cursed" (xxv. 41), are not final on the doctrine of universalism, and they bear a strange meaning on the other theory.

The general strain of Christ's teaching in such parables as those of the Tares, the Net, the Marriage Feast, the Wise and Foolish Virgins, the Talents and Pounds, supports the common and ancient doctrine. That doctrine is their most natural explanation. More or less violence is necessary to make them agree with any other doctrine. It is useless to say that they are parables, and therefore not to be interpreted strictly. Have

they any meaning at all? If so, what is it? Do they, or do they not, teach the lesson of trust abused, opportunity lost, and final exclusion and rejection as the result? If they do, what is the trust or opportunity meant? To refer it to secular trusts and responsibilities would make Christ a teacher of trivial commonplaces, in the style of eighteenth-century essayists. It would be altogether out of keeping with the elevation and grandeur of the rest of his teaching. After the parabolic veil is stripped away, the truth taught is clear enough. In no conceivable way is universalism reconcilable with these parables. The last word of the parables is the rejection and exclusion of some; the last word of universalism is the recovery of all. They do not simply lose all meaning, their obvious meaning is reversed. As to probation after death or annihilation, it can only be said that the parables are silent on the subject, which is condemnation enough. The parables know nothing of them. If we may add these theories, we may add any of the thousand and one theories which the fertility of human fancy has invented. If, indeed, they are to be found elsewhere in the New Testament, we may add them here, but not otherwise; and on this point more will be said.

We refer not only to the general strain of Christ's teaching, but to the general strain of Scripture teaching as evidenced in the doctrine of the urgency of immediate repentance, the absolute evil of sin, the absolute necessity and value of redemption. All the other theories reduce the gravity of these doctrines in a greater or less degree. Anything that weakens the motives against sin, or lowers the value of redemption, is dangerous, and certainly is not in the spirit of Scripture. The Church has always rightly felt that nothing short of an absolute necessity could justify the Incarnation and Atonement. On the doctrine of a general future probation, the hearer may truly say, in answer to God's command to "all men everywhere to repent," "My decision now is not a final one. I may use this life as I choose. The way of return will be just as open to me after death as before. It is only a question of a

longer delay." On the theory of universalism, he has still longer scope and wider licence. He knows that all things are working for his good in the end. He cannot finally perish. As to annihilation, he will probably welcome the thought.

Speaking of those "who obey not the gospel of the Lord Jesus," St. Paul says, "who shall suffer punishment, eternal destruction (ὄλεθρον αἰώνιον) from the face of the Lord." "A testimony to the eternity of future punishment that is not easy to be explained away" (Ellicott). If "destruction" is to be understood literally, as the annihilation theory says, "eternal" is superfluous. "Angels which kept not their own principality, but left their proper habitation, he hath kept in everlasting bonds (δεσμοῖς ἀϊδίοις) under darkness unto the judgment of the great day. Even as Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities about them, having in like manner with these given themselves over to fornication, and gone after strange flesh, are set forth as an example, suffering the punishment of eternal fire" (πυρὸς αἰωνίου), Jude 6, 7. Sodom and Gomorrah mean the people of these places ("giving themselves over," etc.). As their case is compared to that of the angels ("even as"), "everlasting bonds" and "eternal fire" must be equivalent. Compare also "eternal life" (ζωὴν αἰώνιον), ver. 21.

The terms "death" and "destruction" (θάνατος, ἀπώλεια, etc.), used in reference to the future of the wicked, express the same idea of finality, Rom. vi. 23; John iii. 16, 36, etc. The supporters of the annihilation theory understand by these terms a literal death or destruction of the soul; and as this is the main pillar of the theory, we must consider it. Our position is that the words denote a certain moral state or condition over and above mere existence. The meaning of the terms must surely be measured and determined by that of their opposites, "life" and "salvation." There are no words used more frequently than these to express what men receive through faith. "Life" is often thus used alone, John iii. 36, v. 40, vi. 51, 53, x. 10; 1 John v. 12; Rom. viii. 6; 2 Cor. ii. 16, etc. "Salvation" is still more common, Rom. i. 16, etc.

What is it, then, that Christ came to give? What is it men receive when they believe in him? It is not spiritual existence. That they already have. Their souls exist already. Life is more than existence; it is a certain definite kind of existence. What Christ gives to those who believe on him is pardon, the new birth, holiness, adoption, fellowship with God. All these are compendiously summed up as life or salvation. And death and destruction, as the opposite of life and salvation, must mean the absence or loss of these blessings, Phil. i. 28. If life or salvation does not include the gift of bare existence, death or destruction does not include the loss of it. Besides, salvation explains life. When the gift of Christ to man is called by one or the other name indifferently, their meaning is plainly the same. And in the phrase, "eternal life," life must have the same meaning.

Men in a state of sin are described as dead: "You did he quicken, when ye were dead through your trespasses and sins," Eph. ii. 1; Col. ii. 13. Not "ye were doomed to death, or on the way to death, or dying," but "were dead" (ὄντας νεκρούς). Dead "through" sin. The sin itself is not death, but its cause. What then is death but the state of guilt, condemnation, enmity, and separation from God, which is the opposite of the state of reconciliation? Scripture habitually speaks of life as a present possession, of which eternal life is the continuance. Death, too, is a present state. Future death is its continuance. "He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life" (John v. 24). Here, again, death and life are two opposite spiritual states experienced now. "This is life eternal, that they should know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, Jesus Christ" (John xvii. 3). The description refers to the noun "life," which again appears as a moral state or character, apart from mere existence.[1] It may be replied, that even on this

[1] "The definition or description of John xvii. 3 seems to me to give the true, highest meaning of the noun, leaving the adjective with its

interpretation the terms no more exclude the possibility of recovery after death than in this life. Of course the terms themselves do not necessarily exclude it. This must be determined on other testimony. In the present life we have a great scheme of recovery set up and at work, while there is no hint of anything of the kind in the next life.

When, then, it is said that life and death in reference to the soul must include mere existence as well as higher gifts, we reply, here are cases in which they cannot include this. Persons receive the new life who do not receive mere existence, for their souls already exist; and persons are said to be dead, who have not lost existence, for they still exist.

Nothing is more common or more natural than the usage of speech, which raises words from physical to moral meanings. Indeed, we can do nothing else when we want to express spiritual ideas. There is not one of our names for spiritual things which has not a physical basis or origin. The very term "spirit" itself is borrowed from a material thing. To say, "We don't like figures and metaphors; we prefer the literal," is, to say the least, not very thoughtful talk. What of such terms as apprehension, perception, and the like? The fact is that the higher meaning of such words as life and death is as much their real meaning as the lower one. In one connection they bear one, in another the other, sense. Why should there be more difficulty about them than about light and darkness, which are constantly used in Scripture and elsewhere in both ways? Suppose some one to say, "We will not hear of figure and metaphor. It is this sort of interpretation which has darkened (?) Scripture. We are plain, literal people. Wherever light and darkness occur, whatever higher things they may mean, they must include literal light and darkness." The same may be said of cleansing, redemption, and every great spiritual idea. Suppose, when our Lord speaks of the New Birth, we were to insist that this must mean a literal birth of the soul a

received connotation of indefinite duration, raised in this instance at least to that of perpetuity," Plumptre, *Spirits in Prison*, p. 366.

second time. This it must mean, whatever else it may mean. Should we not deserve a sharper rebuke than Nicodemus? And yet this is the kind of argument by which the annihilation theory is supported.

Let us take a few more examples. In Luke xix. 10, Christ says that he came "to seek and to save that which was *lost*" (τὸ ἀπολωλός, allied to the words used for destruction, destroy, perish). So the Jews are "the lost sheep of the house of Israel." In what sense lost, perished, destroyed? Not annihilated, passed out of existence. Lost, destroyed morally and spiritually, as living men may be. We habitually speak of a man as lost who is given up to sin, of a country as lost which has fallen into disorder and bondage, of a fortune as lost which has passed into another's possession. In Luke xv. we read of the lost sheep, and coin, and son. "My son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found" (ver. 24). In all such cases the reason of the usage of language is simple enough. When anything has failed in the end for which it exists, still more when it is perverted to a contrary end, it is lost, destroyed, it has perished.[1] It may continue to exist and act as really as ever, but in respect to the end of its being and the will of its rightful owner it is lost.[2]

It is often said that the acceptance of the teaching of Scripture on Eternal Punishment involves belief in the eternal ruin of heathen millions, and of multitudes who have had no means of Christian knowledge. And nothing so often drives men to

[1] "To what purpose is this waste (ἀπώλεια)?" (Matt. xxvi. 8). The end of the ointment, in the disciples' thoughts, was to be sold, and the proceeds to be devoted to the poor. Its diversion to another end was "destruction" in their judgment.

[2] See essay on "Conditional Immortality," in Dr. Plumptre's *Spirits in Prison*. "I submit as the result of this induction, 1. that there is absolutely no ground for identifying the words 'destroy,' 'perish,' and their cognate forms, as used by the New Testament writers, with the cessation of conscious existence; 2. that as used by them they speak (1) of a state of failure, ruin, frustration, not necessarily irremediable, and (2) of physical death," p. 327. See also 2 Pet. iii. 6, 7.

other theories as this supposition.[1] Yet nothing can be more remote from fact. Scripture speaks of the doom of those who disbelieve and disobey Christ, John iii. 36; 2 Thess. i. 8. Of others it speaks only in general terms. Of others, therefore, we need decide nothing. Responsibility implies knowledge and means of knowledge; indeed, one is the measure of the other. As to those who are cut off from knowledge, we are quite sure that they will be dealt with justly; and we can believe no more, for we are told no more. We have already referred to Rom. ii. 12–15. Let us not suppose that the heathen are innocent beings, incapable of sin. They have both moral knowledge and moral law. They know much, and might know more, Rom. i. 18–23. They sin wilfully. The character and amount of their sin will determine the character and amount of their punishment; and the character and amount of their sin will depend on the opportunities of knowledge within their reach. But this is not the condition of those who form ordinary Christian congregations. We need be in no doubt as to their full responsibility.

When we are confronted with the thought of the eternal existence of sin, the apparent disproportion between sin and its penalties, and the fearful power of finality placed in man's hands, we are far from denying the difficulty. We only recall the fact that they are not the only difficulties. The actual existence of sin, and the enormous misery and suffering it has wrought in human life, are as great mysteries, perhaps greater. But it would be no relief to renounce faith in an infinite mercy and justice and power. The burden of mystery would stand there still, looming as huge and black as ever. The seen is full of mystery. Can we expect the unseen to be perfectly clear? Is there no apparent disproportion between acts and their consequences in this life? The decision, once made, goes on working out its destiny beyond power of recall. And this

[1] Even a Calvinist, Dr. Hodge, says: "We have reason to believe that the lost will bear to the saved no greater proportion than the inmates of a prison do to the mass of a community."

reminds us that the principle of finality is at work in this life in every sphere. Man is constantly obliged to make decisions, which he knows are final. Besides, what reason have we to expect freedom from all mystery in this any more than in other subjects of religious knowledge?

Writers on this question often forget that the law of cause and effect applies as much to the moral world as to the physical. True, moral causes are of a different kind. They act freely, they discriminate and choose between different courses; but they are causes. The evil course chosen, the sinful act done, the consequence is as inevitable as any physical one. We do not say that all moral penalty follows in this manner; but without doubt a great deal does. In the moral world, as elsewhere, God has established certain laws, which have this peculiarity, that they execute themselves, they do not need external aid to ensure the reward and punishment of those who keep and break them. There are doubtless positive penalties as well. It is only just that under a government so intensely personal as God's, there should be such. But the law of cause and consequence is enough to explain all that is essential in Scripture teaching. "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."

Another thing which is often forgotten is the terribly corrupting, degrading power of sin. And yet there is no truth more frequently illustrated in human life. We constantly see the action of sin in destroying all that is fair and noble in human character, in turning men into brutes and demons. And this so rapidly. A few years or months are enough to do the deadly work. Nor need this work stop at death. The sinful principle is still active. When the separation between the righteous and wicked takes place, as Scripture states, when the restraints of goodness and the agencies of grace are withdrawn, where is the restoring power to come from? The mere fact of a special divine interposition in redemption supposes that fallen human nature has no self-restorative power. Human nature, subjected to the action of sin for long years, must be in

a still worse condition. When character is fixed, and that point is visible only to God's eye, hope is possible no longer.[1]

The laws and principles just referred to are no hypothetical abstractions, but governing realities in the present life. The teaching of Scripture on this dread subject is only farther in advance on the same line. We require no arbitrary will or decree of God to explain it. Men make their own character, and character makes destiny. They will only suffer from what they choose. We fail to see the injustice of such a constitution of things. There is much inequality, much injustice, in the present stage of being. But this stage is only preliminary. We look to the future state, to the world's great assize, as the scene of perfect right and perfect justice. Scripture justifies the expectation (Luke xvi. 25), and God will not disappoint the expectation which his hand has implanted deep in our nature, and which his Word warrants.

Other Theories.

These have been considered by anticipation, but a few other remarks on them may be useful.

Probation after death for exceptional classes is a common opinion. But to assert categorically that it is in this particular way that God deals with such classes, is to dogmatize on a question of mode, on which silence were the better wisdom. The character of God and the degrees of destiny are sufficient ground to fall back upon. Could there be a probation for the bad and not for the good? How can we say that one class is fixed, settled in character, and the other not? As for the Scripture evidence, it is very slight. It is impossible to explain why, if probation does cover the future life as well as the present, so much is said about one part and nothing about the other. Even granting, what is by no means certain, that

[1] "The great mystery of religion is not the punishment, but the forgiveness, of sin: not the natural permanence of character, but spiritual regeneration," Westcott.

1 Pet. iii. 18–20 refers to a preaching of Christ in Hades, this makes very little for a doctrine of probation. The doctrine can only be imported into the text by taking Christ's supposed action as a "representative instance" of what is done in other cases.

Universalism has many attractions. Every one would wish all to be saved. No one wishes it as God himself does, 1 Tim. ii. 4. But we are met by facts of Scripture, of human nature and life. Wishes are often a poor guide to truth. We could wish that there had been no sin, no death, no sorrow, no ruined lives and broken hearts. No doubt, if such a passage as Rom. v. 12–21 stood alone, universalism might plausibly be argued from it, but it does not. It is nothing more than a broad outline, which is abundantly supplemented elsewhere. It deals with the divine purpose, which indeed is universal, but which depends for its realization on conditions fixed by God himself. Particular texts, like Col. i. 20, have other meanings.

This theory supposes probation to continue hereafter as in this world. If so, of course it must be for good as well as bad. Only moral means of conversion are admissible. The process must go on until the last human will has been brought to obedience. That such an issue will ever be realized, no one can know independently. Scripture certainly gives a very different account of the future, and its account agrees best with the facts of the present life. The theory quite does away with the finality of the judgment in Matt. xxv., indeed with the Judgment altogether. The picture there drawn may be graphic, but it is the opposite of the truth.

Extreme Universalism rejects the notion of the possibility of any soul being finally lost, for reasons drawn from the divine character. On such a doctrine the work of redemption was quite superfluous. It could only accelerate a result which is certain in any case. Christian (?) Universalism seems to disclaim such high speculative grounds, and to be content with the hope of what will be. Redemption then becomes the means of effecting the result. This doctrine has to confront

the facts of Scripture and human life already referred to, facts which do not greatly favour extreme forms of benevolent optimism. Origen in ancient times held universalism in its widest extent, and he was followed in this respect by Gregory of Nyssa (4th century). In modern times there has been a good deal of latent as well as expressed universalism. In Germany Rothe may be mentioned as an example, in England Maurice.[1]

The Theory of the *Annihilation of the Wicked*, or *Conditional Immortality*, has far less attractiveness. Its views of human nature cannot be pronounced high or noble. Its chief position is the natural mortality of the human soul,—immortality, like the spiritual gifts of pardon and holiness, being conferred only on those who believe in Christ. This it maintains to be the doctrine of Scripture. The principal argument drawn from Scripture, the meaning of the terms death and destruction, has been sufficiently considered. A few other points are worthy of notice.

The idea of man's natural immortality, it is alleged, was imported into Christian thought from Greek philosophy, and is an instance of the corruption of truth due to heathen influence. We know that many early corruptions of belief and practice were importations from heathenism; but if this view of man's nature came from this source, we should not regard it as a corruption. On the contrary, it is distinctly a nobler doctrine. In that case Plato is in advance of Paul. But we altogether doubt the alleged fact, for the simple reason that the Christian certainty of immortality in the New Testament and the early Church is far in advance of heathen opinion. We know that Greek and Roman writers say much that is noble on the subject. Addison indeed says that Plato reasoned well on immortality. But the belief amounted rather to hope and opinion than conviction. The pathetic uncertainty as to the future even of Socrates in his last hours is well known. Cicero tells us that while he was reading Plato his hope of

[1] Blunt, *Dict. Theol.*, art. "Universalism."

immortality burned with a clear, steady light, but directly he closed the book it died away. At the close of the passage quoted on p. 246, he says, "Quod si non sumus immortales futuri, tamen exstingui homini suo tempore optabile est; nam habet natura ut aliarum rerum omnium, sic vivendi modum." How different from these uncertain wishings and guessings the unwavering faith of the Christian Church in man's immortal destiny! To say that heathen philosophy gave the Church this immoveable faith, is to say that it gave what it did not itself possess. The truth is, the common people probably had a firmer conviction than the philosophers. The belief is one of the universal religious ideas of mankind. It is present in some form in every country and every religious system. The speculation of philosophers first breeds scepticism.

According to the advocates of this theory, the extinction of the wicked takes place at the Last Judgment, not at death. In the intermediate period probation continues as at present. The necessity of putting the destruction at the Judgment rather than at death, arises of course from the necessity of providing for the Judgment as described in Scripture. Thus, the wicked are raised from the dead in order to be again destroyed body and soul at once. No doubt different degrees of suffering are admitted in the intermediate period; but as regards the death or destruction itself, which as the sentence of the Judge is the proper penalty of sin, it is the same for all. There is but one and the same penalty for infinite varieties and degrees of guilt.

The Incarnation and Atonement took place for mortal souls! The only difference in this vital respect between men and animals is that the former have a capacity for immortality. This also is the only difference between this theory and the teaching of infidelity and materialism. Barring this capacity, men are animals, only animals. And to such beings we preach God, a divine life, a Christ-like morality! But in doing so we are deprived of the strongest ground of appeal, namely, the fact of an immortal nature and destiny dese-

crated and thrown away. We cannot tell men that an earthly, sinful life is in contradiction to anything which they already are and have. All the motives based on immortality as a fact, on the alternative of immortal bliss or immortal woe, are cut off at a stroke. We tell the wicked that at the worst they cannot be punished beyond a certain term; and if we shorten the term so much, they will shorten it more. They do not throw away immortality, for they never had it. Our forces of appeal are thus immeasurably weakened. Samson shorn of his locks becomes a type of the Christian Church.[1]

Immortality is a natural, not a moral gift. All the other gifts of redemption are moral. Leaving man's nature intact, they alter its quality or character. They make it good, righteous, pure; they fill it with love, truth, holiness, no more. The presence or absence of immortality, on the other hand, is a difference of natural constitution. It may be a question whether mortal and immortal beings are not distinct orders. At all events, the change made in making a mortal being immortal is altogether of a different kind from a moral change, and has no analogy to support it. The improbability of such a change can only be met by very definite statement or conclusive proof.

Referring to this theory, Dr. Plumptre says: "Whatever support that view may derive from a narrow and almost slavish literalism in its interpretation of Scripture, it must be rejected as at variance with the intuitive beliefs which all God's later revelation presupposes, at variance also with the meaning of Scripture when we pass beyond the letter to the truths which it represents."[2]

[Horbery, *Enquiry into the Doctrine of Future Punishment;* Hamilton, *Rewards and Punishments;* M. Randles, *For Ever;* Rev. W. Briscombe, *Hades and Hell;* Plumptre, *The Spirits in Prison;* Rev. W. Reid, *Everlasting Punishment and Modern Speculation;* Dr. Morris, *Is there Salvation after Death?*]

[1] See a noble passage in Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, p. 120.

[2] *Spirits in Prison*, p. 16.

Note on "Eternal."

The adjective *αἰώνιος* is often represented as of utterly indefinite, ambiguous meaning. It is even questioned whether it means duration at all. If it does, it is alleged, it means merely indefinite duration, not necessarily or usually unlimited duration. Certainly it does not mean this or anything, necessarily. Meanings of words are governed much more by usage than derivation. How the temporal sense should be questioned is strange, seeing that the basis of the meaning of *αἰών* is duration.

On the second point, whether the usual meaning is indefinite or unlimited duration, it might be enough to ask, If this is not the New Testament word for eternal, what is? Is it *ἀΐδιος*? This only occurs in two passages, Rom. i. 20 and Jude 6. Will it be pretended that these are the only New Testament passages in which the idea occurs?

We are quite at a loss to discover the grounds for the charge of ambiguity brought against the word. If any one will examine the New Testament usage for himself, instead of trusting to general assertions, he will be in the same perplexity. The term occurs in the New Testament seventy-one times. Of these, in forty-four cases it qualifies "life," where it certainly means "eternal." Or, if it does not, life is never so called. In relation to the present subject, it qualifies "fire" thrice (Matt. xviii. 8, xxv. 41; Jude 7), punishment (Matt. xxv. 46), judgment (Mark iii. 29; Heb. vi. 2), destruction (2 Thess. i. 9). In the other cases it describes "tabernacles" in future state (Luke xvi. 9), redemption (Heb. ix. 12), Spirit (Heb. ix. 14), inheritance (Heb. ix. 15), covenant (Heb. xiii. 20), salvation (Heb. v. 9), kingdom (2 Pet. i. 11), gospel (Rev. xiv. 6), God (Rom. xvi. 26; cf. Septuagint, Gen. xxi. 33), times (Rom. xvi. 25; 1 Tim. i. 9; Tit. i. 2), glory (2 Cor. iv. 17; 2 Tim. ii. 10; 1 Pet. v. 10), unseen things (2 Cor. iv. 18), house in heaven (2 Cor. v. 1), consolation (2 Thess. ii. 16), power

(1 Tim. vi. 16), the restoration of Onesimus to his master (Philem. 15). These are all the cases in the New Testament. Let any one go over them and see what ground there is for the alleged uncertainty in the meaning of the word. What is gained by not translating the word, *i.e.* by using sounds without sense? "Aionian" God, salvation, Spirit, Gospel, glory, kingdom! What does this mean? The passage in Philemon may seem doubtful. But was not Onesimus restored to Philemon for ever? The implicit reference evidently is to the conversion of Onesimus, "whom I have begotten in my bonds," ver. 10. This has established a union that will never cease.

But this is not all the case. In addition to the adjective αἰώνιος, the noun αἰών is used in combination with prepositions sixty-seven times in the New Testament to express the same idea of unlimited duration. The use in doxologies to God is surely conclusive, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας (Rom. i. 25), εἰς πάσας τὰς γενεὰς τοῦ αἰῶνος τῶν αἰώνων (Eph. iii. 21), εἰς πάντας τοὺς αἰῶνας (Jude 25). These sixty-seven instances are all. In all, if eternal duration is not meant, what is? There is no exception. In all questions of meanings of words, the meanings of other forms of the same word are important evidence. If the use of the noun in these phrases confirmed the vague, uncertain meaning alleged, the fact would be felt to be of no mean weight.

We turn to the Old Testament. The adjective is used in the Septuagint eighty-two times, thrice of God (Gen. xxi. 33; Isa. xl. 28, xxvi. 4). It is used of the divine covenant seventeen times, of divine ordinances twenty-one times. If all the cases were given here, as in the New Testament above, it would be found hard to give a reason for assigning a limited duration in most cases. The term is applied to mountains, hills, and "the bars of the earth" (Jonah ii. 6), three times in all. As to the phrase "everlasting hills," it ought not to be made a difficulty. The poetical use of words does not disprove their ordinary use. No one can be under mistake as to what is meant. But, even granting that as used of "covenant, ordinance," and similar

things, eternity in the strict sense cannot be meant, what is the explanation? Plainly, in any case the duration is vast, no end is thought of; or, to put it in another way, the duration is determined by the nature of the subject. We are content with this statement. On the doctrine that the soul is naturally immortal, eternal can only have one meaning in reference to it.

But the far more common method of describing eternity in the Septuagint is the second one mentioned, by *αἰών* and prepositions. In this phraseology the Septuagint copies the Hebrew, which is poor in adjectives. All the great references to eternity are put in this way. The phrase occurs scores and scores of times. It may be worth while to quote a few examples. "From everlasting to everlasting thou art," *ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἕως τοῦ αἰῶνος σὺ εἶ*, Ps. xc. 2. "And live for ever," *καὶ ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, Gen. iii. 22. "I live for ever," *Ζῶ ἐγὼ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, Deut. xxxii. 40. "That inhabiteth eternity," *κατοικῶν τὸν αἰῶνα*, Isa. lvii. 15. *Αἰών* exactly corresponds to the Hebrew *Olam*.

The use of *αἰώνιος* in 2 Cor. iv. 18 is significant: "The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal." If *αἰώνιος* here has no definite temporal meaning, and if the meaning is not eternal, the antithesis is destroyed.

See Dr. Plumptre's essay on "The word Eternal" in *The Spirits in Prison*. His conclusions are—"(1) It is not proved that our Lord excluded duration from the idea of æonian life. (2) In every book of the New Testament, except the writings of St. John, I find this connotation as the obvious and natural meaning of the word æonian. (3) In St. John I find, with Mr. Maurice and Dr. Westcott, the effort to make men realize the thought that the eternal life, being eternal, exists in the present, has existed always in the past. (4) Æonian *death* is not found in Scripture. (5) I find it impossible to conceive of life, either human or divine, apart from the idea of duration."

INDEX.

Abelard, 149.
Acceptilatio, 149.
Adoptianism, 126.
African School, 10.
Agnosticism, 34.
Alexandrian School, 10.
Anglican Doctrine, 13; Rule of Faith, 62; Original Sin, 105; Satisfaction, 145; Predestination, 165; Justification, 171; Holiness, 191; Church, 199; Sacraments, 238; Baptism, 240; Lord's Supper, 252.
Annihilationism, 275.
Anselm, 28, 144, 180.
Antiochian School, 10.
Apocrypha, 57, 255.
Apollinarianism, 124.
Apostles' Creed, 11, 89.
Apostolic Fathers, 58, 144.
Aquinas, 15, 127, 144.
Arianism, 9, 82, 109, 128.
Arminianism, 9, 103, 169.
Athanasian Creed, 11.
Athanasius, 10, 157.
Augustine, 11, 25, 73, 76, 90, 99, 102, 127, 161, 163, 164, 178, 193.

Baptism, 225; Mode, 231; Infant, 230; Dogma, 239.
Baptismal Regeneration, 227.
Baur, 44, 96.
Bellarmin, 63, 104, 167, 177, 180, 247.
Binnie, Dr., 215.
Blunt, 11, 15, etc.
Brentz, 130.
Bruce, Dr., 119, 132, 138, 147, 148, 152, 153.
Burton, Dr., 81.
Bushnell, 137, 152.
Butler, 26.

Calvin, 16, 250.
Calvinism, 153, 165, 169, 179, 194.
Campbell, M'Leod, 154.
Candlish, Dr., 239.
Canon, Muratorian, 60.
Carthage, Synod of, 56, 102.
Chalcedon Creed, 125.
Chemnitz, 130.
Chrysostom, 10.
Cicero, 26, 92, 262.
Circumcision, 224, 230.
Clarke, Samuel, 28.
Clement Alex., 10.
Communicatio Idiomatum, 129, 249.
Concursus, 93.
Congregationalism, 200.
Conscience, 26.
Constantinople, Council, 11, 86, 124, 126.
Consubstantiation, 129.
Cosmological Argument, 20.
Council, General, 11.
Cramp, 13.
Crawford, Dr., 147.
Creationism, 91.
Culverwel, 196.
Cyprian, 11, 218.
Cyril, Alex., 125.

Damascus, John of, 15, 120.
Deacons, 219.
Demonstrative Truth, 5.
Division of East and West, 12.
Doctrine and Dogma, 3, 80.
Dorner, 6, 127, 147, etc.
Dualism, 95.
Duncan, Dr., 77, 125, 161.
Duns Scotus, 149.

Edwards, Jonathan, 154.

Ellicott, 112.
Ephesus, Council, 102.
Episcopalianism, 200.
Erigena, 14.
Eusebius, 61.
Eutychianism, 125, 129, 132.
Evans, Canon, 171, 208.
Evidences, 6, 37.
Evolution, 89.
Ex opere operato, 236.

Farrar, A. S., 15.
Filioque Clause, 11, 12, 86.
Finitude, Theory of, 96.
Flesh and Spirit, 97.
Flint, Dr., 24, 27.
Frankfort Council, 11, 126.

Generation, Eternal, 83.
Gifford, Dr., 110, 198.
Gravenhurst, 23.
Gregory, Great, 150.
Gregory, Nyssa, 149.
Grotius, 159.

Hades, 253.
Hodge, Dr., 1, 16, 50.
Homoousios, 82.
Hooker, 84, 86, 107, 120, 204, 211, 217, 244.
Hume, 20, 41.

Immanence, 92.
Imputed Righteousness, 174.
Infralapsarianism, 161.
Inspiration, 54.
Intuition, 5, 18.
Irenæus, 61, 123, 150.

Jackson, Dean, 65, 68, 118, 178, 202, 205, 250.
Justification — Nature, 169; Condition, 176.
Justin Martyr, 59, 61.

Kant, 26.
Kenotism, 130.
Ker, Dr., 120.

Lecky, 40
Lee, Dr., 50.
Lightfoot, Bishop, 112, 212, 213, 217.
Lombard, Peter, 120, 168.
Lord's Day, 221.
Luthardt, 30.
Luther, 103, 239.
Lutheranism, 13; Original Sin, 105; Christology, 129; Sacraments, 237; Baptism, 239; Eucharist, 248.

M'Cosh, 27.
Macedonians, 86.
Magee, 147.
Manichæism, 89, 96, 104.
Martensen, 16, 71, 127, 184.
Materialism, 32.
Maurice, 153.
Menken. 153.
Merit, 177.
Methodist Doctrine, 13; Original Sin, 103; Repentance, 166; Justification, 171; Holiness, 188; Assurance, 195.
Miracles, 39.
Monophysitism, 126.
Monothelitism, 126.
Moral Argument, 25.
Mozley, Dr., 7, 67, 189, 193.
Mysticism, 14.

Nestorianism, 124.
Newman, Cardinal, 67.
Nicene Creed, 11, 82, 86, 89, 126.
Nominalism, 70.
Norris, Canon, 127, 157.

Offices, Three, 134.
Ontological Argument, 27.
Origen, 10, 81, 83, 89, 91, 173, 255.
Owen, Dr., 7, 76, 87, 114, 120, 123, 129, 137, 140, 144, 150, 176.
Oxenham, Mr., 147, 156.

Pantheism, 30, 89.
Papias, 59.
Passover, 224, 233.
Pearson, Bp., 19, 83, 84, 206.
Pelagianism, 8, 102, 163.
Peshito, 60.
Plumptre, Dr., 268, 270, 277, 280.
Pope, Dr., 1, 16, 19, 49, 86, 95, 105, 126, 178, 181, 182, 192, 194, 241, 249.
Positivism, 34.
Powell, 213.
Predestinarianism, 8, 161, 165.
Pre-existence of Souls, 91.
Presbyterianism, 200.
Presbyters, 215.
Prevenient Grace, 163.
Probable Truth, 5.
Probation, Future, 273.

Procession, Eternal, 85.
Prophecy, 44.

Quenstedt, 93.

Rationalism, 14.
Reatus culpæ and pœnæ, 95.
Remonstrant Confession, 238, 257.
Renan, 43.
Resurrection of Christ, 42.
Rigg, Dr., 151, 154.
Ritschl, 143, 153.
Robertson, F. W., 143, 155.
Rogers, H., 46.
Roman Doctrine, 13; Tradition, 62; Original Sin, 104; Justification, 170; Faith, 167; Holiness, 194; Sacraments, 236; Baptism, 239; Eucharist, 241; Sacrifice of Mass, 246; other Sacraments, 252.
Rothe, 82.
Row, Preb., 46–48.
Rupert of Deutz, 127, 154.

Sabellianism, 81, 109.
Saumur School, 96.
Schaff's Comm., 228, 234, 259.
Schism and Heresy, 207.
Schleiermacher, 82, 153.
Semi-Pelagianism, 103.
Sensuous Theory, 96.
Socinianism, 128, 152.
Socinus, 128.
Sophocles, 26.
Spinoza, 31.
Standards of Doctrine, 12.
Supralapsarianism, 162
Swete, Dr., 255.

Teaching of Apostles, 210, 245.
Teleological Argument, 23.
Tertullian, 11, 81, 83, 92.
Theodore, 10.
Theophanies, 78.
Thomasius, 135, 136, 158, 159, 173, 203.
Traducianism, 91.
Transcendence, 92.
Trench, Dr., 117, 122, 139, 141, 212.
Trent, Council, 62, 64, 144, 170, 177, 237, 239, 241, 245.
Trinitarian Terms, 87.

Universalism, 274.

Visible and Invisible Church, 209.

Wardlaw, Dr., 159.
Watson, R., 16, 182.
Weiss, Dr., 136.
Wesley, 101, 166, 169, 171, 175, 181, 186–192, 196, 228.
Westcott, Dr., 109, 113, 114, 115, 121, 131, 182, 184, 273.
Westminster Confession, 62, 85, 240.

Young, Dr., 196.

Zwingle, 238, 249.

MORRISON AND GIBB, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.

Pantheism - is the doctrine or system that the universe is God

Polytheism is the doctrine of a plurality of Gods

Monotheism - the belief of one God only

Apollinarianism - denied to Christ a human spirit, allowing to His human nature only a body & an animal soul

Arian - one who denies the proper Deity of Christ

Sabellianism - maintains that there is only one person in the Godhead & that the trinity was only one of function & manifestation

Tritheism construes the belief in the Trinity into a belief in Three Gods


230.02
~~B218m~~
B226m

75-850

Banks, John S
A manual of Christian doctrine

DATE DUE			
APR 1 2 1983			

THE MASTER'S COLLEGE
POWELL LIBRARY
SANTA CLARITA, CA 91321



230.02
[redacted]

75-850 ✓

THE MASTER'S COLLEGE
230.02 B226m MAIN
Gwynne, Walker/Manual of Christian doctr
3 3540 00100 4288